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Recent scholarship has increasingly recognized the unity of Herman Bavinck’s 
(1854-1921) thought, shedding the once-predominant reading that Bavinck was a 
conflicted thinker caught between modernity and orthodoxy. There were ‘two 
Bavincks’, the secondary literature claimed. The catalyst of unity for Bavinck’s thinking 
is located in his deployment of organic language to characterize particular theological 
loci. The organic motif stems from Bavinck’s Trinitarian doctrine of God, according to 
which God exists as the archetypal and self-existent Three-in-One. Creation, then, is an 
ectypal reflection of the triune Godhead, and as such can be described as an organism 
comprising of many unities-in-diversities. This new reading, propelled by James 
Eglinton, argued that for Bavinck the Trinity ad intra leads to an organic cosmology ad 
extra. Though this reading has showcased the unity of Bavinck’s thought in general, 
current scholarship on Bavinck’s theological epistemology remains fractured along the 
lines of the ‘two Bavinck’ thesis, with two sides that emphasize, respectively, the 
modern strand of Bavinck’s thinking or his classical, orthodox, side. This thesis re-
investigates the primary texts in which Bavinck discusses epistemology and argues that 
the organic motif is also the lens through which his epistemology is to be read. In doing 
so, this thesis argues that the organic motif allowed Bavinck to utilize both classical 
(Thomistic) and post-Kantian sources in a way that produces coherence rather than 
inconsistency. Thus, it is unnecessary to pit Bavinck’s use of classical sources against his 
use of modern sources: particular deployment is not systematic endorsement.  
The thesis, then, is that a Trinitarian doctrine of God ad intra produces not 
merely an organic cosmology ad extra, but also an organic epistemology. It then proceeds to 
demonstrate this in two ways. First, the thesis observes that Bavinck characterizes the 
sciences (wetenschappen) as a single organism made up of a unity-in-diversity. The 
specialization and divisions of the sciences mean that each field has its own sphere of 
existence with unique grounds and methodologies, but there is an underlying theological 
unity between them that relativizes that diversity precisely because all of the sciences are 
theological. Second, for Bavinck subjective knowledge can organically correspond with 
objects because both participate in a larger, organic universe. Mental representations 
connect with the world because all of creation is primordially interconnected by way of 
God’s organic design. In each of these steps Bavinck’s eclectic use of sources and 
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overall creativity and unity are displayed. This thesis also relates his discussion both to 
his interlocutors and contemporary philosophical and analytic epistemology. Hence, this 
thesis not only demonstrates the overall coherence of Bavinck’s thought, thereby 
further eradicating ill-conceived notions of there being ‘two-Bavincks’, but also 
showcases potentially generative insights concerning the place of theology within the 






























 This thesis examines the role Christian theology might play within the pursuit of 
academic scholarship and in the act of knowing (the study of epistemology). Does 
theology belong within the academy or the church? How do Christian teachings – on 
God, revelation, and humanity – contribute to the activity of knowing? To answer these 
questions, this thesis explores the contribution of Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) – a 
Dutch theologian working from within the neo-Calvinist tradition (a branch of 
Protestantism that emerged in the Netherlands, which emphasized the universal 
significance of Christian doctrine for every area of life). He wrote at the heels of the 
European debates in the 19th-20th century concerning theology’s place in the academy, 
and argued against the increasingly mainstream view that questioned the legitimacy of 
theology as an academic discipline.  
Though rooted in historic Christian teachings, Bavinck’s argument remains fresh 
and provocative. He argued that because the universe was created by the God as 
described in Christian thought as the Trinity (One God in three Persons: Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit, and thus a God who is absolute unity-in-diversity) knowledge of the 
universe can be characterized as a singular organism. When the cosmos is encountered, 
one can see that knowledge of that cosmos has a singular ground and theological unity, 
though there are many fields and divisions of knowledge to be explored. Similarly, as 
creation is composed of unities-in-diversities, creation reflects God’s being. In light of 
this, knowers are seen as primordially connected to the objects under study, such that 
knowledge of reality is both a possibility and a requirement to be enjoyed.  
This thesis explores these answers as provided by Bavinck. Bavinck did not 
merely echo the claims of the Christian traditions on which he stood. He also sought to 
draw from very modern insights in order to argue for the legitimacy of theology as an 
academic discipline in an increasingly sceptical and fragmented intellectual environment. 
In so doing, this thesis advances both a plausible new way of addressing perennially 
important issues in the theory of knowledge (epistemology), and a new interpretation of 
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Chapter 1: Re-Reading Bavinck’s Theological Epistemology 
Christianity, Christian-theism has first laid the foundation and paved the way for this organic 
unity of science…1 
 
If [a unified worldview] is possible, it can only be explained from the fact that the world is an 
organism and thus has first been thought of in such a manner. Only then do philosophy and 
worldview have a right and ground of existence, if subject and object also harmonize on this pinnacle 
of knowledge…2 
 
On 1 May 1903, the Friesche Kerkbode, a Christian newspaper based in Friesland, 
printed a summary of a lecture that Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) delivered at a 
theological conference there on Thursday, 30th of April of the same year. This lecture 
took place a year before the publication of Bavinck’s Christelijke wetenschap and was on 
the same subject. Bavinck’s theses in the lecture discussed the difference between 
positivistic (modern) and Christian views of science, and how Christianity can help the 
academic disciplines flourish.3 After remarking that Bavinck’s lecture exposed the false 
assumptions underlying the opposition against Christian scholarship, the journalist 
wrote that Bavinck called for the indispensability of Christianity for scientific practice. 
The article ended with an encouragement to its readers:  
 
Therefore it is more necessary than ever for science to become practiced and taught 
in Christ, the spirit, to the support of the church, the blessing of society, the sanctity 
of the fatherland, the extension of God’s kingdom, [and] the glory of his name. A 
																																																						
1 Herman Bavinck, ‘Christendom en Natuurwetenschap’ in Kennis en leven: Opstellen 
en artikelen uit vroegere jaren, C. B. Bavinck (ed.) (Kampen: Kok, 1922), p. 202. Dutch 
original: ‘Het Christendom, het Christelijk Theisme heeft eerst den grond gelegd en den 
weg gebaand voor deze organische eenheid der wetenschap’. Unless otherwise noted, 
translations are my own. 
2 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (Kampen: Kok, 1929), pp. 32-3. Dutch 
original: ‘Indien deze mogelijk is, dan kan dit alleen daaruit verklaard worden, dat de 
wereld een organisme is en dus eerst als zoodanig is gedacht. Dan alleen heeft 
philosophie en wereldbeschouwing recht en grond van bestaan, als ook op dit 
hoogtepunt der kennis subject en object samenstemmen’.  
3 Herman Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap (Kampen: Kok, 1904).  
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high, sacred, delightful ideal desires us. May it inspire us all with courage and gird 
[us] with strength. It is a dedication and effort worth all of our strength.4  
 
The lecture prompted an intense enthusiastic response in the audience and the 
Christian commentator present there. But what, exactly, did Bavinck mean by this? 
What kind of resources would Christianity provide that might nurture the flourishing of 
the sciences?  
The concern here is broader than the usual connotations that attend the English 
word ‘science’ – wetenschap refers not merely to matters of the empirical hard sciences 
but also to all higher learning and fields of knowledge in general. As such, it 
corresponds closely to the German Wissenschaft.5 In this context, Herman Bavinck 
insisted on the Medieval dictum that theology remains the queen of the sciences, 
though, as this study will show, he did this while considerably redefining the meaning of 
that queenship. In what sense, then, can he re-assert theology’s priority in the academy 
in this modern context? Is its material content to be siphoned off into its own sphere in 
distinction from the other sciences, or does it govern in such a way that it plays an 
influential role, reshaping how the other sciences are viewed? Bavinck’s context 
amplifies the significance of his answers to these questions. Following the heels of the 
German debates concerning theology’s place in the academy, and after the 1876 Higher 
Education Act in the Netherlands that significantly altered the character of theological 
and religious studies in an attempt to accommodate both modernist and traditionalist 
conceptions of the role of theology in higher education, Bavinck wrestled with these 
issues with acute urgency.6  
																																																						
4 The author’s name is only initialed as K. Jr., in the Friesche Kerkbode, 1 May, 1903, 
issue 809. Dutch original: ‘Daarom is het meer dan ooit noodzakelijk, dat de wetenschap 
beoefend en onderwezen worde in Christ, geest, tot steun voor de kerk, tot zegen van 
de maatschappij, tot heil van het vaderland tot uitbreiding van Gods rijk, tot eere van 
zijn naam. Een hoog, heilig, heerlijk ideaal wenkt ons. Moge het ons allen bezielen met 
moed en aangorden met kracht. Het is de inspanning en toewijding van alle onze 
krachten waard’.  
Bavinck delivered a lecture on the same points earlier that year in Utrecht on 
Thursday, 19 March, 1903, as recorded on pages 83 and 84 of Minerva: Algemeen 
Nederlandsch Studenten Weekblad, 26 March, 1903. Both of these items are archived at the 
Free University of Amsterdam under inventory number 353.  
5 Unless otherwise noted, I have the sense of wetenschap in mind when ‘science’ is 
used.  
6 See especially his speech in parliament which addresses the issue: Verslag der 
Handelingen van de Eerste Kamer, 12 Maart 1913, pp. 432-3. Cf. Jan Bank and Maarten van 
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The subject matter of this study consists in examining the meaning of his response 
to this situation – his characterization of science and knowledge as a ‘single organism’ 
and the concomitant claim that the placement of theology into a purely ecclesial sphere 
is to compromise the ‘organism of science’ (organisme der wetenschap). 
 This is amplified clearly in his parliament speech that addressed the 1876 Higher 
Education Act, which connected the Act to the views of Utrecht University professor 
Cornelis Opzoomer (1821-92). Bavinck argued that a few decades earlier, Opzoomer 
had posited an entailment relationship between ‘the principle of the separation between 
Church and State’ and the consequence that the ‘theological faculty must be removed 
from the organism of science’ that existed in the Universities.7 Opzoomer’s argument to 
locate theology within the church rather than the academy was, to Bavinck, a splitting of 
a singular organism – it fails to do justice to the character of theology and the sciences 
as a whole.  
In his perspective, the 1876 Act is the embodiment of the result of a series of 
modern movements that questioned the scientific (wetenschappelijke) character of theology 
and its relation to the others sciences. Propelled by the strict distinction erected by 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) between a knowledge that is ‘limited to the circle of 
experience’ and a faith that rests on ‘personal, practical motives’, dogmatics became 
gradually understood as the formal articulation of subjective mental states rather than a 
																																																																																																																																																										
Buuren, Dutch Culture in a European Perspective, vol. 3: 1900: The Age of Bourgeois Culture, 
Lynne Richards and John Rudge (trans.), (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 
311-335. Johannes Zachhuber, Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany: From F.C. 
Baur to Ernst Troeltsch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Bavinck was clearly 
aware of the German discussions and their influence on his own Dutch context, see 
especially his speech in parliament which addresses the issue: Verslag der Handelingen van 
de Eerste Kamer, 12 Maart 1913, p. 433; see James Eglinton and Michael Bräutigam, 
‘Scientific Theology? Herman Bavinck and Adolf Schlatter on the Place of Theology in 
the University,’ Journal of Reformed Theology 7 (2013): pp. 27-50.  
7 Bavinck, Verslag der Handelingen, pp. 432-3. Dutch original: ‘Immers het lijdt geen 
twijfel, dat de theologische faculteit in het jaar 1876 is omgezet in een faculteit van 
godsdienstwetenschap. Het is met de regeling van de zaken der theologische faculteit in 
de vorige eeuw zeer eigenaardig toegegaan. Sedert de hoogleraar Opzoomer in 1848 het 
denkbeeld uitte, dat het beginsel van scheiding van Kerk en Staat ook medebracht de 
consequentie, dat de theologische faculteit uit het organisme der wetenschap verwijderd 
moest worden, en dat de opleiding van geestelijken in het algemeen aan de Kerken zelf 
moest worden toevertrouwd, heeft dit denkbeeld in steeds ruimer kring ingang 
gevonden.’ 
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proper scientific study.8 Under the pressures of these intellectual shifts, theologians who 
followed Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1768-1834) lead in seeking to justify theology’s 
place within the academy at times posed an opposition between Wissenschaft and 
confessionalism, by arguing that the role of the theologian was concerned not with 
normative truths for all ages but ‘with the interconnection of whatever doctrine has 
currency in a given social organization called a Christian church at a given time’.9 Within 
this trajectory, too, others sought a mediating theology (Vermittelungstheologie) that 
attempted to fuse traditional Christian doctrines with the demands of the new 
Weltanschauung. The result of this was a ‘tendency to replace all transcendent-
metaphysical statements about God, his essence and attributes, his words and works, 
with descriptions of Christian experience and its content’.10 
By 1876 in the Netherlands, the place of dogmatics and theological reflection in the 
academy was then also reshaped. Religious studies, as the science of religion, would be 
included in the Universities as an objective study that examines the phenomenon of 
religions whereas the ‘dogmatic and practical disciplines’, Bavinck observed, ‘would be 
taught under the auspices of the church’.11  
 
I. Preliminary Observations: Orthodox and Modern 
 
Herman Bavinck stood on the grounds of Reformed orthodoxy in response to these 
perceived challenges.12 Bavinck challenged the charges against the orthodoxy of the 
																																																						
8 Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, Prolegomena, John Bolt (ed.), John 
Vriend (trans.) (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), p. 233. Hereafter, RD. 
Where most relevant, I draw the original texts from Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek, 3rd edn., 4 vols. (Kampen: Kok, 1918). Hereafter GD. The third to fifth 
editions are identical, except for pagination. 
9 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith: A New Translation and Critical Edition, 
Catherine L. Kelsey, Terrence N. Tice (eds.)  Terrence N. Tice, Catherine L. Kelsey, 
Edwina Lawler, (trans.) (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2016), §19. Cf. Bavinck, 
RD, 1: p. 48; Thomas Albert Howard, Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern 
German University (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 131.  
10 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 48.  
11 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 49. Arie van Deursen included the act as one of the 
impetuses for the creation of the Free University of Amsterdam in The Distinctive 
Character of the Free University in Amsterdam, 1880-2005: A Commemorative History, Herbert 
Donald Morton (trans.), (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), p. 6.  
12 Cf. Een Leidse Vriendschap: Brieven van Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje aan Herman 
Bavinck, George Harinck and J. Bruijn (eds.) (Baarn: Ten Have, 1999), 100. Writing to 
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post-Reformation period that came from modern theologians, which tended to report 
that Reformed scholasticism presented an arid form of rationalistic inquiry in their claim 
that a systematic knowledge of God was attainable.13 In this sense, Bavinck’s thought 
could be used to support some current trajectories that argue for the continuity that 
exists between the post-Reformation scholastics and the Reformers themselves.14 The 
distinctive literary styles that often are noted to distinguish Calvin from the divines that 
came after him do not prove so much a difference of substance but a transition from a 
time of pioneering to confessionalization according to the needs of Reformation 
theology in the academies. Bavinck understood that the Reformation was rooted in the 
medieval theology and that it drew from that heritage in a critical manner. He effectively 
resisted theologically motivated caricatures that introduce false binaries, for example, 
between being scholastic/biblical, or between Trinitarianism/federalism into readings of 
Reformed scholasticism.  
Indeed, his response to the intellectual currents that opposed the scientific character 
of theology is fundamentally attuned to these classical instincts. In particular, Bavinck 
insisted on two axiomatic principles: that God’s revelation means that theology remains 
scientific, and that theology can and should be related to other academic disciplines. 
This involved recovering the classical conviction that dogmatics must attend to the 
metaphysical implications of Scriptural revelation while obeying the obligation to relate 
																																																																																																																																																										
his friend Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, Bavinck expressed that he remained committed 
to Reformed theology, despite having completed his education at Leiden University.  
13 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 83-4.  
14 Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of 
Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003); 
Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1986); The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the 
Foundation of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); After Calvin: 
Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Calvin and the Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of Salvation (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012); Willem J. Van Asselt, T. Theo J. Pleizier, Pieter L. 
Rouwendal, and Maarten Wisse, Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism  (Grand Rapids: 
Reformation Heritage Books, 2011); Herman Selderhuis, ed., A Companion to Reformed 
Orthodoxy (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Maarten Wisse, Marcel Sarot and Willemien Otten, eds., 
Scholasticism Reformed: Essays in Honor of Willem J. Van Asselt (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Willem 
J. Van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, Dolf te Velde eds.,Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of 
Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010); Carl 
R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark, eds., Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment 
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999); David Steinmetz, Calvin in Context (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,1995).  
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all things back to their creator. ‘A choice has to be made’, he wrote. ‘[E]ither there is 
room in science for metaphysics and then positivism is in principle false, or positivism is 
the true view of science and metaphysics must be radically banished from its entire 
domain’.15 ‘Theology as a particular science’, after all, ‘assumes that God has 
unmistakably revealed himself’.16 Insofar as a positivistic and modern definition of 
science precluded this conviction one must simply make a choice between two 
antithetical definitions of science.17 Echoing a classical and Thomistic axiom, Bavinck 
affirmed that ‘dogmatics is the knowledge that God has revealed in his Word to the 
church concerning himself and all creatures as they stand in relation to him’.18  
Likewise, to excise the study of theology from the academy in order to relocate it 
strictly within the church, is not to be considered an honour or service to theology itself. 
‘Scripture’ remains ‘a book for the whole of humankind and has meaning for all of 
human life’19 and thus dogmaticians, too, have a responsibility to tease out the riches of 
divine wisdom in relation to the ‘world of science [erve der wetenschap].20 The relocation of 
dogmatics into a separate sphere would be to the detriment of both science and 
practice, rather than an improvement of both.21  
Yet it would be a mistake to draw the conclusion from this that Bavinck sought a 
mere return to the orthodoxy that once was in an act of retreat. John Bolt’s observation 
that Bavinck’s serious interaction with modern philosophy is a ‘hallmark of his 
exemplary work’ remains apt.22 Indeed, Bavinck’s desire to set up an orthodox 
alternative to the intellectual challenges in his day preserved an understanding of the 
nuanced reciprocation that existed between modernity and orthodoxy. Despite all of the 
antithetical emphases of the modern intellectual currents, Bavinck still sought to 
appreciate its unique contributions and to highlight modernity’s dependence upon the 
Christian milieu from which it came. ‘Just as modern theology, in general, thinks and 
																																																						
15 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 37.  
16 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 37-8.  
17 Herman Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 9. 
18 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 38.  
19 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 46.  
20 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 46; GD, 1: p. 26. Erve is a rather uncommon word and is a 
shortening of the word erfgoed, which could mean ‘inheritance’. In that sense, Bavinck’s 
meaning here can refer not merely to the sphere or environment of science, but also to 
all that we’ve received and learned from it. 
21 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 51.  
22 John Bolt, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in RD, 1: p. 14.  
	 16 
lives out of the Christian tradition much more than its practicioners themselves 
suppose, so is orthodoxy also—unless it entirely shut itself off from the environment—
in [a] stronger or weaker degree under the influence of the spiritual currents of this 
century’.23 Bavinck made a similar judgment a few years earlier in his 1908 Stone 
lectures: ‘More than this, all our modern civilization, art, science, literature, ethics, 
jurisprudence, society, state, politics, are leavened by religious, Christian, 
supranaturalistic elements, and still rest on the foundation of the old world-view’.24 
Christians, therefore, cannot afford to adopt a stance of complete opposition to 
modernism, and this is so for at least two reasons. First, it would naively assume that 
one is not already influenced by the dominant worldviews present in the contemporary 
culture. Second, one might miss the opportunity to showcase how Christian theism 
produced the ideals that modernity took for granted, such that, to the extent that it 
denies orthodox Christianity it denies the very grounds on which it stands. Paul Tillich 
advocates the same kind of principle when he said this a few decades later: ‘All theology 
of today is dependent in some way on the classical systems of orthodoxy’.25 
There is, then, no desire in Bavinck to ‘repristinate’ the older conditions or to 
retrieve a ‘dead conservatism’.26 His appreciation of Reformed orthodoxy itself is not 
uncritical, as he would often note areas of disagreement with it.27 It was of critical 
importance to him that dogmatics seeks development from generation to generation. To 
be sure, Bavinck’s tendency to appreciate his contemporary intellectual scene is not 
sourced by a positive endorsement of Enlightenment philosophy, according to which a 
																																																						
23 Bavinck, Modernisme en Orthodoxie: Rede Gehouden bij de overdracht van het rectoraat aan de Vrije 
Universiteit op 20 oktober 1911 (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1911), p. 15. Dutch original: ‘Trouwens, niemand, 
die meeleeft met zijn tijd, kan in elk opzicht tegen al het moderne gekant zijn. Zooals de 
moderne theologie over het algemeen nog veel sterker uit de Christelijke traditie denkt 
en leeft dan zij zelve vermoedt, zoo staat ook de orthodoxie, tenzij zij zich geheel van 
hare omgeving afsluit, in zwakker of sterker mate onder den invloed van de 
geestesstroomingen dezer eeuw.’ 
24 Herman Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation (New York: Longman, Green & co., 
1909), p. 18. Bavinck expresses this same reasoning in a lecture (in English) on realism 
in art. The manuscript could be found in the Free University Bavinck Archive no. 346, 
box 19, folder 213, no date, 'Realism (nature) in de kunst’.  
25 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, Carl Braaten (ed.), (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1968), p. 277. 
26 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Future of Calvinism’, The Presbyterian and Reformed Review 
5 (1894): p. 13.  
27 For example: Herman Bavinck, The Certainty of Faith, Harry der Nederlanden 
(trans.), (Ontario: Paideia Press, 1980), p. 41; Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 78 
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disdain for the past is incubated along with an optimism placed on rational autonomy.28 
Rather, it is the desire to garner new insights generated by a reflection on the 
contemporary intellectual milieu while standing on the grounds of the great traditions of 
the ancient, medieval, and reformed divines. In the 1895 foreword to the Dogmatics, he 
would argue that an aim to bring dogmatics forward by conversing with the present is 
implied in the very definition of Reformed catholicity: ‘to cherish the ancient simply 
because it is ancient’, he wrote, ‘is neither Reformed nor Christian. A work of dogmatic 
theology should not simply describe what was true and valid but what abides as true and 
valid. It is rooted in the past but labors for the future’.29 The result of this is a self-
consciously irenic and eclectic approach – not as a tautological claim concerning the fact 
that all thinkers are necessarily unique30 – but a self-conscious modus operandi grounded 
upon principled theological claims concerning the character of Christianity and the 
catholic scope of her witness.31 Again: ‘[Theology] is not per se hostile to any 
philosophical system and does not, a priori and without criticism, give priority to the 
philosophy of Plato or of Kant, or vice versa.’32 These convictions stem from the neo-
Calvinistic tinge to Bavinck’s theology, as he considered Calvinism to be more 
encompassing than the predicate ‘Reformed’ – in Calvinism there is a fecund power too 
momentous to be confined to the sphere of religion. The ‘Calvinistic principle’, he 
wrote, ‘is too universal and accordingly too rich and fruitful’ – it is generative not merely 
																																																						
28 Cf. Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ in 
Kant: Political Writings, H.S. Reiss (ed.), H. B. Nisbet (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 54.  
29 Herman Bavinck, 'Foreword to the First Edition (volume 1) of the Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek', Calvin Theological Journal 45, trans. John Bolt (2010), p. 10. 
30 ‘For all theologians are “eclectic”. None simply repristinates the thought of a 
single predecessor.’ Robert Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 31.  
31 ‘But the Christian church and theology were, generally speaking, more sensible; 
adopted a critical, eclectic point of view; and tried, while investigating everything, to 
retain the good’. ‘Christianity and Natural Science’, in John Bolt, ed., trans. Harry 
Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres, Essays on Religion, Science and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2008), 93.   This is also recognized by Wolter Huttinga, Participation and 
Communicability: Herman Bavinck and John Milbank on the Relation between God and the World 
(Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn Motief, 2014), p. 23. 
32 RD, 1: p. 609. James Eglinton notes that this ‘synthetic’ character of Bavinck’s 
intellectual method evidences the neo-Calvinistic paradigm of common grace in Trinity 
and Organism: Toward a New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif (London: T&T 
Clark, 2012), pp. 37-44.  
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of a particular theology but a ‘specific view of the world and life as a whole; so to speak, 
a philosophy all its own’.33  
 
II. Theological Epistemology and The Organic Motif: Reshaping the Discussion 
 
 Bavinck’s mode of operation informed his writing in a way that poses a 
considerable difficulty for interpreters. This is not a novel development – already in 
1911 Bavinck complained that the neo-Calvinist movement was unfairly accused of 
adopting a ‘double-minded standpoint’ of being neither truly modern or orthodox.34 A 
cursory reading of the Dogmatics might provide an exculpatory explanation of these 
charges. Readers might find it taxing to locate Bavinck’s own voice, as it is 
commonplace for him to describe his interlocutor’s position for several paragraphs or 
pages on its own strongest terms, only to critique it in a single paragraph. It is difficult 
to know where Bavinck’s voice begins or ends. Interlocutors invoked as foils for his 
own perspective in one area are deployed as a proponent of Bavinck’s own claims in 
another. Here, readers of Bavinck can easily resonate with Wolter Huttinga’s description 
of this phenomenon:  
 
The way [Bavinck] represents the opinions of others, even those with whom he 
obviously disagrees, always belies a deep sympathy which may cause the reader to 
wonder to what extent Bavinck actually agreed with the author under discussion. 
When reading Bavinck, one often wonders: ‘Whose voice is this?’ In Bavinck’s 
idiom, even the most obvious heresies sound tempting. He himself makes no secret 
of this, as he often confesses that ‘there lies a great and deep truth’ in this or that 
view – even if in the end it is not his own. The synthesizing character of Bavinck’s 




33 Bavinck, ‘The Future of Calvinism’, p. 5.  
34 Bavinck, Modernisme en Orthodoxie, p. 5. ‘Wel leidde zij tot eenige meerdere 
waardeering van ons bedoelen en streven, maar tenslotte liep zij toch uit op de ernstige 
beschuldiging, dat wij een dubbelzinnig standpunt innamen, noch modern noch orthodox, noch 
naturalistisch noch supranaturalistisch waren, en dat wij dus het best en het eerlijkst 
handelden, als wij naar het kamp der modernen verhuisden en daar onze tenten 
opsloegen’. Emphasis mine.  
35 Huttinga, Paricipation and Communicability, p. 78. Cf. S. Meijers, Objectiviteit en 
Existentialiteit: Een onderzoek naar hun verhouding in de theologie van Herman Bavinck en in door 
hem beinvloede concepties (Kampen: Kok, 1979), pp. 440-1 
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As such, Bavinck interpreters often note the tensions that reside in his life and 
thinking: an inheritor of Reformed orthodoxy but a sympathizer of Modern theology, 
educated within the pietistic and confessional heritage of Kampen and the mainline 
University at Leiden. He was theologian who was ‘was part and parcel of modern 
culture and contributed to its character and direction’.36 Past interpreters of Bavinck 
have pushed this duality to the point of contradiction, such that there were purportedly 
‘two Bavincks’, the secondary literature claimed, each corresponding to an orthodox and 
modern side.37 The positing of the modern-orthodox binary generated a source-critical 
hermeneutic according to which readers are exhorted to locate strands of Bavinck’s 
thinking to a particular fabric: modern or orthodox.38  
The secondary literature on Bavinck’s epistemology is no exception to this trend. 
While these previous studies often make accurate observations about the sources behind 
Bavinck’s epistemology, a failure to attend to the structural organicism in Bavinck’s 
epistemology has produced significantly one-sided readings that force one to charge him 
with inconsistency when he allegedly deviates from a particular paradigm. These studies 
often identify Bavinck with his sources, such that his deployment of, for example, 
Thomas is taken to signify a rather committed subscription to Thomism, only to be 
frustrated by an encounter with significant sections of Bavinck in which he uses Kant, 
Schleiermacher, or some other seemingly irreconcilable thinker. The other way around is 
also the case: that when Bavinck endorses an axiom of Kant or romanticism he is 
charged for being susceptible to the same subjectivist tendencies of modernism. Indeed, 
it seems fruitful at this point to question the methodology of the whole process: instead 
																																																						
36 George Harinck, ‘The Religious Character of Modernism and the Modern 
Character of Religion: A Case Study of Herman Bavinck’s Engagement with Modern 
Culture’, Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29 (2011), p. 62. See also James Bratt, ‘The 
Context of Herman Bavinck’s Stone Lectures: Culture and Politics in 1908’, The Bavinck 
Review 1 (2010), 4-24.  
37 For example: Valentine Hepp, Dr. Herman Bavinck (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 
1921), pp. 317-18; Jan Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie: De Openbarings-en Schriftbeschouwing 
van Herman Bavinck in vergelijking met die der ethische theologie (Amsterdam: Buijten en 
Schipperhejin, 1968), pp. 108-10, 250-68; E. P. Heidemann, The Relation of Revelation and 
Reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959), pp. 131-2, 156-7, 177-9. 
Recently, Sze Sze Chiew continues to characterize Bavinck’s theology as exemplifying a 
‘striking duality’ in Middle Knowledge and Biblical Interpretation: Luis de Molina, Herman 
Bavinck, and William Lane Craig (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2016), p. 77.  
38 Brian G. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny: Eschatology and the Image of God in 
Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 12.  
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of identifying Bavinck with his sources, one should attend to what Bavinck does with 
those sources in his deployment of the organic motif. The organic motif refers to the 
regularity with which Bavinck describes creation and other theological loci under 
organicist terms. Organic connectedness is the pattern of creation and doctrine because 
God himself is the original unity-in-diversity as the self-existent Three-in-One. As this 
study will show, Bavinck’s organic motif allowed him to reason principally under the 
conditions of the Reformed confessions while deploying an eclectic range of sources 
that span across the ancient, medieval, reformed and modern intellectual heritages. This 
study will also show that Bavinck’s Trinitarian doctrine of God does not merely 
implicate his cosmology, but also his epistemology. The Trinity ad intra implies an 
organic cosmology and epistemology ad extra.  
My thesis, then, is to argue that Bavinck’s unique organicism resulted in a 
theologically reinterpreted synthesis of classical and modern patterns of thought, 
between critical realism and absolute idealism, the emphasis on the specialization of the 
sciences on the one hand and its underlying unity on the other.39 Attending to his 
organic epistemology not only eradicates ill-conceived constructions of the ‘two 
Bavincks’ but also further deepens our grasp of epistemology and the character of neo-
Calvinism in distinction from other branches of Reformed theology. It offers a 
generative mode of inquiry to the Reformed tradition too, which, in many respects, 
often struggles to straddle the sensitive line between modernism and orthodoxy.  
This reading also decisively reshapes the current discussions on Bavinck’s 
epistemology, while accommodating the best of their insights. Hence, the emphasis here 
is not to argue that either side is right or wrong. I contend that both are partially right 
insofar as there are, indeed, classical (Thomistic), and strongly post-Kantian elements in 
Bavinck’s writings. But the point made by this thesis is that Bavinck’s organic motif is 
able to resist contradicting these two strands and instead produces coherence. Insofar as 
that is true, the terms under which the secondary literature have been operating must be 
considerably reconfigured.   
This study thus further supports the trajectory of the current scholarship that 
emphasizes the organic motif as that which accounts for Bavinck’s eclectic use of 
																																																						
39 As one shall see, Bavinck is aware of the important distinctions between kinds 
of realism and kinds of idealism.  
	 21 
modern and classical sources on principled theological grounds.40 Brian Mattson argues 
that Bavinck deploys the organic motif for the purposes of persuasion, speaking into a 
nineteenth-century ‘philosophical preoccupation with teleological concepts’ by 
redefining that motif with resources that are ‘internal’ to the classical Reformed 
tradition.41 James Eglinton, likewise, argues that the organic motif is Bavinck’s preferred 
means of communicating a Trinitarian worldview. Creation displays an organic ontology 
of diversities in unity precisely because in God there is an archetypal unity and diversity: 
‘Theological organicism is the creation’s triune shape.’42 This conceptual apparatus 
allows Bavinck to preserve a worldview that includes a unity that does not imply 
uniformity, and a diversity that resists separation or analytic dissection; it was used to 
‘facilitate, rather than to remove the tension between distinct elements in a system’.43  
With the organic motif in place, then, it is no longer necessary to choose between an 
orthodox or modern Bavinck – the organic motif is Bavinck’s means of negotiating the 
tensions he encountered, a uniting and conceptual catalyst for coherence: ‘the 
outstanding agent of unity within Bavinck’s worldview’.44 Indeed, in Bavinck one sees a 
principled and orthodox theologian who incorporated contemporary philosophical 
grammars for the purposes of illumining and answering the serious intellectual problems 
he faced. He felt free to use classical, Thomistic and post-Kantian sources together as an 
application of his convictions concerning the catholicity of Christianity.   
On the classical and orthodox side, interpreters have classified Bavinck’s 
epistemology as a rehearsal of Thomism, despite Bavinck’s many criticisms of Thomas. 
John Bolt has argued that Bavinck follows the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas, 
according to which a unified worldview is garnered by following the various principles 
of science (scientia) and a twofold-truth according to which some truths are gained by a 
proper use of natural reason, and other truths by consulting special revelation.45 An 
																																																						
40 Brian G. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny; James Eglinton, Trinity and Organism. 
41 Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, p. 54.  
42 James Eglinton, ‘Bavinck’s Organic Motif: Questions Seeking Answers’, Calvin 
Theological Journal 45 (2010), p. 66.  
43 Eglinton, ‘Bavinck’s Organic Motif’, p. 67.  
44 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 205.  
45 John Bolt, ‘Bavinck’s Recipe for Theological Cake’, Calvin Theological Journal  45 
(2010), 11-17; John Bolt, ‘Sola Scriptura as an Evangelical Theological Method?’ in Gary 
Johnson and Ronald Gleason, eds., Reforming or Conforming? Post-Conservative Evangelicals 
and the Emerging Church (Wheaton: Crossway, 2008), pp. 79-81, 89. The term ‘twofold 
truth’ is from Bolt, ‘Sola Scriptura as an Evangelical Theological Method?’ p. 82. This is not to 
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implication involves the call for a ‘modest’ recovery of natural theology, along with the 
claim that Christians should reason on publicly accessible and rational principles with 
regard to natural affairs.46 Bolt further substantiates his claim that Bavinck’s 
epistemology is ‘Thomistic’ by arguing that Bavinck’s many criticisms of Thomas are 
mistaken because Bavinck ‘too, was a child of his time, falling into the trap of reading 
Thomas through the lens… of neo-scholastic advocates.’47  
 Many others continue this interpretation. For Paul Helm, Bavinck and the 
classical Reformed tradition holds that there exists no revealed epistemology, such that 
reason plays a judicial role in natural matters.48 David Sytsma further states that 
Bavinck’s endorsement of Thomism is in direct response to the modern alternatives: 
‘Bavinck was claiming the superiority of Thomistic epistemology as a handmaiden for 
theology over the contemporary philosophical trends of empiricism and rationalism.’49 
From the above authors, one receives the impression that Bavinck was engaged in 
modernity only for the purposes of resisting it by a retrieval of classical epistemology – 
so much so that Bavinck’s epistemology is unfortunately characterized at times as a 
‘reproduction’ of that classical heritage.50 
																																																																																																																																																										
be confused with double truth, which affirmed that what might be true in philosophy 
might be false in theology or vice versa.  
46 John Bolt, ‘An Opportunity Lost and Regained: Herman Bavinck on Revelation 
and Religion,’ Mid-America Journal of Theology 24 (2013), 96; John Bolt, ‘Herman Bavinck 
on Natural Law and Two Kingdoms: Some Further Reflections’, The Bavinck Review 4 
(2013): 93. 
47 John Bolt, ‘An Adventure in Ecumenicity: A Review Essay of Berkouwer and 
Catholicism by Eduardo Echeverria’, The Bavinck Review 5 (2014): 79. Paul Helm, 
appealing to Henri de Lubac, has also claimed that Bavinck’s reading of Thomas was 
mistaken. See Paul Helm, ‘Religion and Reason from a Reformed Perspective’, in Oliver 
D. Crisp, Gavin D’Costa, Mervyn Davies, Peter Hampson (eds.), Theology and Philosophy: 
Faith and Reason, (London: T&T Clark, 2012), p. 69. Paul Helm, Calvin at the Centre 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 328-332. Steven J. Duby notes the natural 
realistic overtones of Bavinck’s epistemology, but without pitting it against Bavinck’s 
modern sources in ‘Working with the Grain of Nature: Epistemic Underpinnings for 
Christian Witness in the Theology of Herman Bavinck’, The Bavinck Review 3 (2012), 62-
74. 
48 Paul Helm, Faith, Form and Fashion: Classical Reformed Theology and its Postmodern 
Critics (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2014), pp. 57-9, 64-5.  
49 David Sytsma, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology’, in John Bolt (ed.), 
Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology (Lewiston: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), p. 47. The sense in which reason and philosophy are 
handmaidens to theology is that they prepare the way for its proper study. 
50 Sytsma, ‘Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology’, p. 27.  
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 There are concessions in the above set of readings about Bavinck’s irenic spirit 
and balanced handling of modern epistemology. Arvin Vos epitomizes the trajectory of 
the above readings, arguing that in Bavinck there are indeed undeniably Thomistic lines 
of thought.51 However, by assuming that Bavinck’s use of Thomistic motifs is indicative 
of Bavinck’s advocacy of Thomism, Vos’s discovery of significant Kantian elements in 
Bavinck’s writings forced him to question the consistency of Bavinck’s epistemology.52 
This leads him to conclude that, despite Bavinck’s desire to uphold Thomistic 
epistemology, his departure from other Thomistic tenets renders Thomas Aquinas as 
the superior realist who offered a more comprehensive account of the objectivity of 
knowledge.53 On this point, one wonders if a more fruitful approach is to resist 
identifying deployment with systematic endorsement.  
 The readings above stand in contrast to the readings of Cornelis van der Kooi, 
Eugene Heideman, and Henk van den Belt, each of whom identifies Bavinck’s 
epistemology with the post-Kantian tradition.54 Van der Kooi argues that Bavinck’s 
distinction between the object-in-itself (Ding an Sich) and the object as they appear 
reflects a distinctly post-Kantian judgment on the nature of perception.55 This 
epistemological picture questions whether Bavinck successfully evaded the subjectivist 
tendencies of modern epistemology, leading van der Kooi to argue that ‘Bavinck 
cooperates in the turning towards the subject, and thereby (probably more than he likes) 
pays tribute to the anthropocentricism of modernity.’56  
																																																						
51 Arvin Vos, ‘Knowledge According to Bavinck and Aquinas’, The Bavinck Review 
6 (2015): pp. 9-36. 
52 Vos, ‘Bavinck and Aquinas’, p. 30. Vos notes the strongly Kantian direction of 
Bavinck’s Beginselen der Psychologie.  
53 Arvin Vos, ‘Knowledge According to Bavinck and Aquinas’, The Bavinck Review 
7 (2017): pp. 8-62.  
54 Post-Kantian epistemology is diverse and hard to define, but nonetheless the 
diversity shares similar characteristics. Among these are (1) the turn to the subject, (2) 
the focus on an attempt to resolve an assumed subject-object dichotomy and other 
potential oppositions, and (3) the active acknowledgement of the role of consciousness 
in mediating knowledge. Cf. Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against 
Subjectivism 1781-1801 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 13-14; 
Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Moderan European Philosophy: An Introduction (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 33. 
55 Cornelis van der Kooi, “The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit, 
Especially in H. Bavinck,” Journal of Reformed Theology 2 (2008): p. 108  
56 Van der Kooi, ‘Inner Testimony,’ p. 107.  
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 Henk van den Belt also argues that Bavinck’s epistemology places a priority on 
the subjective state of consciousness, with the result that Bavinck was self-aware in his 
desire to curb his subjectivist tendencies.57 In correspondence with this, van den Belt 
infers that Bavinck’s epistemology is ‘dominated’ by the subject-object dichotomy.58 In 
Bavinck one encounters not merely a rehearsal of Reformed orthodoxy, but an attempt 
to apply classical conceptual tools in order to resolve distinctly modern epistemological 
problems – an attempt which further reshapes Bavinck’s epistemology toward modern 
grounds. This close connection with which Bavinck relates subject and object, thought 
and being, leads Heideman to wonder whether Bavinck was too influenced by German 
idealism, rendering him unnecessarily vulnerable to charges of pantheism.59 
Nonetheless, Heideman, too, argues that Bavinck’s epistemology puts a premium on the 
role of the subject and on self-consciousness.60  
 The incompatibility of the two strands of thinking between Bavinck’s modernity 
and orthodoxy above becomes more explicit John Bolt’s review of van den Belt’s 
Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology. Though he commends the monograph, Bolt 
wonders if van den Belt was ‘too preoccupied with the modern form of the subject-
object discussion and whether this is a fruitful approach to Bavinck.’61 Further, Bolt 
rejects that Bavinck’s attention to the religious subject hints at the modern tendency 
toward subjectivism – for Bolt, Bavinck was simply articulating his endorsement of 
classical realism:  
																																																						
57 Henk van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust. 
(Leiden, Brill: 2008) pp. 249, 254, 266-7.  
58 Van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture, p. 294.  
59 Eugene P. Heideman. The Relation of Revelation and Reason in E. Brunner and H. 
Bavinck,  (Utrecht: Van Gorcum, 1959), p. 144.  
60 Heideman, The Relation of Revelation and Reason, pp. 155-6. Jan Veenhof, in ‘De 
God van de filosofen en de God van de bijbel: Herman Bavinck en de wijsbegeerte’, in 
George Harinck and Gerrit Neven (eds.), Ontmoetingen met Herman Bavinck (Barneveld: 
De Vuurbaak, 2006), pp. 221, 3, also argues that Bavinck was determined to work from 
within the post-Kantian trajectory even while he was standing on some tenets within the 
Thomistic tradition. Veenhof, though, is an exception is choosing not to pit Bavinck’s 
use of classical and modern sources against each other.  
61 John Bolt, ‘Review’ of Henk van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture in Reformed 
Theology: Truth and Trust in Journal of Reformed Theology 4 (2010): 76. Laurence O’Donnell’s 
review of another volume that included an essay by van den Belt also honed in on a 
similar issue: ‘Review’ of John Bowlin (ed.), The Kuyper Center Review, Volume Two: 
Revelation and Common Grace, in The Bavinck Review 3 (2011): p. 193. Cf. Henk van den 
Belt, ‘An Alternative Approach to Apologetics’, in John Bowlin (ed.), The Kuyper Center 
Review, vol 2: Revelation and Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 43-60. 
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But, is [the grounding of faith within the religious subject] not obviously 
necessary when we are trying to explain how religious subjects come to certainty 
of knowledge about God and the world? And why does Van den Belt consider 
this ‘disappointing’ and suggest Bavinck’s tendency to subjectivism? (290ff.) Is 
Bavinck here not simply being a good Augustinian or Thomist in his realism?62 
 
 Again, one is pressed to decide between competing claims: Bavinck the classical 
realist (and not modern), on the one hand, and Bavinck the modern (and not classical), 
on the other. Is it possible to move beyond this impasse?  
 
III. The Way Forward 
 
In each of the above interpretations Bavinck’s organic motif is conspicuous by 
its absence.63 I will argue that Bavinck’s Trinitarian and organic worldview enabled him 
to utilize an eclectic range of sources such that a unified, organic epistemology emerges. 
The method of this study is to investigate Bavinck’s primary texts in order to examine 
his epistemology in relation to the organic motif. Indeed, a further exculpatory 
explanation for the inconsistencies that characterize the secondary literature in the 
Anglophone world is the lack of attention spent on the lesser known, and mostly 
untranslated, works of Bavinck in which epistemology is treated most comprehensively 
and in which the organic motif is prominent. The study unfolds Bavinck’s 
understanding of what he considered to be the two important aspects of epistemology: 
the character of the sciences and the correspondence between subjects and objects, as 
predicated upon an organic worldview. The study elaborates on the two citations 
provided in the beginning of this introduction: the sciences form a single organism 
comprising of a unity-in-diversity, and subjects and objects correspond precisely 
because both are parts in an organically connected cosmos.  
Re-interpreting Bavinck’s epistemology in light of this motif should also provide 
some new insights concerning the current criticisms and appropriations of Bavinck by 
																																																						
62 Bolt, ‘Review’ of The Authority of Scripture, 76.  
63 Bruce Pass, though admitting that in Bavinck’s epistemology there is a complex 
mixture of modern and classical thinking, also does not comment on the significance of 
the organic motif in relation to Bavinck’s epistemology. See his ‘Herman Bavinck and 
the Problem of New Wine in Old Wineskins’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 
17.4 (2015): pp. 432-49.  
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the various interpreters mentioned above, while generating new avenues for 
contemporary epistemological reflection. Further, instead of reading Bavinck in light of 
the sources he cites, this study methodologically prioritizes ways in which Bavinck uses 
his sources by deploying the organic motif in line with the current readings offered by 
Eglinton and Mattson. In other words, it is a reading of Bavinck on his own terms. In 
this way, this study supports John Bolt’s call to resist identifying ‘a person’s thought as 
“neo-Platonic” or “Thomist” or “Kantian” or “scholastic”’ and to deem those 
identifications as reason enough ‘to condemn’ that person’s thought.64 
The next chapter furnishes the context in which this study takes place as it 
presents Bavinck’s organicism in relation to the doctrines of God, anthropology, and 
revelation. Building on the works of Mattson and Eglinton, it introduces the reader to 
the comprehensive scope of Bavinck’s organic worldview while seeking to develop that 
reading by noting the classical and modern sources of Bavinck’s outlook. Bavinck’s view 
of the creation’s unity-in-diversity is rooted in his classical doctrines of God’s simplicity 
and existence in three persons as modes of subsistence. His theological anthropology, 
shaped by organic language, consists not merely in conceiving the individual as an 
organic unity, but of humanity as a whole as a singular organism grounded in the unity 
of a federal head. General and special revelation likewise form a single organism.  
With this macro-level sketch of the organic worldview in place, one can now 
zoom in on Bavinck’s characterization of the sciences and the structure of knowing as a 
single organism. Chapters three and four elaborate on this point, focusing on Bavinck’s 
Dogmatics, various addresses delivered by Bavinck, and the three lesser known works that 
focus on epistemology: Christelijke wetenschap (Christian Science, 1904), Christelijke 
wereldbeschouwing (Christian Worldview, 1904), and Kennis en Leven (Knowledge and Life, 
published posthumously, 1922). Here it is articulated that Bavinck respects the integrity 
of the different fields of science, such that each enjoys a relative degree of 
independence, utilizing different methods and examining different objects. The differing 
principia of the sciences is correlative to the modern movement toward departmental 
specialization, influenced by Schleiermacher at the University of Berlin. In these 
contexts, the readings of Bavinck that emphasize the differing principia that function 
underlying the various sciences, as grounded in classical Thomistic elements, are to be 
appreciated. However, in Bavinck’s characterization of science as a whole as a singular 
																																																						
64 John Bolt, ‘Following Bavinck’s Lead’, Comment Magazine, Nov 28th, 2012.  
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organism, there is an underlying unity that provides the overall grounds and shape of 
the diversity of the sciences, with Scripture, Christ, and the Triune God’s glory 
constituting that methodological and teleological unifying center that relativizes that 
diversity. This corresponds with Bavinck’s neo-Calvinistic understanding of the 
Kingdom of God and sphere sovereignty, according to which the diversity of the 
sciences correlates with the underlying unity of the organism of science and the 
Reformed orthodox conviction concerning the unity of truth and the harmony between 
general and special revelation. With these observations in place, Bavinck’s similarities 
and differences with Thomas and Abraham Kuyper are also illumined. The fourth 
chapter locates the rationale for Bavinck’s critiques of the epistemologies of Aquinas 
and Kuyper, while locating Bavinck’s critique of the former within the current debates 
on interpreting ‘pure nature’ Thomism. The differences between Bavinck and Kuyper, 
too, consist in the former’s distinction between organic and mechanical knowing in 
reference to believing and unbelieving knowers. This chapter also sketches some 
preliminary implications of Bavinck’s holistic epistemology, and I relate it constructively 
to the work of Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus on Gestalt Holism. 
Chapter five begins to probe the subject-object dichotomy in Bavinck, while 
introducing the interpretations of Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff that 
characterize Bavinck as a ‘proto-Reformed epistemologist’ and an advocate of a kind of 
Reidian commonsense realism. This chapter proceeds to examine the apparent 
similarities between Thomas Reid and Herman Bavinck, precisely because the 
interpretation of Bavinck as a Reidian poses a prima facie tension with the readings that 
locate Bavinck in the post-Kantian turn to the subject. It contends that the initial 
similarities that exist between Bavinck and Reid are really reflective of the accidental 
similarities between commonsense realism and the romantic and absolute idealist 
tendency to affirm that subjects are always attuned (and organically connected) with 
their surroundings, especially as Reid denies a gap between mental ideas and the objects 
they represent, whereas Bavinck affirmed the gap between representations (voorstellingen) 
and things-in-themselves. This points to Bavinck’s particular deployment of Eduard von 
Hartmann, which constitutes the subject matter of chapter six. An examination of 
Bavinck’s deployment of von Hartmann will show their affinities: the acceptance of the 
gap between subjects and objects, a methodological prioritizing of sense perception in 
knowing, and the participation of both subjects and objects in an Absolute whole. The 
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differences between the two are also highlighted, and that difference is determined 
precisely in Bavinck’s understanding of the organic. Whereas von Hartmann’s Absolute 
is an imminent, impersonal and unconscious reality that binds subjects and objects, 
Bavinck’s Absolute is a Creator ontologically distinct from an organic creation that 
reflects that prior divine wisdom. Here, the organic motif’s congeniality with the 
Thomistic understanding of perception grounded in the activity of the agent intellect is 
further demonstrated, while showcasing the creative way in which Bavinck deployed 
both classical realist and absolute idealist moves through the lens of the organic.  
Chapter seven, finally, examines the organic unity of the self in the locus of 
consciousness and the knowing faculties. There is an organic connection between 
reason and feeling, such that Bavinck affirms the existence of a knowing that takes place 
‘without concepts’. This revisits Bavinck’s understanding of general revelation as a 
primordial and pre-predicative, nonconceptual reality that penetrates the unconscious 
psyche. His definitions of the innate and acquired knowledge of God are thus reshaped 
accordingly. This chapter also connects Bavinck’s moves both to current studies on 
medieval epistemology, as a meshing of Bonaventure’s concursus model and Thomas’s 
influentia model of illumination, and to broader neo-Calvinist moves (in Kuyper, J.H. 
Bavinck, and Gerrit Berkouwer) that tend to characterize general revelation as a kind of 
romantic and phenomenological presence in the locus of the psyche. Other than the 
Dogmatics, chapters five to seven focus on Bavinck’s 1908 Stone lectures (Philosophy of 
Revelation) and his Beginselen der Psychologie (1897).  
The conclusion closes with some summative remarks and critical reflections on 
the fruitfulness and contextually determined nature of Bavinck’s epistemology. This 
thesis demonstrates that it is no longer tenable to identify Bavinck with a particular 
source or thinker –whether Kantianism, Thomism, realism, or absolute idealism. He was 
too eclectic to be identified with any particular ‘-ism’, and his views of realism and 
idealism contribute to the emerging understanding that the relationship of the two 
cannot be characterized as a mere opposite. His advocacy of realism over subjective 
idealism did not hinder him from appreciating the insights of absolute idealism, and his 
affirmation of the critical importance of the role of the subject did not dissuade him 
from appreciating classically realist instincts. He did, however, advocate a holistic and 
organic epistemology that allowed him to use the varied array of sources the way he did. 
The organic motif, too, is not just a means by which Bavinck ‘swallows’ up insights with 
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no regard to their overall systematic coherence. Indeed, it shall be displayed that he 
deploys the language of the organic to answer specific epistemological questions with 
acute precision.  
This study will not only offer a unified interpretation of Herman Bavinck’s 
epistemology. With the growing understanding of the diversities of the Reformed 
tradition and the distinctive characters of each, this study further highlights the 
particular characteristics that demarcate neo-Calvinism from the rest of the Reformed 
tradition. It also hopes further to stimulate studies that generate a greater understanding 
of Bavinck and the neo-Calvinistic tradition’s conception of revelation and epistemology 
within the broader trajectories of the 19th-20th century, which tend toward holism and 
pre-conceptual understandings of revelation, while also relating Bavinck to current 
























Chapter 2: Bavinck’s Organicism – God, Anthropology, and Revelation 
The introduction displayed the various strands of the often conflicting 
interpretations of Bavinck’s epistemology. It also shows how recent scholarship on 
Bavinck’s organic motif promisingly delivers a unified, coherent interpretation that 
preserves the tensions in Bavinck’s thought without needing to introduce charges of 
inconsistency against him. Bavinck’s sources do not reflect a bi-polar theologian 
oscillating between his modern self and his classical, orthodox self – but rather a unified 
yet eclectic thinker who sought a coherent synthesis of the two milieus on Reformed 
orthodox grounds. In that vein, this study argues that Bavinck’s epistemology is also 
shaped organically, much like his views on cosmology. In the next chapters, I shall 
observe that Bavinck describes knowledge (kennis) and science (wetenschap) as 
conforming to the organic shape of a unity in diversity, such that there is unifying center 
that grounds and shapes the diverse fields of knowledge, and how the organic motif is 
Bavinck’s means of reconciling the subject-object dichotomy.  
Before embarking on the central epistemological concerns of this study, 
however, it is necessary first to highlight the major contours of Bavinck’s organic vision 
of reality and its Trinitarian roots. This chapter, therefore, builds on the recent 
scholarship in sketching and developing Bavinck’s organicism in relation to three key 
loci in an appreciative yet critical manner: the doctrine of God, anthropology, and 
revelation. This organic worldview provides the context for the chapters that follow. 
This chapter moves in four steps. First, I summarize the definition of Bavinck’s 
organic motif and cosmology along with its Trinitarian roots. Second, I shall clarify and 
highlight the catholic shape of Bavinck’s theology proper, emphasizing that the organic 
motif does not compromise but rather is resourced by a robust affirmation of the 
doctrines of divine simplicity and the immanent life of the divine persons as modes of 
subsistence. Third, I outline the way Bavinck’s organicism shapes his theological 
anthropology. Finally, I sketch the way in which general and special revelation are 
considered to go together by Bavinck. As I cover each of the loci, the Bavinckian theme 
of grace restoring nature and the eclectic character of Bavinck’s thinking shall also be 







I. The Organic Motif 
 
 For Bavinck, the Christian worldview is distinguished from that of non-theism 
by its capacity to see reality as organic rather than mechanistic. There are fundamentally 
two worldviews, ‘the theistic and the atheistic’, he claims.1 
In Bavinck’s perspective, the Christian view of the world goes against a 
narrowminded mechanistic philosophy which imposes uniformity in an irreducibly 
complex universe. The mechanistic worldview demands in an aprioristic manner that 
‘life, consciousness, freedom, and teleology’ should be explained under mechanistic 
terms, thus excluding all other explanations to be ‘unscientific’ as such.2 Bavinck is 
arguing that the Christian view of all things provides a broader, more open-minded 
account of nature precisely because it recognizes that reality far eludes the human grasp 
and goes beyond the purely natural or mechanically verifiable. While the mechanical 
view is ‘exclusive’, the organic view ‘recognizes’ that mechanical explanations have their 
proper place, but refuses to reduce the cosmos under its conditions.3 The organic 
worldview can account for the diverse phenomena one experiences within the world: 
‘There are the lifeless and the living, the inorganic and the organic, the inanimate and 
																																																						
1	‘Eigenlijk zijn er dus maar twee wereldbeschouwingen, de theistsche en de 
atheistsche’, Herman Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (Kampen: Kok, 1929), p. 51. 
Eglinton makes the same observation: ‘In [Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, Bavinck] asserts 
that, at the most basic level, only two worldviews exist: the theistic and the atheistic.’ 
Trinity and Organism, p. 67. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own. 
2 ‘[The organic worldview] komt alleen op tegen den aprioristischen eisch, dat 
leven, bewustzijn, vrijheid, doel zich mechanisch moeten laten verklaren, omdat elke 
andere verklaring onwetenschappelijk zou zijn.’ Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 
50.  
3 ‘De mechanische beschouwing is exclusief, zij eischt de gansche wereld voor 
zich op. Maar de organische beschouwing erkent ook het goed recht der mechanische 
verklaring, op haar terrain en binnen de door de natuur zelf haar gestelde grenzen.’ 
Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 50.  
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animated, the unconscious and the conscious, the material and spiritual creations, the 
mutually different in nature, yet all are included in the unity of the whole.’4  
Bavinck’s Christelijke wereldbeschouwing5 provides the basic contours of his 
organicism, culled well by James Eglinton. First, unity-and-diversity marks the precise 
shape of the created order.6 As it will be further clarified below, for Bavinck, God’s 
triune character somehow necessitates that the creation he chooses to bring about will 
bear a triniform character; creation ‘must reflect his identity as three-in-one’.7 The Trinity 
explains the diverse yet united phenomena encountered within God’s creation more 
satisfactorily than rival ontologies.  
Second, in the organism unity precedes diversity.8 Bavinck shares with the 
German Idealists the idea that the whole precedes the parts in such a way that they find 
their existence and proper place by partaking in the whole.9 Bavinck makes this this 
point by referring to the Logical Investigations [Logische Untersuchungen] of the German 
Idealist Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-72), as Bavinck claims that it is ‘the idea 
that animates and governs the distinct parts in the organism.’10 Trendelenburg couples 
the Absolute-idealist organic view of the world with the Aristotelian emphasis on the 
primacy of sense perception and the modern, scientific, inductive method. In effect, 
Trendelenburg claimed that the absolute idealistic metaphysics he inherited from Hegel 
																																																						
4 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 50. Dutch original: ‘Er zijn levenlooze en 
levende, anorganische en organische, onbezielde en bezielde, onbewuste en bewuste, 
stoffelijke en geestelijke schepselen, die onderlin in aard verschillend, toch alle 
opgenomen zijn in de eenheid van geheel’. 
5 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 67-9.   
6 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 50.  
7 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 67. Emphasis mine.  
8 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 51.  
9 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 69: ‘The notion that, within an organism, the 
whole precedes the parts is also found in Idealist organicism. Both were reacting against 
the mechanistic notion that the parts come first.’ Frederick Beiser summarizes it this 
way: ‘the idea of the whole contains and precedes all its parts, so that every part has its 
identity only in the whole’. German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 517.  
10 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 52. Dutch original: ‘Het is de idee die in 
het organisme de onderscheidene deelen bezielt en beheerscht.’ Friedrich A. 
Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen (Berlin: Bethge, 1840; 2nd ed., Leipzig: Hirzel, 
1862; 3rd ed., Leipzig: Hirzel, 1870). Bavinck does not cite a particular line here, nor 
does he mention the edition with which he works, but points to pages 17, 19 and 124 
onwards from the second volume. Bavinck cites the same work both positively and 
descriptively on pages 19, 32 and 67 of Christelijke wereldbeschouwing.  
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and Schelling needed to be methodologically updated with the claims and results of the 
new empirical sciences. These twin tendencies exemplified by Trendelenburg are 
appreciated well by Bavinck’s own commitment to the epistemological significance of 
sense perception and the organic worldview, though on different Christian-theistic 
grounds.11 As such, Bavinck claims that all objects are knowable because all created 
things ‘are still one [toch één zijn]’ even as diversity is maintained. As Trendelenburg 
remarks: ‘The individual only exists in the whole’.12  
The rationale behind Bavinck’s prioritizing of the unity of the parts stems from 
his belief in the unity of the God who creates the cosmos. Out of this principle the third 
naturally follows, which claims that the organism is bound by a common idea.13 The 
cosmos is unified in an orderly and harmonious manner which itself reflects the unity of 
God’s thoughts. Following the Reformed scholastic Johann Alsted and the classical 
tradition here, Bavinck asserts that the ‘thoughts of God [gedachten Gods]’ are the 
‘exemplary causes of things’ [causae exemplares der dingen]14: ‘it is the bond between God 
and the world, between the one and the many.’15 The divine ideas are the archetype for 
the things exemplified in creation, and because God is one, a single idea orchestrates 
and organizes the cosmos into a single central locus: the Logos as God the Son.16 
																																																						
11 Bavinck is well aware of the Romantic and Idealist retrievals of Greek 
philosophy; on this and Bavinck’s appropriation of Eduard von Hartmann (another 
German Idealist who shares Trendelenburg’s preference for sense perception and the 
absolute in the development of an organic worldview), see chapters four and six of this 
work. See also Frederick Beiser, Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 2-6, 30. On page 32, Beiser surmises that ‘The 
phrase “organic worldview” sums up well Trendelenburg’s entire philosophy’. However, 
this is not to suggest that Bavinck shares Trendelenburg’s monism. 
12 Freiderich A. Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen (3rd ed., reprint. Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964), II: p. 21. German original: ‘Der Einzelne hat 
nur im Ganzen Bestand’.  
13 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 57.  
14 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 57. Elsewhere, however, Alsted is 
critiqued by Bavinck because of his decision to write an ‘independent “natural 
theology”’, signaling that Alsted was a sign of a decline that followed the Lutheran 
failure to uphold ‘reformational principles’ that bind together general and special 
revelation. RD, 1: pp. 306, 305.  
15 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 57. Dutch original: ‘de band tusschen 
God en wereld, tusschen het ééne en het vele.’  
16 Bavinck here cites Colossians 1:15 to support his point. Bavinck claims that 
Christ is the ‘organic centre’ of all created history in RD, 1: p. 383.  
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Fourthly, characterizing creation as an organism means that it is driven towards 
a telos, which is the glory of the triune God.17 The teleology inherent within the 
development of creation as an organism is not identical to a materialistic chain of cause 
and effect that leads to some deterministic end. Rather, the organism of creation tells 
the story of the God who seeks to dwell with humankind and the providence by which 
God sustains the world. It is a personal telos imbued with an eschatological specificity 
disclosed in Scripture and actualized by divine provision.  
Bavinck’s organic motif, therefore, is not a product of speculation concerning 
the nature of reality in order simply to account for the phenomenon one experientially 
encounters, but rather Bavinck’s way of articulating the implications of the Christian 
confession that the Creator is a non-monadic, triune God. This is summarized well in 
Eglinton’s pithy statement that a ‘theology of Trinity ad intra requires cosmology of 
organism ad extra’.18 The theological assertion here involves the realistic claim that the 
nature of God requires that God’s creation would bear his marks. Yet, this is not to 
suggest that Bavinck is inferring that God is triune on the basis of the unities and 
diversities or the teleology embedded in creation – a ‘bottom-up’ move that would 
render Bavinck vulnerable to the critiques of Karl Barth.19 The order is quite the other 
way around and is irreversibly so: creation is seen to be marked by unities and diversities 
precisely because the Christian views the world in light of the revelation of the triune 
God.20 God is the archetype and creation is the ectype.21 As Bavinck says in the Reformed 
Dogmatics:  
																																																						
17 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, pp. 65-7. Bavinck cites Trendelenburg, 
Logische Untersuchungen, II: pp. 29-30 on page 67.  
18 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 68.  
19 Cf. Karl Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology’, in H. Martin Rumscheidt (ed.), The 
Way of Theology in Karl Barth: Essays and Comments (Allison Park: Pickwick, 1986), pp. 30-
33. Cf. Keith Johnson, Karl Barth and the Analogia Entis (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 
especially chapters 4 and 5.  
20 ‘The consistent tendency of Bavinck’s work is to do the opposite [of 
interpreting God in light of the world]. He reads the cosmos in the light of its Creator, 
simultaneously guarding the uniqueness of God and the basic fact of general divine 
revelation in the universe.’ Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 112. Kevin Vanhoozer also 
offers a succinct articulation of this kind of approach in Remythologizing Theology: Divine 
Action, Passion, and Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 8-23.  
21 The distinction between archetype and ectype has a strong pedigree within the 
Reformed tradition; it is articulated at length by Francis Junius’s Theologia Vera, which 
was recently translated: Franciscus Junius, A Treatise on True Theology, trans. David C. 
Noe (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage, 2014). See also Willem J. van Asselt ‘The 
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The Trinity reveals God to us as the fullness of being, the true life, eternal 
beauty. In God, too, there is unity in diversity, diversity in unity. Indeed, this 
order and this harmony is present in him absolutely. In the case of creatures we 
see only a faint analogy of it. Either the unity or the diversity does not come into 
its own… But in God both are present: absolute unity as well as absolute 
diversity. It is one selfsame being sustained by three hypostases. This results in 
the most perfect kind of community, a community of the same beings; at the 
same time it results in the most perfect diversity, a diversity of divine persons.22 
 
 It is in this sense that Bavinck is defending and modifying the medieval notion 
that creation bears the vestiges of God. The theologian’s task in seeking out vestiges of 
triniformity in creation does not consist in seeking proofs that God is triune as an 
exercise of the pre-dogmatic model of natural theology, nor should it result in seeking 
patterns of three-in-oneness in it.23 With regard to the former, the vestiges of the triune 
God in creation are only visible to the one who reinvestigates nature through the lenses 
of special revelation.24 To the latter, Bavinck argues that the triunity of God is absolutely 
unique, such that creation’s triniformity takes shape not as patterns of three-in-oneness 
but as non-numerical unities-in-diversities. Thus, in creatures, the diversity is not united 
in a perichoretic manner in a simple essence, as it is in the Godhead, yet the unity can be 
discerned by a ‘profound physical unity [physische eenheid]’, and also, in some, a ‘moral 
unity [zedelijke eenheid].’25 
With these two moves Bavinck shows that a rejection of natural theology does 
not entail a rejection of an appropriate and modest account of the doctrine that creation 
displays the vestiges of God. Eglinton summarizes Bavinck’s contribution thusly: 
																																																																																																																																																										
Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-
Century Reformed Thought,’ Westminster Theological Journal 64 (2007), pp. 289-306; 
Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, p. 27; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 106; Nathaniel 
Gray Sutanto, ‘Two Theological Accounts of Logic: Theistic Conceptual Realism and a 
Reformed Archetype-Ectype Model,’ International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 79 
(2016): pp. 239-60.  
22 Bavinck, RD, 2: pp. 331-2. See also RD, 2: 555.  
23 The term ‘triniformity’ comes from Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 54.  
24 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 368. See also Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, pp. 86, 150-1. On 
the Reformed tradition’s account of this, see Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed 
Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, vol. 4: The 
Triunity of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), pp. 157-65.  
25 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 331; GD: 2, p. 344. As it will become apparent, to express 
this ethical (or moral) unity, Bavinck consistently uses zedelijk, moreel and ethisch 
interchangeably and synonymously in his works.  
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In this respect, Bavinck’s doctrine of God, by virtue of its outstanding emphases 
on the diversity and oneness of the Godhead, is the foundation for an important 
development in the Reformed tradition. It represents the neo-Calvinist 
redemption of the ‘marks of the Trinity’ concept. In doing so, Bavinck shows 
that one can be wholly against natural theology and wholly for the vestigia 
trinitatis. He moves away from the general post-Reformation aversion to the 
traditional terminology and, as such, reinvigorates the concept while asking 
profound questions on the consequences of God’s Triunity for the Christian 
worldview. Whenever the vestigia trinitatis is referred to in relation to Bavinck’s 
doctrine of God, it is therefore not used in the medieval sense. Rather, the 
phrase is qualified to mean that in Bavinck’s understanding of the Trinity and 
the cosmos, the Trinity is wholly unlike anything else, but everything else is like the 
Trinity.26 
 
Bavinck’s account should thus be situated within the classical affirmation of the 
Creator-creature distinction – an affirmation that excludes univocally identifying 
Bavinck’s organic motif with that of his 19th century Idealist counterparts.27 God’s being 
is that of an absolute and unchangeable being whereas creation is a mutable and 
developing becoming. While the latter is an obvious implication of creation’s contingent 
and finite nature, the former corresponds with Bavinck’s insistence on the aseity of 
God: ‘God is exclusively from himself, not in the sense of being self-caused but being 
from eternity to eternity who he is, being not becoming.’28 In Bavinck’s view, 
Trendelenburg, von Hartmann, and Hegel were inclined to tethering God’s being with 
the becoming of history to the extent that God is often considered to be a being-in-
becoming. In contrast to this, Bavinck maintains a strict separation between the two: 
God is being and all else is becoming. This ontological chasm explains in part the 
irreversibility of the Bavinckian claim that the Trinity is unlike everything else and yet 
																																																						
26 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 89. Emphases original.  
27 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 30. Bavinck’s rejection of Hegel’s ontology is well 
documented, despite his adoption of organic language: see John Bolt, ‘The Imitation of 
Christ Theme in the Cultural-Ethical Ideal of Herman Bavinck’ (University of Toronto: 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1982), pp. 163-72; Brian Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny: 
Eschatology and the Image of God in Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 
pp. 20-64; James Eglinton, ‘To Be or to Become – That is the Question: Locating the 
Actualistic in Bavinck’s Ontology’, in John Bowlin, ed., The Kuyper Center Review, vol. 2, 
Revelation and Common Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), pp. 104-24. 
28 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 152.  
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everything else is like the Trinity.29 Standing on Scripture, Bavinck demarcates the two 
in this way:  
 
Scripture’s worldview is radically different. From the beginning heaven and 
earth have been distinct. Everything was created with a nature of its own and 
rests in ordinances established by God… The foundation of both diversity and 
unity is in God. It is he who who created all things… Here is a unity that does 
not destroy but rather maintains diversity, and a diversity that does not come at 
the expense of unity, but rather unfolds its riches. In virtue of this unity the 
world can, metaphorically, be called an organism, in which all the parts are 
connected with each other and influence each other reciprocally.30 
 
II. Organicism and the Classical Contours of Bavinck’s Doctrine of God  
 
Talk of there being an ‘absolute diversity’ or a perfect ‘community’ in God may 
raise alarm for those critical of current models of social Trinitarianism. However, the 
preceding discussion on the Trinity as the archetypal unity and diversity resulting in a 
creation marked by unities and diversities should not be misunderstood so as to imply 
that Bavinck advocates a form of social Trinitarianism, in which the diversity in the 
Godhead is meant to affirm a community of persons united in nature and by consent 
but not in being.31 Indeed, the affirmation of Bavinck’s organicism ad extra rooted in the 
																																																						
29 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 89.  
30 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 71.  
31 A paradigmatic and rather full-orbed model of social Trinitarianism is found in 
Richard Swinburne, The Christian God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). For a summary 
and critique of social Trinitarianism, see, for example, Karen Kilby, ‘Perichoresis and 
Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity’, New Blackfriars 81 (2000): pp. 
432-45. See also Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth Century 
Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 408-9. It should be 
noted that Bavinck’s tendency to see the unities-in-diversities in creation in light of an 
archetypal unity-in-diversity in the Godhead seems contrary to Ayres’s argument that 
such a move is less than ideal: 'Thus the unity of the church is not to be primarily found 
in direct comparisons between unity and diversity in God and between human beings, 
but by reflection on the unity and diversity appropriate in the body of Christ during the 
process of purification and sanctification, a unity and diversity at this point in the drama 
of salvation.' Nicaea and its Legacy, p. 417 n. 64. A useful survey of the current debate, 
along with a recent defense of social Trinitarianism, however, could be found in 
Gijsbert van den Brink, ‘Social Trinitarianism: A Discussion of Some Recent 
Theological Criticisms’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 16 (2014): pp. 331-50.  
While Bavinck also emphasizes the importance of perichoresis in order to 
contemplate the unity that obtains within the Godhead, he does so as he affirms divine 
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Triune being of God must be set within Bavinck’s catholic doctrine of God – a theology 
proper shared by the Reformed, Medieval, and ancient divines alike. Indeed, in theology 
proper Bavinck was content to inherit the vocabulary and grammar as confessed in the 
tradition of Nicaea, Augustine and Aquinas with little modification: ‘Scholasticism, 
expanding this [Trinitarian] terminology, established a fixed scheme that was later taken 
over by theologians in general, including those of the Reformation.’32 This included the 
confession that the use of metaphysical and extrabiblical philosophical terminology does 
not hinder but rather bolsters the truths found in Scripture – words like substance, 
persons, essence, and subsistence ‘mark the boundary lines within which Christian 
thought must proceed in order to preserve the truth of God’s revelation.’33 In order to 
understand Bavinck’s concerns, one must attend to the unity and simplicity of God and 
the relative properties that distinguish the persons within the Godhead as modes of 
subsistence. Then, I shall introduce some of the potential developments made by 
Bavinck in his theology proper.34  
Bavinck’s treatment of the doctrine of God begins with the unity of the divine 
nature and its attributes, as shared by the three persons. Following this order, however, 
is not meant to imply that it is appropriate to demarcate between a theology based on 
reason alone and a theology as a reflection on divine revelation – such a ‘procedure 
																																																																																																																																																										
simplicity and the unity of the divine will, power, and knowledge. Cf. Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 
331.  
32 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 298. Bavinck repeats this claim concerning the non-novelty 
of his inherited Reformed doctrine of God multiple times. On God’s omnipresence, 
Bavinck would again observe that the ‘thoughts of Augustine surface again later in the 
works of the scholastics. Catholic and Protestant theologians have not added anything 
essentially new.’ RD, 2: p. 167. So, Eglinton: ‘In terms of the basic priorities in its 
doctrine of God, Reformed Dogmatics stands in a most catholic tradition.’ Trinity and 
Organism, p. 107. While Eglinton’s study focused on the patterns of unity and diversity 
within the Godhead, this section highlights the catholicity of Bavinck’s theology proper.  
33 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 297. Cf. Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas 
and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 1-46; Gilles Emery, 
‘Trinity and Creation’ in Rik van Dieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (eds.), The 
Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), pp. 58-
77.  
34 Steven Duby comments that ‘Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) is a rare example of 
a theologian at the turn of the twentieth century who unreservedly affirms a traditional 
doctrine of divine simplicity’, in his Divine Simplicity: A Dogmatic Account (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015), p. 30.  
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would undoubtedly be objectionable’.35 Rather, Bavinck’s ordering reflects the 
pedagogical presentation of the ‘tradition’ on the Triune God, which begins with the 
divine attributes as shared in common by the three persons, along with the ordering 
according to the redemptive-historical development of Scripture itself.36 Further, 
Bavinck follows the lines of the classical mode of speech concerning the triune God 
which involves the twofold rule that distinguishes between essential and relative 
predication, that is, predication denoting the nature and essence of God in distinction 
from predication denoting the relative properties that properly belong to each person 
within the Godhead.37 In so doing, Bavinck remains cognizant of the inappropriateness 
of prioritizing the oneness or the Threeness of God, as if the divine essence exists in 
distinction from the three persons. God’s divine essence exists in the divine persons, 
and as such reminds creatures of the ontological distinction between them and God:  
 
Human nature as it exists in different people is never totally and quantitatively 
the same. For that reason people are not only distinct but also separate. In God 
all this is different. The divine nature cannot be conceived as an abstract generic 
concept, nor does it exist as a substance outside of, above, and behind the divine 
persons. It exists in the divine persons and is totally and quantitatively the same 
in each person. The persons, though distinct, are not separate. They are the 
																																																						
35 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 149. Likewise, Francis Turretin: ‘Thus although theology 
treats of the same things with metaphysics… the mode of considering is far different. It 
treats of God not like metaphysics as a being or as he can be known from the light of 
nature, but as the Creator and Redeemer made known by revelation.’ Institutes of Elenctic 
Theology, 3 vols., James T. Dennison (ed.), George M. Giger (trans.) (Philipsburg: 
Presbyterian & Reformed, 1994), 1: p. 17.  
36 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 150. Bavinck’s claims here are utilized well by Steven Duby, 
‘Classical Christian Theism and the Criterion of Particularity’, International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 15 (2013): pp. 209-10. Likewise, John Webster observes that the order 
of ‘Christian teaching about the Trinity’ follows ‘first the divine essence, then the 
distinction of persons, and (only) then the procession of creatures from God.’ ‘Trinity 
and Creation’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 12 (2010): p. 7. On page 8, 
Webster notes, in consonance with Bavinck’s claims, that this pedagogical ordering is 
not meant to deny the theological reality that in God ‘”one” and “three” are mutually 
interpretive and reinforcing’.  
Hesitation on the ordering of this treatment is perhaps most potently expressed in 
Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (London: Burns & Oates, 1970), pp. 15-
21, and recently also echoed by Gijsbert van den Brink against the Reformed 
scholastics: Gijsbert van den Brink, ‘Reformed Scholasticism and the Trinitarian 
Renaissance,” in Maarten Wisse, Marcel Sarot and Willemien Otten, (eds.),  Scholasticism 
Reformed: Essays in Honor of Willem J. Van Asselt (Leiden: Brill, 2010) pp. 322-40.  
37 This fundamental rule of Trinitarian speech can also be articulated as that which 
is ‘common’ as opposed to what is ‘proper’ to the persons of the Trinity.  
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same in essence, one in essence, and the same being. They are not separated by 
time or space or anything else. They all share in the same divine nature and 
perfections. It is one and the same divine nature that exists in each person 
individually and in all of them collectively. Consequently, there is in God but 
one eternal, omnipotent, and omniscient being, having one mind, one will, and 
one power.38 
 
 In this regard, one can develop James Eglinton’s comment concerning Bavinck’s 
decision to discuss divine diversity prior to the unity in the Godhead with greater 
precision.39 Eglinton argues that Bavinck ‘handles divine diversity and then, having 
established that God is non-uniform, explains the sense in which he is united’ in 
reference to the manifold divine names and attributes of God as revealed in Scripture.40 
While it is true that Bavinck treats this diversity prior to considering the way in which 
these attributes or names are consonant with a robust affirmation of divine simplicity, it 
should be noted that Bavinck is still discussing the divine nature shared by the three 
persons of the Godhead prior to a treatment on the personal properties that distinguish the 
three persons. So, while it is true that in treating the divine nature Bavinck begins with a 
discussion on the many names and attributes predicated of that divine nature, he is still 
following the classical pedagogical order of beginning with the unity of God’s being 
prior to the Threeness that unfold within that same being.41  
God is independent, immutable, and infinite, and his oneness consists in both 
‘the unity of singularity and the unity of simplicity [de unitas singularitatis en de unitas 
simplicitatis]’.42 The unity of singularity denotes the essentially monotheistic faith of 
Christianity as set forth in the Old and New Testaments, whereas the unity of simplicity 
signals Bavinck’s alignment with the traditional doctrine according to which God’s 
																																																						
38 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 300. Hence, there is ‘no genus to which he belongs as a 
member, and there are no specific marks of distinction whereby we can distinguish him 
from other beings in this genus.’ RD, 2: p. 121.  
39 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, pp. 104-6.  
40 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 104.  
41 This nuance remains in basic agreement with Eglinton’s remark concerning 
Bavinck’s consistent accent on the ‘rich internal diversity pertaining to the Godhead’. 
Trinity and Organism, p. 110.  
42 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 170; GD, p. 162. Though both are rendered into the English 
simply as ‘simplicity’ or ‘divine simplicity’, in the original text, Bavinck interchanges the 
Dutch ‘eenvoudigheid Gods’ with ‘unitatis simplicitatis’, signaling his adherence to the 
tradition on this point. For a recent defense of divine simplicity from a Protestant 
perspective, see Steven Duby, Divine Simplicity. 
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attributes are ‘identical with his essence’.43 Bavinck self-consciously follows Augustine 
and the medieval scholastics, repeating once again his point that the Reformation 
faithfully receives this doctrine of God from them.  
 
Augustine again and again reverted to the simplicity of God. God, said he, is 
pure essence without accidents… in God everything is one. God is everything 
he possesses. He is his own wisdom, his own life; being and living coincide in 
him. After Augustine we find this teaching in John of Damascus, in the work of 
the scholastics, and further in the thought of all Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and 
Reformed theologians.44 
 
 Divine simplicity follows God’s naming of himself in Exodus 3:14. God is of 
himself, existing in divine fullness, needing nothing outside of who He is in order to be 
God. The doctrine of divine simplicity links with divine aseity: because God is not made 
of parts, there is no distinction between his essence and existence, between himself and 
his attributes, and as such he is the ‘absolute fullness of being’, the independent and 
fully self-sufficient God on whom every creature depends.45 Bavinck further anticipates 
the objections from various corners of Modern and Remonstrant theologies against the 
doctrine for its alleged dependence on abstract speculation. Against this, Bavinck argues 
that divine simplicity is squarely rooted in divine revelation and in the claim that God is 
the archetype of all creaturely perfections and cannot be identified with the gods of the 
philosophers. This is seen in these two statements culled from Bavinck’s discussion on 
the name of God, on the one hand, and the incommunicable attributes of God, on the 
other:  
 
Hence, in that respect aseity may be called the primary attribute of God’s being. 
We can even say – on the basis of God’s revelation, not by means of a priori 
reasoning – that along with his aseity all those attributes have to be present in 
God that nature and Scripture make known to us. If God is God, the only, 
eternal, and absolute Being, this implies that he possesses all the perfections… 
As One who exists of and through and unto himself, he is the fullness of being, 
the independent and supremely perfect Being.46  
																																																						
43 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 173.  
44 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 174.  
45 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 175.  
46 Bavinck, RD, 2:  p. 124. Bavinck’s descriptions of God’s fullness of being in 
relation to divine aseity displays his awareness that aseity marks a positive doctrine that 
implies much more than the negation of the proposition that God is dependent on 
some external reality. God is not merely independent of anything outside of himself 
	 42 
 
Further in the same volume, he writes:  
 
All his attributes are divine, hence infinite and one with his being. For that 
reason he is and can only be all-sufficient, fully blessed, and glorious within 
himself. From this alone it is already evident that the simplicity of God is 
absolutely not a metaphysical abstraction. It is essentially distinct from the 
philosophical idea of absolute being, the One, the only One, the Absolute, or 
substance, terms by which Xenophanes, Plato, Philo, Plotinus, and later Spinoza 
and Hegel designated God.47  
 
Divine simplicity is thus a revealed doctrine: the revealed God of Scripture is a 
simple God, with one will, power, and wisdom. As such, Bavinck summarizes that God 
is ‘absolute unity and simplicity, without composition or division; that unity is… 
essential to the divine being.’48 The persons within the Godhead do not therefore 
consist in a separation of wills but should be considered as an unfolding of the fullness 
and richness of the divine fecundity. ‘The glory of the confession of the Trinity consists 
above all in the fact that that unity, however absolute, does not exclude but includes 
diversity… whose diversity, so far from diminishing the unity, unfolds it to its fullest 
existence.’49 Simplicity and Triunity are not opposed; the triune God exists as the simple 
God, and the simple God exists as triune.50 
The persons are distinguished not by any essential properties, for they share 
equality in glory, power, and divinity, existing in the divine nature in perfect unity. 
Hence, whatever is predicated of the divine nature is predicated of the three persons. 
Bavinck self-consciously follows Augustine in claiming that the distinction between ‘the 
																																																																																																																																																										
(which would ironically make the doctrine of divine aseity contingent upon its relation 
to God’s creation), he defines himself out of himself, and exists as life out of himself as 
all-sufficient. ‘God’s fecundity is a beautiful theme, one that frequently recurs in the 
church fathers. God is no abstract fixed monadic, solitary substance, but a plenitude of 
life… God is an infinite fullness of blessed life.’ RD, 2: p. 308. See also John Webster, 
‘Life in and Out of Himself: Reflections on God’s Aseity’, in Bruce McCormack (ed.), 
Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2008), pp. 107-24.  
47 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 176.  
48 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 300.  
49 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 300.  
50 For some recent defenses of the claim that Triunity and simplicity are not 
opposed, see Thomas Joseph White, O.P., ‘Divine Simplicity and the Holy Trinity’, 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 18 (2016); pp. 66-93; Scott Swain and Michael 
Allen, ‘The Obedience of the Eternal Son’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 15 
(2013), pp. 114-134.  
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persons among themselves cannot lie in any substance but only in their mutual 
relations.’51 In accord with Athanasius, the persons are modes of subsistence, a 
distinction ‘grounded in revelation and therefore objective and real.’52 They are ‘modes 
of existence within the being’, which Thomas described in the analogy of the difference 
between an open palm and a closed fist.53 
The Father, Son, and Spirit exist with distinct proper names within the Godhead 
with personal properties proper to each: paternity, unbegottenness, active generation 
and spiration to the Father, filiation or sonship, passive generation and active spiration 
to the Son, and procession or passive spiration to the Spirit.54 The processions and 
relations are immanent to the Godhead and are identical to his being, uncompromising 
the simplicity of his nature; the relations between the persons are within ‘that same 
being’ that is God.55 For Bavinck, a subsistent relation does not imply that two extrinsic 
objects are being linked or connected in some accidental fashion.56 ‘The ‘“threeness” 
derives from, exists in, and serves the “oneness.” The unfolding of the divine being 
occurs within that being, thus leaving the oneness and simplicity of that being 
undiminished.’57  
The work of the economic Trinity ad extra is reflective of the immanent life of 
the Godhead. Because God is one, the works of God ad extra are common to the three 
persons – God in his unity is the author behind creation and re-creation. Yet the 
indivisibility of his works does not negate the proper distinctions that obtain by virtue 
of the immanent order of the persons. ‘The “ontological Trinity” is mirrored in the 
																																																						
51 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 304.  
52 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 304.  
53 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 304.  
54 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 305. Later Bavinck notes that Aquinas and his followers 
further distinguished between generation and spiration by arguing that the former 
occurred in the manner of the intellect while the latter in the manner of the will, in 
relation to the association of generation with thought and the Spirit with love. However, 
Bavinck notes that ‘[t]hough Protestant theologians did assume a distinction between 
“generation” and “spiration” – like the distinction between “Son” and “Spirit” – and 
also in part acknowledge the correctness of the above [Thomistic] distinctions, they 
were less inclined to speak with this degree of certainty and boldness and considered 
this distinction insufficiently scriptural and modest.’ RD, 2: p. 314.  
55 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 305.  
56 On this, see Aquinas ST I, q. 28, a. 1-3.  
57 Bavinck, RD, 2:  p. 306.  
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“economic” Trinity’.58 Just as there are personal or relative properties proper to the 
persons in the immanent Godhead, so there are economic distinctions in the works of 
God, in part signified by the diversity of prepositions applied in Scripture proper to the 
work of each person: ‘The Father works of himself through the Son in the Spirit’.59 The 
distinctions deployed here do not refer to historical phases or to some particular act, as 
if the work of creation, redemption, or preservation correspond to the work of only a 
single person without qualification. Bavinck is reiterating a classical axiom of Trinitarian 
theology that follows Augustine, who considered it paramount that ‘according to the 
scriptures Father and Son and Holy Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance 
present a divine unity… although just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are inseparable, 
so do they work inseparably. This is also my faith inasmuch as it is the Catholic faith.’60 
For Bavinck, the works of God are works of the whole Trinity and only in an economic 
sense is some work properly predicated of a specific person: 
 
All the works ad extra: creation, providence, rule, incarnation, satisfaction 
(atonement), renewal, sanctification, and so on, are works of the Trinity as a 
whole. Yet in an “economic” sense, the work of creation is more specifically 
assigned to the Father, the work of redemption to the Son, the work of 
sanctification to the Holy Spirit.61 
  
What is highlighted is the priority on the unity of God in his works, such that all 
of God is involved in the creation to which he relates,62 along with an equal emphasis 
on the ontological chasm that separates Creator and creature by virtue of the distinction 
between the immanent divine processions and the economic missions of God. ‘The 
doctrine of the Trinity, accordingly, speaks of the generation of the Son and the 
procession of the Spirit. But of these are essentially distinct from the work of creation: 
																																																						
58 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 318.  
59 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 319.  
60 Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1991), 
1.7., see also 1.11-22. 
61 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 320. Bavinck reiterates this point later on: ‘The confession of 
the essential oneness of the three persons has as its corollary that all the outward works 
of God (opera ad extra) are common and indivisible (communia et indivisa).’ RD, 2: p. 422.  
62 ‘Prominent in these works, therefore, is the oneness of God rather than the 
distinction of the persons’ Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 330.  
	 45 
the former are immanent relations, while the latter is work ad extra. The former are 
sufficient in themselves: God does not need creation.’63  
Bavinck’s adherence to these classical distinctions sheds light on his organic 
cosmology concerning the grounds on which he prioritizes the unity that precedes the 
diversity of God’s creation as an organism. The unity of the Trinity in the work of 
creation, Bavinck reasons, is the reason why creation too is a unity, and the diversity 
proper to the work of the persons is further mirrored in the diversity displayed within 
creation.  
 
The doctrine of the Trinity provides true light here. Just as God is one in 
essence and distinct in persons, so also the work of creation is one and 
undivided, while in its unity it is still rich in diversity. It is one God who creates 
all things, and for that reason the world is a unity, just as the unity of the world 
demonstrates the unity of God. But in that one divine being there are three 
persons, each of whom performs a task of his own in that one work of 
creation.64  
 
 If there is a potential and modest point of uniqueness in Bavinck’s treatment of 
theology proper (outside of the organic motif as a characterization of reality in light of 
God’s triune being), it is Bavinck’s predication of the divine being as the ‘absolute 
personality’ in response to modern theology’s emphasis on the psychological depth that 
attends talk of personality.65 Bavinck responds to two trends in modern theology; the 
																																																						
63 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 332. Later Bavinck repeats the same point with different 
terminology. ‘Scripture, and therefore Christian theology, knows both emanation and 
creation, a twofold communication of God – one within and the other outside the 
divine being; one to the Son who was in the beginning with God and was himself God, 
and another to creatures who originated in time; one from the being and another by the 
will of God. The former is called generation; the latter, creation. By generation, from all 
eternity, the full image of God is communicated to the Son; by creation only a weak and 
pale image of God is communicated to the creature.’ RD, 2: p. 420. Implicit in Bavinck’s 
language is the distinction between immanent activities and transitive acts. So, Webster: 
‘The immanent activities of God are the personal works of the Father, Son and Spirit 
which make up the relations of the divine life; God’s transitive acts are the opera exeuntia, 
those outgoing works whose term lies beyond the godhead.’ ‘Trinity and Creation’, p. 
10.  
64 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 422. Cf. Ian McFarland, From Nothing: A Theology of Creation 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2014), pp. 67-83.  
65 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 302. Ayres, like Bavinck, remarks that modern theology 
introduces a ‘psychological density’ into the definition of persons that is taken from the 
experience of human consciousness in Nicaea and Its Legacy, p. 408. Hence: ‘Modern 
notions of personhood here do not simply introduce too much division into the Trinity, 
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first involves the total lack of attribution of consciousness or personality to God such 
that he is described as an absolute ‘unconscious force’, while the second fails to 
acknowledge the total uniqueness of the term ‘person’ that does properly refer to the 
Godhead.66 In response to both, Bavinck argues that personality can be attributed to 
God, but its definition ‘in no way lies on the elements of rationality and self-
consciousness’ as found in human beings.67 Such a move improperly applies human 
categories to God, transgressing our epistemic jurisdiction in theological predication. 
Personhood, when applied to God, bears a radical discontinuity from how it is 
predicated to human creatures; ‘all three persons have the same being, and attributes 
and hence the same knowledge and wisdom.’68 Bavinck further argues that it is not that 
we attribute a definition of personality taken from the human experience and apply it to 
God, but the reverse. Humans have their experience as persons precisely because God 
is the archetypal absolute personality: ‘The persons are not three revelational modes of 
the one divine personality; the divine being is tripersonal, precisely because it is the 
absolute divine personality’.69 Bavinck then argues that personality and its concomitant 
psychological features, as found in human creatures, is a mere analogy to the absolute 
personality in God:  
 
In humans we witness only a faint analogy of divine personality. Personality in 
humans arises only because they are subjects who confront themselves as object 
and unite the two (subject and object) in an act of self-consciousness. Hence 
three moments (constituents) constitute the essence of human personality… In 
God, however, because he is not subject to space or time, to extension or 
division, these three are not moments but “hypostases,” modes of existence of 
one and the same being… This self-differentiation results from the self-
unfolding of the divine nature into personality, thus making it tri-personal… the 
unfolding of his being into personality coincides with that of his being unfolding 
into three persons. The three persons are the one divine personality brought to 
																																																																																																																																																										
they run the risk of corrupting the basic pro-Nicene sense of the mysterious and 
incomprehensible union of the Godhead’. Nicaea and its Legacy, p. 412.  
66 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 302.  
67 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 302.  
68 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 302.  
69 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 302. As he recognizes elsewhere, ‘to put it in modern 
theological language, in Scripture the personality and absoluteness of God go hand in 
hand.’ RD, 2: p. 34.  
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complete self-unfolding, a self-unfoldment arising out of, by the agency of, and 
within the divine being.70 
 
In this rather provocative line of reasoning, and drawing critically from modern 
psychology, Bavinck argues that human personality is analogous to the divine being as 
defined by classical Trinitarian theology. However, in arguing that there is an unfolding 
into the three persons in the simple God (not as moments in a series but as coinciding 
with God’s eternal nature as pure actuality), which flows from his essence as absolute 
personality, he makes the interesting move of predicating personality to the divine 
essence. The question of whether this should be seen as Bavinck unwittingly adopting 
the innovative modern theology he sought to resist, or as a move suggesting an 
important development in confessional Reformed theology cannot be decided here. As 
Bavinck infers that marks of the divine will be found in humanity, it is appropriate to 
turn there.   
 
III. An Organic Anthropology: The Individual, the Relation, and Whole 
 
Bavinck’s organic vision of reality recognizes a fundamental difference between 
humanity as the pinnacle of God’s creation and everything else in creation. While he 
affirms that the cosmos displays the vestiges of God, only humanity is created in the 
image of God. Because this is so, humanity reflects triniformity and the pattern of the 
organic unity-in-diversity in a higher mode unshared by the rest of creation. Bavinck 
summarizes his thought in an eloquent statement:  
 
The visible world is as much a beautiful and lush revelation of God as the 
spiritual. He displays his virtues as much in the former as in the latter. All 
creatures are the embodiments of divine thoughts, and all of them display the 
footsteps or vestiges of God. But all these vestiges, distributed side by side in 
the spiritual as well as the material world, are recapitulated in man and so 
organically connected and highly enhanced that they clearly constitute the image 
and likeness of God… Thus man forms a unity of the material and the spiritual 
world, a mirror of the universe, a connecting link, compendium, the epitome of 
																																																						
70 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 303. Bavinck’s characterization of psychology here is 
consonant with what he says in his Beginselen der Psychologie [Foundations of Psychology] 
(Kampen: Bos, 1897), pp. 1-2.  
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all of nature, a microcosm and, precisely on that account, also the image and 
likeness of God, his son and heir, a micro-divine-being.71 
 
These claims imply several things in Bavinck’s theological anthropology on the level 
of the individual, the relationship between male and female, and with regard to 
humanity as a whole. As one shall see, Bavinck characterizes each of these levels with 
organic descriptions of unity and diversity that are polemically set over against what 
Bavinck thinks are ‘mechanical’ views of the Imago Dei. Here, Bavinck’s polemic 
highlights the eclecticism typical of his thought. While it was noted in the previous 
section of this chapter that Bavinck happily receives the classical accounts of theology 
proper as provided by the ancient and medieval traditions, he distances himself from 
aspects of that tradition in theological anthropology for its purportedly inorganic 
character. Just as Bavinck appropriates particular doctrines and ideas from a variety of 
different thinkers, he also freely critiques them, whether classical or modern, where he 
sees fit without adopting the line of reasoning of those figures wholesale.  
First, then, it is significant that Bavinck’s articulation of the human individual is self-
consciously set in contrast to the ‘mechanical view’ he finds in Roman Catholic 
anthropology.72 In Bavinck’s view, Rome makes an infused and extrinsic grace of God a 
prerequisite for the attaining of humanity’s final destiny. This superadded gift did not 
modify human nature, but rather consecrated it so that the capacity to please God in 
obedience is attained.73 This doctrine, in different forms, found its home in Thomas and 
the Scholastics, and was maintained against the Reformers. As such, in Bavinck’s 
description, ‘Roman Catholic theology has a dual conception of humanity: humankind 
in the purely natural sense, without supernatural grace, is indeed sinless but only 
possesses natural religion and virtue and has his destiny on earth; humankind endowed 
with the superadded gift of the image of God has a supernatural religion and virtue and 
																																																						
71 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 562.  
72 Bavinck also often sets the organic, Trinitarian, worldview as a distinct option 
between mechanistic worldviews, often represented by the two poles of deism and 
pantheism, and other ‘less consistent’ forms of Christian-theism. See Mattson, Restored to 
Our Destiny, pp. 54-60 and Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, pp. 27-33.  
73 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 540. Abraham Kuyper shares this assessment. See especially 
his Common Grace: God’s Gifts for a Fallen World, Jordan J. Ballor and Stephen Grabill 
(eds.), Nelson D. Kloosterman, Ed M. van der Maas (trans.) (Bellington: Lexham Press, 
2016), pp. 156-8. 
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a destiny in heaven.’74 Accordingly theologians who accept this conception are prone to 
debate which properties of human beings belonged to their natural constitution and 
which belonged to that which they receive by grace. The fall did not distort or ruin the 
image of God in humanity; human nature remains wholly intact. The only thing lost by 
humanity in the post-lapsarian situation was the superadded gift required to attain a 
meritorious obedience before God. In Bavinck’s reading of the Roman Catholic 
understanding of justification, human beings receive again this supernatural gift, which 
enables them to begin the process of performing good works that merit ex condigno 
eternal life.75 
 Rome’s emphasis on the loss of an external original righteousness leads directly 
to a definition of sin that accents the negative loss of that righteousness rather than a 
reconfiguring of human nature such that it positively desires evil. The natural person’s 
concupiscence is, in Bavinck’s assessment, increasingly treated not as a reflection of sin 
by Rome but as a ‘naked’ feature natural to humanity. Post-Tridentine Roman Catholic 
theology, therefore, ‘appeal[ed] to Aquinas, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and others’ to 
establish a definition of original sin as ‘only the loss of original righteousness’.76 This is 
that which the Reformers counter in their emphasis that ‘original sin is not just a loss of 
something but simultaneously a total corruption of human nature’.77 
An organic anthropology implies something different; ‘if a human being is an 
organic unity’ then he or she is fundamentally either good or evil.78 Here Bavinck 
stresses a strong disagreement with Jonathan Edwards, who described one’s inability to 
do good as a mere moral inability. For Bavinck depravity is not merely a moral but also 
																																																						
74 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 541.  
75 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 543. For Bavinck, any reward that comes from God is only 
possible by virtue of divine condescension: ‘Every creaturely right is a given benefit, a 
gift of grace, undeserved and nonobligatory. All reward from the side of God originates 
in grace; no merit, either of condignity or of congruity, is possible.’ RD, 2: p. 570. The 
covenant, then, is crucial in Bavinck’s theology to maintain the gratuity of the promised 
Adamic reward. Bavinck, as Mattson observes, affirms creaturely rights only ex pacto. See 
Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, p. 72.  
76 Bavinck, RD, 3: p. 97. Also, Crisp: ‘Roman Catholics argue that original sin is 
essentially a privative state, wherein fallen human beings lack the original justice and 
righteousness with which our first parents were created.’ Oliver D. Crisp, ‘On Original 
Sin’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 17 (2015), p. 256. Crisp cites the Catechism of 
the Catholic Church, Part 1, §2. ch. 1. par. 7. 
77 Bavinck, RD, 3: p. 98.  
78 Bavinck, RD, 3: p. 120. Bavinck locates the origin of the organic motif in the 
time after the rationalism and optimism of the eighteenth century in RD, 3: p. 88.  
	 50 
a natural impotence.79 Likewise, the dual view of Rome tears asunder the organic unity 
of human nature, and its mechanistic anthropology is vitally connected to a mechanistic 
hamartiology:  
 
To divide persons in two – like Rome and in part like the Lutherans – and to say 
that in  the realm of the supernatural and spiritual they are incapable of any 
good but in the natural realm they can do things that are totally good is contrary 
to the unity of human  nature, to the unity of the moral law, and to the teaching 
of Scriptures that humans must always be images of God, do everything they do 
the glory of God, and always everywhere love God with all their heart, mind, 
and strength.80 
   
In contrast, Bavinck argues that the Reformed distinction between broad and 
narrow aspects of God’s image is a more appropriate articulation of the human 
individual as made in the image of God in an organic unity.81 The two aspects make up 
the image of God, and the narrow aspect is so intimately ‘bound up’ with the broader 
sense of the image of God such that with the entrance of sin the former is lost while the 
latter is ‘ruined’.82 Consequently, grace restores human nature fundamentally, having ‘the 
greatest significance for his or her whole life and labor, also in the family, society, the 
state, art, science, and so forth’.83 The natural person is lost, depraved and distorted in 
sin, and cannot appropriately function without supernatural grace even in so-called 
																																																						
79 Bavinck, RD, 3: p. 122.  
80 Bavinck, RD, 3: p. 123.  
81 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 554. These comments may shed light on Bavinck’s short 
remark on Aristotle in another place: ‘After all, just like Plato, Aristotle also ascribed 
more than one soul to human beings, and just like his predecessor, he did not succeed 
in combining these souls into one organic unit.’ Herman Bavinck, ‘The Unconscious’, in 
John Bolt, ed., Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres, trans., Essays on Religion, Science, and 
Society (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), p. 180. More clearly in his Beginselen der 
Psychologie, Bavinck remarks that, ‘The harmony of the animated life, of head and heart, 
soul and body, object and subject, perception and thinking, reason, and sensation, the 
higher and lower ‘I’, were not found in Greek psychology’, p. 18. Dutch original: ‘De 
harmonie van het zieleleven, van hoofd en hart, ziel en lichaam, object en subject, 
waarneming en denken, rede, en zinlijkheid, hooger en lager ik werd in de Grieksche 
psychologie niet gevonden.’  
82 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 554. 
83 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 554. 
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‘natural’ affairs; sin marks the distortion of humanity’s imaging essence and not merely a 
loss of a supernatural gift from God.84  
The organic unity of the human person is a microcosm of the organism that is 
the kingdom of God. Just as in the kingdom of God the diverse spheres of life are 
united by a common idea and telos antithetical to the fragmentation that sin brings 
about, the human personality in its diverse faculties is to be united as a coherent whole 
in obedience to God. Restoration as a member of God’s kingdom involves the full 
redemption and uniting of the human personality – a personality that internalizes the 
commands of God. ‘The righteousness of the Kingdom of God consists in this, that a 
person may be fully a person, such that everything within a person may be subject to the 
person’s spiritual, eternal essence.’85 Sin tears what was once united such that the 
members of a person in this stage of redemptive-history work in disharmony: 
‘Understanding and heart, consciousness and will, inclination and power, feeling and 
imagination, flesh and spirit, these are all opposed to each other at the moment, and 
they compete with each other for primacy.’86 Consistent with Bavinck’s motif of grace 
restoring and perfecting nature, then, restoration involves the reunification of the 
individual’s faculties under the kingdom of God such that obedience is done not as a 
burden but as an act of freedom. The kingdom of God comprises free personalities with 
their respective individualities working under the unity of God’s lordship as a single 
organism.87 
 The parallel between the kingdom of God and the individual as organisms runs 
closely to the cosmos itself: Bavinck’s organic motif characterizes his view of every layer 
of God’s created order, and just as the cosmos is a unity in diversity, so the human 
																																																						
84In a discussion on the pollution of sin, Bavinck sets the Reformed view over 
against the mechanistic anthropology he discerns in Roman Catholicism again: ‘The 
image of God is not an external and mechanical appendage to us but integral to our very 
being, it is our health.’ RD, 3: p. 174. 
85 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God the Highest Good’, The Bavinck Review 
2, trans. Nelson Kloosterman (2011): p. 142. So, Bavinck in RD, 1: 362: ‘Such a 
Christianity was not externally imposed… but was inwardly assumed in one’s 
conscience by a free personality’. I discuss the Kingdom of God as an organism and its 
relation to Bavinck’s epistemology in the next chapter.   
86 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God’, p. 143.  
87 ‘Precisely by means of the single shared life of the organism, the individual 
members of the organism are maintained and preserved in their differentiation and 
uniqueness.’ Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God’, p. 144.  
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being and its faculties comprise a superlative yet creaturely unity in diversity.88 In this 
respect, Bavinck’s equal emphasis on the whole of humanity as an organism does not 
eclipse his prior emphasis on the dignity of every individual and their respective eternal 
destinies. ‘Every human being, while a member of the body of humanity as a whole, is at 
the same time a unique idea of God, with a significance and destiny that is eternal!’89  
 The second aspect of the Imago Dei goes beyond the organic character of each 
individual, and consists in the relationship that obtains between male and female.90 This 
is not surprising, since for Bavinck humanity images not merely one aspect or person 
within the Godhead, but the whole Triune God. In short, for Bavinck, ‘the triune being, 
God, is the archetype of man’.91 
This aspect comes to a greater clarity in Bavinck’s short treatise on the Christian 
family.92 Bavinck suggests that it is insufficient merely to affirm that the female is made 
in the divine image equally with Adam.93 Appealing to Genesis 1:27, Bavinck insists that 
‘both together’ are created in God’s image, entailing that ‘both, and not the one separate 
from the other, but man and woman together, in mutual relation, each created in his or 
her own manner and each in a special dimension created in God’s image and together 
displaying God’s likeness’.94 This is why, Bavinck argues, Scripture includes both 
																																																						
88 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 555. On the ontological hierarchical connotations of this 
discussion in Bavinck in conjunction with his rejection of neo-Platonism, see Mattson, 
Restored to Our Destiny, pp. 131-45. For a full discussion of Bavinck on the faculties of 
man as aspects of the Imago Dei see Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 587; RD, 3: pp. 103-13. 
89 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 587. Indeed, embedded within humanity’s creation as God’s 
image in protology is an implicit but organically connected eschatology – an eschatology 
to be gained by obedience to the covenant stipulations voluntarily granted by God.  
90 Mattson mentions the woman as an image of God, but then does not consider 
more fully the relationship between male and female as a constitutive part of the image 
in Restored to Our Destiny, p. 145.  
91 Bavinck, RD, 2: pp. 554-5.  
92 Herman Bavinck, The Christian Family, trans. Nelson Kloosterman (Grand 
Rapids: Christian’s Library Press, 2012). Dutch original: Het Christelijke Huisgezin 
(Kampen: Kok, 1912).  
93 Bavinck writes: ‘the woman herself, seen as a human being, bears the image and 
likeness of God fully as much as the man does.’ The Christian Family, p. 3.  
94 Bavinck, The Christian Family, p. 3. Emphasis mine. This is especially stimulating 
when one considers Karl Barth’s doctrine of the Imago Dei, in which the language of 
relation is central. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 4 vols. in 13 pts., ed. and trans. G.W. 
Bromiley, T.F. Torrance, et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), III/1, pp. 191-206. Also, 
on Karl Barth’s positive use of Bavinck’s Dogmatics, see John Visser ‘Karl Barth’s 
Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics’, Calvin Theological Journal 
(2010), pp. 79-86. A close comparison of the two on the Imago Dei is thus warranted.  
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feminine and masculine relational traits as analogies to God’s character. The relationship 
that maintains both unity and difference, exhibited by the two genders working together 
in obedience unto God, is that which displays an organic unity-in-diversity. ‘Together in 
mutual fellowship they bear the divine image. God himself is the creator of duality-in-
unity.’95 This understanding goes even further as Bavinck provocatively argues that the 
bearing of a child brings forth a ‘three-in-oneness’, such that ‘Father, mother and child 
are one soul and one flesh, expanding and unfolding the one image of God, united 
within threefold diversity and diverse within harmonic unity.’96 Families are organic 
unities and are the foundational building blocks of society. 
Absent in Bavinck’s account, it should be noted, is the ascription of multiple 
wills to the Godhead or an eternal relation of authority and submission that correspond 
respectively to the Father and the Son. Bavinck is also not appealing to the Trinity for a 
thorough-going social program – his dogmatic sketch here is much more modest, 
finding patterns of unity and diversity based on the faint analogies that humanity and 
creation reflect. He does, however, seek to maintain a balance between the uniqueness 
of the Trinity and the implied inappropriateness of seeking univocal applications from 
His being to creation on the one hand and the Christian impulse to see the Triune God 
in the back of reality, on the other.97 Again this is well expressed in Eglinton’s claim that 
the Trinity is not like anything else and yet all else is like the Triune God.98  
 A point of intersection between Bavinck’s understanding of male and female 
and of humanity as a whole emerges as he considers the physical and ethical unity between 
them.99 God uses the same earthly material to form the woman out of the man, and ‘the 
manner in which the woman received her existence served to place her in the kind of 
relationship to the man such that she is inseparably bound to him, and thereby the unity 
																																																						
95 Bavinck, The Christian Family, p. 5.  
96 Bavinck, The Christian Family, p. 8.  
97 Cf. Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 330.  
98 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 89.  
99 This emphasis on the ethical unity of humanity in religion recalls Bavinck’s 
appreciation and subversion of Ritschl’s theology. In Bavinck’s mind, ‘it must gratefully 
be acknowledged that Ritschl has so clearly and lucidly described the ethical character of 
Christianity…[For Ritschl] the human race is destined to become an ethical unity, the 
Kingdom of God, which the whole of physical nature serves and to which it is subject’. 
Herman Bavinck, ‘The Theology of Albert Ritschl’, trans. John Bolt, The Bavinck Review 
3 (2012), p. 156.  
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of the human race is completely preserved’.100 There is unity by virtue of natural 
solidarity. Not only so:  
 
the woman was created not to be self-sufficient, nor to be independent of the 
man, nor apart from his mediation; she is not a unique principal and head of the 
human race, but she herself was formed out of the man, out of his flesh and 
blood. The human race is one entity, a body with one head, a building with one 
cornerstone.101 
 
 This brings us to the third aspect: unlike the individualism Bavinck finds within 
Pelagianism and modern philosophy, humanity as a whole is one organism in unity-and-
diversity. Due to the teleology embedded within the creation of the human race, 
Bavinck argues that the Imago Dei is too rich to be confined by the individual or by the 
family. 
 
[The Imago Dei] can only be somewhat unfolded in its depth and riches in a 
humanity counting billions of members. Just as the traces of God (vestigia Dei) 
are spread over many, many works, in both space and time, so also the image of 
God can only be displayed in all its dimensions and characteristic features in a 
humanity whose members exist both successively…and contemporaneously side 
by side.102  
 
 Again, in the context of defending creationism with respect to theological 
anthropology, Bavinck writes of the unity of the human race in terms of both physical 
and ethical solidarity: ‘Creationism preserves the organic – both physical and moral [beide 
physische en moreele]– unity of humanity and at the same time it respects the mystery of the 
																																																						
100 Bavinck, The Christian Family, p. 4.  
101 Bavinck, The Christian Family, p. 4. Bavinck wrestles with this organic view of 
the family in relation to the issue of political and ecclesial women’s suffrage within his 
anti-revolutionary party. He developed a rather ‘progressive’ view later in his life, much 
to Kuyper’s discomfort, affirming universal suffrage – a controversial stance within his 
party because of the connotations that linked general suffrage with the ideals of the 
French Revolution. Bavinck’s rationale can be found in his De Vrouw in de Hedendaagsche 
Maatschappij (Kampen: Kok, 1918). See also Niels van Driel, ‘The Status of Women in 
Contemporary Society: Principles and Practice in Herman Bavinck’s Socio-Political 
Thought’, in John Bolt (ed.), Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, a Creator of 
Modern Dutch Theology (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), pp. 153-95; James 
Eglinton, ‘Democracy and Ecclesiology: An Aristocratic Church for a Democratic Age?’ 
in John Bowlin, ed., The Kuyper Center Review, vol. 4, Calvinism and Democracy (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), pp. 134-46. 
102 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 577.  
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individual personality.’103 This holistic unity of the entire human race is what 
distinguishes humanity from angels, in which an ethical unity does not obtain. Here, 
then, the concept of a federal covenant comes to the fore as essential in Bavinck’s 
account of humanity as an organism. 
 
Only humanity in its entirety – as one complete organism, summed up under a 
single  head, spread out over the whole earth, as prophet proclaiming the truth 
of God, as priest dedicating itself to God, as ruler controlling the earth and the 
whole of creation – only it is the fully finished image, the most telling and 
striking likeness of God.104 
 
Hence, the assertion of the organic in Bavinck’s anthropology means that a 
single head is required: ‘Humanity cannot be conceived as a completed organism unless 
it is united and epitomized in one head. In the covenant of grace Christ has that 
position, and he is the head of the church; in the covenant of works that position is 
occupied by Adam.’105 Emphatically this preserves the natural and ethical bond that 
binds all of humanity: 
 
The covenant of works and the covenant of grace stand and fall together. The 
same law applies to both. On the basis of a common physical descent an ethical 
unity [ethische eenheid] has been built that causes humanity – in keeping with its 
nature – to manifest itself as one organism and to unite its members in the 
closest possible way, not only by ties of blood but also by common participation 
in blessing and curse, sin and righteousness, death and life.106 
 
 In sum, for Bavinck, an absolute unity-in-diversity in the Triune God implies a 
superlative organic unity-in-diversity in the bearers of his image, in the human being and 
in the entire human race.107 The archetypal unity-in-diversity obtains by perichoretic 
union and God’s simple essence, while the ectype finds its unity by means of ethical and 
natural solidarity. Here, the covenant and its federal head’s ethical union with the 
human race are conceived not merely as a voluntaristic special ordinance of God 
																																																						
103 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 587; GD: 2, p. 634.  
104 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 576. 
105 Bavinck, RD: 2, pp. 577-8.  
106 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 579; GD: 2, p. 624.  
107 All of this has interesting implications for Bavinck’s account of original sin. On 
this, see Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, ‘Herman Bavinck on the Image of God and Original 
Sin’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 18 (2016): especially pp. 184-90. Parts of this 
section of this chapter can also be found in a modified form in this article.  
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(though they include that). It is a special ordinance of God which preserves and respects 
the ontologically Triune features of humanity.  
 Clearly, then, the organic motif is not merely an organizing device that Bavinck 
deploys without significant theological motivations, and in this regard Bavinck is 
certainly to be located as a worldview theologian characteristic of the neo-Calvinist 
tradition.108 By virtue of Bavinck’s Trinitarian doctrine of God, he shapes his doctrines 
of creation and anthropology in resistance to both uniformity and atomistic diversity 
with vigorous rigor, all the while deploying various thinkers in an eclectic manner.  
 Before moving on to the next chapter, however, a sketch of Bavinck’s 




IV. Revelation as Organic 
Though work has been done on the organic character of Bavinck’s 
understanding of general and special revelation respectively, less is written on the 
organic manner in which the two modes of revelation link together.109 General 
revelation is organic as both creation and providence teleologically project the glory of 
the Triune God, impressing that glory to the heart and psyche of every human creature. 
Special revelation is that verbal divine self-disclosure intrinsically communicated by the 
human personalities utilized by the divine will. Those human agents, in turn, are 
themselves created and organically located within their historical particularities. This 
section, therefore, observes that the two modes together constitute an organic unity for 
Bavinck, such that there is an organic center of the content of both modes of revelation, 
forming a unity-in-diversity. This section thus serves well as a pathway to the discussion 
in the next chapter on Bavinck’s understanding of wetenschap and knowledge as organic. 
What emerges in the previous sections is that Bavinck rigorously attends to the 
various dualisms that arise within the history of Christian doctrine. There is a uniformity 
that functions as the authoritarian tyrant that flattens out created diversities, on the one 
hand, and a diversity that reduces all particularities into atomistic singulars that have no 
																																																						
108 Cf. ‘Conclusion: Bavinck as “Worldview” Theologian’, in Eglinton, Trinity and 
Organism, pp. 128-9. 
109 Cf. Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 131-81. 
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relation to the created wholes of which they were a part, on the other. In conveying his 
beliefs on revelation, Bavinck takes no exception to the general mode of reasoning in 
Reformed theology which distinguishes between two modes of divine self-disclosure as 
general and special revelation. As the closing of the first chapter of the Stone lectures on 
the Philosophy of Revelation indicates, Bavinck was committed to the bond that ties both 
modes of revelation: ‘General revelation leads to special, special revelation points back 
to general. The one calls for the other, and without it remains imperfect and 
unintelligible. Together they proclaim the manifold wisdom which God has displayed in 
creation and redemption.’110  General and special revelation are harmonious and non-
contradictory as they express the unity of God’s thoughts as a single organism: ‘God’s 
thoughts cannot be opposed to one another and thus necessarily form an organic 
unity’.111 
Bavinck’s Certainty of Faith summarizes it thusly, ‘[r]evelation is an organism with 
a life of its own’, such that ‘as history in general is no mere sum of incidents but an 
organic unity of interrelated incidents but an organic unity of interrelated events tied by 
a single idea, so the words and facts that belong to the sphere of special revelation 
comprise a system ruled by one thought, one plan one goal’.112  
Bavinck’s chapter on general revelation in the Dogmatics begins with a survey of 
the doctrine as articulated in Augustine, Medieval and Reformed theology, and within 
his account he particularly emphasizes historical examples of the union and severing of 
the two modes of revelation. The severance of that bond became somewhat explicit in 
Medieval Catholic scholasticism and was restored by the Refomational emphases on the 
noetic effects of sin and its concomitant commitment to the necessity of Scripture to 
interpret revelation aright. If ‘scholasticism’ made the ‘distinction between natural and 
supernatural theology [as a result of natural revelation]’ into an ‘absolute contrast’, 
Bavinck argued, the Reformation redefined that distinction by claiming that sin has so 
darkened the mind that natural revelation would inevitably be distorted in its reception 
																																																						
110 Herman Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation (New York: Longman, Green, and Co., 
1908), 29.  
111 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 44.  
112 Herman Bavinck, The Certainty of Faith, trans. Harry der Nederlanden (Ontario: 
Paideia Press, 1980), p. 61.  
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apart from regeneration and Scripture.113 The value in general revelation is not that it 
‘has furnished us a natural theology or religion… Such a natural religion cannot be 
found anywhere, nor can it exist’, but rather that it provides Christians with a point of 
contact with nonbelievers while signaling special revelation’s ‘connectedness with the 
whole cosmic existence and life’.114 
Regeneration and special revelation correspond to both subjective and objective 
sides to the epistemological situation that attends the human knower: ‘Objectively 
needed by human beings to understand the general revelation of God in nature was the 
special revelation of God in Holy Scripture, which, accordingly, was compared by 
Calvin to glasses. Subjectively needed by human beings was the eye of faith to see God 
also in the work of his hands.’115 This principle that was rigorously upheld by the 
Reformation did not always survive the challenges that followed the centuries after it; 
the bond was ‘broken’ in important progressions throughout the history of theology 
such that in pivotal instances ‘reason again achieved some measure of authority 
alongside of faith’.116 This manifested itself in several ways: in the writings of 
independent treatises on natural theology, in the conviction that reason alone was 
sufficient to prove some central tenets of the Christian faith, or even in the opposite 
cases where reason is so disregarded that it mutes entirely the connection that special 
revelation has with the structures of the created world and mind.117  
Bavinck assesses this historical development by arguing that Scripture makes no 
distinction between natural and supernatural modes of revelation, considering them 
both instead under the same terms such that ‘all revelation, also that in nature is 
																																																						
113 Bavinck, RD, 1; p. 303-4. Eglinton rightly commented that ‘[Bavinck] then 
critiques this movement [in distinguishing natural and supernatural modes of revelation] 
as becoming inherently dualistic, particularly in the development of medieval Roman 
Catholic theology.’ Trinity and Organism, p. 140.   
114 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 322.  
115 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 304. On page 348, Bavinck associates regeneration with an 
internal mode of revelation: ‘Just as in the sciences the subject must correspond to the 
object, and in religion subjective religion must answer to objective religion, so external 
and objective revelation demands an internal revelation in the subject.’ The theological 
category and neo-calvinistic emphasis on common grace is also significant to 
understand Bavinck here, as chapter four will explore.  
116 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 305-6.  
117 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 305-6. 
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supernatural’.118 The whole of redemptive-history testifies to the religious character of 
creation, the natural human longing for the divine, the all-encompassing character of 
divine providence and non-verbal revelation. Divine condescension in self-disclosure is 
not simply on account of the necessities that arise from the introduction of human sin 
into the created order – God speaks even in the pre-lapsarian order; his intentions have 
never been otherwise:  
 
Hence, in the state of integrity, according to the teaching of Scripture, natural 
and supernatural revelation go together. They are not opposite but 
complementary. Both are mediate and bound to certain forms. Both are based 
on the idea that God in his grace condescends to human beings and conforms 
himself to them. And the modes of both are that God makes his presence felt, 
his voice heart, and his works seen. From the beginning, by theophanies, word, 
and deed, God made himself known to people.119  
 
Contrary to a strict division between natural and supernatural revelation, 
therefore, Bavinck argues that all modes of revelation are supernatural in in their sources 
while in some cases entirely natural in some aspect of the manner by which they are 
conveyed. This is by virtue of the identical divine agent who remains the subject of both 
modes of revelation.120 The content and goal of revelation, therefore, are identical for 
both modes. Though the Trinitarian God is revealed climactically in special revelation, 
Christians can return to general revelation and see marks of the Trinity and the 
centrality of Christ in a clearer fashion – seeing increasingly the patterns of unities-in-
diversities that exhibit creation’s organic character. Provocatively, Bavinck likens this 
process as one of assimilation:  
 
The whole of revelation, summed up in Scripture, is a special revelation that 
comes to us in Christ. Christ is the center and content of that whole special 
revelation… Now special revelation has recognized and valued general 
revelation, has taken it over and, as it were, assimilated it. And this is also what 
the Christian does, as do the theologians. They position themselves in the 
																																																						
118 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 307. Later, Bavinck writes that though this distinction has 
some validity if defined rightly, this ‘contrast first surfaces in the work of the church 
fathers.’ RD, 1: p. 355. 
119 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 310.  
120 Cf. Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 367-76 
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Christian faith, in special revelation, and from there look out upon nature and 
history.121 
 
A disjunction between natural and supernatural revelation leads to the 
incapability of special revelation to connect with nature and history, leading it to 
function only in a mechanical and ‘superadded’ fashion. ‘When this distinction [between 
natural and supernatural revelation] was understood as a separation – which could easily 
happen – special revelation came altogether to stand by itself, without any connection 
with nature and history. In that case, its historical and organic character was denied.’122 
Bavinck performs this conviction as he mutes the organic motif when general revelation 
is discussed apart from special revelation.123 Indeed, other than passing references to the 
connectedness of creation, its organic character is not explicitly discussed by Bavinck 
until the union of the two is explicitly invoked. Eglinton suggests the organic motif 
would make ‘a sharp disappearance’ precisely because of Bavinck’s belief that creation’s 
triniformity is only enjoyed by those armed with Scripture and regeneration.124 It is in 
those instances that the language of organic connectedness and unity-and-diversity 
emerge consistently.  
 The goal of redemptive revelation is the teleological promise of redemption – a 
redemption not merely of individual souls but the whole of humanity and the cosmos as 
organisms. Here, Bavinck’s view on revelation systematically coheres with his organic 
anthropology: ‘It is none other than to redeem human beings in their totality of body 
and soul… to redeem not only individual, isolated human beings but humanity as an 
organic whole’; it is nothing less than to redeem ‘the whole world in its organic 
connectedness, from the power of sin… Sin has spoiled and destroyed everything: the 
intellect and the will, the ethical and the physical world’.125 Inherent in this goal is the 
reunification of one’s knowledge and person such that humanity can think God’s 
thoughts after him, to see Christ as the center of all things, and to see creation for what 
																																																						
121 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 321. On the same page, Bavinck adds a nuance by 
distinguishing between the subjective epistemological (and redemptive) necessity of 
Scripture as the lens by which one reads nature correctly, and the objective reality that 
nature precedes Scripture.  
122 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 358. Hence, a paragraph later Bavinck writes: ‘In Roman 
Catholicism this supernaturalistic and dualistic system has been consistently worked 
out’.  
123 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, pp. 149-51.  
124 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 150.  
125 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 346.  
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it is. In short, it is a total organic correspondence between objective reality and 
subjective appropriation that sees creation, redemption, and history as unities-in-
diversities with God’s glory as the unifying goal and Christ as the unifying center: 
‘Objective revelation passes into subjective appropriation. In Christ, in the middle of 
history, God created an organic center; from this center, in an ever widening sphere, 
God drew the circles within which the light of revelation shines.’126 Bavinck’s summary 
of the Christian worldview in the Dogmatics communicates the culmination of these 
insights:  
 
The worldview of Scripture and all of Christian theology is a very different 
[worldview from monism or naturalism]. Its name is theism, not monism; its 
orientation is supernatural, not naturalistic. According to this theistic worldview, 
there is a multiplicity of substances, forces, materials, and laws. It does not strive 
to erase the distinctions between God and the world, between spirit (mind) and 
matter, between psychological and physical, ethical and religious phenomena. It 
seeks rather to discover the harmony that holds all things together and unites 
them and that is the consequence of the creative thought of God. Not identity 
or uniformity but unity and diversity is what it aims at.127 
 
 Bavinck’s emphases are clear: general and special revelation communicate the 
organic unity of God’s thoughts, and the two are assimilated into the human 
consciousness through regeneration in a manner that counters the dissecting and 
atomizing powers of sin. Only when the two modes of revelation are taken together by 
the epistemic agent that reality’s organic character comes to the fore, forming a 
worldview that sees a harmonious whole in the midst of the diversities encountered in 
creation.  
 It has been observed elsewhere that Bavinck was critical of pre-modern 
accounts of Scripture and its inspiration precisely because they understood these 
theological loci too mechanically.128 By this, Bavinck meant that pre-modern theologians 
often conceived of inspiration in a manner that did not sufficiently appreciate the 
historical and psychological conditions that mediate the process of Scriptural inspiration 
– a link that would tie God’s inspiration with the fullness of human authorship and 
																																																						
126 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 383. In this light, it is significant that the only mention of 
the ‘organic’ in Bavinck’s section of scientific principles occurs after he introduces 
Scripture into the discussion in his concluding remarks, in RD, 1: p. 231.  
127 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 368.  
128 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 415; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, p. 165.  
	 62 
meticulous divine providence.129 Though Bavinck redefines the organic language he 
inherited from his 19th-20th century philosophical counterparts, and uses it for his own 
purposes, it remains significant that Bavinck describes the organic developments made 
by the Romantics in his introductory section on the doctrine of revelation in a manner 
that closely resembles his own descriptions:  
  
By contrast [to rationalism], Hamann, Claudius, Lavataer, Herder, Jacobi, and 
others placed more stress on the kinship between religion and art and thus 
associated revelation with the inspiration of genius. They expanded the concept 
of revelation to such an extent that almost everything seemed to originate from 
revelation: religion, poetry, philosophy, history, and language are all seen as 
expressions of the one and same original life… And the person of Christ came 
to stand in the center of all those revelations: everything pointed to him, and 
everything revolved around him.130  
 
The developments by the mediating theologies that followed them, then, 
resulted in a more ‘organic’ account of revelation:  
 
When we compare this newer concept of revelation with what was generally 
accepted before that time, we find that it is distinguished by the following 
features: (1) Special revelation, which is the basis of Christianity, is more 
organically conceived and more intimately connected in heart and conscience 
with general revelation in nature and history; (2) scholars adhering to the new 
concept attempt to understand special revelation itself as a historical process, 
not only in word but also in deed, both in prophecy and miracle, which then 
culminate in the person of Christ; (3) they view its content as existing exclusively 
or predominantly in religious-ethical truth, which aims primarily, not at teaching, 
but at moral amelioration, redemption from sin; and (4) they make a sharp 
distinction between the revelation that gradually took place in history and its 
documentation or description in Holy Scripture; the latter is not itself the 
revelation but only more or less accurate record of it.131 
 
																																																						
129 ‘The old theology construed revelation after a quite eternal and mechanical 
fashion, and too readily identified it with Scripture. Our eyes are nowadays more and 
more opened to the fact that revelation in many ways is historically and psychologically 
“mediated”’. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 22. This does not imply, however, that Bavinck 
considers there to be authentic errors in Scripture precisely because he considers it to be 
an organism. See the discussions in Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, pp. 155-82, and 
Richard B. Gaffin, God’s Word in Servant Form: Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck on the 
Doctrine of Scripture (Greenville: Reformed Academic Press, 2008).  
130 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 289-90.  
131 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 291-2.  
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 Significant differences remain between Bavinck’s organicism and the modern 
accounts he outlines in these two texts. Bavinck made no disjunction between revelation 
and Scripture – though revelation is not reducible to Scripture, Scripture is nonetheless 
the revealed word of God and the only means through which Christ, the Triune God’s 
will, and the history of redemption are known. To create a dichotomy between religious 
or Christological truths that affect moral renovation and its supposedly non-essential, 
disposable (and potentially erroneous) historical claims is ironically to recapitulate the 
very mechanistic tendency that the mediating theologians wanted to reject in the first 
place.132 Scripture’s historic, theological, and metaphysical claims have to be taken 
seriously as a single organic whole that possesses no contradictions with the truths 
revealed in the general studies of nature and history.  
 Nonetheless, the affinities are also clear. The holism with which Bavinck 
describes the Romantics marks his own thoughts – Christ is the center of revelation 
toward which all things point and from which all things flow. Revelation incorporates 
the historical process of inspiration and the mediation of the personalities from which 
that revelation was penned. There is a connectedness that persists between revelation as 
an undergirding and pervasive ground that inspires the other fields of study – revelation 
is not merely the foundation for religious truth claims. Comparing Bavinck’s description 
of the Romantics above to his rationale concerning the necessity that one explore a 
philosophy of revelation in his Stone lectures is instructive:  
 
The world itself rests on revelation; revelation is the presupposition, the 
foundation, the secret of all that exists in all its forms. The deeper science 
pushes its investigation, the more clearly will it discover that revelation underlies 
all created being. In every moment of time beats the pulse of eternity; every 
point in space is filled with the omnipresence of God; the finite is supported by 
the infinite, all becoming is rooted in being. Together with all created beings, 
that special revelation which comes to us in the Person of Christ is built on 
these presuppositions. The foundations of creation and redemption are the 
same.133  
 
 Hence, the task of a philosophy of revelation is not simply the exploration of 
the idea of revelation in the abstract, general sense. It is rather to correlate, trace, and 
explore the connections that revelation has with the diverse fields of human knowing: ‘a 
																																																						
132 See the discussion in Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 415-48.  
133 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 28.  
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philosophy of revelation… will trace the idea of revelation, both in its form and content, and 
correlate it with the rest of our knowledge and life.’134 As such, lest its task devolve into 
‘idle’ speculation, it follows every other field of knowledge by being regulated by 
revelation itself. ‘The philosophy of revelation, just like that of history, art, and the rest, 
must take its start from its object, from revelation.’135 It is these convictions that form 
the backbone for Bavinck’s constructive labors in the Stone lectures. 
 These observations anticipate the argument of the next chapter: if organicism 
characterizes Bavinck’s descriptions of creation in light of God, anthropology, and 
revelation, what are the implications for Bavinck’s account of knowledge? If revelation 
is an organism, does Bavinck consider human knowing, and the character of science 
itself, as organisms? It will be made clear that Bavinck answers these in the affirmative.  
 
																																																						
134 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 24. Emphasis original.  
135 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 26. Bavinck’s self-definition of his task 
suggests that John Bolt’s argument that Bavinck’s purpose in writing a philosophy of 
revelation (and not a theology of revelation) was to “explore the reality of revelation in 
general… as a universal phenomenon” requires nuance. Bavinck on the Christian Life: 
Following Jesus in Faithful Service (Wheaton: Crossway, 2015), 136. We can characterize 
Bavinck’s purpose in these lectures as the task of investigating the way in which nature, 
culture, religion, and other areas of human knowledge are actually instances of 
responses to general revelation, which leads them to anticipate more coherent responses 
from special revelation 
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Chapter 3: Organism and Wetenschap – Part 1 
The whole was before the parts, and out of the whole, the members of the organism of science have 
slowly grown and entered into maturity. And still this process of ‘differentiation’ continues…So 
that this unity is never forgotten, the division of science into a multitude of subjects is seen as a 
healthy and normal phenomenon.1 
 
Christianity has made us first understand that the world, that humanity, that science is one.2 
 
The previous chapter displayed Bavinck’s organic worldview with respect to three 
key theological loci: the doctrines of God, anthropology, and revelation. The theme of 
unity-in-diversity was traced through them: the doctrine of God as Trinity means that 
creation is characterized as an organism containing various levels of unities-in-
diversities; unity-in-diversity shapes Bavinck’s account of the individual, the individual 
in relation with others, and the whole of human race, because each level is considered to 
be organic; general and special revelation form a single organism as Christ is the uniting 
center in nature, history, and Scripture. These objective organic realities are then 
suggestively connected to their absorption into the human subjective consciousness. 
The question that can be asked, then, is this: how, and in what way, did Bavinck also 
deploy the organic motif in reference to the structure of human knowledge and the 
sciences (wetenschappen)?  
Answering this question might also illumine two different emphases that arise in the 
secondary literature on Bavinck’s epistemology – two emphases that might, initially, be 
read to contain an implicit tension. One set of readings emphasizes that Bavinck 
advocates a strong distinction between the methods and grounds for the sciences, while 
another places a premium on those texts in Bavinck where he articulates that theology 
and its principles ought to play an influential, even transformative, role in characterizing 
the other sciences. The underlying argument in this chapter, as applied to these differing 
																																																						
1	Dutch original: ‘Het geheel was er vóór de deelen, en uit het geheel zijn de leden 
van het organisme der wetenschap langzamerhand uitgegroeid en tot wasdom gekomen. 
En nog altijd zet dit proces der “Differenzirung” zich voort… Mits deze eenheid nooit 
vergeten wordt, is echter splitsing der wetenschap in eene veelheid van vakken als een 
gezond, normaal verschijnsel te beschouwen’. Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 59. 	
2 Herman Bavinck, ‘Christendom en Natuurwetenschap’ in Kennis en Leven: 
Opstellen en artikelen uit vroegere jaren, C. B. Bavinck (ed.) (Kampen: Kok, 1922), p. 197. 
Dutch original: ‘; het Christendom heeft het ons ’t eerst doen verstaan, dat de wereld, 
dat de menschheid, dat de wetenschap ééne is 
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emphases in the secondary literature, is that reading Bavinck’s account of knowing and 
science in light of the organic motif accommodates both emphases while significantly 
nuancing them. That is, there is no need to choose between an emphasis on the 
diversity of the sciences and their principles and the theological unity that undergirds 
them. As a single organism, science and the structure of human knowing, too, contain a 
unity-in-diversity. The readings that emphasize the diversity of the sciences, then, are 
correct insofar as they observe that Bavinck is careful to ensure that theology does not 
merely dictate the other sciences, as if the material content of the sciences can be 
exclusively deduced from theology’s principia. However, they are one-sided insofar as 
they mute Bavinck’s organic concerns in characterizing the theological character of the 
sciences such that there is a uniting center in the organism of knowledge: Scripture and 
Christian principles. Interpreters of Bavinck that emphasize how he prescribed that 
theology ‘crosses the borders’ of its principles and boundaries to the other sciences, too, 
might become one-sided when they neglect to attend to the diversities that reside within 
the organism of knowledge and science.3  
With the organic motif controlling one’s reading, these seemingly contradictory 
trajectories can be redefined to become mutually informing. In other words, my 
argument is an attempt at a reconciliation by way of a redefinition: its cuts across the 
sets of readings while accommodating their best insights.  
Subscribing to the former emphasis are those interpreters that take Bavinck to be 
reproducing the epistemology of Thomas Aquinas, according to which there is a clear 
distinction between theological and non-theological science. An implication of this 
position is the view that natural reason is relatively sufficient with regard to natural 
affairs, though it should be informed by and consistent with scriptural revelation and 
theology as the queen of the sciences. Theology’s principia should not go beyond its 
bounds by imposing itself on the other sciences. Though this literature has been briefly 
surveyed in the first chapter, two more citations are worth noting to present the 
emphasis these readings take. John Bolt, in the context of discussing Bavinck’s view of 
natural law, says it this way:  
 
																																																						
3	Wolter Huttinga, ‘“Marie Antoinette” or Mystical Depth?: Herman Bavinck on 
Theology as Queen of the Sciences,’ in James Eglinton and George Harinck (eds.), Neo-
Calvinism and the French Revolution (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 145	
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Acknowledging the need for Scriptural guidance to understand general revelation 
should not be used in such a way that it provides privileged knowledge to the followers 
of Christ that can trump public, natural knowledge. Our arguments in the public 
square include witness to the gospel and reasoned argument from common 
principles.4 
 
Also, in perhaps a clearer statement, another interpreter claims that Bavinck 
distinguishes philosophy and theology on the basis of a more fundamental distinction 
between theological and non-theological science:  
 
Bavinck distinguishes the principia of theological science and non-theological 
science… In other words since the scope of theology is bounded by its unique 
principia, theologians are limited to drawing theological conclusions from theology’s 
unique cognitive foundation (Holy Scripture), operating with the unique mode of 
certainty that theology employs (faith), aiming its operations toward theology unique 
end (eternal union with God), and refraining from either imposing its unique 
foundation, method, mode, and end on other sciences or allowing other sciences 
(such as philosophy in Schleiermacher’s case) to impose their foundations, methods, 
modes, and ends on theology.5 
 
On another set of readings, the emphasis is on how Bavinck connects theology to 
the other sciences such that it crosses over to the other sciences and undergirds all 
learning precisely because all of wetenschap is inherently theological. These may not 
contradict the previous set of readings surveyed above, but its emphasis remains 
considerably different. Here, four interpreters are representative.  
Wolter Huttinga, first, argues that Bavinck understands theology to be the telos and 
that transcends its own boundaries into other domains. ‘Science, realizing itself in the 
deepest and fulfilled sense, becomes theology.’6 Theology is not privileged merely 
because it deals with divine matters, but also because ‘it intensifies and concentrates the 
																																																						
4 John Bolt, ‘Herman Bavinck on Natural Law and Two Kingdoms: Some Further 
Reflections,’ The Bavinck Review 4 (2013): p. 93. Emphasis original.  
5 Laurence O’Donnell, ‘“Bavinck’s Bug” or “Van Tillian” Hypochondria?: An 
Analysis of Prof. Oliphint’s Assertion That Cognitive Realism and Reformed Theology 
are Incompatible,’ in Peter Escalante and W. Bradford Littlejohn (eds.), For the Healing of 
the Nations: Essays on Creation, Redemption and Neo-Calvinism (Landrum: Davenant Trust: 
2014),  pp. 153-4. This is not to suggest that this set of readings question the claim that 
theology is the highest and queen of the sciences or that scripture is the norming norm 
for human thought. Rather, its whether Bavinck believes that Scripture can unify and 
undergird the other sciences and whether wetenschap as a whole (including theology) can 
be considered as a single organism.  
6 Wolter Huttinga, ‘“Marie Antoinette” or Mystical Depth?’ p. 145. Emphasis 
mine.  
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movement of knowing in which all the sciences share.’7 Thus, it follows that ‘Bavinck’s 
understanding of “theology” crosses the borders of theology as an academic discipline and 
becomes something more encompassing… In summary Bavinck’s statement that 
theology is the queen of the sciences does not aim at “haughty elevation,” but at 
“humble intensification” [of all the sciences].’8 
 Philip Fisk, secondly, argues that Bavinck places theology as the queen of the 
sciences precisely because of its explanatory power over them, going so far as to 
conclude that for Bavinck theology is a ‘universal science’:  
 
In other words, the meaning of the ‘queen of the sciences’ is not that there are 
some qualities to glean from theology that may be of use to the sciences, but 
there are qualities from all the sciences that can only be explained by the queen 
mother – theology… Theology, for Bavinck, is a universal science.9 
 
Further, theology’s role is to integrate and provide the foundations for each science. 
Fisk wrote on: 
 
theology is not only a scientific and therefore academic discipline, rightly 
deserving a place next to other schools of the academy, but she is the queen, or 
better, the scientia prima inter pares who integrates and lays the foundation of the 
sciences.10 
 
 Finally, James Eglinton and Michael Bräutigam further claim that Bavinck and 
Adolf Schlatter imbue theology with a unique unifying capacity: theology ought to be in 
the university because without it the sciences become disconnected and atomistic. 
Wetenschap cannot do without theology.  
 
In addition to their rejection of a dualistic separation of theology and science, both 
of these theologians claimed that theology was necessary within the academy 
precisely to prevent the fragmentation of its various faculties and departments. 
Their common assertion is that theology alone is able to serve as an integrative force 
among the academic disciplines, as only theology provides a coherent framework 
																																																						
7 Huttinga, ‘“Marie Antoinette” or Mystical Depth?’, p. 154. 
8 Huttinga, ‘“Marie Antoinette” or Mystical Depth?’, p. 154. Emphasis mine.  
9 Philip J. Fisk, ‘The Unaccommodated Bavinck and Hodge: Prolegomena with 
Natural Certainty,’ TrinJ 30 (2009), p. 109.  
10 Fisk, ‘The Unaccommodated Bavinck and Hodge,’ p. 125. S. P. van der Walt’s 
Afrikaans study of Bavinck’s philosophy echoes this interpretation, considering 
Bavinck’s structure of the sciences as a ‘unity and diversity [eenheid en verskeidenheid], Die 
Wysbegeerte van Dr. Herman Bavinck (Potchefstroom: Pro Rege, 1953), pp. 125-7.  
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that enables them to function properly and collaborate in harmony. They foresaw 
the university as becoming a cacophony of arbitrarily associated faculties when 
deprived of theology.11 
 
 Once again, the organic motif seems to play, if any, merely an implicit role in 
these discussions. The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the organic motif shapes 
Bavinck’s structuring of human knowledge and thus the relationship between theology 
and the sciences. This reading provides a more holistic interpretation of Bavinck’s 
thought while accounting for the differing interpretations of his thinking on this matter 
and accommodating the insights those readings offer. Bavinck does maintain the 
integrity of the diversity of the sciences and their relative independence; such a view 
lends itself to the readings that emphasize the divisions of science in line with the 
Thomistic readings. However, in Bavinck, theology does play a foundational role with 
regard to the other sciences, providing the unity and end that harmoniously grounds the 
diverse fields of knowledge.  
The organic motif nuances and reinterprets both sets of readings and securely 
situates Bavinck as standing on the classical orthodox tradition with his own neo-
Calvinistic stamp. The structure of knowledge and wetenschap forms a single organism in 
unity and diversity. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, through a close investigation of 
Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics, Christelijke wetenschap, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing and other 
key texts, I will show that Bavinck himself characterizes knowledge as an organism. This 
involves three interconnected and cumulative claims: (a) there is a unified Christian 
worldview according to which theology provides the resources to develop a philosophy 
and understanding of knowledge, (b) theology is the queen of the sciences because all of 
science is theological, and (c) though methodological distinctions have to be made 
because of human finitude when one pursues the sciences, all of science is ultimately a 
singular whole with multiple operative foundations. Finally, I close by considering the 
relation between Bavinck’s organic account of knowing and his understanding of the 
Kingdom of God and sphere sovereignty, while raising a few questions that arise from 
Bavinck’s construction in relation to his post at the Free University of Amsterdam.  
 
I. Organic Knowing 
																																																						
11 Eglinton and Bräutigam, ‘Scientific Theology?’, p. 30.  
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For Bavinck, human knowledge bears a distinctly organic shape precisely because 
revelation and the cosmos are interconnected and organic wholes as well. The organic 
character of existence and revelation forms the basis on which human knowledge takes 
place and flourishes. This is a constant note throughout Bavinck’s oeuvre. Early in his 
career, Bavinck delivered a lecture on the topic of whether a ‘systematic’ theology is 
desirable, the ‘The Pros and Cons of a Dogmatic System [Het voor en tegen van een 
Dogmatische System].’12 As he considers an affirmative answer to this question, he grounds 
his claims on a prior conviction that all of knowledge itself is a systematic unity because 
of the organic character of the cosmos:  
 
After all, everything that exists is systematic. The entire cosmos was created and 
arranged according to a fixed plan. It is not an aggregate of materials and forces 
that were accidentally merged. If it were, it would not constitute a cosmos, a 
unity. But all things are oriented toward each other, exist together in an 
unbreakable connection, together constitute a system, an organism.13 
 
One sees patterns of the organic unity of all things within the differing levels of 
organic life – from plants to animals to human beings. In each case, what makes an 
organism distinct is the observation that it is a whole that unifies the sum of its parts in 
a systematic manner:  
 
within organisms, each small part is governed, formed, and predisposed by the 
whole. Thus the whole precedes the parts, and supplies each part with its own 
function within the whole. Within the organic for the first time we encounter a 
whole in terms of its parts, unity in diversity, principle within the system.14 
 
This naturally follows from the theses of the previous chapter. Knowledge 
relates parts to wholes because of the Christian conviction that God himself exists as 
the Trinity – the archetype of all organic existence. Here, he explicitly follows Kuyper in 
affirming that the intelligible areas of life rest upon this confession:  
 
He, the Triune One, shows us in himself the entirely perfect system: origin, type, 
model, and image of all other systems. For this reason, it is an altogether 
																																																						
12 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Pros and Cons of a Dogmatic System,’ The Bavinck 
Review 5, trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman (2014), pp. 90-103. 
13 Bavinck, ‘The Pros and Cons,’ p. 90.  
14 Bavinck, ‘The Pros and Cons,’ p. 91. 
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remarkable and glorious idea with which Dr. Kuyper concludes his explanation 
of the Antirevolutionary Program, namely, that life in theological, moral, 
juridicial, social, and political arenas will never be plumbed as long as the 
investigation does not come to rest in God himself, that is, in the confession of 
his Sacred Trinity.15 
 
 These observations resist the idea that the pursuit of systems may cultivate 
narrowness of mind. For Bavinck, seeing all things through the Triune archetype is the 
grounds on which one can establish an encompassing and scientific knowledge of all 
things. A ‘scientific system’, he writes, ‘attempts to discern order and connection’ within 
the ‘endless series of phenomena’ that encounters the human knower.16 The flourishing 
of the natural sciences and human knowledge depends on the affirmation that 
systematic knowledge is attainable: 
 
If everything were chaos, a motley mass, that activity would be impossible; 
science would then not be able to exist. But the person who pursues knowledge 
proceeds on the basis of the assumption that systems exist everywhere, that 
what exists can be known, that an idea, a word, lies at the foundation of 
everything. Without that presupposition, science would destroy itself; and the 
suicide of science may not be demanded, either. Without Reason existing 
outside of us, Reason within us is a purposeless enigma. To practice science is to 
seek for the Word that has made all things.17 
 
A systematic knowledge is supposed to reflect the systematic character of that which is 
external to one – it fulfills the desire that has been implanted by God himself:  
 
Thus, a scientific system may be nothing other than a reproduction in words, a 
translation into language, a description, a reflection in our consciousness, of the 
system present in things themselves. Science does not have to create and to 
fantasize, but only to describe what exists. We contemplate what God has 
thought eternally beforehand and has given embodied form in the creation.  
 
So then, no one can speak evil of seeking a system. To describe all things 
systematically, to search for the system of things, is rather a calling and a duty 
and a yearning placed in the human heart by God himself.18  
																																																						
15 Bavinck, ‘The Pros and Cons,’ p. 92.  
16 Bavinck, ‘The Pros and Cons,’ p. 92. 
17 Bavinck, ‘The Pros and Cons,’ p. 93. This bears similarities with Kuyper’s 
understanding of the purpose of scholarship as grounded in the Logos. See, especially his 
Scholarship: Two Convocation Addresses on University Life, Harry van Dyke (trans.), (Grand 
Rapids, Christian’s Library Press, 2014). 
18 Bavinck, ‘The Pros and Cons,’ p. 93.  
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 These claims are especially stimulating when one recalls Bavinck’s belief that 
revelation in both general and special modes manifests the organic unity of the thoughts 
of God. For Bavinck, God’s organic knowledge can be reflected by the knowledge that 
human beings possess in some analogical fashion as they internally appropriate God’s 
revelation. Behind Bavinck’s construal here is the Reformed orthodox distinction 
between archetypal and ectypal knowledge – the divine archetype desires to produce in 
his image bearers ectypal knowledge of the contents of his mind. As Bavinck affirms in 
the Reformed Dogmatics:  
 
It is his good pleasure, however, to reproduce in human beings made in his 
image an ectypal knowledge that reflects his archetypal knowledge (cognition 
archetypa) in his own divine mind. He does this, not by letting us view the ideas 
in his being (Malebranche) or by passing them all on to us at birth (Plato, the 
theory of innate ideas), but by displaying them to the human mind in the works 
of his hands.19 
 
Just as in any organism, human knowledge bears the shape of a unity-in-
diversity. There is a central principle that unifies the diverse areas of knowledge. This 
can be discerned in numerous places in Bavinck’s Prolegomena. The Logos, after all, is the 
center of revelation:  
 
All the revelations and words of God, in nature and history, in creation and re-
creation, both in the Old and New Testament, have their ground, unity, and 
center in him. He is the sun; the individual words of God are his rays….God’s 
revelation exists only because he is the Logos. He is the first principle of 
cognition, in a general sense of all knowledge, in a special sense, as the Logos 
incarnate, of all knowledge of God, of religion, and theology (Matt. 11:27).20  
 
In short, God and his revelation are of paramount significance for science 
because ‘all science [wetenschap] is the rendering of the thoughts [of God] laid down by 
God in his works’21; it follows that reflection on the God who reveals is of fundamental 
significance for the pursuit of science. Science cannot impose itself on theology, neither 
can theology merely dictate to science its course, but if science, ‘driven by free 
																																																						
19 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 233.  
20 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 402.  
21 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 58. Dutch original: ‘Want alle wetenschap is 
vertolking der gedachten, die door God in zijne werken neergelegd zijn.’ 
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convictions, of course, and not by coercion – allies itself with the Christian faith [it] will 
be able to do more and labor more energetically for the spiritual and intellectual unity of 
humankind. Such unity is guaranteed in the unity of God and is the hope of all 
religion.’22 The consistent tone is that the obtaining of intellectual unity depends upon 
recognizing the resources that the Christian faith possesses for academic pursuit.  
Organic knowing, thus, depends upon theology and revelation.  
 
The justification of theology is grounded in the essence of the Christian religion. 
Revelation addresses itself to human beings in their totality and has the whole 
world as its object. In all areas of life it joins the battle against deception. It 
offers material for the profoundest thought processes and in the field of science 
plants the knowledge of God alongside of and in organic connection with that 
of humanity and the whole.23  
 
 It is here that Bavinck’s short treatise on worldview is relevant. Bavinck writes 
that, in the past century, the individual felt  a ‘disharmony between our thinking and 
feeling, between our wants and acts.’24 A discord exists between religion and culture, 
science and life, such that a unified ‘world-and-life view’ is felt to be missing.25 
Modernity, despite this, continues to resist the Christian faith as an obsolete position. 
Bavinck seeks to vindicate the view that such a renunciation is mistaken, for the 
Christian worldview provides significant answers to the enduring questions of the 
human spirit,  the relationship of thinking and being, of being and becoming, of 
becoming and act, and the character of who one is, the world, and one’s task in the 
																																																						
22 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 299-300.  
23 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 607. Bavinck echoes Kuyper, who advises university students 
not just to ‘work through the books on [one’s] shelf, but proceed as demanded by your 
ability to absorb, in keeping with the organic interconnectedness of knowledge’. 
Scholarship, p. 18.  
24 Herman Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (Kampen: Kok, 1929), p. 8. Dutch 
original: ‘Er is eene disharmonie tusschen ons denken en gevoelen. Tusschen ons willen 
en handelen.’ 
25 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldeschouwing, p. 8. ‘Er ontbreekt eene “einheitliche” 
wereld-en-levenbeschouwing, en daarom is dit woord de leuze van den dag en het 
zoeken daarnaar de arbeid, waaraan allen deelnemen, die belangstellend meeleven met 
hun tijd.’ Bavinck cites James Orr’s The Christian View of God and the World as a source 
concerning the significance of the phrase ‘worldview’. Bavinck’s comments on Orr are 
expanded in his ‘Eene belangrijke apologie van de Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing’, 
Theologische Studiën (1894): pp. 142-52. On Orr’s influence on Kuyper, see Peter S. 
Heslam, Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 92-5.  
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world.26 Christianity’s explanatory power resides precisely in its capacity to provide 
harmony. ‘Autonomous thinking’, Bavinck writes,  
 
cannot find a satisfactory answer to these questions; it oscillates between 
materialism and spiritualism, between atomism and dynamism, between nomism 
and antinomism. But Christendom maintains a balance and reveals to us a 
wisdom which reconciles man with God, but because of that also with himself, 
with the world, and with life.27  
 
The content of the Christian faith thus provides the conceptual and 
metaphysical resources to unify the disparate phenomena that one encounters, thus 
preventing an unstable oscillation between poles in tension. It provides a real alternative 
– an organic explanation of reality quite antithetical to the mechanical interpretations of 
the modern age that reduce reality into purely material terms.28 One turns now to the 
first of three interconnected claims that come from these convictions – the validity of 
the search for a unified worldview. The confession that the world is an ‘organism’ is the 
basis ‘alone’ on which ‘philosophy and worldview have a right and ground of 
existence’.29  
 
a. A ‘Unified Worldview’ - The Organic and the Mechanical 
 
If the cosmos is indeed an organism, and if knowledge bears an organic shape 
that appropriates the organic revelation of God, then Bavinck contends that a unified 
and distinctly Christian worldview is attainable. Beneath the distinctions and 
particularities of each field of knowledge is a harmonious view of the whole. The world 
reveals God’s wisdom, and it is ‘the same divine wisdom that binds the world into an 
																																																						
26 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 14.  
27 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 14. Dutch original: ‘Het autonome 
denken vindt op die vragen geen bevredigend antwoord; het oscilleert tusschen 
materialisme en spiritualisme, tusschen atomisme en dynamisme, tusschen nomisme en 
antinomisme. Maar het Christendom bewaart het evenwicht en openbaart ons eene 
wijsheid, welke den mensch met God, maar daarin ook met zichzelven, met de wereld 
en met het leven verzoent.’ 
28 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 39.  
29 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 32. Dutch original: ‘Indien deze mogelijk 
is, dank kan dit alleen daaruit verklaard worden, dat de wereld een organisme is en dus 
eerst als zoodanig is gedacht. Dan alleen heeft philosophie en wereldbeschouwing recht 
en grond van bestaan, also ook op dit hoogtepunt der kennis subject en object 
samenstemmen, als de rede in ons beantwoordt aan de principa van alle zijn en kennen.’  
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organic whole that plants in us an urge for a unified [einheitliche] worldview.’30 The use of 
the German adjective with a Dutch noun, einheitliche wereldbeschouwing [or, the fully 
German einheitliche Weltanschauung] appears in some key places in Bavinck, as one shall 
see, as he was keen to maintain and establish the unity that undergirds all knowing.31  
A consideration of Bavinck’s statements concerning the achievability of a 
unified worldview requires some attention to Bavinck’s description of the holistic 
concerns behind both philosophy and theology. In his 1883 inaugural address at the 
theological school in Kampen, Bavinck utilizes a German phrase in affirming that 
theology is a ‘universal science’ [Universalwissenschaft]. Much like philosophy, theology 
assumes a central position and covers every area of life – the difference is that 
philosophy looks at all things from the ‘standpoint of man’ while theology is 
theocentric. Both disciplines seek to explain all the phenomena of life but with different 
tools, methods, and questions of inquiry. Both, therefore, must go together – but in 
order to do that, a ‘reconciliation’ between the two must take place. How is 
reconciliation achieved? ‘The reconciliation of both is given in Christ. Once [this is so] 
they fall perfectly together. The view of God is also that of the true man.’32 
What does that reconciliation by Christ look like? Further clarity may be 
achieved by observing Bavinck’s 1902 lecture on theology and religious studies, written 
as a reflection on the Modern demand that religious studies ought to be a confessionally 
neutral discipline in distinction from the pietistic character of theology. Religion, 
Bavinck argues consistently, cannot be divorced from a holistic picture of all things. Just 
																																																						
30 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 32.  
31 One other early commentator has observed the same significance in Bavinck’s 
use of the term: Cornelius Jaarsma, The Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck: A 
Textbook in Education (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1935), pp. 41-7.  
32 Herman Bavinck, De wetenschap der H. Godgeleerdheid: Rede ter aanvaarding van het 
leeraarsambt aan de Theologische School te Kampen (Kampen: Zalsman, 1883), pp. 35-6. Dutch 
original and full text: ‘Eene “Universalwissenschaft” is dus de Theologie. ‘Zij komt 
daarin met nog ééne wetenschap overeen, met de Wijsbegeerte. Ook deze neemt een 
centraal standpunt in en omvat alle gebied des levens en des wetens. Toch is tusschen 
beide het onderscheid groot. De Philosophie is anthropocentrisch; zij beziet alle dingen 
van het standpunt des menschen uit, bij zijn licht; zij is de beschouwing des menschen, 
met hem tot middelpunt en maatstaf. Maar de Theologie is theocentrisch; zij beziet alles 
van boven, van God uit, bij Diens licht; zij is de beschouwing Gods over de dingen, met 
Hem tot centrum en maatstaf. Beide gaan nu naast elkaar, dikwerf strijdend, maar toch 
veel meer dan elk van beide erkennen wil, de eene aan de andere tot 
dankbaarheid verplicht. De verzoening van beide is in Christus gegeven. Eens vallen zij 
volkomen samen. De beschouwing Gods is tevens die van den waren mensch.’ 
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like any other science, the person’s pre-commitments are always involved when one 
engages in scholarship; the divisions within the university thus cannot pretend to veil 
the interconnectedness between the disciplines or the scholar’s personhood. Philosophy, 
especially, ‘has always strived for a unified worldview [einheitliche Weltanschauung], a 
systematic world-and-life view. In its own way, every philosophical system has been an 
attempt to understand the universe.’33 It is superficial, therefore, to say that the Christian 
viewpoint or the gospel cannot touch the subjects that are under philosophy or the 
literary sciences (like religious studies). Instead, it should ‘naturally’ be the case:  
 
Naturally, the obligation rests on the Christian to practice and teach the history 
of religions and the philosophy of religion (and all scholarship) from a Christian 
point of view. The fact that these disciplines actually belong to the literary 
department makes no difference. After all, the gospel of Christ is a joyous 
message not just for some people in certain circumstances, but for every person 
and for the whole person, for the learned as the simple, and no more for the 
theologian than for the literary scholar, the historian, the philosopher. I 
therefore fail to see why a Christian treatment of these disciplines is not 
permitted or not possible.34 
 
Philosophy, therefore, must exist in close relation to theology precisely because 
its subject matter is unlimited and because theology is the means by which philosophy 
finds its ultimate satisfaction and foundations. Bavinck makes this connection explicitly 
in another place. ‘Because philosophy does not limit itself to the finite’, he writes, it 
comes into contact with God ‘who is the final cause of all things’.35 Further, ‘If religion 
contains a worldview in seed-form, and philosophy, searching for the final ground for 
all things, always seeks for God, then it follows naturally that they… must search 
together inwardly into the essence of the matter and not compete with one another.’36 
The unification of religion and philosophy, Bavinck writes succinctly, requires the 
																																																						
33 Herman Bavinck, ‘Theology and Religious Studies’, in John Bolt (ed.), Harry 
Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres (trans.), Essays on Religion, Science and Society (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2008), p. 58.  
34 Bavinck, ‘Theology and Religious Studies,’ p. 59.  
35 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing,’ p. 34. Dutch original: ‘Want de 
philosophie beperkt zich niet tot het eindige en komt dus ook met God als laatste 
oorzaak aller dingen in aanraking’.  
36 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing,’ p. 35. Dutch original: ‘Indien religie in 
kiem eene wereldbeschouwing bevat, en philosophie, zoekend naar den laatsten grond 
aller dingen, altijd naar God zoekt, dan volgt daaruit vanzelf, dat zij… innerlijk in het 
wezen der zaak moeten samenstemmen en niet met elkander strijden kunnen.’ 
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Christian worldview: ‘the Christian worldview alone meets this requirement.’37 In effect 
Bavinck’s argument is that what philosophy demands is actually ‘guaranteed and 
explained by the testimony of God in his word’.38 
To be clear, Bavinck here is not only claiming that Christian-theism provides the 
answers to philosophy’s questions, or that it is the product of a truly consistent 
philosophical undertaking. Rather, on the next page, Bavinck is clear that Christian-
theism is the grounds on which philosophy depends. The Christian religion, for 
Bavinck, ‘makes known to us through her revelation the same theism that upon 
unprejudiced investigation appears to be the foundation [grondslag] of all science and 
philosophy.’39 The message, by now, is clear – a unified worldview is available because 
of the organic connectedness of knowledge, and thus the Christian, too, must ‘strive 
toward a unified worldview [Hij moet streven naar eene einheitliche wereldbeschouwing.]’40 
Bavinck’s firm statements concerning the necessity and desirability of a cohesive 
worldview, however, do not display an over-occupation with the intellect to the neglect 
of feeling or the heart. To the contrary, as already implied, his convictions originate in 
the prior belief that human beings are organic wholes and must be treated as such – it is 
axiomatic that the heart and head ought to be seen as a single unity, for Bavinck. “There 
is not another God for the child and the elderly, for the simple and the learned, for the 
heart and the head.'41  
The organic unity of the affections and reason will receive a fuller treatment in 
chapter seven. Bavinck’s polemical concern here is the dualism that he perceived within 
																																																						
37 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing,’ p. 35. Dutch original: ‘Aan dezen eisch 
voldoet alleen de Christelijke wereldbeschouwing.’  
38 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 33. Dutch original: ‘En wat de 
wijsbegeerte alzoo naar haar wezen eischt, dat wordt ons gewaarborgd en verklaard door 
het getuigenis Gods in zijn woord.’ 
39 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 36. Dutch original: ‘En de Christelijke 
religie maakt ons door hare revelatie met datzelfde theisme bekend, dat bij 
onbevooroordeeld onderzoek de grondslag van alle wetenschap en wijsbegeerte blijk te 
zijn.’ 
40 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 80. One hears echoes of Trendelenburg; as 
Frederick Beiser summarizes: ‘The special sciences, vis., physics, chemistry or biology, 
each deal with some part or aspect of the universe; but this does not satisfy philosophy, 
which wants to know the universe as a whole.’ Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and 
Lotze (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 29-30. 
41 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 35. Dutch original: ‘Er is niet een andere 
God voor het kind en den grijsaard, voor den eenvoudige en den geleerde, voor het hart 
en het hoofd.’  
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the 19th-20th century academy, which makes a strict distinction between faith and 
knowledge, theology and science, and thus between the mind and heart.42  The 
postulation that persons can leave all religious and philosophical convictions aside when 
they engage in the sciences already assumes a disunity in the human person that cannot 
be held consistently. At every point, the scholar remains a whole human person, and 
thus no fact simply speaks for itself:  
 
For it is impossible, just to mention an example, to base the sciences in 
general…on facts that are accepted as certain by all without distinction. It is 
precisely the facts about which there is immediately a difference of opinion; 
everyone observes them through his own eyes and his own pair of lenses. To 
the degree that the sciences lie closer to the center and cease to be merely 
formal, the subjectivity and personality of the scientific investigator play a larger 
role. It is totally futile to silence this subjectivity, to deny to faith, religious and 
moral convictions, to metaphysics and philosophy their influence on scientific 
study. One may attempt it but will never succeed because the scholar can never be 
separated from the human being. And therefore it is much better to see to it that the 
scientific investigator can be as much as possible a normal human being, that he 
not bring false presuppositions into his work but be a man of God completely 
equipped for every good work. To that end the knowledge that God has 
revealed of himself in his Word is serviceable; it does not hinder but rather 
advances scientific study and research.43 
 
 Here, then, the claim is that the involvement of the human person as a single 
unit must be sufficiently appreciated when one considers the character of the sciences. 
To posit that convictions can be separated from the task of scholarship in some 
‘presuppositionless’ way only veils one’s inevitable subjectivity.44 This is further 
																																																						
42 Eglinton and Bräutigam note that Bavinck also discerns that this dualism is 
maintained in a different mode by his denomination’s decision to preserve the division 
between the ‘scientific’ character of the Free University and the pastoral purpose of the 
theological school at Kampen. By keeping the two institutions separate, Bavinck argued, 
the Reformed churches were reinforcing the dualism of the 1876 Higher Education Act: 
‘[Bavinck] alleged that the Act, in annexing the heart to the pietists and the head to the 
modernists, had rendered theological education a shambolic experience for both sides… 
Evidently, Bavinck’s insistence on the place of theology in the university was counter-
cultural even within his own church.’ ‘Scientific Theology?’, p. 42.  
43 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 43. Emphasis mine. See also p. 51.  
44 The claim that a scientific conception of theology ought to be 
‘presuppositionless’ was, of course, first clearly advocated by D.F. Strauss’s Life of Jesus, 
who developed the neo-rationalistic strand of thinking present within his teacher, F. C. 
Baur. The juxtaposition of the practical and thus spiritual character of the church’s 
confession and the ‘objective’ and scientific study of theology that was discussed and 
debated within the German Academy was clearly felt by Bavinck, as one can see from 
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reinforced, Bavinck considers later on, by the theological belief that sin has darkened 
the mind, which prohibits the belief that a ‘neutral’ approach would produce a basic 
unity in every scholar’s scientific findings. ‘No science, however “presuppositionless,” is 
or will ever be able to undo this division [created by the noetic effects of sin] and bring 
about, in the life of all nations and people, unity in the most basic convictions of the 
human heart.’45 Disunity in religion prevents true intellectual unity from becoming a 
reality. Rather, intellectual unity becomes possible if those engaged in scholarship would 
openly discuss their convictions about theology beforehand, and become persuaded that 
it is unity of God that can provide a coherent picture of reality.46 Thus, by the same 
token, Bavinck encourages the Christian to bring into her scholarship the things that she 
knows by revelation.  
The mechanistic interpretation of the world is the antithesis of Bavinck’s 
prescriptions. The modern world, in Bavinck’s view, offers a mechanical vision that 
cannot do justice to the human personality or the personal character of creation and the 
God who stands behind it. It reduces all phenomena into matter, offering no unifying 
thread that binds the diversities one encounters. As such, when the mechanical 
worldview seeps into society, it undermines ‘all notions of religion, morality, and 
justice.’47 Scholarship under a mechanistic worldview would be fundamentally 
misguided, and this is a product of its divorce from Christianity: 'In a certain sense it is 
therefore possible to separate Christianity and culture. But to the degree by which it 
																																																																																																																																																										
his discussions of the likes of Franz Overbeck, Paul Largarde, Julius Kaftan, and 
Albrecht Ritschl. See, for example, Bavinck, RD: 1, pp. 37-46, 49-51, 69-70, 170-4, 421-
2, 541-5,; ‘The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl,’ The Bavinck Review 3, trans. John Bolt 
(2012), pp. 123-63. Cf. Zachhuber, Theology as Science.   
45 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 298. Oliver O’Donovan communicates similar ideas: ‘In 
speaking of man’s fallenness, we point not only to his persistent rejection of the created 
order, but also to an inescapable confusion in his perceptions of it. This does not permit 
us to follow the Stoic recipe for “life in accord with nature” without a measure of 
epistemological guardedness’. Resurrection and the Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical 
Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), p. 19.  
46 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 299. In these kinds of statements, Eglinton and Bräutigam 
sense the influence of Kuyper behind Bavinck’s thought. See ‘Scientific Theology?’, pp. 
43-4.  
47 Herman Bavinck, ‘Christianity and Natural Science,’ in John Bolt (ed.), Harry 
Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres (trans.), Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2008), p. 102. Bavinck makes the same observation in Modernisme en 
Orthodoxie: Rede gehouden bij de overdracht van het Rectoraat aan de Vrije Universiteit op 20 
Oktober 1911 (Kampen: Kok, 1911), p. 11.  
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detaches and withdraws itself as a culture from Christianity, and natural science 
withdraws from the theistic confession, it ceases to be culture in the real sense of the 
word or true scholarship and thus it loses its beneficial influence.’48 
The picture that Bavinck is drawing so far is as follows. Without the Christian 
confession of the organic connectedness of all things, one is hard pressed to unify the 
disparate phenomena encountered in life. The relationship between spirit and matter, 
between the things that stem from anthropology, on the one hand, and the empirical 
hard sciences, on the other, becomes inchoate. The temptation is to reduce one to the 
other, perhaps, or to refuse to provide an account that can connect one field to another. 
‘Sin dissolves; sin “moves from forged unity into diversity”; sin propagates atomism and 
individualism to the extreme. Sin is a disorganizing power possessing no reason for 
existence and thus no purpose in itself.’49 It becomes difficult to account for the diverse 
faculties of the human person – what is the relationship between the intellect and the 
will, and how does one study reality in a manner that accounts for one’s inevitable 
subjectivity without dissolving that study into an act of introspective projection? For 
Bavinck, Christian revelation discloses a reality that is interconnected, behind which a 
Triune God exists. On revelational grounds, genuine diversity can be affirmed without 
reducing one phenomenon to the other. One’s self is an organic unity that is not 
arbitrarily located in this universe – at every point the person is connected to the world, 
such that a natural impulse within human persons spurs them to grasp the unity that 
underlies the whole of reality. There is a natural ‘fit’ – an organic link – between the 
organic wisdom that the world embodies and the mind’s longing for a unified 
worldview. This is what Christianity offers.  
Bavinck fleshes this out in greater detail, as we shall consider in the next two 
sections the way in which Bavinck unifies faith, theology, and the sciences. ‘The one 
who believes in religion and thus the existence, revelation, and knowability of God, 
must demand that mind and heart, faith and science, will be able to live in piece with 
one another. He must strive for one ‘unified’ [einheitliche] worldview’.50 
																																																						
48 Bavinck, ‘Christianity and Natural Science’, p. 102.  
49 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God, the Highest Good’, The Bavinck Review 
2, trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman (2011): p. 141.  
50 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 80. Dutch original: ‘Wie aan de religie en dus 
aan het bestaan, de openbaring en de kenbaarheid Gods gelooft, moet eischen, dat 
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b. Theology as the Queen of the Sciences and the Theological Character of the Sciences 
 
One can already see that theology plays an important role in Bavinck’s thinking. 
Theology is the appropriation of the revelation of God, and theology thus codifies the 
revelation that stands behind all of knowledge. The Trinity, an organic cosmology and 
theological anthropology, are pillars on which science flourishes.  
Bavinck conceives of the relationship between theology and the other sciences 
under the classical language of regina scientarum – theology is the queen of the sciences. It 
is important here to discern the grounds on which Bavinck can make such a claim, and 
the manner in which theology governs in this role.  
There are at least two reasons that ground Bavinck’s belief that theology is the 
queen of the sciences. (1) Theology is the queen by virtue of the direct object of its 
study – God himself, and (2) theology is queen because all of the sciences themselves 
are theological.  
First, then, theology is the queen of the sciences because it has a unique subject 
matter – it transcends all of the other sciences because God in his self-disclosure is the 
object of theology’s study. ‘She is the science’, Bavinck describes, and ‘high it stands 
above the all sciences.’51 All of the other sciences have their place and aim studying the 
various objects of the cosmos, but theology fixes the eye on the Creator himself. 
Bavinck’s emphasis on the unity of the sciences thus cannot compromise the distinctive 
character of theology’s starting point and end; each science has its own principles, and 
in the same way theology ‘has its own clearly identifiable object, which, since it is none 
other than God, the creator and sustainer of all things, gives theology the right to the 
place of honor among the circle of the sciences.’52 This is the case, Bavinck goes on, 
irrespective of the contemporary attitude towards theology as a discipline – she remains 
entitled to the position not out of pity but out of just desert.  
																																																																																																																																																										
verstand en hart, dat geloof en wetenschap met elkander in vrede zullen kunnen leven. 
Hij moet streven naar eene “einheitliche” wereldbeschouwing’. 
51 Bavinck, ‘De Wetenschap der H. Godgeleerdeheid’, pp. 33-4. 
52 Bavinck, ‘De Wetenschap der H. Godgeleerdeheid’, p. 34. Dutch original: 
‘Evenals ze naast andere wetenschappen een eigen beginsel had, zoo heeft zij ook een 
eigen, duidelijk aanwijsbaar object, dat, daar het niets anders is dan God zelf, de 
Schepper en Onderhouder aller dingen, der Theologie aanspraak geeft op de eereplaats 
in den kring der wetenschappen.’  
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Bavinck iterates this point in the Dogmatics. There, he first affirms that theology 
has characteristics in common with all of the other sciences. All of science has an 
inherent value apart from utility – knowledge cannot be a function of pragmatic 
benefits, but rather a matter of understanding the content of God’s own revelation, 
existing for his glory. Yet, this is true of theology in a particular manner – in a ‘special 
sense’, Bavinck notes, theology is ‘from God and by God, and hence for God as well…. 
Amidst all the [other] sciences it maintains its own character and nature.’53 Such a 
knowledge does not only result in blessedness but is in itself the definition of 
‘blessedness and eternal life.’54 Dogmatics thus strives for the reflection and recording of 
the knowledge of God ‘in the human consciousness.’55 Its scientific character depends 
on God’s own initiative, and the high order of its goal demands, therefore, that it 
belongs not ‘in a church seminary, but in the university of the sciences (universitas 
scientiarum).’56 Again: ‘in the circle of the sciences, theology is entitled to the place of 
honor, not because of the persons who pursue this science, but in virtue of the object it 
pursues; it is and remains – provided this expression is correctly understood – the queen 
of the sciences.’57 The proper study of theology thus requires that one take advantage of 
‘philosophical, historical and linguistic’ studies in order to be adequately prepared.58 In 
these ways Bavinck’s affirmations are clearly consistent with the classical and Thomistic 
view of theology’s exalted subject matter as a science.59  
Bavinck modifies this conception with a neo-Calvinistic tinge. The directly 
divine object of study in theology, however, actually directs the scholar to the other 
sciences rather than away from them – and here is the second ground on which Bavinck 
																																																						
53 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 53.  
54 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 53. 
55 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 54. 
56 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 54. 
57 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 54. So, Eglinton and Bräutigam: ‘For Bavinck… [theology’s] 
unique object means that its methodology will differ somewhat from the natural 
sciences. This is so as unlike the natural sciences, where one must go and investigate 
(with knowledge as the goal of the scientific process), theology’s object speaks for 
himself: God practices self-disclosure.’ ‘Scientific Theology?’ pp. 44-5.  
58 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 617. Bavinck takes these prescriptions seriously. A look at his 
notes from him studentship at Leiden University reveals that he wrestled with subjects 
like logic, philosophy, Dutch and church history, the history of religions, literature, and 
Arabic. These notes can be found in the Bavinck archives in the Free University of 
Amsterdam, inventory numbers 19-37, each of which is peppered with notations 
especially in Dutch, Latin, German and Greek.  
59 Bavinck makes this explicit connection in Christelijke wetenschap, p. 100, n. 67. 
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can assert theology’s primacy over the other fields of study: all of the other sciences are 
theological. Bavinck makes this point in his Kampen inaugural address right after he 
describes the transcendently distinct character of theology. Theology, he warns, ‘stands 
in the closest relation to all other sciences, but that relationship must not be sought… 
first and exclusively in the anthropological character of theology, but in the theological 
character of the other sciences.’60 Precisely because the Triune God is the source of all 
revelation, every science must come into contact with him. Indeed, the theological 
shape of each science will come to the fore as one studies each closely, for the ‘deeper 
all these particular sciences penetrate into the depths of created life, the more directly 
and as face to face they come to stand across of him, who creates all the fullness of that 
life and still sustains [it], and [who] is the object of Theology’.61 He would later repeat 
this point in his Philosophy of Revelation, where he writes that it is a mistake to practice 
theology ‘as if all the other sciences, particularly the natural sciences, have nothing 
whatever to do with God… such a dualism is impossible.’62 
Toward the end of the Kampen inaugural address, Bavinck assigns a prophetic 
role to theology’s task. It envisions an end in which the secular and the sacred are visibly 
brought together in the sphere of knowledge – theology proclaims from a mountain top 
that anticipates the coherent unity of the sciences into a single unit. The queen and 
‘prophetess’ directs the sciences into its theological end as every person will orient 
oneself toward the knowledge of God. Just as the distinctions between sacred and 
profane communities will be no more, so there will be ‘no separated, no sacred or 
profane sciences. There is then only one holy, glorious science, which is theology: to 
																																																						
60 Bavinck, ‘De Wetenschap der H. Godgeleerdheid,’ p. 35. Emphasis mine. 
Dutch original: ‘Toch staat zij weer met alle andere wetenschappen in het nauwste 
verband. Maar dat verband moet niet allereerst en uitsluitend met de la Saussaye gezocht 
worden in het anthropologisch karakter der Theologie, maar in het theologisch karakter 
der andere wetenschappen.’ 
61 Bavinck, ‘De Wetenschap der H. Godgeleerdheid’, p. 35. Dutch original: ‘Hoe 
dieper alle die bijzondere wetenschappen indringen in de diepte des geschapenen levens, 
te meer rechtstreeks en als van aangezicht tot aangezicht zij komen te staan tegenover 
Hem, die al de volheid van dat leven schiep en nog steeds onderhoudt, en het object is 
der Theologie.’ Wolter Huttinga’s description is thus apt: ‘When Bavinck praises the 
discipline of theology he does not do so within a framework that praises faith as 
opposed to knowledge. On the contrary, the fact that theology “seeks God in 
everything” does not render it unworldly, but ultimately, “worldly.”’ ‘”Marie Antoinette” 
or Mystical Depth?’, p. 146. 
62 Herman Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation (New York: Longman, Green & co., 
1909), p. 84.	 
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know all things in God and God in all things.’63 These concluding comments may 
harken the reader back to the opening statements of Bavinck’s address. He began by 
invoking Rauwenhoff, a modern professor at Leiden, who proposed in a theological 
magazine that theology’s on-going vitality within the contemporary age depends on the 
degree to which she adjusts to secularism. Succinctly, the rally call was that theology 
‘must become secularized.’64 Bavinck’s response to such a proposal is clear – theology 
must maintain its transcendent and spiritual character, and contrary to it adjusting itself 
to the secular demands of the day, one must instead re-interpret the sciences in a sacred 
manner. Theology must not become secularized, but the sciences must once again be 
sanctified.  
 It seems clear that Bavinck recognizes the complications of theology’s role 
within the academy in his own contemporary context and the present age within 
salvation history. Despite its exalted character within the sphere of the sciences, there 
remains a distinction between the present age in which sin continues to exert an 
atomizing power, and the final day in which all of knowledge achieves theological 
unification. In the present dispensation, sacred and profane individuals live alongside 
one another as the kingdom of God remains a spiritual and not yet visible reality. It is 
appropriate, therefore, that Bavinck concludes his pamphlet on common grace with a 
reflection on the manner in which theology ought to govern in this day. Theology, 
Bavinck contends, continues to depend on the gifts produced by common grace, and 
thus it ‘accords to the other sciences their full due.’65 As a result, her rule is exercised in 
the form of service rather than by some domineering force. In Bavinck’s words,  
 
Theology’s honor is not that she sits enthroned above them as Regina scientarium 
[Queen of the sciences] and waves her scepter over them but she is permitted to 
serve them all with her gifts. Theology also can rule only by serving. She is 
strong when she is weak; she is greatest when she seeks to be least. She can be 
glorious when she seeks to know nothing save Christ and him crucified… In the 
middle of the human woe that life reveals all about us, and also in science, 
theology raises its doxology of the love of God shown forth in Jesus Christ our 
Lord. And she prophesies a glorious future in which all oppositions, including 
																																																						
63 Bavinck, ‘De Wetenschap der H. Godgeleerdheid,’ pp. 48-9.  
64 Bavinck, ‘De Wetenschap der H. Godgeleerdheid,’ p. 5. 
65 Herman Bavinck, ‘Common Grace,’ Calvin Theological Journal 24, trans. Raymond 
C. Van Leeuwen (1989), p. 65.  
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those between nature and grace, shall be reconciled, and all things, whether on 
earth or in heaven, shall again in Christ be one.66 
 
 One cannot interpret here that Bavinck is retracting his statements on theology’s 
role as the queen of the sciences. Already in the Dogmatics, we have seen, Bavinck was 
careful that his reader obtains a proper understanding of what the title entails.67 Rather, 
in this train of thought one discerns most clearly the manner in which Bavinck 
understands theology’s governance. Theology continues to learn from the other sciences 
in humble reciprocation. She serves them with her gifts – she can unify them and give 
them their proper context, and she can show how they are closely interconnected. But 
she directs the sciences in a doxological manner as an act of service and prophetic 
witness.68  
 In sum, theology retains a place of honor within the university and the sciences 
because of its divine object of study. It also has a special place because all of the 
sciences are decidedly theological and thus find their meaningful shape by theology’s 
governance. Christian scholarship, therefore, witnesses to the final day where all of 
science is unified under Christ. We now turn to consider the implications of Bavinck’s 
thoughts so far on how he conceives of the principia of the different sciences.  
  
c. An ‘Organism of Science’: Principia and Unity-and-Diversity 
 
It is apparent by now that theology and the sciences are interwoven. Theology is 
transcendent in the same way that the Christian religion is transcendent. ‘Certainly, 
Christianity is in the first place a religion, but not merely a religion. It is an entirely new 
life that can penetrate and enliven every life sphere and life form. Thus Christianity is 
not coextensive with the church. It is far too rich to allow itself to be expressed within 
																																																						
66 Bavinck, ‘Common Grace,’ p. 65.  
67 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 54. See also Huttinga, ‘“Marie Antoinette” or Mystical 
Depth?’, pp. 152-3.  
68 In a politically charged address that argued for the union of the theological 
school of Kampen and the Free University, however, Bavinck rhetorically claimed that 
theology’s service to the other sciences is not on a par with Scripture: ‘Scripture is the 
lamp for the feet of the other sciences, but not theology [De Schrift is de lamp voor den voet 
der overige wetenschappen, maar niet de Theologie]’ in Het Recht der Kerken en de Vrijheid der 
Wetenschap (Kampen: Zalman, 1899), p. 19. Emphasis his.   
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its walls.’69 As a result, ‘we speak of a Christian society, of a Christian school. There is 
nothing human that cannot be called Christian. Everything within and outside the 
church that is enlivened and governed by Christ who exercises sovereignty over all 
things, constitutes and belongs to the Kingdom of God.’70 In Christ, recall, Bavinck 
envisions all things being united, and it is the telos to which Christian scholarship points, 
especially in the way that scholarship relates theology with the other sciences.  
This section of the chapter will further clarify the organic shape of the sciences by 
paying attention to the way in which Bavinck describes the epistemological principia of 
the various fields of science and the rather flexible way in which he uses the term. In 
short, Bavinck respects the integrity of the independence of the sciences, and yet unites 
them all by the principles of Christian-theism – wetenschap conforms to an organic shape 
of unity-in-diversity such that the principia of theology (Scriptural revelation and the 
doctrinal content of faith) remain the principia of the other sciences in addition to their 
own individual principia.71 The goal here is not to be exhaustive in describing the 
differing principia of each individual science, but rather to show the manner in which 
Bavinck feels the freedom to place theology’s principia underneath the other sciences. 
These claims are intelligible, as one shall see, only when read through the organic motif.  
 This section thus elaborates upon two types of claims that appear to re-occur 
throughout Bavinck’s corpus, each emphasizing the unity or diversity of the sciences, 
respectively. All of the sciences have the same principle of knowledge: ‘The incarnation 
of the Word, the all-dominating fact and fundamental principle of all science, is also the 
source and continuing principle of the kingdom of God,’72 he would write, and yet, in 
other places, he emphasizes a strong distinction between the principles of theology and 
those of science:  
 
the principles out of which the other sciences are built rests in the nature of man, 
lying as innate ideas in his reason or conscience, in his intellect or feeling. But this is 
not so with our science [of theology]. Her principium lies not in our nature, and 
																																																						
69 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God’, p. 157.  
70 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 158.  
71 Marinus de Jong also makes this observation as he says that, for Bavinck, the 
development of the sciences resembles ‘an organism that continues to grow.’ ‘The Heart 
of the Academy: Herman Bavinck in Debate with Modernity on the Academy, Theology 
and the Church,’ in The Kuyper Center Review, vol. 5: Church and Academy (Grand 
Rapids, Eerdmans: 2015), p. 70 
72 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God’, p. 147.  
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cannot be developed in us through effort or exercise; rather it fights with the whole 
of our nature. That principle… is first implanted in us in the faith that was the fruit 
of the working of the Holy Ghost.73 
 
 These statements are best read through the lens of the organic. Bavinck says as 
much in his treatment on Christian scholarship. Science began with the entire world as 
its object but continued to expand, dividing itself into specialized parts. ‘The whole was 
before the parts’, and as the ‘organism of science’ gradually evolved the process of 
‘differentiation’ continues.74 The language of ‘organism’ is once again applied to 
maintain that science and knowledge form a single unity with diverse parts that 
continues to develop toward a teleological end. The act of specialization may 
compromise the prior and underlying unity behind the sciences, but if ‘this unity is 
never forgotten, the division of science into a multitude of subjects is seen as a healthy 
and normal phenomenon.’75  It is inevitable that some ‘division of labor’ [arbeidsverdeeling] 
would obtain, given the broad demands of scientific pursuit.76 The language of ‘division 
of labor’ will prove to be significant later, but for now one follows Bavinck into this 
significant train of thought. Consider:  
 
The world is one whole and yet endlessly varied. Matter and spirit, nature and 
history, man and animal, soul and body, church and state, family and society, trade 
and industry; they are interconnected together, and stand with each other in all sorts 
																																																						
73 Bavinck, ‘De Wetenschap der H. Godgeleerdheid’, pp. 19-20. Dutch original: 
‘Want de beginselen, waaruit de andere wetenschappen worden opgebouwd, rusten in 
de natuur des menschen, liggen als “ideae innatae” in zijn rede of geweten, in zijn 
verstand of gevoel. Maar alzoo is het met deze onze wetenschap niet. Haar principium 
ligt van nature niet in ons, en kan ook door geen inspanning of oefening in ons 
gekweekt worden; veeleer strijdt het met heel onze natuur. Dat beginsel wordt door ons 
eerst erkend en in ons gelegd met het nieuwe leven der wedergeboorte, wordt ons eerst 
ingeplant in dat geloof, dat vrucht is van de werking des H. Geeste.’ 
74 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 59. Dutch original: ‘Het geheel was er vóór de 
deelen, en uit het geheel zijn de leden van het organisme der wetenschap langzamerhand 
uitgegroeid en tot wasdom gekomen. En nog altijd zet dit proces der “Differenzirung” 
zich voort.’ 
75 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 59. Dutch original: ‘Mits deze eenheid nooit 
vergeten wordt, is echter splitsing der wetenschap in eene veelheid van vakken als een 
gezond, normaal verschijnsel te beschouwen.’ Van der Walt observes the same point as 
he argues that for Bavinck ‘science [wetenskap]’ produces more parts as an ‘organism 
[organisme]’ that slowly grows in Die Wysbegeerte van Dr. Herman Bavinck, p. 127.  
76 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 59. Its an open question at this point whether 
this development of divisions is positive in its effects for theology’s influence within the 
academy.  
	 88 
of connections. But they are also mutually distinguished, each has its own character 
and nature, life and law. This diversity in unity also has in view the special sciences. 
In the university, both the unity of science [as a whole] along with the independence 
and particularity of all the special sciences must be given their rightful place.77  
 
 The unity of the sciences does not diminish the distinctions that exist between 
the objects of knowledge and the methods appropriate to their study. Thus, Bavinck 
appreciates the differences between scientific foundations and religious foundations78, 
with the former having its principium cognoscendi externum in the created world, and the 
work of the Logos and the light of reason form the principium cognoscendi internum of 
science.79 In this way, Bavinck follows the long tradition of Reformed orthodoxy in its 
implementation of Thomistic motifs; Bavinck’s claim is that in one’s study of the world, 
there should be a liberal use of the ‘general concepts’ and ‘common notions’ that are 
implanted by the Logos in humanity.80 Further, Bavinck argues, following Bacon and 
Schopenhauer, that ‘the starting point of all human knowledge is sense perception… 
Truth must not be drawn from books but from the real world. Observation is the 
source of all real science.’81 Scholasticism’s allegiance with Aristotle leads it, in Bavinck’s 
judgment, to appreciate the priority of the senses more satisfactorily than Plato.82 
																																																						
77 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 59. Dutch original: ‘De wereld is één geheel en 
toch eindeloos verscheiden. Stof en geest, natuur en geschiedenis, mensch en dier, ziel 
en lichaam, kerk en staat, gezin en maatschappij, handel en nijverheid; zij hangen 
onderling saam, en staan met elkaar in allerlei verband. Maar zij zijn onderling ook 
onderscheiden, hebben elk een eigen aard en natuur, een eigen leven en wet. Deze 
verscheidenheid in de eenheid behooren ook de bijzondere wetenschappen in het oog te 
houden. In de universiteit moet zoowel de eenheid der wetenschap als ook de 
zelfstandigheid en de eigenaardigheid van alle bijzondere wetenschappen tot haar recht 
komen.’  
78 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 207-79.  
79 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 233. Bavinck’s view, as one shall see in the next chapter, 
cannot be identified with classical foundationalism.  
80 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 225, 232. See also David Sytsma, ‘Herman Bavinck’s 
Thomistic Epistemology,’ in John Bolt (ed.), Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, 
A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), pp. 1-55. 
Sytsma’s analysis is useful in showing some of Bavinck’s classical sources in the section 
on scientific foundations in the Dogmatics. However, I am interested here in how 
Bavinck’s organic motif shapes his epistemology, rather than tracing all of Bavinck’s 
sources. There is also a lack in Sytsma’s account of Bavinck’s use of modern sources, 
which would be made clearer in the next chapters.  
81 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 226.  
82 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 229. 
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 This appreciation for the different methods and grounds of epistemological 
justification of the different fields of science is heightened in places where Bavinck 
seeks to ensure that theology’s norms are not constricted by the other sciences. 
Theology is not like the other sciences, where rational or empirical certainty are often 
demanded, but rather finds its certainty in faith. So, after observing that Aristotle 
establishes the existence of different kinds of certainties and grounds, Bavinck writes:  
 
We all feel certain about the things we can perceive with the senses. Nor do we 
doubt the most basic, self-evident, undemonstrable principles of the various 
sciences, such as the axioms on which mathematics is based. Similarly, we are also 
completely certain about the truths that in are inferred through logical deduction 
from an established premise which are therefore based on sufficient proof.83 
 
Moreover, now favorably upholding a principle from Fichte, he went on: 
 
We do not obtain and maintain our deepest convictions, our world and life view, by 
way of scientific demonstration. These are not a product of understanding or of the 
will. These beliefs are located deeper, in the depths of the soul, in the heart. They 
are part of man himself; they are, as it were, part of his essence; they are him, as he 
was born, raised, and molded in a particular environment. J. G. Fichte (1762-1815) 
said that the philosophy a man chooses determines what kind of man he will be. 
The shape of one’s thought is often nothing more than the history of his heart.84 
 
 It would be mistaken, Bavinck thought, to try to show that theology can satisfy 
the norms and grounds of the other sciences, for doing so would lead to theology’s loss, 
betraying a misunderstanding of its character. The testimony of the Spirit in 
regeneration and the particularly revelatory source of its object means the necessity of 
preserving this methodological independence. It is in these contexts that Bavinck can 
characterize the other sciences as ‘non-theological’ [niet-theologische].85 There exists, 
																																																						
83 Herman Bavinck, The Certainty of Faith, Harry der Nederlanden (trans.) (Ontario: 
Paideia Press, 1980), p. 21. Original: Herman Bavinck, De Zekerheid des Geloof (Kampen: 
Kok, 1901).  
84 Bavinck, Certainty of Faith, p. 23. This line, taken from Fichte, is a repetition of 
what Bavinck says earlier in 1897’s Beginselen der Psychologie (Kampen: Bos, 1897), p. 77: 
‘Fichte properly said…one’s philosophy is often nothing other than the history of his 
heart’. Dutch original: ‘zeide Fichte terecht… iemands philosophie is dikwerf niet 
anders dan de geschiedenis van zijn hart.’ Bavinck expresses the same ideas in relation 
to speech and language in De Welsprekenheid:  Eene lezing voor de studenten der Theol. School te 
Kampen, 29 November 1889 (Kampen: Zalsman, 1901), pp. 8-9.  
85 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 77, 260; GD, pp. 60, 267. 
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Bavinck argues, ‘a unique religious certainty, it should be made plain both in its 
distinction from and its connection with other kinds of certainty… Even within the 
circle of the nontheological sciences, there are varying kinds and degrees of certainty.’86 
Rational justification cannot be demanded of theological convictions in the same way it 
may be demanded of the other sciences precisely because divine authority ‘is the 
foundation of religion and therefore the source and basis of theology as well.’87 
Likewise, Bavinck is resisting Schleiermacher’s move in submitting theology under the 
norms of ethics, conceived as a non-theological science.88 
 A cursory reading of the above claims can easily lead one to conclude that 
Bavinck demarcates the sciences in such a way that, though theology remains the queen 
of the sciences, those sciences are divided into neat distinctions such that the norms, 
methods, and goals of each cannot transgress its assigned jurisdictions. Here, however, 
one must remember Bavinck’s own reminders above that ‘the organism of science’ has a 
unity that cannot be ‘forgotten’.89 Instead of entertaining the temptation to charge 
Bavinck with inconsistency in his earlier claim that all of the sciences are theological,90 
an application of the organic motif preserves Bavinck’s emphasis on the real diversity of 
the sciences along with its underlying unity. This diversity is in large part due to the 
necessity imposed upon the academy by the division of labor that attends the fact of 
human finitude: 
 
All science is one… Because of the limits of our view and of our understanding, 
however, the scientific enterprise is divided up into many kinds of science, each 
of which chooses its own group of phenomena as the object of investigation… 
They attempt, as it were, to uncover the basic idea, the life force of those 
phenomena, in order from that point of view to describe and illuminate 
everything belong to a particular field, in order to know each thing not only in 
itself but also – and this too is required for genuine science – in the light of, and 
in connection with, and from the standpoint of, the whole.91 
 
																																																						
86 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 76-7.  
87 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 77.  
88 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 260.  
89 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 59.  
90 See the above discussion, especially, on Bavinck’s ‘De Wetenschap der H. 
Godgeleerdheid,’ pp. 35, 48-9.  
91 Bavinck, ‘Pros and Cons of a Dogmatic System,’ p. 94.  
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A holistic picture continues to emerge in our analysis of Bavinck on this subject: the 
whole must be known in order to understand the parts of the unity of science. Bavinck 
reminds us of this again in his 1887 article on Christianity and natural science.92 
Consistent with his claims in the 1904 Christelijke wetenschap, his words, betraying a 
Kuyperian persuasion, are worth quoting in full: 
 
Depending on the object, [science] divides itself into many particular sciences in 
accordance with each object, principle, and method of investigation; theology 
should not dictate to and impose its method upon natural science. Each particular 
science is ‘sovereign in its own sphere’. But as the objects of the difference sciences 
are not separated side by side, all parts of creation, on the contrary, closely cohere; 
even God and the world are not deistically separated or pantheistically identified but 
in their duality are once again one, so are all the sciences closely related; each fills the 
other, each is an integral part of the whole. Science is one, and therefore animated by a single highest 
principle.  
And what principle can or may that be other than the Christian one? On the 
ground there is but a choice between two principles, the theistic and the pantheistic. 
On the standpoint of polytheism deism etc., there is no unity of science, no 
encyclopaedia of all sciences, no ‘scientific teaching’ possible. Christianity, Christian-
theism has first laid the foundation and paved the way for the organic unity of science… 
Such a science is thus our ideal, which, coming forth from Christian 
principles, saves us from philosophical wanderings and preserves the unity of the 
various sciences; which was given by the light of the revelation that investigates all 
things, thereby properly [raising us] to [undertake] a more serious and deeper study; 
[an ideal] independent of the church and state, her own mistress, is with all other 
things subject to him who is king also of the courtyard of the sciences.93  
																																																						
92 Herman Bavinck, ‘Christendom en Natuurwetenschap’ in Kennis en Leven: 
Opstellen en artikelen uit vroegere jaren, C. B. Bavinck (ed.) (Kampen: Kok, 1922), pp. 184-
202.  
93 Bavinck, ‘Christendom en Natuurwetenschap’, pp. 201-2. Dutch original: Naar 
gelang van de objecten, verdeelt zij zich in vele bijzondere wetenschappen en heeft in 
overeenstemming met haar voorwerp dan telkens een ander beginsel en eene andere 
methode van onderzoek; de theologie mag haar methode niet voorschrijven en 
opdringen aan de natuurwetenschap, maar ook evenmin de laatste aan de eerste, gelijk 
thans geschiedt. Elke bijzondere wetenschap is weer “souverein in eigen kring.” Maar 
gelijk de objecten der verschillende wetenschappen niet los naast elkander staan, alle 
deelen der schepping integendeel ten nauwste samenhangen, God zelfs en wereld  niet 
deistisch gescheiden noch pantheistisch identisch zijn, maar in hun tweeheid weer één, 
— zoo zijn ook alle wetenschappen ten nauwste verbonden; de eene vult de andere aan; elke 
is een integreerend deel van het geheel. De wetenschap is ééne, en daarom door één hoogste beginsel 
bezield. 
En welk beginsel kan of mag dat anders zijn dan het Christelijke? In den grond is 
er maar keuze tusschen een tweetal, beginselen, het pantheistische en het theistische. Op 
het standpunt van het polytheisme, van het deisme enz. is er geen eenheid der 
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Theology thus cannot dictate her methods to the other sciences, yet it is Christian-
theism that supplies the sciences with their foundations. Understood in this way, 
Bavinck’s distinction within the Dogmatics between scientific and religious foundations 
cannot mean to imply that the two are simply disconnected. Rather, each ‘fills’ the 
other, as Bavinck claims here. The theology of Christian-theism as a third option 
between the ‘pantheism’ that leads to the uniformity of the sciences and the ‘deism’ that 
segregates the sciences into a cacophony, Bavinck argues above, is one of the claims 
that undergirds how the sciences must be understood. It is in this sense that Bavinck’s 
lament on the frequent failure of Christianity to perform a truly ‘organic reformation’ of 
the cosmos in relation to the sciences come to light; Christianity often rejects the 
‘unbelieving results of science’ but there remains ‘no inner reformation of the sciences 
on the basis of a different principle’.94 
Finally, in Bavinck’s desire to unify all of the various sciences, one must consider 
Bavinck’s claim that the principia of all of the sciences are found in Scripture and its 
content. Bavinck makes this claim in three key places, in the Dogmatics, in Christendom en 
natuurwetenschap and in Christelijke wereldbeschouwing. In especially the first two, one finds a 
measured understanding of the manner in which he understands this proposition. 
																																																																																																																																																										
wetenschap, geen encyclopaedie aller wetenschappen, geen “Wissenschaftslehre” 
mogelijk. Het Christendom, het Christelijk Theisme heeft eerst den grond gelegd en den weg gebaand 
voor deze organische eenheid der wetenschap. Wat men ook van materialistische zijde smale op 
Kerk en Christendom het zal toch wel mede aan den Christ. godsdienst dank zijn te 
weten, dat de Christelijke volken geweest zijn en nog zijn de dragers der cultuur, dat de 
lijn der wereldgeschiedenis heenloopt door de gedoopte natiën. 
Zulk eene wetenschap zij dus ons ideaal, welke, van Christelijke beginselen 
uitgaande, ons voor allerlei wijsgeerige afdwalingen behoedt en de eenheid der 
verschillende wetenschappen bewaart; die bij het licht door de openbaring geschonken 
alle dingen onderzoekt en daardoor juist tot des te ernstiger en dieper navorsching 
opgewekt wordt; die onafhankelijk van Staat en Kerk, haar eigen meesteresse, alleen met 
alle andere dingen onderworpen is aan, Hem, die ook Koning op het erf der 
wetenschappen is.’ Emphases mine. These comments by Bavinck seem to be 
incompatible with Thomas Aquinas’s statement that ‘it is impossible and ridiculous to 
hold that the principles of one science are the same as those of another science’, and his 
denial that ‘all the sciences were one science’, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics, Richard Berquist (trans.) (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 2007), I. 43. c.  
94 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, Calvin 
Theological Journal 27, trans. John Bolt (1992), p. 246. Bavinck was aware that his claims 
could be taken into a triumphalist direction, and distances himself from those 
trajectories. See, for example, Het Recht der Kerken, pp. 17-8. 	
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 In a discussion concerning the relationship between Scripture and other sciences, 
Bavinck warns that the admonishment that one cannot infer the mundane facts of life 
from Scripture has been unfortunately abused in order to distance scholars from any use 
of Scripture in scholarly study. Hence, Bavinck writes this:  
 
Much misuse has been made of Baronius’ saying: ‘Scripture does not tell us how 
the heavens move but how we move to heaven.’ Precisely as the book of the 
knowledge of God, Scripture has much to say also to the other sciences. It is a light on 
our path and a lamp for our feet, also with respect to science and art. It claims 
authority in all areas of life. Christ has [been given] all power in heaven and on 
earth. Objectively, the restriction of inspiration to the religious-ethical part of 
Scripture is untenable; subjectively the separation between the religious life and 
rest of human life cannot be maintained. Inspiration extends to all parts of 
Scripture, and religion is a matter of the whole person. A great deal of what is 
related in Scripture is of fundamental significance also for the other sciences. At 
every moment science and art come into contact with Scripture; the primary 
principles for all of life are given in Scripture. This truth may in no way be discounted.95 
 
The English translation here veils the force of Bavinck’s language in the original 
Dutch text. Instead of using the Dutch wording to convey Scripture’s status as the first 
principle for all areas of life, Bavinck uses the more technical Latin word, principia; so it 
reads: ‘At every moment science and art come into contact with Scripture; the principia 
for all of life are given in Scripture.’96 
 This reasoning is basically identical to the one in Christendom en natuurwetenschap. 
There, Bavinck first warns that Scripture is not a textbook out of which one can infer 
the contents of the other sciences – revealed theology assumes natural revelation, and 
then moves on to consider nevertheless Scripture’s essential role in relation to science, 
specifically with regard to its unity. He writes:  
 
																																																						
95 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 445. Emphases mine. It is worth noting that the abused 
statement of Baronius to which Bavinck refers is identical with the reasons O’Donnell 
gives in order to say that philosophy does not have its cognitive principle in Scripture, in 
‘”Bavinck’s Bug”or “Van Tilian Hypochondria?”’ p. 156. On page 465, Bavinck affirms 
that the authority Scripture of extends over all the limited authorities of the sciences.  
96 Bavinck, GD, 1: p. 472. Dutch original: ‘Ieder oogenblik komen wetenschap en 
kunst met de Schrift in aanraking, de principia voor heel het leven zijn gegeven in de 
Schrift.’ My emphasis. He is repeating here what he regards as the difference between 
Calvin and Luther: ‘Not only the church but also home, school, society and state are 
placed under the dominion of the principle of Christianity… the Bible is, for Luther, 
only a source for salvation truth, whereas for Calvin it is the norm for all of life’.  ‘The 
Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, p. 238.  
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Scripture…. frequently touches all the other mundane sciences. It is not dualistic: 
she distinguishes between the natural and the spiritual but she does not separate 
them. The one is connected to the other… Christianity has made us first understand 
that the world, that the humanity, that science is one. Therefore, revelation is not 
strictly limited to religious and ethical being, but also lets the mid-point of its light 
shed over the whole of natural life, heaven and earth, plant and animal, angel and 
man, over all of creation. And therefore the object of theology is not the bare 
knowledge of God, but also that of the creature insofar as it stands in relation to 
him and reveals him.97 
 
 Bavinck continues to wrestle with this question: if it is true that Scripture 
provides the scholar of science with revealed knowledge, would this not impinge upon 
his research? Would one now simply deny that the earth revolves around the sun 
because it appears that Scripture teaches this assertion, as in previous centuries?98 Not 
so, Bavinck thinks, but neither is the solution to separate between natural and spiritual 
truths. Rather, Bavinck voices a familiar note: the scholar engaged in research remains a 
personality with an inevitable subjectivity. If all of this can be granted, Bavinck thinks, 
so must one admit that the Christian cannot deny the influences one receives from 
revelation: ‘For the Christian, this question was answered in principle: [one’s influences] 
can only be derived from revelation.’99   
 These notes are repeated often in Bavinck’s Dogmatics. The Christian person 
cannot ‘reject the greater light given him and must then look at all of nature and history, 
as well as the religions of non-Christian nations and people, by that light.’100 It is, after 
all, revelation that makes the difference between the Christian and non-Christian 
																																																						
97 Bavinck, ‘Christendom en Natuurwetenschap,’ p. 197. Dutch original: ‘Maar nu 
is het ter anderer zijde evenzeer waar, dat de Schrift, juist om ons eene zuivere 
“geestelijke” kennis te geven, dikwerf met al die andere mundane wetenschappen in 
aanraking komt. Dualistisch is zij niet; zij onderscheidt wel het natuurlijke en het 
geestelijke maar zij scheidt het niet; het eene staat met het andere in verband; ethos en 
physis liggen niet gescheiden naast, maar grijpen telkens in elkaar; het Christendom 
heeft het ons ’t eerst doen verstaan, dat de wereld, dat de menschheid, dat de 
wetenschap ééne is. Daarom kan de openbaring niet strikt tot het religieus-ethische 
beperkt wezen, maar laat van dit middelpunt uit haar licht ook vallen over heel het 
natuurlijke leven, over aarde en hemel, plant en dier, engel en mensch, over al het 
geschapene. En daarom is object der Theologie niet bloot de kennis Gods, maar ook die 
der creatuur inzoover zij tot God in relatie staat en Hem openbaart.’ 
98 Bavinck, ‘Christendom en Natuurwetenschap,’ p. 198.  
99 Bavinck, ‘Christendom en Natuurwetenschap,’ p. 201. Dutch original: ‘Voor 
den Christen is die vraag in beginsel beantwoord; slechts aan de openbaring kunnen zij 
worden ontleend.’ 
100 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 78. In context, that revelation includes the person of Christ, 
along with the prophets and apostles in Scripture. 
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worldview. ‘The knowledge of believers is unique in that they view the whole of life 
religiously, theologically, and see everything in God’s light, from the perspective of 
eternity (sub specie aeternitatis). That is the difference between their worldview and a 
philosophical or scientific worldview.’101 With these things considered, one, it seems, 
must significantly nuance Bolt’s claim that in Bavinck’s view Christians have no 
privileged knowledge over natural affairs, since Christians are uniquely equipped to see 
the world in an organic fashion.  
 Lastly, Bavinck writes in Christelijke wereldbeschouwing concerning the foundational 
status of revelation with a particularly Trinitarian and Johannine tinge. The wisdom 
from the ‘Divine Word’ lays upon one the ‘confession’ of God as the ‘Father, almighty, 
creator of heaven and earth’, a confession, Bavinck argues, that forms ‘not merely the 
first article of the Christian faith but also the principle and foundation of all knowledge 
and science.’102 Indeed, the deeper one goes the deeper one will understand that truth is 
understood by the divine wisdom, who is the ‘Word’ that was ‘in the beginning with 
God and was God.’103 In a manner that harkens one back to his statements concerning 
the necessity of the Trinity for the pursuit of the sciences in his ‘Pros and Cons’ lecture, 
Bavinck again asserts that whoever ‘denies this Wisdom undermines the foundation of 
all science’.104 In short, Scripture is the ‘first [eerst]’ source out of which one understands 
‘the full truth [volle waarheid]’ concerning the nature of reality as an organic unity and 
diversity that overcomes the one-sidedness of past philosophy, whether Plato or 
Aristotle.105 
 
II. The Kingdom of God and Sphere Sovereignty 
 
																																																						
101 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 110.  
102 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 21. Dutch original: ‘En tot verklaring 
zal zij alleen in staat zijn, als zij zich voorlichten laat door de wijsheid van het Goddelijk 
Woord, die ons de belijdenis op de lippen legt van God den Vader, den Almachtige, 
Schepper des hemels en der aarde. Deze belijdenis is niet alleen het eerste artikel van 
ons Christlijk geloof, maar ook de grondslag en hoeksteen van alle kennis en 
wetenschap.’ 
103 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 29. Dutch original: ‘En dieper 
doorgedacht, is alle waarheid begrepen in de Wijsheid, in het Woord, dat in beginner bij 
God en zelf God was.’ 
104 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 29. Dutch original: ‘Wie deze Wijsheid 
loochent, ondermijn het fundamentum van alle wetenschap.’ 
105 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 45.  
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With the preceding analysis in view, it is profitable to step back and relate 
Bavinck’s understanding of knowledge as an organism to his account of the kingdom of 
God. One finds an interesting structural parallel between the two. Bavinck conceives of 
the kingdom of God as that which is eternal and spiritual, the highest good toward 
which humanity is oriented that envisions all things under the rule of God. In Bavinck’s 
words: ‘The Kingdom of God as the highest good consists in the unity, the inclusion, 
the totality of all moral goods, of earthly and heavenly, spiritual and physical, eternal and 
temporal goods.’106 The distinctions that obtain within the created order are not in 
opposition, as if the pursuit of the eternal meant the resistance of the temporal. Rather, 
sin is the force that obfuscates the underlying unity, often reducing diversity into 
autonomous atomism. The good, by contrast, ‘constitutes a unity’ that ‘automatically 
organizes.’107  
This kingdom is the unity that precedes the diversity of the life spheres found in 
creation – it provides them with their shape, purpose, and direction without reducing 
one to the other, and without elevating them above their appropriate function. This 
language is familiar by now, as it befits Bavinck’s understanding of the kingdom, too, as 
a single organism; ‘it is an organism whose totality not only precedes and transcends the 
individual parts but also simultaneously forms the basis, the condition, and the 
constitutive power of the parts.’108 Precisely because the kingdom is an organism can 
Bavinck then insist that the diversity of the parts is maintained in their fullness – it 
respects the expression of the individual personality and places each sphere in its proper 
location and function.  
Each sphere thus has its own unique expression within the kingdom – this is, of 
course, no less than the Kuyperian understanding of sphere sovereignty.109 Bavinck 
reflects primarily on the spheres of the church, family, state and culture and asserts that 
the Reformation restores the independence and freedom proper to them; ‘before the 
Reformation [the spheres] existed in service to the church.’110 Bavinck locates science 
																																																						
106 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God’, p. 141.  
107 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God’, p. 141.  
108 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 144.  
109 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 159.  Bavinck expresses the same ideas in 
‘Souvereiniteit der wetenschap’ in De Bazuin (Zalsman, Kampen: 11 April 1902).  
110 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 161.  
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under the sphere of culture, thereby including its practice within the cultural mandate 
that God assigns to humanity in the Genesis account. Hence,  
 
Culture exists because God bestowed on us the power to exercise rule over the 
earth. It is the communal calling of the human race to make the world its own 
and to shape it as the property and instrument of personality. Humanity was 
given power to transform the entire treasury of created life forms, whether 
spiritual, moral, as well as natural, into a pure organism and to rule over it. That 
occurs in two ways: science and art.111  
 
 Science and art find their reason and existence in the Kingdom of God, no less 
than the other spheres of life in their unique expressions. Again, one must coordinate 
Bavinck’s organic understanding of the spheres with his sober realization that sin 
continues to persist in the present order – in Bavinck one finds no totalitarian or 
triumphalist account according to which each sphere is expected to embrace Christianity 
or God’s rule over all things in a harmonious and unified agreement. ‘Here on earth’, 
Bavinck writes, ‘all those goods are not yet one; here holiness and redemption, virtue 
and happiness, spiritual and physical good do not yet coincide. More often here on earth 
the righteousness of the Kingdom of God is bound with the cross, and through many 
tribulations we must enter the Kingdom of Heaven (Acts 14:22).’112 Sin has created real 
oppositions, and in this life our expectations must be curbed, in the hope of the future 
eschatological realization of the Kingdom. One can certainly relate to Bavinck’s claims 
here from the perspective of the 21st century. Here, one finds that scholarship and the 
empirical sciences are often presented as incompatible with the confessional seminary or 
the church; the family’s ideals are often in conflict with those of the state, and the 
expression of religion lie uncomfortably with the ideals of philosophy and culture. 
Technological advancement is heralded to be identical with the claims of progress, 
whereas the belief in some absolute God is associated by many with the backward 
norms of the past – a belief that can only be held either in ignorance or nostalgic 
wishful thinking.   
 Nonetheless, the goal remains: ‘The ideal is that the oppositions appearing 
everywhere – with the individual, the family, the state, the church, culture, and so forth, 
and whereby each of these repeatedly interferes with the others – that all those 
																																																						
111 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 161.  
112 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 141.  
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oppositions gradually disappear and find their resolution in the kingdom of God.’113 
Moreover,  
 
To the extent that each of these various life spheres answers more and more to 
its essential idea, it loses its sharpness and isolation from the others and prepares 
the way all the more the coming of the Kingdom of God. For that kingdom, 
since it is the highest good, destroys nothing but consecrates everything. It 
includes every good, a kingdom wherein all the moral good that is now spread 
throughout the various spheres and comes into being in each sphere according 
to its nature and in its appropriate manner, is incorporated as purified and 
perfected. It is a kingdom wherein the human personality obtains its richest and 
most multiform manifestation, a community life of the highest order wherein all 
oppositions are reconciled and individual and community, state and church, 
cultus and culture are integrated in perfect harmony… In the Kingdom of God, 
full sovereignty is handed over to the Messiah, a sovereignty that has descended 
from him in the various life spheres and returns completely once more to God, 
who will be all in all… So, in spite of so much that seems to contradict it, do not 
deprive me of the idea that this Kingdom of God is the essential content, the 
core, and the purpose of all of world history.114  
 
 The future realization of this Kingdom is one that God achieves by a unilateral 
act of divine intervention, to be sure, yet those who find themselves in line with the 
Reformation have that prophetic task to witness to this vision of the future. Its task is to 
set the trajectory of that future unification wherein the antithesis is fully realized and sin 
is no longer an atomizing power in God’s creation. Christians continue to stand on the 
Kingdom that is already present yet invisible, harkening them back to Scripture – the 
unifying revelation from God which explains all human living precisely because it is the 
book of the core underneath the spheres of life, namely, the book of God’s kingdom:  
 
Scripture is the Book of the Kingdom of God, not a book for this or that 
people, for the individual only, but for all nations, and for all of humanity. It is 
not a book for one age, but for all times. It is a Kingdom book. Just as the 
Kingdom of God develops not alongside and above history, but in and through 
world history, so too Scripture must not be abstracted, nor viewed by itself, nor 
isolated from everything. Rather, Scripture must be brought into relationship 
with all our living, with the living of the entire human race. And Scripture must 
be employed to explain all of human living.115 
 
																																																						
113 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God’, p. 163.  
114 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 163.  
115 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 163.  
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 The structural parallel seems clear by now. The organism of the Kingdom of 
God as a unity in diversity, the consciousness of the distinction between the fallen age 
and the eschaton, and thus the prophetic task of Christianity to witness to a future where 
the unity is no longer veiled in obscurity by sin, is a macro-organism in which the 
organism of science (wetenschap) finds its location. Just like the Kingdom, science and 
knowledge form a single organism, according to which an underlying unity undergirds 
the development of the process of differentiation of the distinct spheres of knowledge. 
Sin causes that unity to be often forgotten, but it is the Christian view of knowledge, 
which again harkens back to the unified purpose, character, and foundation of the 
spheres. Scripture is the book of the kingdom, just as Scripture is the book that 
underlies all of science, and theology is the queen of the sciences, not merely because of 
its transcendent subject matter, but because it permeates all of the spheres of human life 




It seems that the overwhelming evidence produced above implies that the following 
propositions ought to condition interpretations of Bavinck’s epistemology henceforth. 
 
(1) Wetenschap is a single organism containing a unity-in-diversity. 
(2) From the perspective of diversity, each science is methodologically distinct and 
directed at different objects due to the need for a division of labor. 
(3) From the perspective of unity, each science depends upon Trinitarian and 
scriptural Christian principles for them to be seen organically. 
(4) Theology is the queen of the sciences because, 
a. its subject matter is higher than the other sciences and thus one cannot 
impose the methods of the other sciences upon theology or vice versa; 
and, 
b. its subject matter touches and shapes the other sciences, providing them 




In the next chapter, I shall observe Bavinck’s account of dualistic or mechanical 
knowing, which he often associates with the epistemology of Medieval Roman 
Catholicism, and consider some implications of his epistemology.  
Before moving on, however, it is worth noting a few implications that flow from 
Bavinck’s epistemology, especially as it relates to the role of theology within the 
university. Bavinck himself notes that the principles that shape his understanding of 
Christian science are embodied in a Christian university.116 Theoretically, and thinking 
somewhat after a ‘utopian’ fashion, Bavinck’s picture of the organism of knowledge as a 
single unity is attractive, as it may generate a great deal of cognitive solace as the body of 
truths that the student learns in one class will coalesce with what she learns in 
another.117 It resists the tendency of the modern research university to become 
increasingly fragmented, resembling a ‘multiversity’ that eschews the ideal that each 
discipline should contribute ‘to a single shared enterprise’.118  
However, what is initially attractive may become quite problematic in concrete 
application. Even with Bavinck’s insistence that theology’s influential and central role in 
the organism is one of prophetic witness and service, questions in relation to practical 
specificity and the contemporary standard of academic freedom naturally arise.119 When 
one looks closely at the early history of the Free University of Amsterdam, where the 
visions of Kuyper and Bavinck are supposed to take place as an institution of higher 
education that bases its independence on the intention ‘to pursue Christian science’, one 
finds complications immediately.120 Kuyper’s criteria for the employment of faculty 
																																																						
116 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 108.  
117 In any case David Kelsey suggests that thinking about the shape of theological 
schooling inevitably begins with utopian assumptions in his To Understand God Truly: 
What’s Theological About a Theological School? (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2011), pp. 103-13.  
118 Alasdair MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic 
Philosophical Tradition (New York: Sheed & Ward, 2009), p. 174. Bavinck might, however, 
quibble with MacIntyre’s suggestion on page 167 of the same work that the ‘autonomy 
of philosophy as a secular enterprise’ ought to be maintained.  
119 The question of academic freedom is related to the question of theological 
pluralism. For Kelsey, at least, the two imply that theological schools ‘cannot [assume] at 
the outset that any one construal (of the Christian thing, social location, way of 
understanding God, model of excellent schooling, etc.) is the one Christianly correct 
version.’ To Understand God Truly, p. 117.	The insistence of Bavinck and Kuyper on 
Reformed principles seems, at least at first glance, incompatible with Kelsey’s claim.  
120 Arie Theodorus van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University in 
Amsterdam, 1880-2005: A Commemorative History, Herbert Donald Morton (trans.), (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), p. 21.  
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members involve not merely that the candidate is intellectually capable. The candidate 
must be dedicated to investigating a science that is ‘Christian according to its principle, 
method, and result’, which necessarily involves that, like theology, his science ‘must seek 
its light by [the] Word’, wrestling with the questions of what it is that makes Christian 
scholarship distinct from non-Christian ones.121 From its inception and at least to the 
generation of Valentine Hepp, Bavinck’s successor as a lecturer of dogmatics at the 
University, the commitment to the principle that ‘all sciences are subject to the 
Scriptures, the Scriptures are opened up by exegesis, exegesis proceeds from dogmatics’ 
is rigorously maintained.122 All of this seems to suggest that theology plays less of a role 
of service and more as the queen that dictates to her subjects how each ought to 
operate; though the faculty in its early years never ceased to contemplate on how the 
sciences may inform theology, the direction at times seems more unilateral than 
reciprocal.  
Bavinck’s role and person in all of this, however, is somewhat ambiguous. In the 
first place, it was clear that Bavinck stood with Kuyper on the character of the sciences. 
Van Deursen writes that, for Bavinck, intellectual capability or expertise in research are 
secondary to a professorial candidate’s commitment to Reformed principles of 
scholarship: ‘Science always requires more precise definition… It can be reformed or 
roman catholic [sic] or naturalistic but never neutral. Bavinck accordingly proceeded on 
the assumption that in the matters of appointments, devotion to the principle must 
weigh more heavily than scientific quality.’123 The faculty members further thought that 
this conviction ought to apply not solely to the process of hiring lecturers, but also to 
their students. It was difficult to graduate from the Free University if a student betrayed 
a lack of commitment to these Kuyperian ideals. In 1911 the issue came to a head when 
a student named A. Winckel was denied a doctorate in theology precisely because he 
was judged to have failed to stand on Reformed principles. In this case, Bavinck’s voice 
was among those who denied Winckel his doctorate. Van Deursen recounts the case as 
follows.  
																																																						
121 Van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University, pp. 54-5.  
122 Van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University, p. 92.  
123 Van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University, p. 88. Abraham Flipse 
also notes Bavinck’s allegiance to Kuyper’s ‘strong emphasis on an underlying 
worldview’ in the former’s rejection of macroevolutionary accounts of human origins in 
‘The Origins of Creationism in the Netherlands: The Evolution Debate among 
Twentieth-Century Dutch Neo-Calvinists’, Church History 81 (2012): pp. 112-6 (116).  
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One ought for all examinations to investigate whether the examinee accepted 
the principles and stand of the Free University. The Senate adopted by a vote of 
seven to give with one abstention the position of Fabius and Woltjer. At 
Bavinck’s request the nays were recorded: Bavinck, Geesink, H.H. Kuyper, 
Rutgers and Sillevis Smitt. To the yeas belonged Anema, Fabius, Grosheide, and 
J. Woltjer. Of the remaining four – Boueman, Diepenhorst, Van Gelderen, and 
R.H. Woltjer – one must have abstained. The Senate, however, could only 
advise. The curators lined up behind the minority. One who would not practice 
science on the basis of gereformeerde principles could attain a doctorate anywhere, 
but not at the Free University.124  
 
Despite this episode, Bavinck’s characteristically irenic and curious mind also 
made himself the subject of controversy. Outside of publication, Bavinck would propel 
the argument that the older exegesis of the biblical creation account was in need of 
revision because of the new scientific consensus that resulted from current historical 
and scientific research.125 This caused the other faculty members to have reservations 
(even suspicions) on Bavinck’s orthodoxy, no less because in writing and in his teaching 
Bavinck seemed reticent to arrive at traditionally Reformed answers and was exceedingly 
sanguine about the contemporary theological and scientific scenes. ‘Bavinck was not 
averse to consulting ethicalist theology and garnering there whatever suited him… [He] 
had always had an aversion to that word [conservative], at times that must have made 
his life as a Reformed theologian difficult.’’126 All of these observations suggest that 
Bavinck was open to the idea that the organism of knowledge would continue to 
develop in surprising ways, even taking on a distinct shape by virtue of new findings in 
the sciences – even those that he takes to be less central in the organism. If science is 
indeed one, then this, at least, could follow: the unity of the whole could be 
																																																						
124 Van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University, p. 89.		
125 Van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University, p. 94; Bavinck would 
say so as much, on 2 February 1917, particularly with refer to the ‘duration and order 
[duur en orde]’ of the creation account, as cited in George Harinck, Cornelis van der 
Kooi, and J. Vree (eds.), ‘Als Bavinck nu maar eens kleur bekende’: Aantekeningen van H. 
Bavinck over de zaak-Netelenbos, het schriftgezag en de situatie van de gereformeerde kerken, 
November 1919 (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1994), p. 77.  
126 Van Deursen, The Distinctive Character of the Free University, p. 96. This conforms 
well with the well-known existential crises that Bavinck dealt with throughout his life 
and career, of which Willem J. De Wit provides a brief outline in On the Way to the Living 
God: A Cathartic Reading of Herman Bavinck and An Invitation to Overcome the Plausibility Crisis 
of Christianity (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2011), pp. 16-51. 	
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reformulated by a new change in one of its parts. In principle, it seems that Bavinck 
would be open to this idea.  
In any case, the second generation neo-Calvinist scientists between 1920-30 read 
Bavinck in precisely this way to ground their argument that the university should be 
more open to the results of modern science. Abraham Flipse notes that these scientists 
were encouraged ‘by some ideas of the late Bavinck, who had shown more openness to 
modern culture, they stressed that the contemporary situation was different from the 
nineteenth century… and mainstream science could not be considered suspect just 
because it was based on non-Calvinist principles.’127 
How these characteristics of Bavinck hang together with his rather militant 
commitment to Reformed principles, however, is where the tension lies.
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Chapter 4: Organism and Wetenschap – Part 2 
The preceding chapter argues that Bavinck understands science to be a single 
organism. There are distinct fields of science because the process of differentiation is a 
natural one as the organism of science grows, and as the reality of human finitude 
necessitates some division of labor with regard to the scientific task. The theology of 
Christian theism facilitates the unity of the distinct sciences. To grasp further Bavinck’s 
concerns in this construction, one ought to consider the way in which Bavinck 
characterizes the epistemology of Roman Catholicism as mechanistic, dualistic, and 
non-organic, as represented by his criticisms of Thomas Aquinas in numerous places.1 
These criticisms do not entail that there are no Thomistic motifs in Bavinck – indeed, as 
seen before, Bavinck’s doctrine of God is highly indebted to the developments made by 
Thomas, and chapter six will elucidate the fact that Bavinck retrieves Thomas’ account 
of perception. Thomas’ account is congenial with Bavinck’s conception of the relation 
between subject and object, as he synthesized it with some insights gleaned from the 
German Idealist Eduard von Hartmann.  
Hence, the way Bavinck uses and critiques Thomas, just as he uses and critiques 
many aspects of idealism or Aristotelianism for his own purposes, highlights the 
eclecticism that characterizes his writing. The previous chapter has already suggested 
that there may exist significant differences between the two theologians, no less because 
Bavinck operates with a broader notion of science (wetenschap) from the medieval notion 
of scientia, though he was certainly aware and appreciative of the latter. Recall this claim 
by Thomas, for example: ‘[I]t is impossible and ridiculous to hold that the principles of 
one science are the same as those of another science’, for, if that were the case, it would 
erroneously ‘follow from this that all things in the sciences were the same and, 
consequently, that all the sciences were one science.’2 By comparison, Bavinck’s 
																																																						
1 Recent commentators also record aspects of Bavinck’s critique of Thomas. This 
includes Bavinck’s critique of Thomas on mystery and natural theology (in Eglinton, 
Trinity and Organism, pp. 97-9), on the function of proofs and ontology (in Mattson, 
Restored to our Destiny, pp. 14-15, 45, 132), and on the relationship between nature and 
grace and epistemology (in Brian Mattson, ‘A Soft Spot for Paganism?: Herman Bavinck 
and “Insider Movements”’, The Bavinck Review 4 (2013): pp. 36, 40-2).  
2 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle Posterior Analytics, Richard Berquist 
(trans.), (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 2007), I. 43. c. For Aquinas, science is 
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emphatic claims noted in the previous chapter contradict Thomas. ‘All Science is one’3, 
he affirms, and thus, ‘each [science] fills the other, each is an integral part of the whole. 
Science is one, and therefore animated by a single highest principle… Christian-theism 
has first laid the foundation and paved the way for the organic unity of science’4, such 
that at ‘every moment science and art come into contact with Scripture; the principia for 
all of life are given in Scripture.’5  
That Bavinck uses the organic motif to shape his theological epistemology 
suggests, therefore, that past descriptions of Bavinck’s epistemology as mere 
reproductions of Thomism should be modified.  However, observing Bavinck’s self-
conscious criticisms of the purportedly inorganic epistemology of Thomas and Rome 
remain significant to understand Bavinck’s organic concerns. Bavinck appreciates 
Thomas but self-consciously develops and modifies Thomas’ thought in important 
respects. When the reference in the previous chapter concerning Bavinck’s positive 
answer to the question of whether a distinctly Christian expression of every sphere of 
life is achievable is reproduced in full, Bavinck juxtaposes his account to a Roman 
Catholic one:  
 
[Because Christianity is not merely a religion, but a new life that penetrates every 
sphere], we speak of a Christian society, of a Christian school. There is nothing 
human that cannot be called Christian. Everything within and outside the 
church that is enlivened and governed by Christ who exercises sovereignty over 
all things, constitutes and belongs to the Kingdom of God. For Rome, the 
church and the Kingdom of God are one. Thus Rome’s church views everything 
																																																																																																																																																										
different from the sense of wetenschap with which Bavinck worked. In Aquinas the 
sciences are based on first principles that are either self-evident or from the principles 
traceable to a higher science. For Thomas this necessitates that there are multiple 
sciences, precisely because there are multiple first principles for the differing sciences. 
However, Bavinck seems to be aware of this as he considered the differing first 
principles that are operative when a particular division of labor is being considered, and 
in his claim that the first principles of all of life is also found in Scripture. Both claims, 
as seen in the previous chapter, are reconciled if one reads Bavinck’s view of wetenschap 
in light of the organic motif of unity-in-diversity.  
3	Herman Bavinck, ‘The Pros and Cons of a Dogmatic System,’ trans. Nelson D. 
Kloosterman, The Bavinck Review 5, (2014), pp. 94. 	
4	Herman Bavinck, ‘Christendom en Natuurwetenschap’ in Kennis en Leven: 
Opstellen en artikelen uit vroegere jaren, C. B. Bavinck (ed.) (Kampen: Kok, 1922), pp. 201-2. 	
5	Bavinck, GD, 1: p. 472. Dutch original: ‘Ieder oogenblik komen wetenschap en 
kunst met de Schrift in aanraking, de principia voor heel het leven zijn gegeven in de 
Schrift.’ As noted in the previous chapter, the translation here is my own. 	
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that does not flow from it and is not consecrated by it to be unholy and profane. 
But the Reformation recognizes the life spheres outside the church in their 
independence. No Protestant church may denigrate the territory of human living 
outside the church as unclean or profane…. The Kingdom of God was present 
already among Israel. It progresses secretly like leaven and does not – unlike the 
church – constitute a separate community over against the state and culture.6 
 
As it will be clear, Bavinck’s comments here find their parallel in his critique of 
Thomas’s account of knowledge. The second section of this chapter, then, formulates a 
preliminary defense of Bavinck’s critique of Thomas in light of some recent criticisms of 
Bavinck. More specifically, the defense addresses the criticism that Bavinck’s 
interpretation of Thomas as a nature/grace dualist depended upon a neo-Thomistic 
19th-20th century interpretation that has been dissolved by contemporary 
reconsiderations of Thomas. Such a defense is relevant to the present thesis because the 
criticisms of Bavinck on this very issue serve to fortify the interpretation that Bavinck, 
though often unwittingly, was actually repristinating Thomas in his epistemology. These 
criticisms of Bavinck are mistaken insofar as they suggest that Bavinck’s interpretation 
of Thomas is outdated and no longer repeated in the current literature. Bavinck’s 
interpretation is still echoed by a stream of literature coming from many contemporary 
Roman Catholic Thomists. Thus, Bavinck’s critique of Thomas cannot be dismissed and 
ought to be situated within the current and in-house Thomist debates. Indeed, the 
primary objective here is not to argue that Bavinck’s interpretation of Aquinas is wholly 
correct, but that a failure to attend to Bavinck’s critique of Thomas seems to eclipse the 
organic structure of Bavinck’s epistemology.  
 Finally, I consider two implications stemming from the preceding analysis and 
the organic shape of Bavinck’s epistemology. The first involves re-articulating the 
difference between Kuyper and Bavinck on the connection (or lack thereof) between 
regeneration and science. The central claim here is that the difference between Bavinck 
and Kuyper hinges upon the former’s idea that there are two understandings of science, 
rather than two different sciences. Addressing the affinities and differences that exist 
between the two neo-Calvinists also serves to clarify Bavinck’s organic epistemology in 
important ways. The second implication I draw toward the end of this chapter involves 
elucidating the distinction that Isaiah Berlin draws between mechanical and organic 
																																																						
6 Bavinck, ‘The Kingdom of God,’ p. 158.  
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knowing in a Bavinckian fashion by way of a few analogies and thought experiments, 
connecting it also to what Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus call Gestalst Holism.  
 
I. Bavinck’s Thomas and Roman Catholic Epistemology 
 
Given the preceding exposition, one would be hard pressed to maintain that in 
Bavinck’s epistemology is found a mere reproduction of Thomism. Indeed, when one 
takes the whole of Bavinck’s corpus into account and not solely the sections in which 
Bavinck’s use of Thomas is most apparent, it is clear that Bavinck was utilizing distinctly 
19-20th century (reinterpreted) conceptual tools in order to develop and convey the 
Reformed tradition upon which he stands. Further, the organic motif imbues Bavinck’s 
epistemology with a holistic and Romantic tinge that sees the whole as greater than the 
sum of its parts.  
Instead of merely identifying Bavinck with his sources, it seems better to suggest 
that his use and appreciation of Thomas is set within the backdrop of a Reformed 
recalibration of an organic epistemology – an organic motif that in Bavinck’s view 
cannot be said to be present in the same mode in Thomas. What is involved here is, 
again, not necessarily a pitting of Bavinck against Thomas, despite the existence of some 
clear differences, but rather of making the point of development and the highlighting of his 
eclecticism. A simple identification of Bavinck’s epistemology and Thomas, I suggest, 
threatens to flatten the developments that have occurred between them while eclipsing 
Bavinck’s uniquely Reformed and organic modification and appropriation of him. 
Identifying Bavinck with a particular thinker also threatens to eclipse the self-
consciously eclectic character of Bavinck’s theology and use of sources.   
Bavinck himself recognized that Aristotle was perhaps the first thinker to conceive 
of reality as an organism and a developing whole with a telos: ‘[Aristotle] derived his 
theory of becoming from the facts of organic life, seeing in it a self-actualizing of the 
essential being in the phenomena, of the form in the matter.’7 The notion that reality 
develops as a single whole, though reconceived by some into a materialistic doctrine of 
																																																						
7 Herman Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1909), p. 9. See also Bernard Mulcahy, Aquinas’s Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian 
Integralism of Henri de Lubac: Not Everything is Grace (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), p. 98 
on Aristotle’s organic account of science. Cf. Bavinck Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 55. 
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evolution, Bavinck notes, is re-interpreted by and developed from Aristotle throughout 
philosophical and theological history up until modern and Romantic thought:  
 
This idea of [organic] development aroused no objection whatever in Christian 
theology and philosophy. On the contrary, it received extension and enrichment by 
being linked with the principle of theism. For the essence of it, it appears also in 
modern philosophy, in Lessing, Herder and Goethe, Schelling and Hegel, and in 
many historians of distinction. Some of these, it is true, have severed the idea of 
development from the theistic basis on which it rest in Christianity, and by so doing 
have reverted to the ancient pre-Christian naturalism… Whatever terms Goethe and 
Herder, Schelling and Hegel might employ to designate the core and essence of 
things, they never regarded nature as a dead mechanism, but as an eternally formative 
power, a creative artist.8  
 
Further, attending to Bavinck’s interpretation and subsequent criticism of Thomas 
and Roman Catholic epistemology as a whole is necessary because Bavinck considers it 
inorganic in concept. Here, I shall detail those criticisms, particularly in the Reformed 
Dogmatics, before I then turn to the recent criticisms of Bavinck’s interpretation, 
considering whether it is as outdated as some claim.  
Bavinck’s take on Thomas should be situated in his claim that Christianity is a vital 
reality that ought to leaven the rest of society – an aim not fully realized unless the 
principles of the Reformation are rigorously followed:  
 
In [both Pietism and Methodism] there is a failure to appreciate the activity of the 
Holy Spirit, the preparation of grace, and the connection between creation and re-
creation. That is also the reason why in neither of them does the conversion lead to 
a truly developed Christian life. Whether in Pietistic fashion it withdraws from the 
world or in Methodist style acts aggressively in the world, it is always something 
separate, something that stands dualistically alongside the natural life, and therefore 
does not have an organic impact on the family, society, and the state, on science and 
art…The Reformation antithesis between sin and grace has more or less made way 
for the Catholic antithesis between the natural and the supernatural.9 
																																																						
8 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 10. Emphases mine. For Hegel’s development 
of Aristotle, especially in his Phenomenology of Spirit, see Nicholas Adams, Eclipse of Grace: 
Divine and Human Action in Hegel (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), pp. 17-117 and 
Allegra de Laurentis ‘Absolute Knowing’, in Kenneth Westphal (ed.), The Blackwell Guide 
to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 246-64. On Hegel’s 
use of Aristotle outside of the Phenomenology, see Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Bavinck’s observation and the current 
scholarship thus further suggest that a claim of opposition between Aristotelian realism 
and modern absolute idealism must be articulated with great nuance and care.  
9 Bavinck, RD, 3: p. 568. 
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Bavinck regards the lack of an organic understanding between creation and re-
creation, between faith and reason with regard to wetenschap as one of the ‘defects’ that 
cling to past endeavors toward developing Christian scholarship. He writes: 
 
The first [defect] were faith and reason, although [they] were initially closely 
united and harmoniously connected, [they] were soon after once again torn apart 
and loosely placed side by side. Each of the two brought its own set of truths. 
So, there were supernatural truths, which were accepted on account of authority; 
and beside it stood also natural truths which could be found by reason. There 
exclusively and only faith alone was possible, here pure and accurate knowledge 
was accessible. The result was that these two truths were separated and stood 
side by side and finally some were even led to the opinion that truth itself was 
not one, but that which was true in philosophy could in essence be false in 
theology, and vice versa.10 
 
Another clearer statement, perhaps, is found in Bavinck’s address on the 
catholicity of the Church, as seen in these two statements:  
 
It is not difficult from this to see how it became necessary for Rome to set itself 
over against culture, the state, society, science, and art. According to Rome, 
Christianity is exclusively church. Everything depends on this. Outside the 
church is the sphere of the unholy.11 
 
Rome thus maintains the catholicity of the Christian faith in the sense that it 
seeks to bring the entire world under the submission of the church. But it denies 
																																																						
10 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 17. Dutch original: ‘Ten eerste werden geloof 
en rede, ofschoon aanvankelijk ten nauwste vereenigd en harmonisch verbonden, 
spoedig weder uit elkaar gerukt en los naast elkander geplaatst. Ieder van beide bracht 
zijn eigen stel waarheden mede. Er waren dus bovennatuurlijke waarheden, die op gezag 
werden aangenomen; en daarnaast bestonden er ook natuurlijke waarheden, die door de 
rede gevonden konden worden. Daar was enkel en alleen geloof mogelijk, hier was zuiver 
en nauwkeurig weten bereikbaar. Het gevolg daarvan was, dat deze beide waarheden 
gescheiden naast elkander stonden en ten slotte bij sommigen zelfs leidden tot de 
meening, dat de waarheid zelve niet één was, maar dat hetgeen waar was in de 
philosophie, valsch kon wezen in de theologie en omgekeerd.’ Sameer Yadav recently 
registers the same concerns when he writes that ‘most attempts to articulate a principled 
way of distinguishing theological inquiry from philosophical inquiry strikes [him] as 
wrongheaded.’ Further, ‘Thomists in particular are often inclined to marking out which 
issues “properly” belong to theologians and which to philosophers.’ The Problem of 
Perception and the Experience of God: Toward a Theological Empiricism (Minnesota: Fortress 
Press, 2015), p. 75 and 75 n. 13, respectively.  
11 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church’, Calvin 
Theological Journal 27, trans. John Bolt (1992), p. 230.  
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catholicity in the sense that the Christian faith itself must be a leavening agent in 
everything. In this way an eternal; dualism remains, Christianity does not 
become an immanent, reformed reality. This dualism is not an antinomy in 
which one of the realities annuls the other. Rome does not abolish the natural 
order in Manicheaen fashion but suppresses it. It leaves marriage, family, 
possessions, earthly vocations, the state, science, and art intact and even permits 
them, in their own place, a greater space and freedom than Protestantism tends 
to do. Nonetheless it downgrades the natural by stamping it as profane and 
unhallowed.12 
 
It is thus important to be clear that Bavinck is not denying that Rome sees 
revelation as the authority over human thought or that theology is the queen of the 
sciences. Rather, the critique here, it seems, is that Rome fails to endorse that the 
Christian faith and conversion ought also to have a leavening influence in all spheres of 
life.13 Rome has a solely vertical direction, whereas the Reformation has a distinctly 
horizontal dimension that Rome lacks. This is the difference, per Bavinck, between an 
organic account of nature and grace and a Roman Catholic account. In this sense, 
Eglinton’s distinction between the non-antithetical dualism of Rome and the antithetical 
dualism of Bavinck is accurate.14  The former fails to confront the individual in such a 
way that a false dichotomy emerges: either a complacency content with the natural life 
ensues, or it is avoided altogether in pursuit of the supernatural. 
Bavinck’s criticisms of Thomas Aquinas should be understood in this context – 
that of Thomas as a frequent dialogue partner in relation to Bavinck’s articulation of an 
organic worldview and Christianity’s leavening character. Bavinck understands Thomas 
to hold a vertical epistemological dualism, where there are natural, rational truths at the 
bottom with relative independence from the theological truths in the second level. The 
theological level may confirm or clarify some aspects of the truths of reason, but this 
																																																						
12 Bavinck, ‘The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,’ p. 231.  
13 One may see a contrast in Alister McGrath, who argued that theology is not to 
be considered as the ‘queen of the sciences’ but rather as the ‘base, not the apex, of the 
sciences.’ A Scientific Theology, vol. 2, Reality (London: T&T Clark, 2007), p. 229. For 
Bavinck, theology is both the apex and the base; in his judgment (with McGrath), Roman 
Catholicism sees theology merely as the apex.  
14 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, pp. 40-1, 96. This is rather different from 
Sytsma’s interpretation that Bavinck follows the dictum of grace perfecting nature, in 
‘Thomistic Epistemology’, p. 8, n. 22. Bavinck uses the dictum, as Sytsma notes, in RD, 
1: p. 322. However, in context Bavinck is admitting only a sense in which the dictum is 
right, namely that grace finds its context in nature and takes it to its end.  
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bottom level enjoys a high degree of epistemological self-sufficiency, despite it being 
soteriologically insufficient.15  
 Bavinck criticizes Thomas in many ways, but at least three interconnected 
criticisms from his Prolegomena alone are relevant for our present purpose. The 
objections involve (1) an inadequate appreciation of common grace, (2) a strong 
distinction between nature and super-nature, (3) and an insufficient use of Scripture. 
First, in Thomas there is an insufficient account of the necessity of common 
grace in natural affairs. In the Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck observes that, ‘In the Middle 
Ages Thomas not only asserted that as rational human beings can – without 
supernatural grace – know natural truths,’ which leads to the later perceived sufficiency 
of natural theology.16 Bavinck argues that the Reformation countered this by their 
implementation of common grace: “[b]y it they were protected, on the one hand, from 
the Pelagian error, which taught the sufficiency of natural theology…but could, on the 
other hand, recognize all the truth beauty, and goodness that is present also in the pagan 
world.’17As such, while Roman Catholicism can commend the existence of science and 
art on the basis of nature alone, Bavinck insists that ‘science, art, moral, domestic, and 
social life, etc., were derived from that common grace and acknowledged and 
commended with gratitude.’18 The Reformation restored these convictions ‘in 
opposition to the Roman view that the natural gifts have remained to men and only the 
supernatural lost.’19 
 Bavinck reiterates this in his discussion of apologetics. After observing with 
appreciation the historical character of the apologetics found in the biblical period, 
Bavinck argues that ‘these arguments were later taken over in Christian theology but in 
the process frequently changed in position and character.’20 This change, though based 
on faith, evolved into a two-tiered epistemology:  
 
Scholasticism…in its attempt to turn the truth of faith into the content of 
reason, in time created a division between natural and supernatural truths, a 
																																																						
15 On Bavinck’s agreement with Thomas that general revelation is soteriologically 
insufficient, see RD, 1: p. 312-4. 
16 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 319.  
17 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 319 
18 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 319. Bavinck cites Calvin, Witsius and Turretin, among 
others.  
19 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 204. See also pages 45, and 48.  
20 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 510.  
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division that had a detrimental effect on both. For the former could be 
established by reason, but the latter could only be accepted on authority. In the 
former, therefore, real science was possible; in the latter there was room only for 
faith.21 
 
 It was this division that led to the development of rationalistic apologetics, 
whereby the truths of special revelation became dependent upon a justificatory-
preamble of natural theology. Bavinck’s admission that there is a sense in which the 
truths of nature comprise a pre-amble is therefore rather different from Rome’s in 
important respects, at least in his perspective.22 For Bavinck, it means simply that the 
truths of special revelation connect with the truths of general revelation, whereas for 
Rome the latter erects the foundations and motivations for belief in the former.23 Again, 
Bavinck emphasizes that on this natural level ‘science is even possible.’24  
 Second, Bavinck critiques Thomas’s supernaturalism, according to which 
theological matters are set above natural matters. This is apparent in the practice of 
natural theology so advocated by Medieval scholastic thought, where some truths of 
God could be known by natural reason, while other supernatural, mysterious truths are 
known by authority alone, accepted in meritorious faith.25 As a result, in this ‘Catholic 
theology knowing and believing, reason and authority, natural and supernatural 
revelation, occur dualistically side by side.’26 The Reformation encountered this structure 
directly in their insistence that illumination and special revelation are necessary to read 
																																																						
21 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 510. Emphasis mine. Bavinck cites Thomas as one 
representative of this scholastic position. Alvin Plantinga registers the same criticism in 
‘Augustinian Christian Philosophy’, The Monist 75 (1992): pp. 316-20. So, Diller: ‘[in the 
locus classicus of Summa Theoloiae I. q. 12] we find that faith’s advantages over reason have 
to do with the limitations of reason. Knowledge by faith, however, is without 
intellectual vision and therefore lacks real understanding. Knowledge of God’s essence 
is not available in this mortal life but awaits the beatific vision that surpasses faith 
because it is a direct seeing’. Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma; How Karl Barth and Alvin 
Plantinga Provide a Unified Response (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2014), p. 200 n. 90.  
22 See Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 322.  
23 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 512. Norman Kretzmann seems to express the sort of 
interpretation of Thomas that Bavinck has in mind, according to which natural theology 
‘offers the best route by which philosophers can, as philosophers, approach theological 
propositions’. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 22.  
24 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 512.  
25 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 304, 571-2, 620-1.  
26 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 304. Cf. Matthew Levering, Proofs of God: Classical Arguments 
from Tertullian to Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), p. 60.  
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general revelation aright.27 The Catholic division is detrimental because it fails to uphold 
the bond between general and special revelation, causing reason gradually to gain 
autonomy. When this bond is severed, even the Reformed were vulnerable to its 
negative consequences: ‘in civil matters, then in science, soon also in philosophy, [within 
the Reformed] reason elevated itself to a position alongside of and over against faith.’28 
This elevation of reason due to a dualistic understanding of natural and supernatural 
spheres is the same root problem behind what Bavinck considered to be common in 
Medieval and historical-rationalist apologetics, something that, in Bavinck’s judgment, 
even Calvin failed completely to avoid.29 The scholastic model likewise depended so 
much on Aristotle that their dogmatic system slowly became a system of philosophy.30 
Bavinck detects this dualism in Thomas’s classification of the virtues as well. For 
Thomas, theological virtues are set apart because their object is directed toward God: 
‘the intellectual and moral virtues are according to human nature, the theological virtues 
are above nature.’31 Intellectual virtues include wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, 
while religious disposition falls under moral virtue. Bavinck argues that this distinction 
cannot be maintained because of its dualistic character, for the ‘moral virtues and also 
the religious disposition must be renewed and reborn to be truly good.’32 The 
Reformation therefore rightly remedies this dualism when it incorporates theological 
virtues ‘into religion itself as the primary acts of internal religion.’33  
 Finally, Thomas omits a discussion on the doctrine of Scripture in the beginning 
of his dogmatic structure. Because of this Bavinck judges Thomas’s organization as 
‘inferior’ to Bonaventure’s, who by contrast included a doctrine of Scripture in the 
																																																						
27 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 304.  To make sense of Bavinck’s claim here, one could 
remember the distinction between God’s revelation, which renders all men inexcusable, 
and the unregenerate individual’s reception and expression of that revelation, which in 
Reformed theology always produces false theology. Willem J. Van Asselt, ‘The 
Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-
Century Reformed Thought,’ WTJ 64 (2002), po. 323, 325. 
28 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 306.  
29 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 512-3.  
30 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 145-6.  
31 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 240. Thomas’ discussion of the virtues is, for Bavinck, not 
yet a mature acknowledgement of the subjective side of religion, which Bavinck traces 
from the Reformation unto modern thought.  
32 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 240. 
33 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 240.  
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prologue to his Breviloquium.34 Instead, Thomas treated the essence of theology first, 
which led to the doctrine of the pre-ambles of faith in scholasticism. Characteristically, 
Bavinck commends the Reformed for countering this in their insistence that theological 
foundations are necessary for dogmatics, as represented by Calvin’s Institutes. ‘The 
starting point of the Institutes is theological, but Calvin does not proceed from an 
abstract concept of God but from God as he is known by humanity and nature and 
Scripture.’35 Later Protestant Scholasticism, however, reverted back to the old order and 
thus further severed the connection of dogmatics with the ‘life of faith.’36 This 
observation is significant because in Bavinck’s insistence that a doctrine of Scripture be 
placed first in the organization of dogmatics, he resists the dualistic structure he thinks 
is characteristic of both Thomistic epistemology in general and dogmatics in particular. 
 
II. ‘Bavinck’s Mistake’: Re-situating Bavinck’s Account of Thomas Within the Current Internal 
Thomist Debates 
 
It would be beyond the scope of this present study to enter into the debates of 
current scholarship on Thomas Aquinas regarding the accuracy of Bavinck’s critiques of 
Thomas.37 However, given the existence of recent and rather harsh criticisms of Bavinck 
regarding his interpretation of Thomas, it is appropriate to draw some implications from 
the interpretation of Bavinck offered here that might be relevant to those critiques. 
What I attempt, therefore, is not an assessment of Bavinck’s interpretation of Thomas, 
but rather a preliminary assessment of the critiques launched against Bavinck, generated 
by his interpretation of Thomas. Fortunately for the present purposes, whether 
Bavinck’s interpretation of Thomas is correct need not be adjudicated here because it 
would require a close investigation of the primary texts and the in-house Thomist 
debates. Situating Bavinck’s criticisms within the current stream of debates internal to 
the scholarship on Thomas is sufficient not to discredit Bavinck’s account, and to better 
appreciate Bavinck’s organic concerns.  
																																																						
34 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 98-9.  
35 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 101. 
36 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 102.  
37 Here, one must heed a warning from Nicholas Wolterstorff: ‘To say that there 
is not a consensus view on Aquinas's understanding of natural law is to understate 
drastically the depth and scope of controversy on the matter.’ Justice: Rights and Wrongs 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 39. 
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The criticisms against Bavinck’s reading of Thomas revolve centrally around the 
claim that Bavinck’s reading is dependent upon an outdated 19th century interpretation 
of Thomas. Following Echeverria and Arvin Vos, John Bolt argues that Bavinck’s 
interpretation depends on Cajetan and neo-scholastic readings of Thomas.38 Bolt claims 
that this interpretation has been decisively ‘discredited’ in recent decades by proponents 
of the nouvelle theologie, ‘who insisted that human reason always operates within a 
teleology of belief and unbelief.’39 Catholic theology, and Aquinas in particular, do not 
hold a  ‘duplex ordo of natural knowledge and supernatural knowledge’, nor does Rome 
operate ‘in a two-tiered epistemological universe.’40 Bavinck was merely a ‘child of his 
time’ who fell into the ‘trap’ of reading Thomas through the lens of the ‘sixteenth-, 
seventeenth-, and especially nineteenth-century neo-scholastic’ interpreters.41 
Furthermore, the noetic effects of sin in Aquinas, argues Bolt, lead to the view that 
human natural knowledge of God does not purchase true divine cognition.42  
Paul Helm also launches an identical critique of Bavinck. Neo-Calvinism, in 
Helm’s view, has as a whole misunderstood the natural law position and Thomas:  
 
This misunderstanding has taken the form of frequent warnings against the 
nature-grace ‘dichotomy’ or ‘dualism’, according to which ‘pure nature’ is the 
intact human state unaffected by the Fall, except for the loss of the donum 
superadditum. This view is in fact the brainchild of various Roman Catholic 
Counter-Reformation theologians. In rejecting it, and condemning it as Pelagian 
in contrast to the Augustinianism of the Reformation, the Reformed theologians 
who did so also mistakenly turned their backs on the entire mediaeval tradition. 
																																																						
38 John Bolt, ‘An Adventure in Ecumenicity: A Review Essay of Berkouwer and 
Catholicism by Eduardo Echeverria,’ The Bavinck Review 5 (2014), pp. 76-89. Arvin Vos, 
Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the 
Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985). In another place, Bolt 
argued that ‘Bavinck himself contributed to the problem [of anti-Thomism] with his 
general assessment of Roman Catholic thought but also provided the basis for an 
antidote [by rejecting von Harnack’s “hellenization thesis”]’, ‘Doubting Reformational 
Anti-Thomism’, in Aquinas Among the Protestants, Manfred Svensson and David 
VanDrunen, eds. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), p. 131.  
39 Bolt, ‘An Adventure in Ecumenicity,’ p. 80.  
40 Bolt, ‘An Adventure in Ecumenicity,’ p. 78.  
41 Bolt, ‘An Adventure in Ecumenicity,’ p. 80.  
42 Bolt, ‘An Adventure in Ecumenicity,’ p. 80. Bolt cites Eugene F. Rogers Jr., 
‘The Narrative of Natural Law in Aquinas’ Commentary on Romans 1,’ Theological Studies 
59 (1998): 254-76. Chapter seven returns to this topic. Bolt, insofar as he is missing that 
revelation might be felt rather than accessed by reason, might still be missing Bavinck’s 
central concerns.  
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For the retention of ‘pure nature’ was most certainly not Thomas Aquinas’s 
estimate of the effect of the Fall on human nature, for example, yet it came to 
be regarded by Reformed thinkers such as Kuyper and Herman Bavinck as the 
standard, unchanging Roman view.43 
 
In another place, Helm identifies Bavinck’s neo-Calvinistic interpretation of 
Calvin and negative evaluation of Thomas’ alleged ‘pure nature’ theology as simply 
‘Bavinck’s mistake.’44 Again, Helm argues that Bavinck’s criticisms of Thomas were 
dependent on Counter-Reformational theologians like Cajetan and Bellarmine – 
readings that have been challenged by Henri de Lubac and Arvin Vos.45  
It must be acknowledged, first, that the theology propounded by the thinkers 
stemming from the nouvelle theologie marks a significant strand in contemporary Roman 
Catholic thought, distinct from the theology espoused by neo-scholasticism, and often 
congenial with Bavinck and Kuyper’s neo-Calvinistic emphasis on the intrinsic 
relationship between nature and grace. It must also be emphasized that Thomas’ 
thinking is complex, perhaps suggesting that Bavinck’s interpretation of him merits 
more critical attention by a closer reading of both primary texts, coupled with a fair 
attention to internal debates concerning Thomas’s views. Indeed, great thinkers often 
generate such discussions and disagreements concerning how best to interpret their 
writings.46  
However, I suggest two brief assessments of these charges. First, I argue that 
discrediting Bavinck’s interpretation of Thomas as an advocate of a two-tiered 
epistemology, with a concomitant commitment to a ‘pure nature’ theology would be too 
quick. There are still many Catholic theologians and interpreters of Thomas who 
																																																						
43 Paul Helm, ‘Religion and Reason from a Reformed Perspective,’ in Theology and 
Philosophy, eds. Oliver D. Crisp, Gavin D’Costa, Mervyn Davies, Peter Hampson 
(London: T&T Clark, 2012), p. 69.  
44 Paul Helm, Calvin at the Centre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 328-
332. James Eglinton includes Helm’s critique within a recent ‘back-lash’ against neo-
Calvinism. For this observation and a preliminary response, see James Eglinton, ‘To 
Transcend and to Transform: The Neo-Calvinist Relationship of Church and Cultural 
Transformation,’ The Kuyper Center Review, vol. 3, Calvinism and Culture, ed. John Bowlin 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), pp. 163-197.  
45 Helm, Calvin at the Centre, p. 312.  
46 The debates around how to interpret Hegel or Barth, for examples, also come 
to mind.  
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interpret him in precisely this way, as Echeverria admits.47 After observing this intra-
Roman Catholic debate from both a general and particularized perspective, I shall build 
upon some arguments erected by Peter Leithart and Kevin Vanhoozer and suggest that 
Bavinck’s organic epistemology and interpretation of Thomas are critiqued because 
substantive disagreements exist between his critics and Bavinck himself.  
First, then, this section makes some general observations regarding the on-going 
character of this debate, and then it situates Bavinck’s interpretation within a recent 
resurgence of the ‘pure nature’ interpretation of Thomas in the last decade.48  
Linda Zagzebski, for example, says that the extent and powers of natural human 
reason still form the question that distinguishes Protestant and Catholic accounts of 
knowledge:  
 
Although both traditions agree that natural human faculties have suffered 
damage as a result of original sin, Catholic theology has commonly maintained 
that the will suffered more than the intellect, and that our powers of reasoning 
can still hope to achieve much that points the way to Christian belief. Catholic 
philosophy also has a long tradition of natural law, which implies that our reason 
is a potent source of knowledge about moral matters. The extension to matters 
metaphysical is relatively easy. The idea is that both moral and metaphysical 
knowledge have important underpinnings in the knowledge of human nature, 
and the knowledge of human nature is within the reach of ordinary human 
reason.49 
																																																						
47 ‘I do not mean to deny that there have been and still are Catholic rationalists of 
this sort, but such rationalism is a corruption of Aquinas’ thought and by implication 
the teaching of Vatican 1.’ Eduardo Echeverria, ‘The Reformed Objection to Natural 
Theology: A Catholic Response to Herman Bavinck,’ Calvin Theological Journal 45 (2010), 
p. 99. However, this assertion seems to beg the question. The Catholic theologians 
Echeverria has in mind do not believe they are corrupting Aquinas’ thought.  
48 Though the following debate is not recognized by the current critics of Bavinck, 
Kevin Vanhoozer offers a significant interaction with it in Biblical Authority After Babel: 
Retrieving the Solas in The Spirit of Mere Protestant Christianity (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2016), 
pp. 44-50.		
49 Linda Zagzebski, introduction to Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed 
Epistemology, ed. Linda Zagzebski, Library of Religious Philosophy 10 (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 3-4. James Turner likewise remarks that for 
Rome ‘faith gives no epistemological edge.’ In Mark A. Noll and James Turner, The Future of 
Christian Learning: An Evangelical and Catholic Dialogue, ed. Thomas A. Howard (Grand 
Rapids: Brazos, 2008), p. 106. One may add Diller’s observation as well concerning 
Plantinga: ‘Plantinga rejects [the] Thomist characterization of faith and knowledge, and 
recommends an Augustinian view. On this view knowing something by way of 
testimony is not necessarily inferior to knowing something by way of deductive 
argument.’ Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, p. 200.  
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Likewise, in a dialogue with Gavin D’Costa, Oliver Crisp argues that,  
 
The Reformed traditionally have denied the adage, beloved of some Thomists, 
that grace perfects nature. They have replied, instead, that grace regenerates 
nature, redirecting it back to God by repairing what has been damaged, or 
almost effaced (Calvin says both things at different times in his works). That 
which has been damaged or almost effaced, is of course, the divine image and its 
concomitant in Reformed theology, the sense of the divine. So it is not merely 
that grace must perfect that which is imperfect, but functional. It is more that 
grace must repair what is severely damaged.50 
 
 In response, D’Costa does not deny Crisp’s observation, except to admit that 
not all Thomists affirm the adage that ‘grace perfects nature.’51 Indeed, this provokes the 
suggestion that there is no single interpretation of Thomas that is established to the 
point that other interpretations could be so easily discredited. Michael Rota argues that 
Thomas was no evidentialist,52 while others contend for the opposite.53 Furthermore, 
Bavinck’s observation in the previous section regarding Bonaventure’s superior 
sensitivity over Aquinas concerning the grounding of philosophy in Scriptural revelation 
is also still echoed quite recently by Larry Siedentop:  
 
No doubt [Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas] claimed to 
reject ‘pagan’ philosophy when it conflicted with Christian revelation. Yet 
Bonaventure remained within the Augustinian tradition – concerned, above all, 
with relating the individual will to God’s will – while adapting some arguments 
																																																						
50 Oliver D. Crisp, ‘On Being a Reformed Theologian,’ Theology 115 (2012), p. 21. 
If one believes that the sense of the divine refers to the content of the knowledge of 
God produced by the Logos, perhaps it is more accurate to say that the sense of the 
divine is suppressed, rather than damaged. 
51 Personal correspondence between Crisp and D’Costa, cited in Crisp, ‘On Being 
a Reformed Theologian,’ p. 25 n. 13.  
52 Michael Rota, ‘What Aristotelian and Thomistic Philosophy Can Contribute to 
Christian Theology,’ in Theology and Philosophy, eds. Oliver D. Crisp, Gavin D’Costa, 
Mervyn Davies, Peter Hampson (London: T&T Clark, 2012), p. 112. He gives a nice 
and short summary on the various ‘Thomist’ views on page 113, n. 1.  
53 See Hugo Meynell, ‘Faith, Foundationalism, and Nicholas Wolterstorff,’ in 
Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology, ed. Linda Zagzebski, Library of 
Religious Philosophy 10 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 79-
109; Ralph MacInerny, Praembula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers (Indiana: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2006).  
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from Aristotle. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, 
sought to integrate far more of Aristotle…with Christianity.54 
 
 Provocatively, Rik van Nieuwenhove suggests that integralist interpreters of 
Thomas may be (wrongly) motivated by the post-Barthian anxiety to deny philosophical 
reason the role of becoming a pre-amble to dogmatic construction, leading them 
mistakenly to mute the demonstrative character of Thomas’s use of philosophy.55 
Fergus Kerr argues that current interpretations of Thomas are incommensurably 
conflicting,56 while Matthew Levering also affirms that later interpreters of Thomas read 
him in a dualist manner ‘not due to ill-will or rationalism, but because of the divergence 
in what he says at various places.’57  
 Levering’s illuminating comment sheds light on a recent resurgence of Catholic 
scholarship reacting against de Lubac’s interpretation of Thomas. Indeed, some 
theologians in the last decade have argued that Cajetan’s reading of Thomas is actually 
in keeping with Thomas’ thinking, and that de Lubac has misread Cajetan as well – 
accounts not sufficiently acknowledged by Bolt, Echeverria, or Helm. Steven Long’s 
work Pura Natura is one representative work. In it he calls for a return to the Thomistic 
doctrine of pure nature, which he thinks was expressed in Vatican I and Aeterni Patris.58 
Nature and natural reason ought to have its own relative autonomy and intelligibility 
																																																						
54 Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (United 
Kingdom: Penguin Books, 2014), 298. For an account of the debate regarding whether 
Aquinas falls within the Augustinian tradition, and an argument for the conclusion that 
he is indeed within that tradition in his account of the image of God, knowledge, and 
illumination, see Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of 
Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley & Blackwell, 2011), pp. 155-180.  
55 Rik van Nieuwenhove, An Introduction to Medieval Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 171-210.	Elsewhere Van Nieuwenhove writes 
that the ‘readings of those scholars who deny that Aquinas allows for a demonstration 
of the existence of God by the natural light, seem therefore rather problematic’, 
‘Catholic Theology in the Thirteenth Century and the Origins of Secularism’, Irish 
Theological Quarterly 75 (2010): p. 341.		
56 Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002) 
pp. 15-6.	
57 Personal correspondence with Peter Leithart, cited in Peter Leithart, Athanasius, 
Foundations of Theological Exegesis and Christian Spirituality, Hans Boersma and 
Matthew Levering (eds.) (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), p. 188, n. 49.  
58 Steven A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2011), p. 211.  
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apart from grace in order that the supernatural character of grace can be sufficiently 
appreciated.59  
 Bernard Mulcahy argues against the integralist account of nature and grace 
found in de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy, particularly regarding natural law and 
Thomas’s epistemology of the sciences: 
 
Thomas contends that the natural, God-given light of the human intellect is 
what makes the Gentiles (and, for that matter, all humans) ‘a law to themselves.’ 
Without revelation and even in out fallen state, human intelligence is able to 
frame general principles of right action.60 
 
There are, Aquinas observes, two kinds of sciences: those which use axioms 
recognized in the natural light of human understanding (such axioms as, for 
example, the principles of non-contradiction, identity, consistency, etc.) and 
those which use axioms recognized in the light of a yet higher science (as, for 
example, when mathematics or biology draws on logic). Sacra doctrina is a science 
of a second type. The superior science from which it derives its principles is, 
Thomas boldly declares, nothing less than the scientia divina itself, God’s very 
own understanding, which is communicated to the angels and saints in the 
beatific version.61 
 
Furthermore, following the observation that Thomas organizes the sciences by 
way of sub-alternation in which theology takes the highest supernatural level that builds 
on the lower natural sciences, he writes that theology and philosophy are ordered 
vertically in this way:  
 
[Thomas] compares the two ways of knowing, the natural (philosophical) and 
the supernatural (Christian and theological), and tells us that each has its own 
method…Against all psychological theories of supernatural illumination, 
Thomas insists that the natural human intellect is itself the means by which God 
creatively and providentially endows us with understanding. Our nature, he 
insists, is sufficient for its own intellectual activity: no further intervention or 
illumination is needed for our natural knowing.62 
 
																																																						
59 Long, Natura Pura, pp. 93-97, 155.  
60 Mulcahy, Not Everything is Grace, p. 88.  
61 Mulcahy, Not Everything is Grace, p. 103.  
62 Mulcahy, Not Everything is Grace, pp. 106-7. Emphasis mine. Mulcahy’s account 
is especially relevant when one considers Wolter Huttinga’s recent work in connecting 
Bavinck strongly with the theology of Millbank’s Radical Orthodoxy. See Wolter Huttinga, 
Participation and Communicability: Herman Bavinck and John Milbank on the Relation between 
God and the World (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn Motief, 2014).  
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 Laurence Feingold, also arguing that the pure-nature tradition finds its home 
within Thomism maintains that, contrary to de Lubac, the beatific vision is not 
constitutive of humanity’s natural end. Rather, he draws from Thomas in his 
consideration that limbo is the purely natural end for the human soul, while the beatific 
vision is a supernatural end.63 Although it never obtains concrete existence, pure nature 
can nonetheless be intelligible on its own as abstracted from its actual existential 
conditions. Thomas’s metaphysical realism seems to imply that God is obligated to 
bestow the beatific vision universally if this were truly the natural eschatological end of 
humanity. This scenario serves to argue that integralist accounts of nature and grace 
undermine the gratuity of grace, rendering God wrongly vulnerable to charges of 
injustice.64 These authors appeal to this kind of text from Thomas to establish the 
distinct ends and virtues of the natural from the supernatural:  
 
If man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his 
natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction 
the part of his reason, beside the natural law and human law which is derived 
from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is 
disproportionate to man’s natural faculty…it was necessary… that man should 
be directed to his end by a law given by God.65 
 
 Andrew Swafford gives a succinct summary of the pure-nature tradition as 
represented by the Counter-Reformational readings of Thomas and the contemporary 
defenders of that tradition:  
 
for the pure nature tradition, human nature is self-contained and integral in its 
own right, and for that reason it has no strict exigency for anything beyond what 
is contained within the definition of nature. In this light, it cannot be said that 
																																																						
63 Laurence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas 
and His Interpreters (2nd ed.; Naples: Sapientia, 2010), pp. 235, 250.  
64 On this point de Lubac appeals to Ockham’s dictum that God owes nothing to 
any creature, in direct opposition to Thomas. See Andrew Swafford’s concise discussion 
of the Debitum Naturae in Nature and Grace: A New Approach to Thomistic Ressourcement 
(Cambridge: James Clark & Co, 2015), p. 82.  
65 Aquinas, ST I-Iae, q. 91, a. 4. Quoted in Swafford, Nature and Grace, p. 134. Cf. 
ST III, q. 9, a. 2; Steven A. Long, ‘On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man’, 
The Thomist 64 (2000), pp. 211-237; see also the discussion in Steven A. Long, 
‘Obediential Potency, Human Knowledge, and the Natural Desire for God’, International 
Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1997), pp. 49-51.  
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grace is necessary for the functioning of human nature, for such a statement 
would negate the gratuity of grace.66 
 
 Hence, the above authors argue that Henri de Lubac is over-confident about his 
interpretation of Aquinas and that he simultaneously misrepresents the pure nature 
tradition. In effect, they argue that de Lubac often holds views in contradistinction to 
Thomas because of his conviction that a distinctly Christian expression of humanism is 
achievable.67 As these texts convey, the pure nature Thomists are trying to preserve the 
important theological insight that grace does not merely bring nature to perfection, but 
truly brings something new and gratuitous – something ‘disproportionate’ – to it. 
 The polemical tone of this debate between extrinsicist ‘pure-nature’ Thomism 
and de Lubac’s intrinsicist account has subsided, leading to Steven Long’s admission 
that in Thomas there exists ‘two sets of texts’: one which lends itself to de Lubac’s 
interpretation and the other to the pure-nature tradition.68 Swafford, who argues that the 
pure nature tradition (which he defends) is ‘organically’ developed from principles 
readily found in Thomas,69 nevertheless concedes that Thomas is ambiguous:  
 
Let us state upfront that the exegetical questions [regarding whether Thomas 
Aquinas was a nature/grace dualist] is largely insoluble, since it all depends on 
which texts are interpretively privileged over others. One set of texts lends 
support to the legitimacy of the pure-nature tradition, while others clearly favor 
de Lubac.70 
 
 Nonetheless, the existence of current nuanced defenses and advancements 
within the pure-nature Thomistic tradition must be taken into account when 
																																																						
66 Swafford, Nature and Grace, p. 47.  
67 Swafford, following Feingold and Long, argues that (1) de Lubac misses the 
distinction between specific/generic obediential potency in Cajetan and Thomas, (2) de 
Lubac wrongly rejects the debitum naturae because he has a more voluntaristic account 
of what God owes to natural man, whereas the pure-nature tradition are more 
consistently realists, and (3) de Lubac also misses that Thomas considers it possible to 
abstract ‘pure nature’ apart from its existential concrete instantiations, such that a 
natural end is distinguished from a final end. On this third point, Keith Johnson also 
provides a brief outline on the internal Thomist debate on the matter in Karl Barth and 
the Analogia Entis (London: T&T Clark, 2010), pp. 76-7. 
68 Long, Natura Pura, pp. 12-13.  
69 Swafford, Nature and Grace, 37.  
70 Swafford, Nature and Grace, p.  37. Swafford finally argues that Matthias J. 
Scheeben’s theology provides a middle way that preserves the virtues of both 
interpretations. See Nature and Grace, pp. 143-194.  
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considering Bavinck’s criticisms. Failure to attend to the complexity of the debates 
internal to the current scholarship on Thomas may lead to facile dismissals of Bavinck’s 
interpretation of Thomas. David Grumett likens this recent string of scholarship to a 
‘firing line’ against de Lubac’s retrieval of Thomas.71 As a result, Grumett provides a 
reminder that de Lubac’s project is a distinctly Augustinian one.  He in turn argues that 
de Lubac himself acknowledged the existence of significant differences between 
Thomas and Augustine, such that the question of whether an appeal to Thomas is 
necessary at all to follow de Lubac’s integralism arises. In Grumett’s words: 
 
In this article it has been clearly shown, however, that the primary theological 
inspiration for de Lubac’s theology of grace and nature was neither Thomism 
nor secularism, but Augustinianism. De Lubac necessarily engaged Thomas in 
order to develop an alternative to contemporary neo-Thomist readings of him. 
In so doing, de Lubac elucidated Thomas’s Augustinian heritage and showed 
how Thomas consciously used Augustine rather than read him neutrally. De 
Lubac thereby proved that real theological choices needed to be made between 
Augustine and Thomas, and that the notion that their theologies could be 
melded into an overarching ‘orthodoxy’ was untenable.72 
 
 Given the lively character of the debates between thinkers representing various 
streams of theology on Thomas, a charitable reading of Bavinck would perhaps suggest 
that he is not simply ‘trapped’ as a passive recipient of the intellectual climate of his day. 
Bavinck’s critique of Thomas is quite in line with the ‘pure nature’ Thomism still 
propelled today. Further, the extensive manner in which Bavinck engages with Thomas 
directly (along with other Catholic theologians contemporary to his time) points to the 
conclusion that Bavinck was not merely dependent on secondary readings of Aquinas. It 
is thus better to suggest that Bavinck offers a reading of Thomas consistent with one 
voice within on-going discussion, namely, with the ‘pure-nature’ interpretation still 
asserted in the present day.   
 Secondly, Peter Leithart has argued that the retrieval efforts of Thomas by 
Henri de Lubac and the nouvelle theologie do not escape the dualism between nature and 
grace they found problematic within neo-scholasticism. Leithart argues that de Lubac 
still reasons, at times, as if nature and super-nature were in opposition in his attempt to 
																																																						
71 David Grumett, ‘De Lubac, Grace, and the Pure Nature Debate,’ Modern 
Theology (2015), p. 124.  
72 Grumett, ‘De Lubac, Grace, and the Pure Nature Debate,’ p. 138.  
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preserve the gratuity of the supernatural.73 Despite making significant improvements, 
the debates between Rahner and de Lubac and the pure-nature Thomists show that they 
often spoke as if nature and supernature were opposed rather than connected while 
neglecting sufficiently to acknowledge the fallenness of creatures. Because of this, 
Leithart suggests that the terminology of nature/supernature should be totally 
reconsidered, pointing to Athanasius’s biblicization of metaphysics instead as a way 
forward in order to recapture a metaphysical vision in which ontology is fundamentally 
found within an economy of divine grace. Kevin Vanhoozer expresses similar 
frustrations to the in-house debates on interpreting Thomas and summarizes the issues 
by following Leithart’s judgment:  
 
Peter Leithart speaks for many Protestants when, observing this intra-Catholic 
debate, he comments that the problem is that both neoscholastics and their 
nouvelle detracters appear to chalk up humanity’s distance from God to their 
createdness, not fallenness. On the contrary: the problem is not that God (or the 
supernatural) is “external” to creation but rather that the whole realm of 
creation has become alienated from God through sin… not because human 
nature has by grace been “elevated” but because human sinners (persons) have 
by grace been forgiven.74 
 
Significant to the present purpose, Vanhoozer connects these claims explicitly to 
Herman Bavinck’s ‘observation that grace is not opposed to nature but to sin’75 precisely 
because created existence already participates in ‘grace’: ‘the gospel of Jesus Christ 
presupposes an ontology of grace, consists in an economy of grace, and continues in a 
teleology of grace’.76 These points link well with Bavinck’s emphasis on the necessity of 
common grace and his ambivalence towards making a distinction between natural and 
supernatural revelation, preferring instead to emphasize the organic unity of general and 
special revelation and the all-encompassing supernatural character of revelation.77 
Building upon Vanhoozer and Leithart here, I suggest that Bolt’s (and Helm’s) 
critiques of Herman Bavinck are materially motivated by the rather tenuous relationship 
																																																						
73 Leithart, Athanasius, p. 37.  
74 Vanhoozer, Biblical Authority After Babel, p. 49.  
75 Vanhoozer, Biblical Authority After Babel, p. 50.  
76 Vanhoozer, Biblical Authority After Babel, p. 49. On the same page Vanhoozer 
connects this to the idea that, for the Reformation, ‘grace does not simply perfect or 
complete but restores and transforms nature.’		
77 Leithart, Athanasius, pp. 89-116. Bavinck, RD: 1, pp. 307-312.  
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between their epistemologies and Bavinck’s, as evidenced by their explicit critiques of 
Bavinck’s epistemology.    
 Bolt’s alternative, hinted at above, is to argue that the Bible (or, special 
revelation) could not be used to construct a biblical philosophy; rather, it is best to say 
that ‘a particular philosophy or view of the human person’ is appropriately ‘consistent with 
or at odds with biblical teaching about the image of God.’78 Indeed, Bolt argues that 
Bavinck started a misguided trajectory of Biblicism which led to the birth of 
Dooyeweerd’s Reformational philosophy, and an unending regress of mistaken attempts 
at ‘purifying’ one’s worldview.79 Thus, though the Bible may inform our philosophical 
endeavors, it is misguided to seek a ‘biblical’ or truly Christian philosophy because this is 
not what the Bible is for. Here, in Bolt’s direct critique of Bavinck, the differences 
between the two thinkers emerge. For Bavinck, as previously noted, a truly ‘Christian 
treatment’ of philosophy can be developed.80 
 Human beings are not mechanical creatures that can siphon off one ‘set’ of 
propositions from another. Indeed, image-bearers of God who are embodied as psycho-
somatic wholes come to topics with all that they know.81 The relationship between 
nature and grace and the truths of general and special revelation do not pose two 
parallel lines or two hermetically sealed silos that do not interact with one another. They 
are all known organically in the consciousness of creatures. As such, Bavinck rejects a 
methodological atomism that prioritizes the acquisition of knowledge by way of 
quantitative addition and a structure that implies a two-tiered epistemology.82 
																																																						
78 Bolt, ‘An Adventure in Ecumenicity,’ p. 88.  
79 Bolt, ‘An Adventure in Ecumenicity,’ pp. 86-8. In Bolt’s view, this regress is a 
negative one. But this is not necessarily so – perhaps, in the eyes of someone engaged in 
Reformational philosophy this work is not regress, but simply a development of 
scholarship.  
80 See the above discussion on Bavinck, ‘Theology and Religious Studies,’ p. 59 
81 For a model of human knowing congenial to Bavinck’s, see Hubert Dreyfus and 
Charles Taylor, Retrieving Realism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). More on 
this, below.  
82 Bavinck implies that the method of ‘quantitative addition’ is connected with an 
inorganic epistemology when he rejects the notion of a ‘hierarchy of truths’ with regard 
to the articles of faith: ‘Faith on the side of the Reformation, however, is special (fides 
specialis) with a particular central object: the grace of God in Christ. Here an arithmetic 
addition of articles, the knowledge of which and the assent to which is necessary for 
salvation, was no longer an option. Faith is a personal relationship to Christ; it is organic 
and has put aside quantitative addition’. RD, 1: p. 614. See also James Eglinton’s 
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 As noted earlier, the observation that Scripture is not a manual for philosophy 
for Bavinck is not reason enough to deny the fundamental significance that the Bible 
bears for other fields of knowledge: ‘A great deal of what is related in Scripture is of 
fundamental significance also for the other sciences. At every moment science and art come 
into contact with Scripture; the primary principles [principia] for all of life are given in Scripture. 
This truth may in no way be discounted.’83 Statements like these do not seem readily 
amenable to Paul Helm’s view, according to which he denies that Scripture speaks of an 
epistemology.84 Rather, for Helm reason bears a judicial role with regard to natural 
affairs.85 What Bavinck is after, it seems, is not a purified Biblicism, but rather an 
exploration of how the content of Scripture can play a leavening role on the other 
sciences; this leavening can already be discerned by the way in which Bavinck organizes 
the sciences into an organic whole – an organic motif he derives by a reflection on the 
Trinity’s being.  
Bavinck’s outlook is quite different from Helm’s. To affirm that the principia 
for every science are from Scripture is not identical with saying that Scripture is a 
manual for every science – neither does it necessarily conflict with Bavinck’s affirmation 
that illumined reason is a principium cognoscendi with respect to science. Rather, it is merely 
to affirm the holism entailed by Bavinck’s organic view: each form of revelation, general 
and special, is unintelligible without the other. The organic motif and the holism it 
implies allow for a modified and more flexible view that multiple principia are always 
operative in the different fields of inquiry, despite some degree of methodological 
priority granted to one or another. Each part demands the perspective of the whole, and 
the unity behind the diversity resulted from the developing differentiations out of the 
growing ‘organism of science’ cannot be forgotten.  
As such, it is Bavinck’s conviction that Christian theology can ‘fashion for 
herself’ a philosophy, while using the tools found in any pre-existing philosophies freely. 
This might include, for example, Aristotelianism or Berlin Romanticism.86 There is no 
singular philosophical handmaiden to Christianity, and thus all philosophies can be re-
																																																																																																																																																										
discussion in, ‘Vox Theologiae: Boldness and Humility in Public Theological Speech’, 
International Journal of Public Theology 9 (2015), pp. 17-25.  
83 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 445 
84 Paul Helm, Faith, Form and Fashion: Classical Reformed Theology and its Postmodern 
Critics (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2014), pp. 64-5.  
85 Helm, Faith, Form and Fashion, p. 57-9.  
86 Bavinck, ‘The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl,’ p. 123.  
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assimilated with Christian principles. The conviction that a distinctly Christian 
expression can be achieved in every field of inquiry is indeed a part of what makes neo-
Calvinism distinctive among the various Reformed streams of thought.87 Significantly, 
Helm’s charge that the neo-Calvinists dissolve the ‘exclusively spiritual character of the 
Church’ because they emphasize the achievability of a Christian expression of every 
sphere of life seems identical to the objections lodged by pure nature Thomists against 
de Lubac.88 As one commentator observes, de Lubac is often critiqued for risking a 
conflation between ‘the natural and supernatural’ because of his emphasis on theology’s 
capacity to display ‘its inner intelligibility and beauty of Christian doctrine and its ability 
to interpret all of reality.’89 Here, Helm and the pure nature Thomists display similar 
patterns of reasoning in their objections against neo-Calvinism and de Lubacian 
integralism.   
 I suggest that Bavinck’s organic epistemology – with an implication that the 
prospect of a distinctly Christian expression of philosophy is achievable – leads to a 
picture indeed different from the views implied in Bolt and Helm. If all of knowledge is 
a single organism, it is insufficient to say that one particular philosophy or other is 
consistent with theology. It is also insufficient to say that theology or Scripture informs 
our investigations of philosophy. Rather, one would ask which philosophy – or 
philosophical concepts and views - organically flow from or to theology, or could be 
assimilated into it. To draw on Bavinck’s own categories, it seems that a ‘mechanistic’ 
approach to truth is operative in the above accounts held by Bolt or Helm. If all of 
knowledge is a single organism, then, as Bavinck contends, the division between the 
sciences is merely a division of labor. 
 
III. On Organisms and Machines 
 
a. Re-articulating the Difference Between Bavinck and Kuyper 
																																																						
87 Helm comments and laments that Kuyper’s thought ‘came to supplant the two-
kingdoms idea and has transformed the idea of natural law into that of a number of 
cultural spheres, from mathematics to art, each retaining their own integrity in a kind of 
hierarchy, and each capable of distinctive Christian expression.’ Helm, ‘Religion and 
Reason from a Reformed Perspective,’ p. 69.  
88Helm, ‘Religion and Reason from a Reformed perspective’, p. 69.  
89 Joseph A. Komonchak, ‘Theology and Culture at Mid-Century: The Example of 
Henry de Lubac,’ Theological Studies 51 (1990), pp. 582-3. 
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Bavinck’s organic epistemology and account of the sciences differ considerably, 
at least in his view, with the account provided by Roman Catholic thinking. A distinctly 
Christian expression of each science is achievable, and Bavinck’s neo-Calvinistic 
impetus for a Christian University is thereby established. Naturally, these observations 
call to mind the relationship between Bavinck and Kuyper, as the evidence above shows 
a close affinity between the two archetypical neo-Calvinists. Theology and the Christian 
faith play an important role, as Eglinton and Bräutigam observe, in unifying the diverse 
sciences and in providing the resources properly to understand their character: 
‘Bavinck’s views on the place of theology in the university were strongly Kuyperian’.90 
Also, in Bolt’s brief summary of Bavinck’s worldview as essentially organic, Bolt admits 
that ‘the content of Bavinck’s and Kuyper’s worldview is virtually identical.’91  
Yet, the report by R.H. Bremmer concerning the differences between Bavinck 
and Kuyper should be kept in mind, lest the results of the above exposition be 
misunderstood. This is necessary in order properly to locate the epistemological 
affinities (and divergences) between the two Dutch thinkers. With Bavinck’s organic 
account of the sciences and the way in which that account is polemically situated against 
Roman Catholic epistemology already firmly in view, it seems appropriate to revisit the 
discussions concerning the material similarities between Bavinck and Kuyper.  
A set of student notes records the critiques that Bavinck apparently lodged 
against Kuyper’s understanding of ‘two kinds of science’, according to which the 
antithesis produced by regeneration entails an antithesis in the scholarship of believers 
																																																						
90 Eglinton and Bräutigam, ‘Scientific Theology?’ p. 48. Bavinck explicitly 
connects his understanding of how the Christain faith ought to benefit and influence 
the sciences within the context of a university with Kuyper in Christelijke wetenschap, p. 
108. This claim could be further nuanced, however, as Bavinck’s view on theology’s 
place seemed to have matured over time.  
91 John Bolt, Bavinck on the Christian Life, p. 141. In an appreciative review, Cory 
Brock states that Bolt’s treatment nonetheless does not give the organic the ‘expansive 
treatment’ it deserves in ‘Review’ of John Bolt, Herman Bavinck on the Christian Life in 
Calvin Theological Journal (forthcoming), p. 2 (page reference refers to a pre-print 
manuscript). See also Abraham Flipse on the agreement of Kuyper and Bavinck in their 
‘worldview’ approach to the question of empirical science in ‘The Origins of 
Creationism in the Netherlands: The Evolution Debate Among Twentieth-Century 
Dutch Neo-Calvinists’, Church History 81 (2012): 112-6.  
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and unbelievers.92 In these notes, students record that Bavinck made three salient 
criticisms of Kuyper.93  
First, Bavinck claimed that Kuyper was too ‘speculative’ in his account of 
science.94 Kuyper too comfortably relies on deductions from principles and fails to take 
sufficient account of the empirical phenomena itself in the objects of study. Bavinck 
emphasized the daily experience that scholars, whether regenerate or unregenerate, 
continue to labor together in the same scientific enterprise.  
Second, Bavinck argued that Kuyper mixes two distinct categories: regeneration 
is a personal category and not one of principle. As such, to make a correspondence 
between regenerate and unregenerate humanity with ‘principles’ is unduly to conflate 
two distinct ‘terrains.’95 On this point, John Bolt provides a concise summary: 
 
To conflate the scientific distinction between truth and falsehood with the 
personal one of regenerate and unregenerate people is to commit a logical fallacy 
technically known as metabasis eis allos genos (crossing over into a different genus). 
To mix a metaphor, it is to substitute an orange for an apple in an argument. In 
this instance, according to Bavinck, to identify the scientific work of the 
regenerate with truth and that of the unregenerate with the lie is categorically 
false. Not only is there much that is true in the scientific work of unregenerate 
people, but Christian faith in itself gives no one a corner on scientific truth.’96 
 
The third criticism, then, is connected to the second. Bavinck argued that 
regeneration is not the source from which true science is produced. According to the 
notes, again, Bavinck capitalized on Kuyper’s admission that ‘the unregenerate and 
regenerate both perform formal scientific work…Regeneration has no influence on 
																																																						
92 Kuyper’s claims on the two sciences are found in Encylopedia of Sacred Theology: Its 
Principles (Norwood: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898), pp. 150-175. Hereafter, EST.  
93 The account is detailed in R. H. Bremmer, Bavinck als Dogmaticus (Kampen: Kok, 
1961), pp. 39-45.  
94 Bremmer, Bavinck als Dogmaticus, p. 39. Dutch original: ‘Bavinck opperde verder 
als kritiek, dat Kuyper het begrip der wetenschap niet empirisch, maar speculatief 
ontwikkelde.’ 
95 Bremmer, Bavinck als Dogmaticus, p. 40. Dutch original: ‘De fout is hier “Dat hij 
van ’t terrain der beginselen overgaat tot het terrain der personen.”’ On Kuyper’s 
understanding of the relationship between regeneration and science, see EST, pp. 219-
28.  
96 Bolt, Bavinck on the Christian Life, p. 134. Bolt reiterates Bremmer’s observations 
concerning Bavinck’s objections against Kuyper in ‘Doubting Reformational Anti-
Thomism’, p. 135.  
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many parts of science… Whether one is regenerate or not, one can then come to 
knowledge.’97  
Two caveats should be noted before these notes are taken into account. First, 
these notes were written between 1896 and January 1897.98 This is significant because 
these lectures, therefore, were recorded before (1) the completion of the first edition of 
the Dogmatics as a whole, (2) the writing of the most thorough works by Bavinck on 
science and worldview, namely, Christelijke wetenschap (1904), Christelijke wereldbeschouwing 
(1904), and Philosophy of Revelation (1908). Second, Bavinck himself did not write these 
lecture notes: they are unpublished notes taken by one of his students.99  So, though I 
shall argue that my analyses are consistent with Bremmer and these notes, one should 
take these factors into account and give due hermeneutical weight on the published 
works in which Bavinck most clearly deals with the structure of wetenschap.100  
It is clear that Bavinck unlinks regeneration with the practice or attainment of 
science. Believers and unbelievers alike can engage in higher inquiry precisely because 
common grace is a theological reality. Bavinck argues in no uncertain terms that 
common grace and not nature qua nature is the principle from which non-believers can 
do science:  
 
The arts and the sciences have their principium not in the special grace of 
regeneration and conversion but in the natural gifts and talents that God in his 
common grace has also given to nonbelievers. Therefore Christian theologians 
of all times have profited from pagan art and have insisted upon a classical 
education for every man of learning, including the theologian.101  
																																																						
97 Bremmer, Bavinck als Dogmaticus, p. 40. Dutch original: ‘“de onwedergeborenen 
en wedergeborenen verrichten beiden formeel wetenschappelijke arbeid… De 
wedergeboorte heft op vele deelen van de wetenschap geen invloed… Of men 
wedergeboren is of niet, men kan dan wel tot kennis komen.”’ On the next page, 
Bremmer also notes that Bavinck, unlike Kuyper, makes a strong distinction between 
the certainty of confessional faith and the certainty of scientific faith. 
98 Bremmer, Bavinck als Dogmaticus, p. 39 n. 75. 
99 The notes were handwritten by A. Terpstra, as Bremmer notes in Bavinck als 
Dogmaticus p. 39, n. 75. It is unfortunate that Bolt attributes the words from Bremmer’s 
citations to Bavinck himself (Bavinck on the Christian Life, p. 134), when a student was the 
writer of the notes.  
100 It is also worth noting that Bremmer’s account of Bavinck involves the thesis 
that Bavinck was greatly influenced by neo-Thomism (see Bavinck als Dogmaticus, pp. 
328-9). Cory Brock recently challenges this thesis in his ‘Herman Bavinck and Neo-
Thomism: Toward a Nuanced Rendering.’ M.Th. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 
2014.  
101 Bavinck, ‘Common Grace,’ p. 64.  
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Though Bavinck differs from Kuyper in that the latter emphasizes the noetic 
effects of sin more heavily than Bavinck, Bavinck would still admit that fallen reason 
requires divine aid in natural affairs: 
God did not leave sin alone to do its destructive work. He had and, after the fall, 
continued to have a purpose for his creation; he interposed common grace 
between sin and the creation – a grace that, while it does not inwardly renew, 
nevertheless restrains and compels. All that is good and true has its origin in this 
grace, including the good we see in fallen man… Consequently, traces of the image 
of God continued in mankind. Understanding and reason remain, and he 
possess all sorts of natural gifts.102 
 
Consistent with the observations made in the previous chapter, Bavinck argues 
that religious disunity is the root of scientific disunity precisely because a denial of 
Christian revelation prevents practitioners of wetenschap from attaining an organic 
worldview. Christianity offers a greater light that provides insight on the grounds and 
telos that properly account for the presence of good works in nonbelievers. Bavinck’s 
Christelijke wetenschap repeats this same point. Though there are not two kinds of science 
produced by two kinds of people, there is a Christian understanding of science in 
contrast to a non-believing one: ‘Belief and unbelief, Christian and positivist 
conceptions of science stand diametrically against each other. Compromise is here not 
possible, but an obligation to choose definitively.’103 Accordingly,‘[f]aith and science 
stand in a relationship of conception and birth, as tree and fruit, as work and wage; the 
knowledge is the fruit and the wage of faith.’104 
For Bavinck the connection between faith and science thus does not consist in 
the claim that the unregenerate will fail to do science, but that they are lacking the 
resources to understand its proper character and place. They have a kind of atomistic 
knowledge. True science, in Bavinck’s judgment, continues to flourish in his day only 
because it ‘in fact still rests in part on Christian foundations. But to the same extent it 
																																																						
102 Bavinck, ‘Common Grace,’ p. 51. Emphasis mine. 
103 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 9.  Dutch original: ‘Geloovige en ongeloovige, 
Christelijke en positivistische opvatting van de wetenschap staan lijnrecht tegenover 
elkander. Vergelijk is hier niet mogelijk, maar besliste keuze plicht.’  
Bolt also rightly notes that Bavinck affirms the conflict between Christian and 
non-Christian science in Bavinck and the Christain Life, p. 140.  
104 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 16. Dutch original: ‘Geloof en wetenschap 
staan dus tot elkander in verhouding als ontvangenis en geboorte, als boom en vrucht, 
als werk en loon; het weten is de vrucht en het loon des geloofs.’ 
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seeks to undermine this, [science] labors also to her own destruction.’105 Indeed, the 
‘newer practice of nature and history, in her noblest form, consciously or unconsciously 
presupposes the thoughts of Christianity.’106 Eglinton’s and Bräutigam’s comments 
concerning Bavinck’s discussion of this is appropriate: ‘Having claimed that the universe 
cannot be coherently viewed without metaphysics, Bavinck turns the reader toward the 
revelation of the Triune God.’107 It seems fitting that Bavinck concludes his treatment 
on Christian science with a reflection on how revelation informs the believer of the true 
character of things, which makes their knowledge quite alien to unbelief:  
Because there is in science, just as in everywhere else, much falsehood and 
counterfeiting, God gives to us in his revelation a guide and a signpost, which 
directs our steps in the practice of science and protects us from straying. 
Christian science is a science that examines all things in the light of his 
revelation, seeing, therefore, things as they truly are in their essence. In the eyes 
of the world this may be foolishness, but the foolishness of God is wiser than 
men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. For we can do nothing 
against, but for, the truth.108 
 
These statements do not give Christians automatic superiority over the practice 
of science, but it certainly does give them an advantage in the knowing enterprise, at 
least in Bavinck’s view – revelation provides the knowledge of things as they truly are, 
which makes them quite strange to the world. 
 The difference between Bavinck and Kuyper is thus summarized accordingly: 
Bavinck is more modest in his claims concerning the principles of unbelieving and 
believing science; he refuses to transfer the principle of regeneration unto the practice 
of science itself. Bavinck makes a distinction not between two sciences (in some 
																																																						
105 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap. p. 97. Dutch original: ‘Wel is waar staat de 
wetenschap heden ten dage op eene aanzienlijke hoogte; zij rust feitelijk voor een deel 
nog op Christelijke grondslagen. Maar in dezelfde mate als zij deze ondermijnt, arbeidt 
zij ook aan haar eigen verderf.’ 
106 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 104-5. Dutch original: ‘Meer nadruk behoort 
nog hierop te vallen, dat de nieuwere beoefening van natuur en geschiedenis, in haar 
edelsten vorm bewust of onbewust de gedachten van het christendom onderstelt.’ 
107 Eglinton and Bräutigam, ‘Scientific Theology’, p. 46.  
108 Bavinck, Christelijke wetenschap, p. 130. Dutch original:  ‘Maar omdat er in de 
wetenschap, evenals overal elders, zooveel schijn en namaak is, schonk God ons in zijne 
openbaring een gids en een wegwijzer, die bij de beoefening der wetenschap onze 
schreden richt en ons voor afdwaling behoedt. Christelijke wetenschap is dus zulk eene 
wetenschap, die bij het licht dier openbaring alle dingen onderzoekt en ze daarom ziet, 
gelijk zij waarlijk, in hun wezen zijn. In het oog der wereld moge dit dwaasheid zijn, 
maar het dwaze Gods is wijzer dan de menschen en het zwakke Gods is sterker dan de 
menschen. Want wij vermogen niets tegen, maar voor de waarheid.’ 
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ontological sense that flow out of two kinds of persons) but in two conceptions of science. 
Thus Bavinck can more readily affirm that non-believers are often more capable, more 
learned, and more skilled in the sciences than Christians. Bavinck is also more 
comfortable with embracing the proper functionality of the unbeliever’s noetic 
capacities even after the fall, due to common grace.  
However, their affinities, it seems to me, are still maintained in that both have an 
organic understanding of science and of human knowledge such that the whole 
precedes the parts. Both hold that knowledge of the whole is the context in which each 
part is properly understood. Indeed, Bavinck makes a distinction between atomistic 
knowing and organic knowing; unbelievers have knowledge, but Christians have a 
knowledge, a science, which form a coherent organism. Bavinck ‘foresaw the university 
as becoming a cacophony of arbitrarily associated faculties when deprived of 
theology.’109 The distinction is not between not knowing and knowing, but between 
atomistic (mechanical) knowing and organic knowing.  
 
b. Bodies and Propositions 
 
In both the previous and current chapters, something of Bavinck’s Romantic 
spirit is evident.  ‘The world can be conceived organically – like a tree, in which every 
part lives for every other part, and through every other part – or mechanistically… in 
which the parts are external to one another… These are very different conceptions of 
life, and they do belong to different climates of opinion, and are influenced by different 
considerations.’110  
What is the upshot of all of this? If Bavinck considers knowledge and wetenschap 
to be single organisms, what are the implications? In this section preliminary inferences 
are drawn that clarify and develop ideas from Bavinck and Isaiah Berlin’s influential 
account. The construal of this relationship will further implicate the way the nature and 
structure of human knowledge is understood. These two ways can be communicated in 
terms of some analogies or thought experiments.  
																																																						
109 Eglinton and Bräutigam, ‘Scientific Theology’, p. 30.  
110 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), p. 5. 
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 The first is the mechanical view. A highly advanced machine, such as an 
automobile, is composed of individual parts that go together in a specific way mapped 
out by a design. The individual components of the automobile may be extricated: there 
are wheels, steel bars, screws, springs, and so on. Once extricated, the disconnected 
components seem to have little or no relation to the others. Comprehending the steel 
bar, for example, does not require a prior understanding of the wheels and vice versa: 
each component can be considered entirely on its own without reference to the others, 
and the assembling of the parts together to form an automobile is merely one 
contingent way that the parts may be assembled. The steel bar can serve different 
purposes, and the wheel, too, can be used otherwise.111  
The analogy is this: just as the steel bar and wheels could be considered in 
isolation but also be compounded together into a greater whole, so can the truths of 
nature (or general revelation) and the truths of special revelation be considered in 
relative isolation. The propositions ‘there is a tree in front of me’ and ‘the Triune God 
exists’ are two propositions that have no direct relevance to one another. Logical 
inferences can be drawn to connect the two propositions, like an inference concerning 
the decision of the Trinity to create and sustain all of creation. However, knowledge of 
the tree can be gained without knowledge of the Trinity with no significant loss. General 
and special revelation each provides a set of propositions that may be compounded 
together to form a larger aggregate of propositions. 
Another analogy will render the point more precise. Perhaps Andreas has before 
him some dough, tomatoes, zucchinis, and cheese. Further, Andreas has no knowledge 
of Italian food and thus no comprehension of the idea of a vegetarian lasagna. Nothing 
else but a stroke of genius would enable Andreas to take the ingredients before him to 
make the classical dish. There is no direct or obvious inference to be made that forms a 
knowledge of vegetarian lasagnas simply by examining the ingredients before him. 
However, upon receiving a recipe for vegetarian lasagnas from a distant Italian friend, 
Andreas suddenly reinvestigates the ingredients and sees them anew. He does not 
merely see individual kinds of food that bear no relation to each other, but the requisite 
																																																						
111 I owe this ‘mechanical’ analogy to Oliver D. Crisp, ‘Analytic Theology,’ in 
Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea 
(eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 36. 
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ingredients to bake an authentic Italian lasagna. The reception of the recipe now causes 
Andreas to think of lasagnas when he encounters tomatoes, zucchinis, and the like.  
In this same way, here knowledge of special revelation causes the knower to see 
the vestiges of God in all of creation, but not the other way around. General revelation 
bears the marks of Triniformity precisely because the knowledge of the triune God was 
disclosed to the Christian in the verbal revelation of Scripture, just as the primal 
ingredients of lasagna can only be seen as such when a prior knowledge of lasagnas is 
obtained. This analogy does not deny that the ingredients can be known individually as 
isolated kinds of food, but knowledge of them as ingredients for a lasagna can be known 
only in an a posteriori manner. Though this analogy is not too different from the 
automobile analogy above, it highlights specifically the priority of special revelation as 
the lens that interprets general revelation.  
The food analogy is a mid-way point between the mechanical view and the 
organic view. In this latter way of construing the relationship, a rather vivid thought 
experiment may help. Consider Sera Phim, who is a non-corporeal angelic being and, as 
such, has never encountered anything like a human body, and has no knowledge of 
what makes a human body. One day Sera glides around and by accident finds a dead 
human heart on her path. She comes closer and is perplexed by what she encounters. 
She goes further along and finds a sticky, red, and wet net of string-like objects – the 
interconnected web of arteries found in a human body – and is further confused: what 
is this red object that looks like a set of small tubes? By the end of the day she has 
encountered all the individual main components that make up the human body, but, 
presumably, she would not be able to know this. All she thinks is that she has found 
some odd, soggy pieces of corporeal objects – she will not know how each works, or 
what they are supposed to do, nor would she know that they are all supposed to go 
together. At least, not until she finds a working human body, and learns how it works. 
But even when she does find one, she will not have a proper understanding of the heart 
without considering the whole cardiovascular system. She will not have a proper 
understanding of the brain apart from the skeletal structures that make up the body. 
Articulated differently, knowledge of the parts require a knowledge of the whole, and no 
individual part can be properly understood without a prior knowledge of other parts, 
and so on. Each thing requires another to be fully intelligible.  
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Here, knowledge of the body is necessary to know how the parts can form the 
body just as special revelation is necessary to understand general revelation. Further, on 
this picture of things, general and special revelation work together as one organism. 
Knowledge of the whole is a requisite properly to know the parts, and each part calls for 
knowledge of another, for each to be rightly construed. The tree is not organically 
known without being regarded as something created, and creation cannot be understood 
apart from the character or plan of the creator, and so on. Here, too, the analogy works 
in emphasizing how the knowledge of the whole is greater than a knowledge of the sum 
of its parts – seeing how the whole of the human body functions is greater than 
knowing the heart as a heart in a greater system. An epistemic account for the parts of 
general revelation is inaccessible prior to the light disclosed in special revelation and vice 
versa. Though neither analogy is meant to be totalizing or wholly accurate precisely 
because human beings live in a revelational and (common) graced universe such that a 
primordial and divinely initiated contact already obtains between their consciousness 
and the world, both the lasagna and bodily analogies seem to be consistent with 
Bavinck’s thought: ‘General revelation leads to special, special revelation points back to 
general. The one calls for the other, and without it remains imperfect and unintelligible. 
Together they proclaim the manifold wisdom which God has displayed in creation and 
redemption.’112  
In this sense, these observations connect well with the previous chapters by 
supplying the proviso that working toward a knowledge of the whole through the 
careful investigation of the parts is due not to the nature of the objects known but due 
to the necessity of human finitude. Knowledge is a single organism, but a mastery of the 
whole is impossible for a single human knower and requires the attentiveness of 
humanity as a whole – a task actualized in and corresponds with the citizens of the 
eschatological kingdom of God.  
Along these lines, Bavinck’s organic account seems to be consonant with what 
Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor call Gestalt Holism: 
 
The point has often been made about gestalts that they can’t be seen as simply 
composed of their parts. Or to put it another way, the meaningful elements they 
contain cannot be identified on their own, but only in relation to the whole. This 
																																																						
112 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 28. The next chapters further elaborate on 
Bavinck’s view of this primordial contact between consciousness and reality. 
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high note is the climax of a long rising passage in this song. But its nature as 
climax doesn’t reside in the note itself. The same note in another song has a 
quite different valence. This kind of holism undercuts completely the atomism 
of input. These elements are what they are only in relation to the whole and to 
each other. It is not that, independently identified, they have to be combined in 
a certain way in order to yield truth. It is independent identification as such 
which is impossible.113 
 
A more appropriate term that denotes Bavinck’s position might simply be 
Organic Holism – a holism of a distinctly Reformed variety. ‘The whole cannot be 
explained in an atomistic manner by a combination of its parts; but on the contrary the 
parts must be conceived in an organic way by unfolding the totality.’114 
Intuitions cannot settle in this case which account of knowledge, the mechanical 
or the organic, provides a more accurate picture of human knowing. It seems that the 
plausibility of Bavinck’s account rests on whether his understanding of the organic 
character of reality is first accepted. Indeed, Bavinck’s organic epistemology must be 
correlated with his organic ontology, such that the Trinity ad intra implies an organic 
cosmology and epistemology ad extra. Further, the organic motif is Bavinck’s preferred 
means of articulating the relationship between general and special revelation and the 
scientific enterprise in ways that nuance his affinities with Kuyper and makes him 
critical of the purportedly mechanical epistemology of Roman Catholicism.  
This chapter has not yet discussed the significance of the organic motif in 
Bavinck’s account of the connection between subject and object. It is to this subject that 
the next two chapters turn.
																																																						
113 Dreyfus and Taylor, Retrieving Realism, pp. 43-4.  
114 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 216.  
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Chapter 5: Bavinck, the ‘Gap’, and the Question of Subjects-and-Objects 
 This study has so far unfolded Bavinck’s use of the organic motif in his 
theological epistemology, with a particular reference to the structure of human 
knowledge and the relationship of theology to the other sciences. In so doing, the 
differences and similarities that Bavinck saw between himself and other thinkers, such 
as Thomas Aquinas and Abraham Kuyper, were broached in order further to elucidate 
his epistemological concerns. This also sheds light on the secondary literature and why 
various interpreters have focused on the real distinctions of the sciences, on one hand, 
and the unity of the sciences, on another. The result is that although Bavinck does make 
a distinction between the diverse fields of knowledge, the basis of that diversity also 
orchestrates it as a single organism, with Scripture and Christian principles constituting 
that unity. These considerations show that Bavinck deploys the organic motif for 
positive and constructive purposes, relating it to the distinctive neo-Calvinistic doctrines 
of sphere sovereignty and the transformative (leavening) effects of Christianity upon 
knowing and culture.  
 In Bavinck’s thought, however, a Christian recasting of the world as an 
organism does not merely vindicate the possibility of a unified worldview. Indeed, in his 
account, understanding the world as a created organism produces another 
epistemological fruit – and this has to do with the correspondence that obtains between 
subjects and objects, mind and world. In a paradigmatic summary (which will receive 
greater attention in chapter six), Bavinck wrote the following: ‘If [a unified worldview] is 
possible, it can only be explained from the fact that the world is an organism and thus 
should first be thought in such a manner. Only then does philosophy and worldview 
have a right and ground of existence’. Further, it is only ‘on this pinnacle of knowledge 
that subject and object harmonize’.1 Therefore, to penetrate more deeply into Bavinck’s 
use of the organic motif in epistemology, one should also turn to the manner in which 
the subject-object problem is treated by him through the application of organic 
																																																						
1 Herman Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing (Kampen: Kok, 1929), pp. 32-3. 
Dutch original: ‘Indien deze mogelijk is, dan kan dit alleen daaruit verklaard worden, dat 
de wereld een organisme is en dus eerst als zoodanig is gedacht. Dan alleen heeft 
philosophie en wereldbeschouwing recht en grond van bestaan, als ook op dit 
hoogtepunt der kennis subject en object samenstemmen’.  
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language. Considering this issue will reveal that Bavinck’s deployment of that motif is 
not merely ad hoc or pragmatic. Rather, the organic motif fills in and answers acute 
epistemological problems with precise specificity. To ascertain the epistemological yields 
and the significance of Bavinck’s moves, however, will require this chapter and the next, 
as clarity needs to be advanced concerning Bavinck’s conception of the relationship – 
and gap – between subjects and objects.  
This chapter has three sections. First, I review an argument from a stream of 
secondary literature briefly surveyed in the introduction, mostly represented by Cornelis 
van der Kooi and Henk van den Belt. Their argument suggests Bavinck’s indebtedness 
to post-Kantian epistemologies that made a strong distinction between subjects and 
objects and the constructive powers of the mind in forming the objects of knowledge. 
This observation, however, must be tempered by a potential defeater in the 
appropriation of Bavinck as a proto-Reformed epistemologist, as found in the works of 
Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. If Plantinga and Wolterstorff are right, then 
Bavinck has to be seen as offering a strict alternative to those epistemologies that 
question whether beliefs directed at external reality can be unmediated or properly basic. 
Wolterstorff, more specifically, has argued that there are strongly Reidian connotations 
in Bavinck’s thought. As such, Bavinck is seen by some as indebted to post-Kantian 
epistemologies (which make knowledge of objects susceptible to the mind’s subjective 
functions) and to a Reidian commonsense realism (which grants an unmediated access 
to reality). As these readings seem mutually exclusive, one ought to ask: are they 
accurate?  
The second section hints at an answer by offering an analysis of Bavinck and Reid 
on perception. At first glance, it strengthens the Reformed epistemologist reading by 
observing that Bavinck diagnoses the modern epistemological conundrums in much the 
same way as Reid. Both consider the malaise of modern epistemology to be the creation 
of an inflexible gap between subjects and objects, making it difficult to ascertain how it 
is that objects can be known at all. The third section, however, demonstrates that, 
despite Bavinck’s objections to the subject-object dichotomizing tendencies of modern 
epistemology, he maintains that there is, indeed, a fundamental difference between 
mental representations and the objects that they represent – there is no access to reality 
to which the constructive effects of the mind do not apply. This further showcases that 
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assertion of a clear conceptual continuity between the epistemologies of Bavinck and 
Reid cannot be sustained.  
The conclusion of this chapter hints at the solution to this apparent conundrum in 
interpreting Bavinck by pointing to his use and appreciation of the German Idealist and 
empirical Realist Eduard von Hartmann.2 The next chapter, in turn, will substantiate the 
claim that what is at first glance a similarity between Bavinck and Reid is actually 
reflective of a prior accidental similarity between Reid and von Hartmann. That is, to 
understand the epistemological moves made by Bavinck between subjects and objects, 
and the relevance of the organic motif to this aspect of his thought, his critical 
appropriation of von Hartmann must be appreciated. Eduard von Hartmann (1842-
1906) was an absolute idealist from Berlin. Although he is relatively unknown today, his 
philosophical work on the nature of the unconscious in 1869 was considered to be the 
‘pinnacle’ of studies on this issue, meriting the critical attention of major figures like 
Friedrich Nietzsche and triggered the writing of encyclopedia articles dedicated to his 
view.3 His Philosophy of the Unconscious, regarded as his magnum opus, ran 11 editions during 
his lifetime; von Hartmann was certainly noteworthy enough to merit Bavinck’s 
attention.  
Bavinck’s critical appropriation of von Hartmann, in turn, will then illuminate why it 
is that both claims – that Bavinck was a proto-Reformed epistemologist and, at the 
same time, indebted to post-Kantian idealism and subjectivism – are partly right.  
 
I. Bavinck and World-Directed Beliefs: Two Interpretations – Reformed Epistemology and Post-
Kantian Trajectories 
 
It is difficult to deny the truth in Henk van den Belt’s claim that Bavinck’s 
epistemology is ‘dominated’ by the distinction and correspondence between subject and 
																																																						
2 As it will become clear in this chapter and the next, due to the variety of ways in 
which realism and idealism can be defined, the two, as Bavinck recognized, are not 
mutually exclusive.  
3 Angus Nichollas and Martin Liebscher, ‘Introduction: Thinking the 
Unconscious’, in Angus Nicholls, Martin Liebscher (eds.), Thinking the Unconscious: 
Nineteenth-Century German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1-
2.  
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object.4 Indeed, Bavinck defines the nature of truth, science, and knowledge in precisely 
those terms. He says this in numerous places. First, in the Dogmatics: ‘Science always 
consists in a logical relation between subject and object. Our view of science depends 
on the way we relate the two’.5 Secondly, in the Certainty of Faith: ‘truth is agreement 
between thought and reality and thus expresses a relation between the contents of our 
consciousness and the object of our knowledge’.6 Finally, in Christelijke wereldbeschouwing: 
‘… knowledge is indeed always and can never be other than a relation between subject 
and object. Once one or both falls away, there is no more knowledge’.7 On the opening 
page of his Beginselen der Psychologie (Foundations of Psychology), he considers a 
demarcation between the phenomena in the internal consciousness and the realities 
outside to be axiomatic: ‘But consciousness gradually awakens to the distinction 
between what is perceived and perception; between the object, which caused the pain, 
and the pain itself; between the concern which is desired and the desiring self, that is, 
between object and subject, matter and spirit, the not-I and the I.’8 In his treatise on the 
Christian worldview, Bavinck argues that the rupturing of  ‘the harmony of subject and 
object [and of] knowing and being’  is the result of the oscillation between rationalism 
and empiricism in modern epistemology – a problem which he then tries to address 
throughout the chapter.9  
																																																						
4 Henk van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 294.  
5 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 214.  
6 Herman Bavinck, The Certainty of Faith, Harry der Nederlanden (trans.), (Ontario: 
Paideia, 1980), p. 19. 
7 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, pp. 18-19. Dutch original: ‘Want weten is 
juist altijd en kan nooit anders zijn dan eene relatie tusschen subject en object. Zoodra 
een van beide wegvalent, is er geen weten meer’.  
8 Herman Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (Kampen: Bos, 1897), p 1. Dutch 
original: ‘Maar langzamerhand ontwaakt het bewustzijn en leert hij onderscheiden 
tusschen het waargenomene en de waarneming; tusschen het voorwerp, dat de pijn 
veroorzaakte en de pijn zelve; tusschen de zaak, die begeerd wordt en die begeerte zelve, 
d.i. tusschen object en subject, stof en geest, niet-ik en ik.’ Crucially, he later notes that it 
is the Logos that connects these same, disparate, phenomena: Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 
76.  
9 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 16. Dutch original: ‘In beide gevallen 
[empiricism and rationalism] en naar beide richtingen wordt de harmonie van subject en 
object van kennen en zijn verbroken.’ 
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It is exactly here that van den Belt makes the further claim that Bavinck is most 
influenced by the philosophy contemporary to his time.10 Bavinck, he argues, introduces 
a subjective element into theology and the epistemological process by emphasizing the 
constructive influences of the mind in his prolegomena. More clearly, he elaborates that 
Bavinck is located between ‘naïve realism and the transcendental idealism of Kant’.11 
While noting Bavinck’s affinities with von Hartmann, van den Belt wonders whether 
Bavinck’s emphases on the subject tend him toward epistemological subjectivism. 
Indeed, in interpreting the way in which subjects and objects correspond in Bavinck, 
Cornelis van der Kooi expresses the same reserved worries with respect to Bavinck’s 
position and questions whether Bavinck ultimately succeeds in evading subjectivism: 
 
[Bavinck’s] expression betrays, in a high degree, a post-Kantian situation, and could 
never really have been uttered by someone like Calvin. Bavinck’s expression can 
nourish the thought that the existence of things can be acknowledged only as they 
appear to the mind’s eye. That would be a modern Cartesian point of departure. 
One can naturally not accuse Bavinck of such a position. There are too many 
elements in his theology that would prevent that. It is true, however, that his focus 
is strongly directed to the religious subject to whose mind’s eye the things of 
revelation must appear if he or she wants to find them worthy or true. One can ask 
whether, to the extent that the focus is on the knowing subject, this naturally leads 
in detaching the subject a-historically from the community on which this subject is 
dependent for his knowledge.12 
 
 This set of readings locates Bavinck well within the post-Kantian tradition of 
modern epistemology that assumes the subjective influences of the human mind in 
forming the objects of knowledge.  
																																																						
10 Van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture, pp. 266-7. 
11 Van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture, p. 267. Here, I presuppose the new 
dimensions of complexity re-introduced by the so-called ‘third-wave’ of Kantian 
scholarship, in which Henry Allison’s Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and 
Defense (Yale: Yale University Press, 2004) remains central. In this wave, the debate 
between (transcendental) idealism and realism hinges not on ontology so much as on 
whether there exist certain epistemic conditions in one’s knowledge of objects. Thus, 
the distinction between phenomena and the things-in-themselves rests on two modes of 
talking about the same object, rather than two numerically distinct entities. As we shall 
see, there are hints that Bavinck is not unaware of these complexities. 
12 Cornelis van der Kooi, ‘The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit, 
especially in H. Bavinck’, Journal of Reformed Theology 2 (2008): p. 108. Van der Kooi is 
commenting specifically on Bavinck’s RD: 1, p. 586 – a passage to which I will return in 
this chapter. 
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At this point, however, it is necessary to consider a potential tension raised by 
the invocation of Bavinck as a precursor to the project of the Reformed epistemology 
of Plantinga and Wolterstorff.13 The tension is raised because this project is formed 
precisely as an alternative to the modern trajectory that nurtures a kind of evidentialist 
skepticism with respect to beliefs about the external world. To appreciate how Bavinck 
is being invoked by the Reformed epistemologists, though, first requires paying 
attention to the contours of the project as a whole.  
The project advanced by Plantinga and Wolterstorff consists in the rejection of 
the classical foundationalist assumption that justification in the form of sufficient 
evidence is necessary for knowledge. In more formal terms, Plantinga defines the 
epistemological thesis of classical foundationalism this way:  
 
A belief is acceptable for a person if (and only if) it is either properly basic (i.e., 
self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for that person), or believed 
on the evidential basis of propositions that are acceptable and that support it 
deductively, inductively, or abductively.14 
 
 A belief is properly basic if it is formed immediately, and not mediately by an 
inference from another belief. A belief is properly basic because these immediate beliefs 
enjoy the status of being justified. Reformed epistemology takes issue not with the 
positing of properly basic beliefs as the foundations of one’s noetic structure, but in the 
classical foundationalist criteria that beliefs can only be properly basic if they are self-
evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses. There is a stong evidentialist bent behind 
																																																						
13 In what follows, I am not suggesting that Plantinga and Wolterstorff offer an 
epistemology that eschews an affirmation that human knowers are bound by their 
situatedness and finitude in the epistemic process. Indeed, Plantinga and Wolterstorff 
are well attuned to the lack of a neutral ‘view from nowhere’, and instead emphasize an 
epistemology that takes into account the dependent ways in which knowers are related 
to their environment and contexts. Hence, Kevin Diller is correct in characterizing 
Plantinga and Bavinck as critical realists insofar as the modest definition he offers is 
kept in mind: ‘Plantinga’s response… is aligned with Plantinga’s Dutch ascendents 
Bavinck and Kuyper. Human knowers occupy a stance of epistemic dependence. There 
simply is no privileged, neutral point of view’. Kevin Diller, Theology’s Epistemological 
Dilemma: How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga Provide a Unified Response (Downers Grove: 
IVP Academic, 2014), p. 108. On Wolterstorff’s theory of situated rationality, see 
Nathan D. Shannon, Shalom and the Ethics of Belief: Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Theory of Situated 
Rationality (Eugene: Pickwick, 2014).  
14 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 84-5.  
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this, applied not merely to everyday beliefs but also to beliefs about God. If it is the case 
that a belief is justified only if it is incorrigible, evident to the senses, or self-evident, or 
inferred from beliefs that are incorrigible, evident to the senses, or self-evident, and so 
on, then beliefs about God, too, must be justified in the same way. Evidence is required 
for belief in God, and no ‘immediately formed belief about God possesses the merit in 
question’.15  
Classical foundationalism thus includes two more basic commitments: first there 
is the deontological commitment which claims that rational agents have an obligation to 
hold their beliefs with sufficient evidence, and are guilty – failing to live up to their 
epistemic obligations – when they do not provide said evidence. In Plantinga’s words: 
‘More precisely, your assent to p is justified only if the degree of your assent to p is 
proportional to the degree to which p is probable with respect to what is certain for you. 
If you believe in some other way, then you are going contrary to your epistemic 
obligations; you are guilty; you are flouting epistemic duty.’16  
The second commitment is that of internalism: the view of epistemic 
justification according to which knowers require cognitive access to the grounds or 
properties they need in order for their beliefs to be justified (or warranted).17 ‘The basic 
thrust of internalism… is that the properties that confer warrant upon a belief are 
properties to which the believer has some sort of special epistemic access.’18 The 
polemical side of Reformed epistemology is not to meet this challenge, but to challenge 
its validity in the first place. 
																																																						
15 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Herman Bavinck – Proto Reformed Epistemologist’, 
Calvin Theological Journal 45 (2010), p. 136.  
16 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 87.  
17 Plantinga prefers the term ‘warrant’ over ‘justified’ for his definition of 
knowledge in response to Gettier. Warrant is ‘a normative, possibly complex quantity 
that comes in degrees, enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true 
belief’. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), p. 4.  
18 Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, p. 6. Hence, Michael Bergmann: 
‘According to internalists, for a belief to be justified it is not enough that it has certain 
virtues (such as being reliably formed or supported by the evidence), the person holding 
it must be aware that he has those virtues.’ Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of 
Epistemic Externalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 3. Emphasis original. 
Kevin Diller notes that this internalist emphasis on justification and the believer’s 
responsibility to gain cognitive access to the evidences that justify his beliefs is a kind of 
‘epistemic-works righteousness’ (Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, p. 114).  
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In response, Plantinga and Wolterstorff argue that the criteria provided for what 
counts as proper basicality is much too restrictive. Many of our common beliefs are held 
in good epistemic order even if they are not self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the 
senses to us. Perceptual beliefs, as prime examples, are immediately formed beliefs, and 
common rational agents are well within their epistemic rights in holding them as reliable 
in a properly basic way, though these beliefs are not self-evident, incorrigible, or 
maximally evident to the senses. Wolterstorff argues for it in this way:  
 
[The Reformed epistemologist] answer was that not only is classical 
foundationalism not a tenable thesis for beliefs about God, it is not a tenable 
thesis for very many beliefs at all. Perceptual beliefs are formed and held 
immediately rather than by inference; surely many of these we are entitled to 
hold. Yet, none of them satisfies the classical foundationalist’s criteria for 
certitude: The propositional contents of the beliefs are not necessarily true nor 
are they reports of states of consciousness. This also true for memory beliefs, 
for inductive beliefs, for testimony beliefs, and for other kinds of beliefs. 
Classical foundationalism is just false as a general theory of entitlement.19  
 
 In another place, Plantinga appeals to the reasoning of Thomas Reid to 
elaborate upon this particular objection to the classical foundationalist thesis, in this 
way:  
 
But how much of this can be seen to be probable with respect to what is certain 
for us? How much meets the classical conditions for being properly basic? Not 
much, if any. I believe that I had cornflakes for breakfast, that my wife was 
amused at some little stupidity of mine, that there really are such ‘external 
objects’ as trees and squirrels, and that the world was not created ten minutes 
ago with all its dusty books, apparent memories, crumbling mountains, and 
deeply carved canyons. These things, according to classical foundationalism, are 
not properly basic; they must be believed on the evidential basis of propositions 
that are self-evident or evident to the senses (in Locke's restricted sense) or 
incorrigible for me.20 
 
   The upshot is that if classical foundationalism is accepted, then many of the 
beliefs that we ordinarily take for granted must be rendered suspect. It is epistemically 
impossible to justify our beliefs in the way that classical foundationalism says we must, 
and the inevitable result is a vicious kind of skepticism with respect to our everyday 
																																																						
19 Wolterstorff, ‘Herman Bavinck’, p. 137.  
20 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 98.  
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beliefs. More seriously, Plantinga further argues that the classical foundationalist thesis 
itself cannot meet its own criteria. In other words, the classical foundationalist claim [that 
a belief is justified if, and only if, it is properly basic (i.e. incorrigible, self-evident, or 
evident to the senses), or mediately formed on the basis of properly basic beliefs] is 
itself not a properly basic belief (on classical foundationalist criteria), nor inferred from 
properly basic beliefs. The classical foundationalist picture, then, is not only much too 
restrictive, it is also self-referentially incoherent.21  
 The alternative picture that Plantinga and Wolterstorff offer, then, is that 
perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and inductive beliefs are all formed immediately, and 
are so formed in a properly basic way. Following Reid, they agree with the principle of 
credulity, to the effect that rational agents are entitled to the epistemic credentials of 
their ordinary beliefs unless they have good reasons to doubt them (i.e., in the form of 
defeaters). Whereas classical foundationalism raises positive criteria – that rational agents 
must provide positive evidence before their beliefs can be justified –  Reformed 
epistemologists, following Reid, advocate a negative thesis: rational agents are warranted 
in holding their beliefs in the absence of good reasons to doubt them. Moreover, they 
hold that beliefs about God can be warranted in much the same way as their perceptual, 
memorial, or inductive beliefs. In Wolterstorff’s judgment, there is no ‘relevant 
difference among perceptual beliefs, memorial beliefs, and the like, on one hand, and 
beliefs about God, on the other hand’22. If this is so, then beliefs about God can be 
warranted in the absence of evidence, much like perceptual, memorial, and inductive 
beliefs.  
 It is here that Wolterstorff’s and Plantinga’s appeals to Herman Bavinck are 
relevant and intelligible. Consider this particular passage on the proofs for God’s 




21 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 93-7.  
22 Wolterstorff, ‘Herman Bavinck’, p. 137. Diller summarizes this accurately with 
respect to Plantinga: ‘In his constructive model for how Christian belief might have 
warrant, the means by which we receive the knowledge of God are treated as analogous 
processes that deliver properly basic warranted belief independent of argument or 
evidence. The counter examples of memory, introspection and others indicate that 
knowledge formed in this way is not necessarily deficient’. Theology’s Epistemological 
Dilemma, p. 123.  
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Now it appears as if belief in the existence of God is based on these proofs and 
has no foundation apart from them… The contrary, rather, is the case. There is 
not a single thing whose existence is certain to us only on the basis of proofs. 
We are fully convinced – prior to any argumentation – of our own existence, the 
existence of the world around us, the laws of logic and morality… We accept 
that existence – without constraint or coercion – spontaneously and 
instinctively. And the same is true of God’s existence.23 
 
The Reformed epistemological tinge to Bavinck’s reasoning in such passages 
seems clear: ‘Bavinck points out that belief in God relevantly resembles belief in the 
existence of the self and of the external world – and, we might add, belief in other 
minds and the past. In none of these areas do we typically have proof or arguments, or 
need proofs or arguments.’24 As such, Wolterstorff observes that Bavinck was an ‘anti-
evidentialist’ concerning beliefs about God precisely because he takes ‘an “innocent 
until proven guilty” approach to entitlement’.25 Human beings are hard-wired to believe 
in the deliverances of their perception, memory, and induction with respect to external 
reality. ‘Rather than trying to assemble propositional evidence for most of what we 
believe, our only option is to be watchful for the emergency of reasons for giving up 
one or another of our beliefs’.26 It is for specifically these reasons that Wolterstorff 
concludes that Bavinck’s analysis of the way beliefs are formed and how one is entitled 
to their ordinary beliefs align him closely with Thomas Reid.27  
An important and implicit result here is that, on Bavinckian grounds, much like 
Reid’s, an unproblematic access to the external world is granted, and, by parity of 
reasoning, an unproblematic access to the apprehension of God. Ordinarily, human 
beings can take for granted that their beliefs about the world are reliably held because 
																																																						
23 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 90. See: Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, in Alvin 
Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 64-5; Wolterstorff, ‘Herman 
Bavinck’, p. 141. Due to its publication date, Plantinga was using an earlier translation of 
a portion of Bavinck’s God and Creation: Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, William 
Hendricksen (trans.) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), p. 78.  
24 Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God’, p. 65.  
25 Wolterstorff, ‘Herman Bavinck’, p. 143.  
26 Wolterstorff, ‘Herman Bavinck’, p. 143. 
27 ‘Furthermore, though I have not had time to explore the matter in this article, 
an important influence on Reformed epistemology has been the eighteenth century 
Scots philosopher and Presbyterian clergyman, Thomas Reid, and there are astoundingly 
Reidian-sounding passages in Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics (e.g. 1. 223-24)’. Wolterstorff, 
‘Herman Bavinck’, p. 146.  
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they are created in such a way that they have a direct access to the world. Reid, 
Wolterstorff reasons, thus provides an alternative to the modern skeptical stance toward 
whether we can have knowledge of external reality, and concomitantly, of divine reality. 
Indeed, Wolterstorff argues that Kant erected an epistemological boundary between 
mental representations and external reality that precipitates an anxiety in modern 
theologians about whether one can properly refer to God.28  Implied in Wolterstorff’s 
and Plantinga’s reading of Bavinck, then, is that Bavinck and Reid provide a rather 
unified response to the internalist ‘guilty until proven innocent’ approach of much 
contemporary epistemology that renders dubitable whether our beliefs are actually 
directed to the external world.  
When the readings of Wolterstorff and Plantinga are coupled with those of van 
der Kooi and van den Belt, a curious picture emerges. On the one side, Bavinck is 
regarded as providing a clear and reliable access to objective reality, to the extent that 
those beliefs about reality can be warranted without evidence or argumentation. They 
are properly basic beliefs. On the other, Bavinck is interpreted as offering an 
epistemology in which the subjective starting point so influences one’s perception of the 
world that a worry is raised about whether he provides sufficient reasons to guard 
against epistemological subjectivism. Can Bavinck’s writing so lend itself toward both 
conclusions? 
To address this tension, I argue in the rest of this chapter that although 
Bavinck’s views may have some Reidian connotations, he offers an account of 
perception and correspondence between subjects and objects that resists identification 
with Reid’s, which sheds light on why van der Kooi and van den Belt might read him 
the way they do.29 Further, as the next chapter will also show, Bavinck thinks that 
Christians specifically have an obligation to offer material and theological reasons for 
why it is that humans can reliably trust their perceptual and ordinary beliefs about 
external reality. These analyses, in turn, would display how Bavinck’s organic motif plays 
a significant role in addressing the epistemological problems he encounters in modern 
																																																						
28 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover 
From Kant?” Modern Theology 14 (1998): 1-18. See also his “How Philosophical Theology 
Became Possible within the Analytic Tradition of Philosophy”, in Analytic Theology: New 
Essays in the  Philosophy of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),  156-168.  
29 As will become clear, because Bavinck was not working within the methods of 
analytic epistemology, he cannot be clearly located as an advocate either of internalism 
or externalism. A key passage here is Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 15.  
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philosophy. It is precisely the neglect of taking into account the organic motif that has 
caused the aforementioned interpretations to become somewhat one-sided.   
 
II. Herman Bavinck and Thomas Reid on Perception and the Problem of the ‘Gap’ 
 
To these ends, this rest of this chapter proceeds in three steps. First, I exposit 
the modern problem as interpreted by Bavinck and Reid – namely, that modern 
epistemology, with a few exceptions, posits a seemingly unbridgeable gap between the 
mental image as perceived by the human mind and the external object (an object that is 
thought to have first caused a mental image of that object to become present in the 
mind). Second, I exposit Reid’s response to this problem while following closely 
Wolterstorff’s interpretation and appropriation of Reid. Once Reid’s response is in 
place, I present the response of Herman Bavinck. In short, I argue that Bavinck affirms 
the gap between the external object and the mental image of that object which the mind 
perceives, but seeks to establish a link between the gap by an appeal to divine revelation 
and an organic ontology. Reid, however, sought to eliminate the gap by denying that 
knowledge is mediated by mental images – for Reid, the mind is aware not of a mental 
representation, but of the external object itself. Finally, I close with some comments on 
the way in which Bavinck’s and Reid’s respective responses affect their understandings 
of the knowledge of God.  
Before I begin my analysis, the contextual differences between the two thinkers 
must be acknowledged. Thomas Reid’s birth (1710-1796) predates Bavinck’s death by 
almost two centuries. Furthermore, as a philosopher, Reid addressed primarily 
philosophical issues. The answers he offered and the problems he sought to resolve 
were distinctly philosophical problems and rarely, if ever, did he engage in explicitly 
theological discourse. Further, Bavinck was not an analytic theologian – he wrote prior 
to the rise of analytic philosophy and did not think or write in terms of the logic set out 
by contemporary analytic methodology. Nicholas Wolterstorff’s retrieval, refinement, 
and application of Reid’s epistemology, by contrast, stand squarely in the analytic 
tradition. This makes an analysis among the thinkers somewhat tricky. However, given 
the explicit use of both Bavinck and Reid in Wolterstorff, and the overlap of concerns 
between Bavinck and Reid, an analysis in order to anticipate Bavinck’s employment of 
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the organic motif to bridge the gap between subjects and objects is still both possible 
and desirable, given that these caveats are acknowledged.  
 
a. A ‘Problem’ in Modern Epistemology 
 
For Reid, since Descartes, philosophers have wrongly created a dual-object view 
of the thing known. The philosophers were commendable insofar as they sought to give 
an account of the belief that common persons take for granted, namely,  “that the 
object which they distinctly perceive certainly exists.”30 The analysis that the 
philosophers offer, however, goes wrong when they assume principles that are 
ungrounded.  
Two of these principles include the belief (1) that a thing cannot produce a 
cause where it is not present and (2) that an immediate cause of apprehension must be 
identical with the immediate object apprehended; these principles lead to the deduction 
that the immediate object perceived in the external world is not a physical object but a 
mental idea immediately in one’s mind. This mental image, in turn, is that which 
mediates indirectly the external object that first caused that image to be perceived in the 
mind. This creates a gap between the object that the mind perceives and the thing 
outside of the mind. More precisely, Wolterstorff specifies that it is the ‘belief that 
physical objects are too distinct for us to have an immediate apprehension of them; our 
knowledge of them has to be mediated by mental representations.’31 
As a result, Reid observes that philosophers have ‘split objects into two, where 
others [the unlearned and the common person] can only find one.’32 The separation 
between mental ideas and external objects seems to imply either skepticism at best or 
																																																						
30 Thomas Reid, “Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man” in The Works of 
Thomas Reid, D.D.: Now Fully Collected, With Selections from His Unpublished Letters 
(Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart and Co., 1846), p. 369. The narrative that follows here 
is a familiar one; Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus have recently presented another 
rendition of this narrative in their Retrieving Realism, pp. 1-26.  
31 Nicholas Wolterstoff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 44. Wolterstorff uses the 1858 edition of 
Hamilton’s collected works of Thomas Reid. Ryan Nichols’s Thomas Reid’s Theory of 
Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007) also offers an account of Reid’s epistemology 
largely consistent with Wolterstorff’s, but a focus of this chapter is Wolterstorff’s 
retrieval of Reid. 
32 Reid, “Intellectual Powers of Man,” p. 369.  
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solipsism at worst, especially when it may involve claims according to which the external 
world is only accessible by an inference from or an examination of mental ideas.33 The 
advocates of the theory of mediation may argue that ideas provide a window to reality, 
but their arguments fail to command Reid’s agreement.34 Reid is convinced that the 
denial of immediate access to reality entails the veracity of the conclusions of Hume and 
Berkeley, effectively rendering the existence of the external world as a philosophical 
hypothesis rather than a ‘dictate of our perceptive powers.’35 
 In Wolterstorff’s judgment, Kant’s epistemological construction would have 
been equally vulnerable to Reid’s critiques because it still falls into the same species of 
Locke’s phenomenalism.36 The only difference between them is that, in Locke, there is 
an ‘ontological duality of types of entities (subjective states vs. external objects and 
qualities)’, while in Kant, there is a ‘duality of ways in which the intuitional given is 
conceptualized as, and presented to, a person (as subjective states of self vs. as objective 
entities).’37 Both espouse an account of knowledge whereby the external world (or 
Kant’s thing-in-itself) is only knowable by some mediated subjective state, whether it be 
an idea (Locke), or the product of an intuition processed by the categories of the ego 
(Kant). In Wolterstorff’s analysis, both epistemologies call the accessibility of the 
external world into question.  
 This move created the ‘boundary’ between the phenomenal and the noumenal – 
a boundary that produces significant implications for thinkers since Kant, among which 
is an anxiety in modern theologians about whether one can meaningfully speak about 
God. Experience limits knowledge, and the intuitions given in experience must be 
processed by the active receptivity of the categories in the mind. As such, ‘[k]nowledge 
of the transcendent, Kant has been saying, is unavailable to us, since the bounds of the 
intuitional employment of the categories define the bounds of human knowledge, and 
those bounds coincide with the bounds of time.’38 Claims to the effect that one can 
																																																						
33 Reid, “Intellectual Powers of Man,” p. 299.  
34 Reid, “Intellectual Powers of Man,” p. 300.  
35 Reid, “Intellectual Powers of Man,” p. 299.  
36 Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid, p. 103. What Wolterstorff labels ‘the way of ideas’ is 
described in this thesis as ‘the theory of mediation’. Reid, of course, had not yet read 
Kant, as Kant was his contemporary.   
37 Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid, p. 90.  
38 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover 
From Kant?”, p. 12.  
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attain knowledge of things-in-themselves and of the divine, then, are to be regarded 
with suspicion at best.  
 Herman Bavinck’s articulation of the perceived problem is almost identical with 
Reid’s. In the Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck expresses his dissatisfaction in Plato, 
Descartes, Leibniz and Rosmini, because by an affirmation of innate ideas they raise an 
‘untenable dualism between subject and object.’39 He traces a distinction between a 
mental representation of a thing and the thing itself to the Medieval Scholastics, but 
argues that modern philosophy perpetuates ‘an ever-growing gap between a thing and 
its representation.’40 He pinpoints the problem in this way: ‘The error underlying this 
theory seems to be that the actual object of our perception is said to be, not the thing 
outside of us, but some impression or neural vibration within us.’41 In limiting objects of 
knowledge to the representations internal to the mind, modern epistemology cannot 
seem to evade the charge that their main theses introduce a vicious skepticism 
concerning the external world. 
 In the Stone lectures, Bavinck extends these objections to Kant in much the 
same way as Wolterstorff. Though Kant cannot deny that ‘the existence of on objective 
world’ is a belief presupposed by every common person and that perception is a starting 
point of knowledge, Kant nevertheless misidentifies the products of sense perception.42 
Instead of beginning with the claim that sense perception reliably transmits knowledge 
of external reality, Kant thought that sense-perception ‘discovers nothing but an 
orderless mass of phenomena’43. ‘Scientific knowledge’, in turn, ‘is possible and 
attainable only when the human mind introduces order into the chaos and subjects it to 
its own law’.44 Kant’s emphasis on the necessary constructive activities of the mind on 
the chaotic representations received in perception nurtures the later idealist axiom that 
knowledge of reality is wholly the product of the mind. Although Bavinck admits that 
this is an unintended consequence of Kant, it remains undeniable to him that Kant 
																																																						
39 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 224. Bavinck follows Voetius and the Reformed scholastics 
in their objections against modern epistemology here.  
40 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 227-8.  
41 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 228. See also pages 216-220. Hegel and Schleiermacher, who 
rose above the epistemology prevalent in their day are the ones who finally reconnected 
“subject and object”, in Bavinck’s judgment, in ibid. 521. 
42 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 67.  
43 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 67.  
44 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 67. 
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continues the trajectory towards the worst forms of subjective idealism that create two 
distinct worlds: an inner ‘world of perception’ that is ‘in part or in whole a product of 
the perceiving subject’, on the one hand, and an outer world, to which one has no real 
access, on the other.45  
 In Bavinck’s judgment, this epistemological trajectory toward subjective idealism 
that limits knowledge to the internal representations of the mind also leads to 
reductionist forms of theology. It was Albrecht Ritschl, in Bavinck’s judgment who was 
the theologian that incorporated Kant’s epistemology into a whole theological system.46 
At the root of Ritschl’s theology is the epistemological distinction between ‘things as 
they are in themselves, outside of any relation to our observation, from things as they 
are for us.’47 Bavinck considered this error to be the engine driving Ritschl’s 
constructive efforts leading to the affirmation that theology is merely a set of value 
judgments. Concomitant to this commitment is the claim by Ritschl that theologians 
cannot gain knowledge of God as he is in himself, but only as he is for us. ‘Not only is 
revelation here robbed of its specific character and in Christianity restricted to Jesus, but 
Ritschl’s epistemology also pushes him to reduce its content.’48  
 It is clear, then, that for Bavinck and Reid (and Wolterstorff), modern 
epistemology and the influence of Kant had led to serious and negative consequences 
for one’s confidence in the basic faculties of perception and whether knowledge of 
external reality can be taken for granted. Their responses to this challenge, then, 
required them to figure out a way in which those two theses could be preserved. While 
their diagnoses of the problem is nearly identical, however, it is here that their 
differences begin to emerge.49  
																																																						
45 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 68. In Bavinck’s view, ‘Kantianism’ is also 
untenable because it presupposes that God does not reveal himself in history. See, here, 
Bavinck, RD, 1: 340. Bavinck’s historical analysis is consistent with James Brown, Subject 
and Object in Modern Theology: The Croall Lectures Given in the University of Edinburgh 1953 
(London: SCM Press, 1953), 19-20, 168. 
46 Herman Bavinck, “The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl,” TBR 3 (Trans. John 
Bolt; 2012): pp. 123-63.  
47 Bavinck, ‘Albrecht Ritschl’, p. 128.  
48 Bavinck, ‘Albrecht Ritschl’, p. 158.   
49 I further explore the consequences of modern epistemology to whether 
knowledge of God can be attained, and Bavinck’s and Reid’s respective responses, in 
Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, ‘Herman Bavinck and Thomas Reid on Perception and 
Knowing God’, Harvard Theological Review 111 (2018): pp. 115-34. Parts of this section 
can also be found in a modified form in that article.  
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b. Reid’s Proposal 
 
 Reid’s response to the above epistemological conundrum is multi-faceted, but 
for our purposes can be boiled down to two major moves.50 The first is to deny that 
perception involves external reality causally acting upon something in the knower. For 
Reid, causation is tied to volition; nature, having no volition, lacks causal powers. This 
polemic is set against Locke’s view, according to which perception involves the 
causation of ideas in the knower by external objects.51 So, Reid reads his contemporary 
philosophers as thinking ‘that the object perceived acts upon the mind in some way 
similar to that in which one body acts upon another, by making an impression upon it.’52 
This, however, ‘contradicts the commonsense of mankind.’53 Reid wants to account for 
perception differently; rather than arguing that in perception the mind is passive, Reid 
affirms that perception is essentially an act of the subject, an exercise of some original 
faculty of the make-up of humanity. In perceiving objects, we apprehend what they are 
by an act of the intellect. 
 This act of perception produces a different picture altogether. In Reid’s account, 
when perceiving an object is not accomplished by way of a mediate idea or mental 
image that was caused by the object. Rather, one perceives the object itself – an immediate 
and direct perception. In perception, one apprehends the object and attains an 
“irresistible conviction” that it exists.54 For Reid, the claim that a direct perception of 
the object is what commands our knowledge of and response to the external world is 
merely a recognition of what the learned and the unlearned alike already take for 
granted. This claim may not be susceptible to further philosophical dissection, but it is 
the only claim that does justice to the commonsense of humanity. In the final analysis, 
Reid appeals to the creative design of God who ‘intended that we should have such 
																																																						
50 Among them, of course, is Reid’s contention that the results of adopting the 
theory of mediated knowledge runs against the cherished deliverances of Common 
Sense.  
51 For an elaborate analysis of Reid on this, see Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid, 61-74. 
What is in view here is objectual apprehension, but Reid, it seems, would also affirm 
direct propositional apprehension.  
52 Reid, ‘Intellectual Powers of Man’, p. 254.  
53 Reid, ‘Intellectual Powers of Man’, p. 254. 
54 Reid, ‘Intellectual Powers of Man’, p. 258-9. 
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knowledge of the material objects that surround us, as is necessary in order to our 
supplying the wants of nature… and he has admirably fitted our powers of perception 
to this purpose.’55 
 Reid’s account is, of course, more nuanced than the brief sketch that I have 
presented here. He believes that, in perception, objects are processed through the 
natural pathways of one’s biological constitution. He also leaves open whether 
perception should be conceived in terms of presentation or conceptual apprehension. 
What is clear is that in Reid’s account perception involves ‘direct, immediate 
apprehension.’56 Instead of trying to establish the existence of the external world (or, as 
for Wolterstorff, whether theological predication bears referential success) by working 
around the theory that knowledge is mediated by mental representations, Reid gets rid 
of mediation altogether, and that is the key insight that Reid offers as a solution to the 
problem of the gap. This is not to say that the apprehension of the external world does 
not make use of concepts. Concepts are necessary to apprehend reality but are not mere 
mental impositions on raw data; rather they are instantiated by the external object. 
 Wolterstorff puts Reid’s insight to good use as a response to Kant’s boundary.  
 
…if we understand perception of an object as awareness of the object – rather 
than as awareness of mental representation caused by the object – then it will not make 
sense to follow Kant in the further step he takes of thinking of concepts as rules 
for structuring the objects of our awareness. For now the objects of our awareness are 
not mental states but eagles and dogs. And eagles and dogs are already structured; they 
don’t await structuring by us.57 
 
From here, this follows:  
 
How do concepts work on this alternative picture? To perceive an eagle under 
the concept of eagle is to perceive it to be what it is. Concepts are not barriers 
between mind and reality but links…If that is so then properties are at one and 
the same time entities that we grasp and entities that external objects possess. 
They are the links.58 
 
																																																						
55 Reid, ‘Intellectual Powers of Man’, p. 260.  
56 Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid, p. 98. Emphasis in original.  
57 Wolterstorff, ‘Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover From 
Kant?’, p. 17. Emphasis mine.  
58 Wolterstorff, ‘Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover From 
Kant?’, p. 17. 
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 Hence, first, instead of seeking to bridge the gap erected between subject and 
object, Reid (and Wolterstorff) erased the gap altogether by way of direct apprehension. 
There is no ‘space’, or boundary, ‘between being acquainted with something under some 
concept and having a belief about that entity; to be acquainted with something under 
some concept just is for one’s acquaintance to evoke a de re / predicative belief about 
that entity.’59 Second, in Reid’s account an appeal to divine activity is ultimately 
necessary for an initial creational make-up of the human being as one is equipped with 
the necessary apparatus for reliable perception. If this is the case, then the skepticism 
nurtured by modern epistemology evaporates precisely because there is no good reason 
to believe that the objects of perception are merely internal to the mind. In normal 
conditions, rational agents are quite well within their rights to hold that their powers of 
perception are reliable and that the world of perception is identical with the outside 
world. Unless there are good reasons to doubt that what is perceived truly is reality 
(such as, say, if there are good reasons to believe that one is suffering a hallucination or 
that the agent has consumed too much alcohol), then it is rational to continue to assume 
that the perceptual beliefs obtained are, indeed, reliable. In other words, perceptual 
beliefs enjoy the epistemic status of being properly basic.  
 
c. Bavinck’s Proposal 
 
 At first glance, Bavinck’s proposed solution seems identical to Reid’s. Recall that 
Bavinck thinks the root problem is the disconnect between a mental representation and 
the thing external to the knower. Bavinck argues that, in perception, one gets a ‘faithful’ 
interpretation of the external world.60 Even more strongly, Bavinck faults Ritschl for 
limiting knowledge to perception without including the external world, for in Bavinck’s 
view Ritschl should have seen that ‘the predicate brings us to the subject; perceptions 
draw us to essences.’61 Essences of things are given in perception, and thus Bavinck 
could claim that ‘the object of perception is not any phenomenon within myself but the thing 
																																																						
59 Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid, p. 159. This is a straightforward account of direct 
realism.  
60 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 229.  
61 Bavinck, ‘Albrecht Ritschl’, p. 131.  
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outside myself.’62 In perception, one is immediately convinced of the existence and 
objectivity of the external world.  
 Upon closer inspection, however, Bavinck arrives at this conclusion in a quite 
non-Reidian way. In Bavinck’s desire to reject a boundary provided by the 
epistemological gap, Bavinck admits, first of all, that some gap must be acknowledged. 
Bavinck accepts a truth in epistemological realism, according to which the mind can 
know the mind-independent things external to the knower – but how, exactly, does the 
mind access external reality? Bavinck says this: “Realism…holds fast to the existence of 
the world because that world is, in an ideal sense, given in the representation itself.”63 It is 
clear here what he is not denying: “It does not deny the distinction that exists between the 
representation and the thing but at the same time maintains the inseparable connection 
between the two because it takes the representation as it presents itself.”64 There is a 
distinction between the ideal representation and the thing in itself, but there is 
communication of the thing in the representation.65 Again, this time acknowledging 
Thomas and the Medieval Scholastics:  
So on the one hand there is an essential difference between the thing and its 
representation, because the thing exists outside of us, has real existence there, 
while the second exists in us and merely has ideal existence. On the other hand, 
there is complete correspondence: the representation is an image, a faithful ideal 
reproduction of the object outside of us.66 
 
 Bavinck accepts the existence of a gap, but it is a fixed gap. It is here that 
Bavinck criticizes modern philosophy for creating an ‘ever growing gap’ between the 
																																																						
62 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 228. Emphasis mine.  
63 Bavinck, RD: 1, pp. 223-4. Emphasis mine.  
64 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 224. Emphasis mine. 
65 In this way Bavinck’s analysis of knowledge differs from one articulation of 
Hegel’s, in which one ‘cannot begin from the assumption that the determinations or 
categories of thought and reality are conceivably distinct from one another, or that they 
might conceivably ‘correspond’ to one another. It cannot begin with any conceivable 
distinction between thought and being at all.’ Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: 
Freedom, Truth and History 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 45. However, it is 
congenial with another articulation, in which Hegel regards subject and object as distinct 
but as a pair in relation. For this view, see Nicholas Adams, The Eclipse of Grace: Divine 
and Human Action in Hegel (Hoboken: Blackwell, 2013). Despite some of the overlapping 
epistemological concerns, Bavinck self-consciously distanced himself from Hegel’s 
ontology. On this, see Eglinton, ‘To Be or to Become – That is the Question: Locating 
the Actualistic in Bavinck’s Ontology’, pp. 104-24. 
66 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 227. Cf. Sytsma, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic 
Epistemology’, p. 29.  
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image and the external object.67 Why, exactly, does Bavinck affirm the existence of this 
gap?  
 A few pages before the above statements, Bavinck rejection of empiricism 
provides some clues. The problem with Empiricism, Bavinck thinks, is that it conceives 
of the mind as passive as a mere recipient of impressions caused by external objects. 
This cannot be the case, however, as it ‘is firmly established, first of all, that in its 
intellectual activity the human mind is never totally passive or even receptive but also 
always more or less active.’68 Reid would agree, as he conceives of perception as an act 
of the intellect by which minds apprehend reality. But Bavinck’s sense is rather 
different. For Bavinck, the mind not only judges, connects or compares perceptions – it 
adds to it. Here, Bavinck explicitly agrees with Kant, who ‘rightly says’ that experience 
can give us what is, but not what it could not be: one cannot experience universal and 
necessary truths.69 For Bavinck: ‘After all, we possess not only particular and incidental 
truths but also universal and necessary truths…which empiricists have tried in vain to 
deduce from experience.’70 These universal truths are a priori starting points for all 
argumentation – presupposed as the basis for understanding.  
 It is especially significant that the word translated as ‘representations’ above is 
the Dutch word voorstellingen. A closer investigation of how Bavinck uses this word in 
Christelijke wereldbeschouwing shows the post-Kantian connotations of Bavinck’s use, 
																																																						
67 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 227. Again, compare this with one interpretation of Hegel’s 
attempt to connect subject and object: “Hegel’s objection is not primarily to Kant’s 
ontology – in ontology in which there are phenomena and noumena, or appearances 
and things in themselves… Hegel’s primary objection is to the logic which guides the 
account – a logic in which phenomena and noumena are opposed, where appearances 
and things in themselves are utterly separate.” Adams, The Eclipse of Grace, pp. 22-3. 
There is, of course, an important difference of emphasis. Hegel responds to Kant by 
offering an alternate account of logic – a logic of distinctions in inseparable relation 
(thereby vindicating the connection and essential difference between two poles) – 
whereas Bavinck appeals to a Triune ontology to connect the two poles, as one shall see.   
68 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 220.  
69 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 220. 
70 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 220. For Reid one does not need to account for how the 
belief in causality or necessary truths originate. One merely finds oneself believing these 
truths (presumably because of how human beings are hard-wired), and one is perfectly 
justified in believing so. Kevin Hector summarizes Kant (and Hegel) in a manner 
consistent with Bavinck: ‘Apart from the mind’s application of such universals, sensible 
appearances break up into a series of disconnected This-Here-Nows’. The Theological 
Project of Modernism: Faith and the Conditions of Mineness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), p. 142.  
	 159 
further signified to the use of the German Vorstellung in the German edition of the 
book.71 Bavinck investigates epistemology in the first chapter of this booklet, in which 
he critiques Idealism for failing to produce a proper process of reasoning: it seeks to 
establish the existence of the outside world by way of an inference from the circle of 
one’s representations (voorstellingen): ‘… out of one representation [the idealist] can 
merely infer another, but [he] can never by reasoning bridge the distance between 
thinking and being.’72 Though Idealism is right in arguing that the object can only be 
known by representations, the existence of the outside world is not meant to be inferred 
from them. Rather, it is to be axiomatic that in ‘sensations and representations a 
trustworthy knowledge of the objective reality’ is given.73 In ‘sensation and 
representation’ lie the maxims of truth and science.74 The external world is not 
established by an inference from representations, but representations are those through 
which we know the external world.   
 In the Philosophy of Revelation, Bavinck reiterates this point. Before elaborating on 
some salient criticisms against subjective forms of idealism, Bavinck concedes that 
idealism contains undeniable features of truth:  
 
The truth of idealism lies in this, that the mind of man, in other words, 
sensation and representation [voorstelling], is the basis and principle of all 
knowledge. If there be an objective reality, a world of matter and force, existing 
in the forms of space and time, then it follows from the nature of the case that 
the knowledge of it can reach me through my consciousness only. In this sense 
it is quite proper to affirm that the object exists for the subject alone, and that 
the world is our representation. Apart from consciousness I know nothing, 
whether of myself or of any province of reality. In the defense of this truth, 
idealism holds strong ground over against that naïve naturalism which thinks it 
																																																						
71 Herman Bavinck, Christliche Weltanschauung, Hermann Cuntz (trans.), 
(Heilderberg: Carl Winter, 1907), pp. 9, 20. See footnote 32 in the next chapter for a 
further discussion on this Vorstellung. 
72 Herman Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 18. Dutch original: ‘… uit de 
eene voorstelling kan hij slechts tot een andere besluiten, maar nooit overbrugt eene 
redeneering de klove tusschen het denken en het zijn.’ 
73 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 20. Dutch original: ‘… dat wij in de 
gewaarwordingen en voorstellingen eene betrouwbare kennis van de objectieve 
werkelijkheid bezitten.’ 
74 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 20. Dutch original: ‘Dit nu is het feit, dat 
aan alle gewaarwording en voorstelling ten grondslag ligt. Wie het ontkent, ondermijnt 
alle waarheid en wetenschap.’  
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possesses… a directly given reality, and which loses sight of the influence 
exerted by the subject in every perception of an object.75  
 
 In sum, there is an essentially constructive activity by the mind on the thing it 
perceives – the mind does not merely apprehend objects. Nor does Bavinck appeal to 
the wiring of humanity simply to believe in universal and necessary truths, as Reid does. 
Bavinck elaborates on this further as he discusses the role of faith for theological 
construction. There, he argues that the subjective starting point is necessary, no less 
because all knowledge begins there: ‘Certainly the subjective starting point is not 
peculiar to theology. All that is objective can be approached only from the vantage point 
of the subject: the “thing in itself” is unknowable and does not exist for us…All life and 
all knowledge is based on a kind of agreement between subject and object.’76 The 
subjective consciousness is the window through which the world is seen: ‘All that is 
objective exists for us only by means of subjective consciousness; without 
consciousness the whole world is dead for us.’77  
 It is tempting to take a wooden interpretation of what Bavinck says here and 
infer that the world’s existence is dependent upon the consciousness of human beings. 
That would render Bavinck as a subjective idealist of a higher order, making 
epistemology and ontology contingent upon the subject’s activity. Rather, he explicitly 
links the claim that the thing in itself ‘does not exist for us’ with the epistemic claim that 
it is ‘unknowable’. What he says is not that the things in themselves do not exist, but that 
knowledge of things in themselves do not exist. Despite the provocative choice of words, 
the sense of Bavinck’s claim is epistemological rather than metaphysical. His sense is 
that the subject has no epistemological access to the thing in itself, no access to reality 
that is not affected in some way by the subjective consciousness. There is no direct 
access and thus knowledge should not be conceived as though external objects could be 
																																																						
75 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 56; Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, p. 46. It is 
significant that Bavinck considered these lectures as a further elaboration upon the 
themes found in Christelijke wereldbeschouwing. See Philosophy of Revelation, p. 320 n. 21. The 
Philosophy of Revelation is Bavinck’s way of tracing out how it is that the philosophies that 
are produced independently of special revelation (in response solely to general 
revelation) in some ways anticipate the Christian worldview. They ‘trace’ revelation and 
‘correlate’ it with the rest of our ‘knowledge and life’. (p. 24).  
76 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 586. This definition of knowledge as agreement of subject 
and object, and how to account for that agreement is the focus of modern 
epistemology. Cf. James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology, 20-24.  
77 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 564.  
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known them ‘in themselves’ – to do so would be to succumb to what Bavinck calls a 
‘naïve naturalism’ that fails to take into account the activity of the subject in the 
knowing event.78  
An affirmation of this gap leads Bavinck to wonder how a correspondence may 
be established between the subject and object – a problem that Bavinck takes seriously. 
A reflection on the way the brain produces a mental image distinct from the neural 
activity that communicates the world posits for one  an ‘insoluble riddle.’79 A few pages 
later, Bavinck makes this riddle even more perplexing when he brings into consideration 
that the objects of science are not particulars but universals. The mind abstracts 
universals from individual particulars, but “the universality we express in a concept does 
not exist as such, as a universal, apart from us….it has its basis in things and is 
abstracted from it and expressed in a concept by the activity of the intellect.”80 The 
universal in the mind is not in the particular; again, how does the concept in the mind 
actually help us ‘approximate’ reality? Bavinck admits that it is ‘strange, even amazing, 
that converting mental representations into concepts and processing these again in 
accordance with the laws of thought, we should obtain results that correspond to 
reality.’81 When one couples this Aristotelian mode of thinking with Bavinck’s 
affirmations concerning the mediating role of representations, the gap between subject 
and object is even clearer.   
 One wonders if Bavinck would have been vulnerable to the critiques lodged by 
Reid and Wolterstorff against Locke had he left matters there, as he is clearly indebted 
to certain modern epistemological categories that distinguish internal representations 
and external reality. He has offered an account of perception incompatible with that 
which Reid constructed. However, as we have seen before, Bavinck admits of a 
correspondence between the two sides of the gap. How exactly did he do this? 
 
III. Toward Bavinck’s Use of Eduard von Hartmann 
																																																						
78 In this and the preceding analysis I am in agreement with Cornelis van der 
Kooi, ‘Internal Testimony,’ p. 108. Chapter seven will elaborate on the implications of 
this claim: because there remains a gap between representations and external objects, 
Bavinck argues that knowledge of things can be nonconceptual, leading to a rather 
Romantic picture of the unity of self, knowledge, and external reality.   
79 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 228.  
80 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 231.  
81 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 231. 
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Although Bavinck and Reid offer similar diagnoses on the modern problem of the 
seemingly unbridgeable gap between subjective representations and objective reality, 
their responses to the problem are rather different. While Reid eliminates the gap 
altogether by offering an account which pictures intellects as picking out external 
objects, Bavinck maintains that the existence of the gap is undeniable. The question 
then arises: what accounts for the apparent ease with which Bavinck can say that 
rational agents can continue to enjoy their ordinary beliefs about the world with 
epistemic warrant? What, in other words, accounts for his apparent similarity with 
Thomas Reid in their mutual objection of the ‘gap’ between subjects and objects, such 
that knowledge of external things can be taken for granted – a reading that does lend 
itself to the project of Reformed epistemology? I suggest, in the next chapter, that 
Bavinck’s critical appropriation of Eduard von Hartmann explains these phenomena. 
Eduard von Hartmann offered an epistemological and metaphysical account between 
naïve realism and subjective idealism, to the effect that internal representations can 
reliably communicate external reality precisely because both take part in an absolute 
Unconscious whole. In other words, subjects and objects participate in a larger unity 
and as such must be held in equipoise. This, then, explains why the ordinary person can 
take their perceptual beliefs for granted, while providing the logical grounds needed by 
philosophers, who peer more deeply into this subject, to explain why those perceptual 
beliefs are indeed reliable.82 Using the conceptual resources provided by a Christian and 
theological interpretation of the organic, Bavinck, as the next chapter shows, re-
interprets von Hartmann’s unconscious absolute in a stimulating manner. In this way, 
the potential worries raised by van der Kooi and van den Belt at the beginning of this 
chapter will also be addressed.  
Bavinck should thus be located as a theologian who wrestled with the 19-20th 
century trends in philosophical discourse that put a premium on the life of the 
unconscious, representational thinking and the spontaneous/instinctive life. Indeed, the 
commonsense connotations felt by Wolterstorff and Plantinga in Bavinck are reflective 
of the broader trend in that century that focuses on what lies underneath active 
																																																						
82 This seems to imply that Eduard von Hartmann, precisely because he does not 
work within the methods of analytic philosophy, does not operate neatly within 
externalist/internalist parameters of justification or warrant.  
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consciousness. In his 1915 study on the unconscious, Bavinck regarded consciousness 
as a ‘wondrous phenomena’, considering it to be ‘one of the seven mysteries of the 
world’.83 Related to the intuitive life and practical reason, consciousness provides an 
immediate contact with ‘psychic phenomena…it is a direct and concomitant 
consciousness’.84 It is what distinguishes the sensations perceived as a self’s own, rather 
than another’s: ‘Sensations, observations, memories, thoughts, judgments, and so forth 
do not exist by themselves or float in the air. They are what they are first because they 
are my or your or his or her sensations, and so on.’85 Bavinck relates these insights on 
the psychic faculties and the immediate awareness of consciousness, whether in relation 
to the contents of the inner life or of external objects, to the Scriptural notion of the 
‘soul’.86 He is not an anomaly in this regard. In 1908, Abraham Kuyper would also 
publish a politically driven study on the place of the instinctive life in the individual and 
social consciousness.87 In that study, Kuyper relativizes the importance of rational 
deliberation and places a focus on the instincts that drive art, religion, and the genius, 
the paradigms of romantic exemplars.88 He envisions a kind of knowing that is no 
longer discursive but intuitive, and a collective consciousness that works in harmony 
before God in a manner that ‘drew off the contemporary fascination with instinct and 
social psychology’.89  In a striking passage, he distinguishes between proper and 
improper accounts of ‘common sense’:  
 
																																																						
83 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Unconscious’, in John Bolt (ed.), Harry Boonstra and 
Gerrit Sheeres (trans.), Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2008), p. 175. 
84 Bavinck, ‘The Unconscious’, p. 176.  
85 Bavinck, ‘The Unconscious’, p. 176. 
86 Bavinck, ‘The Unconscious’, p. 197. 
87 Abraham Kuyper, Ons Instinctieve Leven (Amsterdam: W. Kirchner, 1908). 
English translation: Abraham Kuyper, ‘Our Instinctive Life’, in James Bratt (ed.), 
Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 255-77.  
88 Kuyper was politically motivated, to be sure. This work emphasizes the pre-
rational life of the people in order to emphasize the closeness of his political program 
with the common masses, and further to establish himself as a man of the ‘little people’ 
(de kleine luyden). See especially James Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian 
Democrat (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), pp. 350-5. 
89 Bratt, Abraham Kuyper, p. 351. In particular, Kuyper’s treatment ‘appealed to a 
French authority, Gustav Le Bon, a pioneer in the study of social psychology, Le Bon 
was most famous for showing how a crowd could become a being in itself with will of 
its own that swept up those of its individual members’. (Bratt, Abraham Kuyper, p. 353).  
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What is frequently dismissed as ‘common sense’ is something very different from 
what the French call sens commun. Sens is above all the expression of the instinctive 
life and the word commun calls for an organic society. Sens commun is the sensibility 
that the interested parties have in in common.90 
  
 
The instinctive and intuitive lives of the individual and collective consciousness are 
predicated on an organic anthropology: the singular and the whole, and the phenomena 
‘not subject to the reflection of the thinking intellect’91:  ‘All such phenomena are the 
natural effect of our organic unity. Anything organized by that very fact comes under 
the “psychology of the crowd”, and it is almost exclusively the instinctive factors of life 
that explain the psychology of the “man in the mass”’.92 Kuyper thus construes 
common sense not as the ordinary world-directed propositional beliefs that are elicited 
on a daily level, but an intuitive, pre-reflective, connectedness that binds psychic 
phenomena and the individual with the society: it is more romantic than it is Reidian.93 
For Bavinck, too, there is a primordial and pre-reflective unconscious life that connects 
representations with objects. These can be explained, further, only if an organic vision 
of creation is deployed. James Bratt’s apt summary of Kuyper’s ‘Our Instinctive Life’ 
can easily be used to characterize Bavinck’s own position: ‘Kuyper valorized intuition 
against rationalization, vital conviction against learned pose, the reasons of the heart 
against a science that could but weigh and measure’.94 
In the next two chapters, it shall become clearer that although Bavinck’s realism is 
of the distinctly post-Kantian variety, he is motivated by materially theological claims 
regarding the Trinity and revelation in his construal of the relationship between subjects 
and objects. As it will become apparent, for Bavinck idealism and realism are not two 
wholly distinct options, contrary to popular caricatures, but rather two poles in a 
spectrum, each defined by an emphasis on the nature of the mode by which the world is 
																																																						
90 Kuyper, ‘Our Instinctive Life’, p. 266. Cf. George Marsden, ‘The Collapse of 
American Evangelical Academia’, in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), 
Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1983), p. 250. 
91 Kuyper, ‘Our Instinctive Life’, p. 265.  
92 Kuyper, ‘Our Instinctive Life’, p. 265.  
93 This is not to say that Kuyper did not value the life of the rational intellect. Like 
Bavinck, he would argue that ‘a few genuine scholars whose all-absorbing studies’ 
should plunge themselves into ‘the depth of things’ in order to bring into closer 
synthesis the rational and practical life. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper, p. 352.   
94 Bratt, Abraham Kuyper, p. 252.  
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accessed. To be sure, Bavinck is clearly (most) critical of subjective idealism, but not all 
forms of idealism are identical.95 The absolute in Eduard von Hartmann’s absolute 
idealism lends itself toward particularly Christian ways of answering specifically modern 
epistemological problems with acuteness and precision. In this, absolute idealism does 
not involve the claim that reality is a projection of finite human minds – the term 
‘idealism’ in absolute idealism denotes, instead, the view that certain epistemic and 
ontological conditions (normally involving the view that the world is encountered by one as 
pre-conceptualized) always obtain in the knowing process.96 In this way, Bavinck, also 
showcases that, if related rightly, idealism and realism can be seen as not merely 
compatible but complementary. A theological-realist account of knowing is grounded in 
an absolute. It is to Bavinck’s use of Eduard von Hartmann, then, that this study now 
turns.   
																																																						
95 Commenting on Hegel, Bavinck wrote: ‘In presenting this view idealistic 
philosophy is not merely toying with abstract conceptions or idle ratiocinations, but 
takes its start from reality, - reality, to be sure, as seen by it. Even Hegel, who certainly of all 
philosophers has most sinned by apriori constructions, had far more knowledge of the 
facts of nature and history than his opponents have given him credit for.’ Bavinck, 
Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 54-5. Emphasis mine 
96 John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 
pp. 4-9, 44, 83; Paul Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 8. Even Berkeley’s anti-materialistic 
idealism has been shown to be non-inimical to a realist view of knowledge. On this, see 
especially Gregory Trickett, ‘Idealism and the Nature of Truth’, in Steven B. Cowan and 
James S. Spiegel (eds.), Idealism and Christianity, vol. 2, Idealism and Christian Philosophy 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 29-50. Andrew Inkpin’s short comment is 
appropriate: ‘idealism [involves the view] that entities are defined by a particular mode 
of access’. Disclosing the World: On the Phenomenology of Language (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2016), p. 238. See also Bavinck’s distinction between ‘thoroughgoing’ and ‘half-hearted’ 
idealism; the former denotes subjective idealism, while the latter those who follow 
Locke in positing secondary qualities to the constructive powers of the mind, but not 
primary qualities, in Philosophy of Revelation, p. 70. 
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Chapter 6: The Absolute and the Organic – Bavinck and Eduard von Hartmann 
Chapter five elaborates on two further trajectories within the secondary 
literature on Bavinck’s account of perception. This involves the observations by 
Cornelis van der Kooi and Henk van den Belt, on the distinctly critical realistic (post-
Kantian) and subjectivist connotations in certain key passages in Bavinck’s account. The 
second recounts the way in which Wolterstorff and Plantinga read Bavinck as a pre-
cursor to their Reformed epistemology. This reading rests, at least in part, on the 
presence of purportedly Reidian connotations in Bavinck’s epistemology, especially as 
Bavinck insists that modern epistemology wrongly inserts a wedge between subject and 
object, and as Bavinck argues that ordinary beliefs about external reality can be held in a 
properly basic way. An implicit tension between the two set of readings is this: how can 
Bavinck be indebted to a post-Kantian subjectivist bent, on the one hand, and have 
Reidian connotations, on the other? This question is particularly acute especially as 
Reidianism is seen to be an alternative to post-Kantian subjectivist and skepticist 
tendencies with respect to beliefs about external reality.   
In an attempt to untangle and elucidate all of the issues involved, the chapter 
then explored how Reid rejects ‘the way of ideas’ in favor of the view that subjects 
perceive objects immediately without the role of representations. It then went on to 
argue that Bavinck, quite unlike Reid, posited a strong distinction between 
representations (through which one knows the external object) and the things in 
themselves. This suggests that although Bavinck is quite insistent that knowing subjects 
can access external objects in themselves, there are certain epistemological conditions 
that always attend the epistemic process, among which is the constructive role of the 
subject in the act of perception. Knowledge of things, in Bavinck’s view, is always 
through mental representations; the consciousness mediates knowledge of objects and 
adds to it in some way.1 
 This suggests that the Reidian connotations in Bavinck’s epistemology are more 
accidental than substantial. It seems that unlike Reid, Bavinck affirms the mediation of 
																																																						
1 In this regard Cornelius Jaarsma is right to summarize Bavinck’s view thusly: 
‘The world of perception is given in our consciousness, not as a dream or hallucination, 
but as appearance and idea (voorstelling) which actualizes the existence of the objective 
world.’ The Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck, pp. 48-9.   
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representations in the denial of naïve (direct) realism. If that is so, a curious shared 
affirmation arises: namely, that prior to reasoning man can be (in some way) initially 
warranted in the belief that external reality is susceptible to the powers of the human 
faculties.  What accounts for this apparent similarity? I suggest that Bavinck’s similarities 
with Reid are not so much a reflection of his dependence on the commonsense or direct 
realistic tradition, but more a signal of his use of Eduard von Hartmann. This is so 
because von Hartmann seeks to construct a mediating position between subjective 
idealism and naïve realism. Hence, the similarities that obtain between Bavinck and Reid 
are actually a reflection of a prior accidental similarity between Von Hartmann and Reid. 
Stated positively, Bavinck’s reconnoitering of the epistemology of Eduard von 
Hartmann is what accounts for the apparent similarity and differences between Bavinck 
and Reid. I shall suggest this by observing the way in which Bavinck and von Hartmann 
reject subjective idealism, their affirmation of how both the subject and object must be 
treated in equipoise, and their appeal to some ontology in which subject and object 
participate. These moves will thus further broach on an issue left loose in the previous 
chapter, namely, how Bavinck understands the nature of epistemic justification.  
 This chapter contributes to the thesis in three ways. First, it clarifies how 
Bavinck is a principled yet eclectic thinker as it observes that his epistemology draws 
from von Hartmann, and how Bavinck would deploy the organic motif to 
accommodate insights from various epistemologies. Second, and more significantly, I 
will demonstrate that Bavinck’s deployment of the organic motif in order to connect 
subject and object is developed within the context of an engagement with the problems 
and grammar of 19th-20th century philosophical discourse. In doing so, the significance 
of the organic motif, in Bavinck’s view, in its capacity to resolve some apparent 
philosophical problems with respect to perception and knowledge will also be clarified. 
Third, some important themes involved in Bavinck’s organic account for subsequent 
chapters will be considered, including his view that revelation is prereflective, that 
contact with God and reality are primordial facts, and that these two claims are 
accounted for by an appeal to the organic.  
 The following argument follows Bavinck’s use of von Hartmann in the third 
chapter of the Philosophy of Revelation and von Hartmann’s own argumentation in his 
magnum opus, the Philosophy of the Unconscious, before culling material from Bavinck’s 
deployment of the organic motif with respect to the subject-object discussions in the 
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rest of Bavinck’s corpus.2 Henk van den Belt, as we have seen, noted Bavinck’s use of 
von Hartmann before, yet it seems necessary to offer further justification for my use of 
von Hartmann, especially as Philosophy of the Unconscious is not explicitly referenced by 
Bavinck in the third chapter of his Stone lectures, despite Bavinck’s invocation of his 
name multiple times throughout the chapter.  
First, Bavinck was clearly aware of von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious, 
as seen both in his use of it in his psychological study on the relationship between the 
unconscious and consciousness,3 and in a handwritten notebook that studies the text’s 
argument at length, noting what Bavinck considers to be the most salient points of each 
chapter and section.4 The second reason will be found in the material congeniality 
observed between Bavinck and von Hartmann and Bavinck’s explicit invocation of von 
Hartmann’s name at crucial points within the text; there are also many references to 
Von Hartmann’s Unconscious Absolute, as I shall demonstrate in this chapter.  
 Bavinck’s initial descriptions of von Hartmann in his notes immediately reminds 
the reader, at least prima facie, some of Bavinck’s own tendencies. Bavinck notes that in 
von Hartmann ‘the inductive method is preferred’.5 The philosophy of the unconscious 
																																																						
2 Cf. Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious: Speculative Results According 
to the Inductive Method of Physical Science, William Coupland (trans.), 9th ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2000). Where seemingly relevant, I make a reference to Von Hartmann’s 
German text: Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophie des Unbewussten: Speculatie Resultate nach 
Inductiv-naturwissenschaftlicher Methode, 3 vols., 10th ed. (Leipzig, Hermann Haacke, 1890). 
The differences between the 9th edition in the English translation and the 10th edition 
are merely in pagination and in some added appendices, and also that the former 
includes all three volumes in a single work, while the latter divides the three volumes 
into three books. 
3 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Unconscious’, in John Bolt (ed.), Harry Boonstra and 
Gerrit Sheeres (trans.), Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2008), pp. 175-98.  
4 This notebook (Notitieboekje met aantekeningen betreffende de zesde druk van Die Welt 
als Wille und Vorstellung geschreven door Arthur Schopenhauer, en Eduard von Hartman, 
Philosophie des Unbewussten [Berlin 1882]) is found as item 279 in the Bavinck archives 
at the Free University of Amsterdam. The notes on Von Hartmann in the notebook, 
though not explicitly paginated, are 36 pages long and is preceded by more notes on 
Arthur Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. The heading of the notes 
indicates that Bavinck is working with the 9th edition of the text, which is dated 1882. 
From here I will refer to the notes as BNVH (Bavinck’s notes on Von Hartmann).  
5 Bavinck, BNVH, p. 1. ‘De induct. Method heeft de voorkeur’. Cf. Von 
Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, I. p. 8. That Bavinck prefers the inductive, 
empirical, method in scholarly study is commonly acknowledged. See, for example, 
Bavinck, Modernisme en Orthodoxie: Rede gehouden bij de overdracht van het Rectoraat aan de Vrije 
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also ‘distinguished’, Bavinck surmises, between ‘perception (representation) and 
apperception (consciousness)’.6  
Further, despite Bavinck’s clear preference for a realistic epistemology over 
‘idealism’, his desire to be located somewhere between subjective idealism and naïve 
realism can also be discerned in von Hartmann’s epistemology. Von Hartmann says as 
much, as seen most clearly in these two passages. First, he affirms that ‘[a]ll belief in an 
immediate self-apprehension of the Ego in the act of self-consciousness depends on the 
same self-delusion as the naïve realistic belief [Glaube] in the immediate conscious 
apprehension of the thing in itself that exists independently of consciousness.’7 
Second, and even more explicitly, von Hartmann writes the following toward 
the end of the third volume of the Philosophy of the Unconscious, under chapter XV (‘The 
Ultimate Principles’), section five, entitled ‘The Possibility of Metaphysical Knowledge’:  
 
[With the assumption of the heterogeneity of thought and thing], only two 
standpoints are possible: that of naïve Realism and that of Subjective Idealism. 
The former fails to see that everything that I can express in words and reach 
with my thoughts can always only be my own thoughts, but never a reality lying 
beyond the same; that thought can never denude itself of the character of 
thought, and erroneously confuses itself or the thinkable (intelligible) with that 
which lies beyond thought (trans-intelligible)… The second standpoint 
[Subjective Idealism] corrects this error…. but it commits the other fault of 
denying that which is placed beyond the limits of thinking, because it is 
unattainable to thinking, and therewith annihilates the possibility of all 
knowledge, in that thinking is lowered to a dream without object and therewith 
without truth.8  
																																																																																																																																																										
Universiteit op 20 October 1911 (Kampen: Kok, 1911), p. 12. Indeed, Bavinck objects to 
pragmatism precisely in that it fails to be ‘sufficiently’ empirical, in his Philosophy of 
Revelation, p. 55. He is not, however, unaware of its drawbacks, and lists potential 
weaknesses of it (including failing to take into account one’s inevitable subjectivity) in 
Beginselen der Psychologie (Kampen: Bos, 1897), pp. 7-8.  
6 Bavinck, BNVH, p. 1. Bavinck specifically switches to the English when he 
denotes perception and apperception here: ‘De philoso... altijd als berust op [Leibniz’s 
discovery of unconscious representations, and] onderscheidde dus perception (voorstelling) en apperception 
(bewustzijn)’.  
7 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, II: p, 79; Philosophie des Unbewussten, II: 
p. 29. Recall Bavinck’s reasoning in RD: 1, p. 586: ‘Certainly the subjective starting point 
is not peculiar to theology. All that is objective can be approached only from the 
vantage point of the subject: the “thing in itself” is unknowable and does not exist for 
us.’ Also, in the Philosophy of Revelation, p. 56, in which he says that ‘naïve naturalism’ 
assumes falsely that there is a ‘directly given reality’ accessible apart from ‘the influence 
exerted by the subject in every perception of an object.’  
8 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, III: p. 198.  
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 Naturally, von Hartmann posits the Absolute Unconscious as the Subject in 
which thought and being, subject and object, are reconciled because they are 
reconceived as two modes of the same monistic existence.9 In Bavinck’s brief summary 
of this section, he notes that von Hartmann’s philosophy navigates into ‘naïve realism 
or idealism [naief realism of het idealisme]’, as it posits an ‘identity-philosophy [De 
identiteitsphilos.]’, a ‘philosophy of the Unconscious [de philos. Onbewuste] according to 
which ‘thinking and being’ [denken en zijn] are one.10 As such, von Hartmann’s critical 
(idealistic) realism is already palpable: he affirms that objects are truly independent of 
finite minds, yet are accessed by way of the consciousness of the subject, which always 
contributes something to the knowing process.  
 As this chapter will further demonstrate, Bavinck critically appropriates von 
Hartmann. In the following section, Bavinck’s critical appropriation of von Hartmann is 
observed in his rejection of subjective idealism and in his belief in the availability of the 
external world. The close reading of the primary texts involved will also be sensitive to 
the interpretations of Wolterstorff and Plantinga, along with the current scholarship that 
discusses the debate between realism and idealism, showing further that the distinction 
between the two is mired with more complexity than the common presentation that the 
two form the choice between solipsism and objectivism. After the following section, I 
will then turn to Bavinck’s strategy to account for how the subject knows objects by his 
re-interpretation of the Absolute, and the deployment of the organic motif.   
 
I. The ‘Mistake of Idealism’ and the Immediacy of Contact with the World: Bavinck’s Critical 
Appropriation of Eduard von Hartmann 
 
																																																						
9 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, III: pp. 201-3. Sebastian Gardner’s 
comment here is apt: ‘[Von Hartmann combines] a metaphysics of absolute idealism 
with a philosophical methodology which denies anything more than auxiliary value to a 
priori reflection, and according to which derivation from experience is the proper source 
of metaphysical cognition: scientifically processed experience is held to be sufficient to 
support the most robust metaphysical conclusions’. ‘Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophy 
of the Unconscious’ in Angus Nicholls, Martin Liebscher (eds.), Thinking the Unconscious: 
Nineteenth-Century German Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 
174-5. 
10 Bavinck, BNVH, p. 36.  
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 The above section observes that Bavinck accepts the distinction between subject 
and object, between the mental representations through which rational agents acquire 
knowledge and the external objects. The mistake of idealism, therefore, lies not so much 
in the acceptance of the mediating and key role played by mental images or 
representations in the epistemic process. Indeed, the mistake, in Bavinck’s thinking, is in 
the attempt to purchase the epistemic reliability of the external world by an inference 
from internal representations, as the last section had already teased. By observing 
Bavinck’s argumentation in the Philosophy of Revelation, his affinities with von Hartmann 
will emerge in greater clarity, and in doing so will further demonstrate how he brings in 
the organic motif as a solution to the subject-object dichotomy.  
 Immediately after Bavinck admits that ‘idealism’ is correct to affirm that the 
subject11 always exerts some influence in every act of perception, Bavinck begins an 
elaboration on what he takes to be the erroneous inferences made from this starting 
point by idealists. First, Bavinck argues that idealism wrongly infers from the truth that 
consciousness is a ‘medium’ for perception to the conclusion that the objects perceived 
‘must itself be immanent in the mind.’12 Consciousness is simply the organ by which the 
subject knows, and it is not to be confused as the ‘principle and source of the 
knowledge of the object.’13 Bavinck goes on:  
 
The mistake of idealism lies in confounding the act with its content, the 
function with the object, the psychological with the logical nature of perception. 
Perception is an act of the subject, and sensation and representation, as truly as 
concepts and conclusions, have a purely ideal, immanent existence. But 
perception as such terminates upon an object, and sensation and representation, 
logically considered, by their very nature are related to a reality distinct from 
themselves. Hence psychology and logic differ in character. It is one thing to 
consider the representations as they lie in consciousness and another thing in 
and through them to apprehend reality. To ignore the difference means to 
remain entangled in a sort of psychologism, imprisoned in one’s self and 
doomed never to reach reality.14 
 
																																																						
11 Jaarsma provides a brief account of Bavinck’s critique of Idealism in The 
Educational Philosophy of Herman Bavinck, pp. 52-7, but without paying sufficient attention 
to (1) the organic and (2) Bavinck’s critical appropriation of the Absolute, especially as 
he considers Bavinck’s view to be a theistic ‘monism’ (p. 65). This point becomes clearer 
throughout this chapter.  
12 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 56.  
13 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 56.  
14 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 56-7.  
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 Bavinck’s reasoning rests on the distinction between ‘psychology’ and ‘logic’. 
Psychology, in Bavinck’s pre-Freudian usage, is the study of the processes and faculties 
involved in the functioning of consciousness and the acts of cognition. It observes the 
phenomena and the workings internal to the human subject. Logic, on the other hand, 
has to do with deductions, inferences, and epistemology – it draws conclusions from 
premises and is as such a normative discipline meant to distinguish between valid and 
invalid forms of reasoning. Logic apprehends reality. Idealism, Bavinck charges, 
conflates the two. While the idealist correctly observes the findings of psychology, it 
wrongly identifies those workings with an epistemological process – its mistake lies in 
conflating mental representations with the only immanent object the subject encounters 
in perception, rather than seeing that those representations lead subjects to an external 
object – an object independent of finite minds. As a result, the idealist inevitably shuts 
the mind up ‘in the circle of representations’, locking it inside a ‘self-constructed 
prison.’15  
 These remarks bear great consistency with Bavinck’s objections against idealism 
found in his Prolegomena, specifically that (1) idealism wrongly identifies a representation 
with the thing it represents, and (2) that it wrongly places the ‘intellect’ as the source of 
knowledge rather than the organ of knowledge. So, ‘if the thing and the representation 
of it are nevertheless equated with each other, idealism must lead to absolute 
illusionism.’16 The ‘intellect [het intellect] is an instrument, not a source. Idealism equates 
the organ of knowledge with the source of knowledge’.17 In these ways, idealism is 
inferior to realism, in Bavinck’s judgment, specifically because idealists miss that the 
‘distinguishing mark’ of representations is precisely that they are about something else – 
																																																						
15 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 59. This links well with Beiser’s comment 
concerning what unites the various idealist traditions: ‘[W]hat makes them belong to a 
single tradition – is their similar approach to some common philosophical problems. 
Since Kant, philosophers had become pre-occupied with two distinct but closely related 
issues: how to explain the possibility of knowledge and how to account for the reality of 
the external world… To explain the possibility of knowledge requires demonstrating 
that there is some kind of identity between subject and object; for if the subject and 
object are completely distinct from one another, they will not be able to interact or 
correspond with one another to produce knowledge.’ German Idealism: The Struggle 
Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 13. 
Emphasis original.  
16 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 217.  
17 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 217; GD, 1: p. 217.  On this page Bavinck lists Spinoza, 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, among others, as the interlocutors in mind.  
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they point beyond themselves, representing ‘that reality ideally’. As such, idealism denies 
the ‘representative character’ of representations.18 Realism, by contrast, argues that the 
world is ‘in an ideal sense, given in the representation itself.’ Hence, with the ‘idealist’ he 
affirms that ideas or representations are constitutively involved in knowing, but with the 
realist he asserts that the objects are ‘given’ in representations.19 
In the Philosophy of Revelation, Bavinck does not identify the ‘intellect’ as the organ 
of knowledge, but rather the ‘consciousness’ and an agent’s ‘subjective perception.’ He 
wrote:  
 
in other words, no one can know reality except through his consciousness 
[bewustzijn], since it is obviously impossible to know without knowing. 
Perception on the part of the subject renders a double service; it is at once the 
condition and the instrument of the perception of the object. None the less 
there is a great difference between the view that subjective perception [subjective 
waarneming] is the means and organ, and the other view that it is the principle and 
source of the knowledge of the object.’20 
 
This may be due to a development in Bavinck’s philosophy concerning the all-
encompassing role that consciousness (and self-consciousness) plays in one’s being and 
thinking.  But materially, one should note, there is much overlap in Bavinck’s critique of 
idealism on this point between the Prolegomena and the Philosophy of Revelation. This is 
further confirmed when the reader revisits Bavinck’s discussion of faith and the 
introduction of the role of consciousness in the later section of the Prolegomena: ‘All 
knowledge comes from without. But on the human side all that knowledge is mediated 
by their consciousness. Not feeling or heart but the mind, consciousness as a whole 
(perception, awareness, observation, intellect, reason, conscience) is the subjective organ 
of truth.’21 
Returning to the argument in the Philosophy of Revelation, Bavinck again reasserts 




18 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 223.  
19 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 223-4.  
20 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 56; Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, p. 47.  
21 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 565.  
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Epistemology… teaches the very opposite of what idealism asserts. The 
perceptive and cognitive activity of man is only in a psychological, and not in a 
logical, sense, a purely immanent act of the mind. Both perception and 
representation would cease to be what they are if nothing existed that was 
perceived and represented. On both the character of logical transcendence is 
indelibly impressed; by their very nature they point to an objective reality, 
detached from which they would become equivalent to hallucinations and 
illusions.22  
 
 Bavinck discerns that this fundamental error is what mitigates idealism from the 
ability truly to affirm an objective epistemology, and it manifests itself in two concrete 
ways. The first, in Bavinck’s view, is the application of ‘the principle of causality’ such 
that representations are considered as ‘effects’ that are caused by external objects. This 
idealist move seeks to ascertain the existence of the external world through a causal 
inference from internal representations.23 The second move argues that it is by an act of 
freedom, rather than an act of inference, that external reality can be affirmed. Bavinck 
rejects both of these moves, and his reasoning is as follows:  
 
We find that neither of the two methods leads to the goal contemplated. For 
previously to all reasoning about representation and will, all men, the unlearned 
as the learned, and even children and indeed animals, are convinced of the 
reality of an objective world. Not even the thinker, who by scientific reflection 
has reached the position of idealism, can divest himself of this reality.24 
 
 The objection here, it seems, consists in the observation that objective reality is 
never a conclusion to an argument or the product of our conscious willing. Idealism 
neglects to appreciate the constancy and immediacy with which creatures perceive – and 
indeed, take for granted – the reality of the external world. Seeking to produce an 
argument or a chain of reasoning to grasp reality is really to assume falsely that such a 
process was needed. Here, the commonsense connotations are obvious, but instead of 
appealing to Reid, it is Eduard von Hartmann who is invoked. Bavinck argues that von 
Hartmann concedes,  
 
[T]hat without this belief it is impossible for man to live. “Without this faith in 
the reality and continuity of what we perceive,” says he, “we should be unable to 
																																																						
22 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 71.  
23 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 57.  
24 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 58.  
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live for a moment, and hence this naively-realistic faith, coalescing with the 
perception itself, by way of an intuition, into an indivisible act, forms an 
indispensable, practically inalienable ingredient of our mental equipment.”25  
 
Like von Hartmann, Bavinck generally accepts a characteristic of naïve realism 
in placing a premium on the everyday beliefs that rational subjects ordinarily take for 
granted: ‘practically we all draw a distinction between the waking and dreaming states, 
between the representation of reality and hallucination.’26 What is clear here, is that 
though Bavinck and von Hartmann reject that objects can be immediately or directly 
perceived apart from the mediation of mental representations, both are congenial to the 
commonsense thesis that ordinary individuals are within their epistemic rights to assume 
the accessibility and existence of the external world. Philosophical or metaphysical 
argumentation should protect this belief, rather than render it susceptible to doubt in 
order to see whether that belief could be held as a conclusion to an argument. In other 
words, Bavinck and von Hartmann affirm the temporal or logical immediacy of knowledge 
of the external world while also maintaining a mediated access view of how one perceives 
the world.  
 Accordingly, for Bavinck, ‘the human mind must by its very nature be under the 
necessity of connecting its representations with reality, in which case the procedure can 
neither be unconscious nor consist of an act of syllogistic reasoning.’27 The idealist 
cannot ignore that he is as much a human being as the ordinary non-philosopher. Both 
experience the daily conviction, ‘antecedent to all reasoning’, that the external world 
																																																						
25 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 58. Bavinck is quoting Eduard von Hartmann, 
Kristische Wanderungen durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart (Leipzig: Friedrich, 1890), p. 190. 
The kind of ‘idealism’ Bavinck is critiquing, it seems, is subjective idealism (rather than 
absolute or objective idealism), as Bavinck’s idealist seeks to apprehend reality by way of 
the subject and her ideas as the starting point. This is further confirmed when Fichte’s 
concession is brought into Bavinck’s discussion: ‘Even Fichte felt compelled, chiefly by 
moral considerations, not to regard himself as the only existence being. Every man 
knows that he does not exist alone, that he is not able to do what he pleases, that on 
every side he is curbed and hedged in, and encounters resistance.’ Philosophy of Revelation, 
p. 66.  
26 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 58. Cf. Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophy of the 
Unconscious, I: pp. 9-12.  
27 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 59. This is tethered to Bavinck’s 
understanding that God reveals himself, our selves, and the world, immediately in one’s 
consciousness, prior to thinking and reasoning, below.  
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surrounds them – a conviction ‘indispensable for knowledge and activity.’28 Indeed 
though there is an ‘irremovable distinction, between the representation and the thing of 
which it is a representation’,29 Bavinck writes, it is nonetheless ‘in and through’ these 
representations that one perceives ‘the things themselves.’30 
 Though I will make clear that Bavinck’s understanding of how representations 
immediately communicate reality is pre-cognitive below, it seems undeniable that, 
materially speaking, Bavinck advocates for something like Wolterstorff’s retrieval of a 
Reidian belief disposition – human beings are hard-wired to hold beliefs that are triggered 
by ordinary circumstances. Humans find themselves immediately believing in the 
external physical world, that their memory beliefs are reliable, and that their perceptual 
states refer to external things quite unproblematically. These beliefs are acquired not by 
way of conscious reasoning or argumentation, but rather by the make-up of the way we 
are. We can take much of what we believe for granted, and are epistemically no worse 
for doing so.31  
One explicit way in which Bavinck is sympathetic to these commonsense theses 
is his appeal to G.E. Moore’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ as he argues that ‘in 
consciousness our own being, and the being of the world, are disclosed to us 
antecedently to our thought or volition; that is, they are revealed to us in the strictest 
sense of the word.’32 Though Bavinck does not cite a particular line in Moore’s article, 
																																																						
28 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 67.  
29 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 61 
30 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 60.  
31 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Can Belief in God Be Rational if it Has No 
Foundations?’ in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, Alvin Plantinga and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 
149.  
32 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 75. Emphasis original. The reference to 
Moore is in a note that follows this line, to G. E. Moore, ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, 
Mind (1903): pp. 433-53. Bavinck’s appeal to Moore, it seems, is not uncritical, as 
Bavinck also notes a response by the idealist, C.A. Strong, against Moore: C. A. Strong, 
‘Has Mr. Moore Refuted Idealism?’, Mind (1905), pp. 174-89. An explicit point of 
tension between Bavinck and Moore is the latter’s rejection of the thesis that mental 
images exist at all, and thus Moore believes that the idea of a correspondence between 
mental images and external objects dissolves entirely: ‘What reason have we for 
supposing that there are things outside the mind corresponding to things inside it? What I 
wish to point out is (1) that we have no reason for supposing that there are such things 
as mental images at all – for supposing that blue is part of the content of the sensation 
of blue’, and later he rejects that ‘Vorstellungen’ refer to subjective experience and 
relations within the mind. ‘Refutation of Idealism’, pp. 449, 453, respectively. Emphasis 
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passages that resonate clearly with Bavinck’s concerns can be easily found. The 
argument that idealists fail to extricate subjects from the ‘circle’ of ideas can be found in 
Moore. ‘There is, therefore, no question of how we are to “get outside the circle of our 
own ideas and sensations’, Moore reasoned, for to perceive sensations is ‘already to be 
outside that circle.’33 Like Moore, then, Bavinck thought that to begin at the level of a 
purely subjective consciousness in an attempt to erect a bridge toward the outside 
world, whether by way of a mental inference or a free volitional act, is to inaugurate an 
unnecessary process. One must treat subject and object in equipoise.  
 Nonetheless, as one attends to the argumentation of the Philosophy of Revelation 
thus far, Eduard von Hartmann is invoked more explicitly, especially as both Bavinck 
and von Hartmann – unlike Reid or Wolterstorff – accept the role of representations as 
mediators through which rational subjects perceive the world. Although Bavinck does 
not cite a particular reference in von Hartmann concerning the contact of the external 
world through the mental representations assumed by all human beings ordinarily, many 
passages in von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious can be reproduced to showcase 
his view. In this following passage, for example, Bavinck’s reasoning concerning the 
mistaken application of the ‘principle of causality’ by Idealism and his priority on the 
beliefs of the non-philosopher seems to be a material replication of von Hartmann’s 
reasoning:  
 
The Unconscious, must lend a helping hand in order to fulfill the purpose of 
perception, the cognition of the external world. Accordingly, the animal and 
child instinctively projects its sense-perceptions as objects outside itself; and, 
accordingly, to this day, every uninstructed human being thinks he perceives the 
things themselves, because his perceptions, with the determination of 
externality, instinctively becomes objects to him. Thus only is it possible that the 
world of objects stands there ready for any being, without the idea of the subject 
occurring to it, whilst in conscious thought subject and object must necessarily 
spring simultaneously from the ideational process [vorstellungsprocesse herausspringen 
mussen]. It is, therefore, wrong to posit the concept of causality as mediator for a 
conscious segregation of the object, for objects are there long before the causal 
																																																																																																																																																										
original. On Reid’s influence on Moore, see John Greco, ‘How to Reid Moore’, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): pp. 544-63.  
33 Moore, ‘Refutation of Idealism’, p. 451. Emphasis original. Bavinck’s argument 
in pages 74-5 concerning the inseparability between primary and secondary qualities can 
also be found in Moore’s article.  
	 178 
concept has arisen; and even were this not the case, yet, even then, the subject 
must be simultaneously gained with the object.34  
 
 The objects are present to subjects ‘long before’ the principle of causality is even 
considered, and thus both subject and object should be treated ‘simultaneously’ in the 
process of representation. Bavinck seems to be applying von Hartmann’s critique of 
Idealism directly. Later, von Hartmann again affirms that the subject and object should 
treated as a pair, and that the philosopher’s task as such should not undermine the 
intuitions of the ‘natural man’:  
 
For it lies in the conceptions themselves that subject and object require each 
other as correlatives; but this correlation is patent only to the consciousness of 
the philosopher, not to the unreflecting feeling of the natural man, and therefore 
to the latter in the intuitive apprehension of the concrete object the relation of 
the concept of the object to the concept of the subject, and especially the latter 
remains unconscious.35 
 
 Bavinck’s appreciation for  von Hartmann should not eclipse the critical 
differences between the two. Bavinck is highly critical of von Hartmann’s engulfment of 
the individual consciousness into the Absolute Unconscious.  For von Hartmann, the 
Unconscious does not merely lend a ‘helping hand’ to the problem of perception – it is 
an absolute monistic principle in which all individuals are engulfed. The finite 
consciousness is but an instantiation of its activity. In his words, ‘all unconscious 
operations spring from one same subject, which has only its phenomenal revelation in the 
several individuals, so that “the Unconscious” signifies this One Absolute subject.’36 
With respect to the problem of perception specifically, von Hartmann wrote, ‘[t]he 
world consists only of a sum of activities or will-acts of the Unconscious, and the ego 
consists of another sum of activities or will-acts of the Unconscious. Only so far as the 
former activities intersect the latter does the world become sensible to me; only so far as 
the latter intersect the former do I become sensible to myself.’37 In his strategy to prove 
																																																						
34 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, I: pp. 350-1; Philosophie des 
Unbewussten, I. p. 303. Emphases original. Cf. Bavinck, BNVH, pp. 11-2.  
35 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, II: p. 79. Cf. Bavinck, BNVH, pp. 
15-7.  
36 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, I: p. 5. Emphasis original  
37 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, II: p. 242. Emphasis original.  
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‘‘the essential likeness of Mind and Matter’, he conceived of an Absolute Unconscious in 
which both subject and object participate.38  
 Bavinck appreciates von Hartmann’s point that ‘there is no other way of doing 
justice to both subject and object’ except that one affirms a rational ‘divine wisdom’ 
which undergirds the structural integrity of both.39 Yet in Bavinck’s judgment, von 
Hartmann erred in subsuming all things under a single Unconscious principle. If the 
perception of the external world is ‘as Von Hartmann actually represents 
it…accomplished in us by the great Unconscious, in which case it is no conclusion of 
ours’, Bavinck reasoned, then it follows that ‘all self-activity of man in thinking and 
acting disappears.’40 Bavinck charges von Hartmann for failing to appreciate the 
constitutive individuality of the human person and rejects the implicitly pantheistic 
assumptions in monistic philosophy. To identify the divine being with the world and 
with human individuals is to reduce diversity into uniformity, and to confuse the 
Creator for the creature. ‘What monism seeks in the wrong direction, and cannot attain 
unto, has been reached, viz., the unity which does not exclude but includes the 
multiformity’.41  
 Clearly, then, though Bavinck drew many of the same logical moves and 
conceptual grammar from von Hartmann, Bavinck rejected the system underlying them. 
Von Hartmann’s monism was seeking the answers to the right questions but in the 
wrong direction – answers that, in Bavinck’s view, are resident in Christian theism. 
																																																						
38 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, II: p. 81. Von Hartmann’s strategy 
finds material resemblance in John McDowell’s recent attempt to offer a reading of 
Kant and Hegel according to which knowledge of reality hinges on the existence of 
conceptual conditions that characterize both the act of knowing and the objects 
themselves. See, John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and 
Sellars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 69-89.  
39 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 80.  
40 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 59. Bavinck does not provide a citation here 
to von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious, but it is certainly the text in view. It is 
also worth noting that von Hartmann assigns to the (unconscious) will a rather 
significant role in the acts of cognition: ‘[H]ere we must contemplate the origin of the 
conscious idea [vorstellung] as brought about by unconscious mental reactions 
[Geistesreactionen]. There the (unconscious) will, directly influencing the molecule, was to 
be conceived united with unconscious representation [vorstellung]; here we must suppose, 
for the sake of coming to pass of the sensation, an unconscious will conceived as an 
essential factor…. A union of unconscious will and unconscious idea [vorstellung] always 
takes place.’ Philosophy of the Unconscious, II: p. 86; Philosophie des Unbewussten, II: p. 36. 
Emphases original.  
41 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 80.  
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Bavinck says this in no uncertain terms: ‘The only possible way of demonstrating this is 
by briefly inquiring how we approach reality in what way we discover its content. From 
this it will appear that neither materialism nor humanism, but only theism, that neither 
emanation nor evolution, but revelation alone, is capable of solving the problem.’42 
Here, then, Bavinck is not satisfied with leaving the connection between subject and 
object and one’s purchase of reality to the workings of commonsense. Bavinck reaches 
underneath it and sees a theological account of why perception and the gap between 
representations and reality do not pose a philosophical conundrum.43 An appeal to the 
behavior of the common human being in taking the epistemic access to reality for 
granted does not negate that this is indeed nonetheless a problem to be solved by an 
appeal to revelation.  
The next section considers how Bavinck does this, and in so doing his use of 
von Hartmann and re-interpretation of certain key modern motifs will be further 
elucidated.  
 
II. Overcoming the Gap: The Absolute, Revelation, and the Organic 
 
 Bavinck’s proposed solution is thus to deploy the resources located in the 
theological particularity of the Christian faith. Christianity includes ‘such a harmonious 
whole of representations, which reconcile subject and object, man and world, nature 
and revelation.’44 
																																																						
42 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 55.   
43 In this regard, Bavinck’s comments may reminder the reader of the inclinations 
of Kuyper. As George Marsden notes concerning Kuyper’s appeal to God and his 
works in order to account for perception: ‘The common-sense starting point in the 
assumption of a harmonious correspondence between our subjective perceptions and 
objective reality, however necessary it is for us to rely on it, dies of a thousand such 
qualifications unless it has some other supposition to support it [namely, God].’ George 
Marsden, ‘The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia’, in Alvin Plantinga and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 250. In Kuyper’s own words: We ‘in our 
University resist tooth and nail that wanton rejection of certainty and, honor religious 
belief as a foundation also for science and scholarship, use our common sense and hold 
fast to man’s immediate knowing of the basic elements of all being and all thought’. 
Scholarship: Two Convocation Addresses on University Life, Harry van Dyke (trans.), (Grand 
Rapids, Christian’s Library Press, 2014), p. 33.  
44 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 240. Elsewhere, he makes a similar point: ‘The 
center of Christianity is the incarnation of the Word, and therein, the reconciliation of 
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This section presents his arguments to overcome the subject-object gap in the Philosophy 
of Revelation by an appeal to a Christian re-interpretation of the Absolute and to the 
divine decree. Here, I argue that Bavinck’s proposal involves appreciating the (von 
Hartmannian) absolute idealist insight that subject and object come from a single source 
and participate in the same reality, though unlike absolute idealism, Bavinck conceives 
of subject and object as participating in a reality distinct from and created by the (true) 
Absolute, personal, God. The next section explores how Bavinck appeals more 
explicitly to an organic worldview to connect subject and object, particularly in 
Christelijke wereldbeschouwing and the Dogmatics. Specifically, subject and object correspond 
because they both come from the same divine wisdom, who forms creation as an 
organism. Thus, there is great material complementarity between Bavinck’s argument in 
the Philosophy of Revelation and the organic motif as found in the rest of his oeuvre. In this 
section some motifs important for subsequent chapters also emerges, including that (1) 
Bavinck conceives revelation as pre-cognitive (as something prior to thinking and 
reasoning), and (2) Bavinck argues that contact with the world, self, and God are 
primordial facts of our existence  
 
a. Philosophy of Revelation  
 
 Recall above Bavinck’s argument that in consciousness one’s self and world are 
somehow ‘revealed’ prior to all reasoning. The use of that verb provokes certain 
questions: what accounts for this immediate ‘revealing’ into our consciousness? Who, or 
what, is the agent who performs the action referred to in the verb? There is thus ‘more’ 
behind this phenomenon into which reflective agents may rightly probe in their ‘self-
consciousness’.45 For confidence to be maintained in the ‘testimony of our self-
consciousness’, Bavinck wrote, ‘a true unity’ is required, a unity that ‘Idealism has felt’ in 
																																																																																																																																																										
God and man, of spirit and matter, of content and form, of ideal and reality, of soul and 
body, of thought and language, and of word and gesture.’ De Welsprekenheid (Kampen: 
Zalsman: 1889), p. 33. Dutch original: ‘Want middelpunt des Christendoms is de 
vleeschwording des Woords, en daarin de verzoening van God en mensch, van geest en 
stof, van inhoud en vorm, van ideaal en werkelijkheid, van ziel en lichaam, van gedachte 
en taal, van woord en gebaar.’ 
 
45 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 75.  
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some significant way.46 Bavinck argued that the idealists were led by this inclination to 
probe behind what agents take for granted, to account for the unity of experience and 
to account for the ‘possibility of objective knowledge’. Consequently,  they were forced 
to seek ‘some way or other in the absolute the ground for the objectivity and the reality 
of our knowledge.’47 After briefly surveying other idealists, from Malebranche to the 
Marburg school, Bavinck further notes that Eduard von Hartmann was one who 
thought that some ‘absolute substance’ is ‘the only true being’ in which all things 
participate as accidents.48  
 It was the absolute – conceived of in differing forms – that served to re-
establish some connection between thought and being, subject and object. Bavinck 
agrees with this recovery of an absolute, but does not see it as supplying an adequate 
answer.49 He elaborated on the reason why in this way:  
 
Hence the absolute cannot be conceived as an unconscious and involuntary force. No doubt 
from time to time the deity has been so conceived by a few “intellectuals,” but 
pantheism has never been the creed of any people, the confession of any 
church. Men have, it is true, often broken up, along with the unity of the world 
and the unity of the human race, the unity of God also; but the personality of 
God has remained firmly established, always and everywhere, among every 
nation and in every religion. Just as confidently as man is convinced of his self-
consciousness of his own existence and of the reality of the external world, does 
he believe also in the reality and personality of God.50 
 
 Several things are worth noting in this passage. First, von Hartmann’s 
‘Unconscious’ absolute is certainly a target of Bavinck’s polemics here. In his view, the 
Unconscious is a ‘golden mean’ between Theism and the naturalistic ‘renunciation’ of 
final causes.51 The activity of the unconscious animates all things and is operative in all 
																																																						
46 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 75.  
47 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 75.  
48 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 75.  
49 ‘Although the attempt to recover after this fashion [namely, in seeking unity in 
the absolute] the lost unity of thought and being deserves appreciation, it is impossible 
to regard it as the true solution of the problem.’ Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 76.  
50 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 77. Emphasis mine. For Bavinck, 
consciousness refers to the phenomena internal in the psyche of humanity, and self-
consciousness is the consciousness directed at the self.  
51 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, II. p. 246. On page 271 Von 
Hartmann declares that the Unconscious is also the mean between ‘theistic dogmatism’ and 
an ‘irreligious atheistic naturalism’; hence his philosophy can rightly be called ‘spiritualistic 
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objects, mental and non-mental alike.52 For von Hartmann, ascribing consciousness to 
the Absolute is inappropriate for several reasons. For example, it renders theists 
susceptible to the charge that a conscious being independent of the world is the cause of 
the negative consequences of creatures with free will and ‘world-misery’.53 A conceptual 
benefit of denying consciousness to the absolute is the provision of a purportedly 
unproblematic explanation to the misery encountered in the world, for then the 
Absolute is indifferent to the being or non-being of existence.  
 As such, von Hartmann’s monism not only denies conscious personality to 
God, but also rejects the principle of ‘dualism’ in Theism, according to which the world 
and God denote two ontologically distinct entities.54 Denying consciousness to the 
absolute preserves the virtues resident in theism whilst eluding the philosophical 
problems normally charged against it.  
 Bavinck overturns these two claims by arguing that (1) personality is intrinsic to 
God, and (2) subject and object are part of a single creation reflective of divine wisdom. 
This is the case because creation is the product of the free, intelligible decree ordained 
by God, implying that the world and God are two distinct entities, and that the former 
is created freely (and consciously) by the latter. 
To argue for (1), Bavinck returns to an earlier point: that in consciousness, our 
existence is revealed to us in a pre-cognitive, primordial way. His reasoning here is 
complex, but can be summarized briefly as follows. In consciousness the existence of 
the self and the world are revealed prior to thinking, cognizing, willing, or reasoning. In 
other words, for Bavinck knowledge of the self and world somehow come prior to the 
active use of our cognition in acts of inference or the formation of predication. This is a 
primordial knowledge, something even prior to the formation of representations.55 He is 
																																																																																																																																																										
Monism or Pantheism.’ Emphases original. On a piece of loose paper, Bavinck mapped a 
taxonomy on different kinds of ‘unconscious’ [Het Onbewuste] philosophies. After 
describing subliminal and occultist forms of the unconscious, there is the category of 
the ‘Metaphysical Unconscious’ [Het metaphysiche-onbewuste], under which Bavinck located 
Von Hartmann’s name. This seems accurate.  The piece of paper can be found in the 
Bavinck archives at Historisch Documentatiecentrum voor het Nederlands Protestantisme (1800-
heden). the Free University of Amsterdam library, inventory number 413.  
52 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, II: pp. 247, 264.  
53 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, II: p. 273.  
54 Von Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, II: p. 266.  
55 In this section I have chosen words like pre-cognitive or pre-predicative (prior 
to thinking and reasoning) rather than pre-propositional in order to leave open the issue 
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not satisfied to leave it merely as a bare phenomenon to be accepted. Rather, he 
ultimately argues that the testimony of consciousness is dependable precisely because it 
manifests the act of God, who independently of us, reveals to us our selves and the 
world. In making this move, Bavinck could then argue that we also know God, as a 
personal Absolute, in self-consciousness primordially. Bavinck characterizes this as a 
‘reality that is immediately [onmiddelijk] given us, antecedently to all reasoning and 
inference.’56 Von Hartmann, in excising personality and consciousness from God, 
therefore, fails to take seriously the testimony of one’s self-consciousness, in effect 
shutting himself off from the clarity of God’s (general) revelation.  
 In consciousness the human being feels that the self is a united being in contact 
with the external world.57 Kant, argued Bavinck, kept perception and the world rightly 
distinct but connected, in that the ‘world of perception is given to us in our 
consciousness, not as dream or hallucination, but as phenomenon and representation, 
involving, according to universal belief, the existence of an objective world.’58 This 
intuitive, pre-cognitive (and thus pre-predicative) certainty that obtains ‘before all 
thinking’ and ‘reasoning’ includes our knowledge that we exist in a specific ‘mode’59; a 
mode in which we exist as creatures in the world.60 Likewise this certainty, or feeling, 
																																																																																																																																																										
of whether knowledge is necessarily propositional. The terms I have chosen have the 
conceptual merit of being closer to Bavinck’s own words, and are more modest in 
character; they simply affirm that for Bavinck knowledge is possible prior to the ability 
to articulate what one knows, prior to cognizing it. 
56 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 61; Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, p. 51. Emphasis 
mine.  
57 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 66-8. Bavinck’s reasoning is a retrieval of the 
philosophical grammar of Schleiermacher. On this point, see Cory Brock and Nathaniel 
Gray Sutanto, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Eclecticism: On Catholicity, 
Consciousness, and Theological Epistemology’, Scottish Journal of Theology 70 (2017): pp. 
310-32.  
58 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 68.  
59 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 66. 
60 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 67. The passage marks a development of 
Bavinck’s thinking in RD: 2, pp. 72-4. This is not unlike James K.A. Smith’s account of 
anthropology that retrieves some Heideggerian insights according to which humans are 
fundamentally embodied creatures that ‘take in’ the world precognitively and pre-
predicatively: ‘There is a precognitive perception that is to be distinguished from 
perception proper – that is, from perception as being cognizant of and attentive to an 
“object” in front of me.’ Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2013), p. 18.  
	 185 
provides that which bridges the gulf between ‘the reality and the representation 
[werkelijkheid en de voorstelling]’.61  
There is thus a correlation between the immediate pre-cognitive certainty with 
which we know our selves, and with which we know the world, ‘for the representation 
is connected with reality by the same inner tie that binds self-consciousness to the self.’62 
Bavinck then posits that these facts are manifestations of God’s revelatory act in and 
outside of us, independent of our action. In doing so, Bavinck is explicitly reconceiving 
the traditional category of general revelation under the philosophical grammar of 
Schleiermacher; we feel ourselves ‘dependent’, for, ‘independently of our co-operation’ 
the world and our egos are ‘revealed’ to us.63 Indeed, a few pages before this, Bavinck 
asserts that at every point we ‘feel [voelen] ourselves dependent on everything around us; 
we are not alone.’64 In another place, he would ask rhetorically: ‘Do we not feel [voelen] 
with the whole of creation? Are we not connected to all things?’65 
																																																						
61 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 68; Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, p. 57.  
62 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 68.  
63 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 69. Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian 
Faith: A New Translation and Critical Edition, Catherine L. Kelsey, Terrence N. Tice (eds.)  
Terrence N. Tice, Catherine L. Kelsey, Edwina Lawler, (trans.) (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2016), §4. 2.  
In Beginselen der Psychologie, pages 53-4, Bavinck summarizes Schleiermacher 
consistently: ‘Schleiermacher… defined feeling as the immediate self-consciousness, 
wherein the subject, before all thinking and willing himself, becomes conscious of his 
own being and thereupon simultaneously his absolute dependence on God’. Dutch 
original: ‘Schleiermacher… omschreef het gevoel als het onmiddellijke zelfbewustzijn, 
waarin de mensch vóór alle denken en willen zichzelf, zijn eigen zijn, en daarin tegelijk 
zijne volstrekte afhankelijkheid van God bewust wordt.’ Cf. Schleiermacher, Christian 
Faith, §3. 2.  
64 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 66; Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, p. 55. Matheson 
Russell provides a nice summary in capsule form on Schleiermacher (and Heidegger’s) 
view: ‘The religious intuition, therefore, is to Schleiermacher what aesthetic intuition 
was to Schelling: that mode of conscious awareness which uncovers the self and world 
as a whole, prior to its dichotomized interpretation under the categories of freedom and 
causality; that interpretive intuition which perceives the bonds between ourselves and 
the world, which perceives the significance of all things and thus motivates and orients 
our thought and our action. At the heart of religion then, for Schleiermacher, is not a 
faculty of knowledge, but an originary, affective, intuitive, synoptic comportment 
toward the world and the self – something very similar to what Heidegger would later 
describe in Being and Time as a “fundamental disposedness” (Grundbefindlichkeit).’ 
Matheson Russell, ‘Phenomenology and Theology: Situating Heidegger’s Philosophy of 
Religion’, Sophia 50 (2011): p. 650.   
65 Bavinck, De Welsprekenheid, p. 8. Dutch original: ‘Voelen wij niet met de gansche 
schepping mee? Zijn we niet aan alle dingen verwant?’ Paul Vissers also notes 
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Bavinck’s understanding of revelation’s locus in that primordial and pre-
cognitive certainty66 characteristic of the phenomena in one’s consciousness allows 
Bavinck to posit that God, and his personality, are included within the number of things 
that are immediately revealed. Elaborating on his point, noted above, concerning the 
immediacy with which humanity comes to know God in self-consciousness, Bavinck 
wrote this:  
 
This belief [in God] is interwoven with his self-consciousness, more particularly 
with its double testimony to dependence and freedom… The sense of 
dependence is the core of self-consciousness and the essence of religion, but it is 
not a mere de facto dependence, as the unconscious and the irrational creation is 
dependent on God; in man it is sense of dependence…67 
 
 Bavinck’s description of knowledge of the world and God as ‘immediately’ 
revealed in self-consciousness should not be misunderstood to be identical to the claim 
that creaturely knowledge of God is an unmediated knowledge of God’s essence in 
himself. In the Dogmatics, Bavinck is emphatic about the claim that ‘[s]upernatural 
revelation may not, however, be equated with immediate [onmiddelijke] revelation’.68 
There is an ambiguity with regard to the word ‘immediate’ (onmiddelijk) here that needs 
to be disentangled. By using this word, Bavinck is arguing in the Stone lectures that 
revelation comes antecedent to all thinking, reasoning, or cognition – it is a revelation 
from God in consciousness that comes prior to, and becomes the basis of, our 
reasoning about the external world and God.69 It is immediate, therefore, in the sense 
																																																																																																																																																										
Schleiermacher’s formative influence on Bavinck’s missiologist nephew, J. H. Bavinck: 
‘Introduction’, in The J. H. Bavinck Reader, John Bolt, James Bratt, Paul Vissers (eds.), 
James De Jong (trans.) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), p. 34.  
66 It is hard to capture the specificity of Bavinck’s sense here. Other words that 
may be serviceable include awareness, feeling (not as an emotion, but as pre-predicative 
contact), or attunement.  
67 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 77-8. Recall the oft-quoted statement in the 
opening chapter of the Philosophy of Revelation I noted earlier in this monograph: 
‘revelation is the presupposition, the foundation, the secret of all that exists in all its 
forms. The deeper science pushes its investigation, the more clearly will it discover that 
revelation underlies all created being’, p. 27.  
68 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 309. GD, 1: p. 319.  
69 ‘To ignore this fact of self-consciousness, this primary fact, this foundation of 
all knowledge and activity… [is] not merely a logical but also an ethical sin’. Philosophy of 
Revelation, p. 62.  Recall also Bavinck’s remark that ‘in consciousness our own being, and 
the being of the world, are disclosed to us antecedently to our thought or volition; that 
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that it is not mediated by the subject’s active use of his rational faculties. However, its 
still a revelation from God in the locus of consciousness and in this sense always 
presupposes that principle that revelation comes from an external divine source, located 
in some creaturely media (consciousness), and the distinction between archetypal and 
ectypal knowledge. Bavinck affirms that revelation is not mediated by creaturely 
reasoning on the one hand but that it is still a mediate knowledge of God precisely 
because ‘the distance between the Creator and creature is much too great to perceive 
God directly’.70 The revelation in consciousness is thus unmediated with respect to 
creaturely reason, but does not entail a direct (and in that sense, immediate) knowledge 
of God’s essence. Bavinck’s point here connects with his claim that revelation is organic 
in character, and as it is located internally in the human consciousness its tethering to 
God’s creation is preserved organically: ‘in cases where he revealed himself internally in 
the human consciousness by his Spirit, this revelation always occurs organically and 
hence mediately’.71  
Furthermore, this revelation antecedent to all reasoning is not an innate idea as 
it presupposes the free will of God in revealing himself and as it therefore assumes that 
revelation comes from the outside.72 The testimony of self-consciousness in connecting 
one, as dependent, to the self, world, and God, are to be heeded for it is due to that 
																																																																																																																																																										
is, they are revealed to us in the strictest sense of the word’. Philosophy of Revelation, p. 75. 
Bavinck connects this with general revelation, as will be seen below. 
70 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 310. That this is Bavinck’s point is made even clearer as he 
considers whether creatures know God directly in the eschaton after this passage.  
71 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 309.  
72 Bavinck rejects the concept of innate ideas because it is aligned with the 
procedural mistake of idealism, elaborated at length above, which seeks to infer the 
epistemological accessibility of external reality from a mental idea: ‘This does not mean 
that our knowing follows the same course and has to be identical with the order of 
being, that we must first of all know God from and through his idea within us and only 
then come to know the world.’ RD, 2: p. 69. Rather, Bavinck’s claims in the Stone 
lectures connect with what he says about God’s revelation that precedes all of our 
knowledge: ‘God’s revelation precedes both [innate knowledge and acquired 
knowledge], for God does not leave himself without a witness. With his eternal power 
and deity he exerts revelatory pressure upon humans both from without and from 
within…it is the same complete revelation of God that introduces the knowledge of 
God into our consciousness. But in the case of the innate knowledge of God, that 
revelation acts upon the human consciousness, creating impressions and intuitions 
[indrukken en beseffen]. In the case of the acquired knowledge of God, human beings 
reflect upon that revelation of God.’ RD, 2: pp. 73-4; GD, 2: pp. 51-2. The word besef, 
translated here as ‘intuition’ can be rendered as awareness, understanding, appreciation, 
sense, realization, or idea. See the next chapter for a further discussion on this. 
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divine act that precedes our being and continues to work in and around every individual. 
Here, it is again worth quoting Bavinck at some length as he relates this notion to the 
category of general revelation: 
 
And this is due in the last analysis to the fact that God, the creator of all nature, 
has not left himself without witness, but through all nature, both that of man 
himself and that of the outside world, speaks to him. Not evolution, but 
revelation alone accounts for this impressive and incontrovertible fact of the 
worship of God. In self-consciousness God makes known to us man, the world, 
and himself…Hence this revelation is of the utmost importance… particularly 
for epistemology. All cognition consists in in a peculiar relation of subject and 
object, and is built on the agreement of these two. The reliability of perception 
and thought is not assured unless the forms of thought and the forms of being 
correspond, in virtue of their origin in the same creative wisdom.73  
 
Bavinck’s appeal to consciousness, therefore, is not to posit that God is knowable by 
the mere fact that our consciousness is constituted the way it is. Consciousness as such 
does not reveal God, but it is rather that God, as the free and sovereign divine subject, 
actively reveals himself to creatures in the locus of their consciousness.74 It is because of 
this train of reasoning that Bavinck could assert that ‘testimony of self-consciousness’ 
enters to protest von Hartmann’s view concerning the unconscious character of the 
absolute.75 The starting point of revelation provides Bavinck with the resources to 
affirm the testimony of consciousness concerning the Absolute’s character as a personal 
God, upon whom humanity feels itself absolutely dependent. Thus, though Bavinck 
agrees that the connection between subject and object could be obtained by an appeal 
to an absolute, Bavinck’s absolute stands above and behind reality precisely because the 
two are separated by the act of creation. Bavinck’s appeal to creation and revelation 
recalls Bavinck’s programmatic statement concerning the two-fold character of reality – 
a chasm demarcates the ontological distinction ‘between the Infinite and the finite, 
																																																						
73 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 79. In the passage preceding this quotation, 
Bavinck discusses the naturality with which humanity universally come to believe in 
God as they mature in their social and historical contexts; I take this to mean that 
Bavinck grounds how humanity naturally believes in God in their development on that 
prior act of God’s revelation in consciousness.  
74 Hence, Bavinck may have the resources to evade Barth’s charges against Erich 
Pryzwara’s appeal to one’s consciousness as the means by which creatures know God. 
See Keith L.  Johnson, Karl Barth and the Analogia Entis (London: T&T Clark, 2010), pp. 
87-121.  
75 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 76.  
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between eternity and time, between being and becoming, between the All and the 
nothing’.76 The subject and object do reflect a greater, and higher unity into which they 
are parts, but this higher unity is not the being of God. In short, creation and revelation 
reflect that higher divine wisdom without being identical to it.  
 Creation and revelation both embody that wisdom, Bavinck would later affirm, 
because an intelligible decree is the basis on which both are carried out. This illumines 
the passage alluded to above as Bavinck invokes von Hartmann.  
 
As even von Hartmann admits, there is no other way of doing justice to both 
subject and object except by recognizing that it is one and the same reason 
[Rede] “which is active in consciousness as a principle introducing order into the 
sensations, and in the objective world as the principle of synthesis for the things 
in themselves.” The forms of being, the laws of thought, and – to add this here 
for the sake of completeness – the forms of conduct, have their common source 
in the divine wisdom.77  
 
 An identical power is ordering the phenomena internal to consciousness and the 
features of reality such that the latter is susceptible to the understanding powers of the 
former. Existence has specific forms intelligible to the laws of thought precisely because 
existence and the laws of thought are ordered by a divine wisdom, and are reflective of 
it. Reality is not ‘co-extensive with the phenomena’ but contains the marks of the divine, 
as it is the ‘realization of the decree of God’.78 It is on this theological ‘foundation’ 
[grondslag] that ‘science’ [wetenschap] progresses, and truth is found.79 Reality becomes 
absorbable by consciousness, and truth is in both as much as it transcends them. God 
reveals himself in nature and Scripture, and in so doing makes both the objects of our 
consciousness; ‘knowledge of the truth lies the end of its revelation.’80 
   
																																																						
76 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 30. Recall also Eglinton, ‘To Be or to Become – That is the 
Question: Locating the Actualistic in Bavinck’s Ontology’, pp. 104-24. 
77 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 80; Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, p. 67. The 
capitalized Rede in the original Dutch signifies that Bavinck is not appealing to some 
‘reason’ in support of a conclusion, but rather an absolute, divine being who embodies 
reason. In the endnote (21), Bavinck seems to be citing someone else’s citation of von 
Hartmann in an unspecified text: ‘Ed. von Hartmann, in Willems, op. c., pp. 56-79.’ 
78 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 81.  
79 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 80; Wijsgebeerte der Openbaring, p. 67.  
80 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 82.  
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b. The Organic Motif and the Gap81 
 
In the previous sub-section, Bavinck’s strategy in overcoming the gap between 
subject and object in his Philosophy of Revelation was outlined. There Bavinck appeals to 
the all-encompassing and primordial character of divine revelation and its locus in 
consciousness, the personal Absolute that stands behind subject and object, and 
creation as the unfolding of the decree of that absolute. These three theological claims 
ground Bavinck’s argument that subject and object are parts in a larger creation 
reflective of divine wisdom, and accounts for possibility of the subject’s knowledge of 
the object. In the next section, I shall argue that Bavinck also appeals to the organic 
motif in a similar fashion, and thus that his claims in the Philosophy of Revelation 
complements his deployment of the organic motif to this philosophical question. 
Revisiting the paradigmatic statement culled from Christelijke wereldbeschouwing concerning 
the key role in which the notion of the organic plays in the connection between subjects 
and objects, with the analysis of the Stone lectures in hand, would prove to be 
illuminating, as now the reader sees some obvious threads that tie them together:  
 
It is the same divine wisdom that organically binds the world into a single whole 
that plants in us an urge for a unified worldview. If this is possible, it can only be 
explained from the fact that the world is an organism and thus have first been 
thought of in such a manner. Only then do philosophy and worldview have a right 
and ground of existence, if subject and object also harmonize on this pinnacle of 
knowledge as the reason in us corresponds with the principia over all being and 
knowing. And thus what philosophy demands, according to her essence, is that 
which is guaranteed and explained by the testimony of God in his word. It is the 
same divine wisdom, which gives existence to things and our thoughts objective 
validity, which bestows to objects intelligibility and our mind the capacity of 
thought, who makes objects real and our ideas true. What is intelligible in the objects 
is the context of our intellect. Both, being and knowing, have their rationale in the 
Word, through whom God created all things.82  
																																																						
81 Parts of the following section can be found in a modified form in Brock and 
Sutanto, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Eclecticism’.  
82 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, pp. 32-3. Dutch original: ‘Het is dezelfde 
Goddelijke wijsheid, die de wereld organisch tot één geheel verbindt en in ons den 
drang naar eene “einheitliche” wereldbeschouwing plant. Indien deze mogelijk is, dan 
kan dit alleen daaruit verklaard worden, dat de wereld een organisme is en dus eerst als 
zoodanig is gedacht. Dan alleen heeft philosophie en wereldbeschouwing recht en 
grond van bestaan, als ook op dit hoogtepunt der kennis subject en object 
samenstemmen, als de rede in ons beantwoordt aan de principia van alle zijn en kennen. 
En wat de wijsbegeerte alzoo naar haar wezen eischt, dat wordt ons gewaarborgd en 
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It is appropriate now to comment on this passage in light of the preceding analysis. 
Notice here that Bavinck is subordinating the themes found in the Philosophy of Revelation, 
such as the creation of subject and object by the Creator, the way in which subject and 
object take part in a creation reflective of that divine wisdom, the necessity and unity of 
general and special revelation, and the possibility of knowledge because of those two 
claims, under his understanding of ontology as organic. What is implicit in the Stone 
lectures is thus explicit here: the organic ontology and the unified worldview called for 
by Bavinck are presupposed and further expressed by the claims he expounded in the 
lectures. This should not be surprising, as Bavinck himself argues that the lectures are 
meant to be an elaboration on and thus read along with Christelijke wereldbeschouwing.83 
The organic motif indeed enriches and undergirds the account Bavinck supplies 
above. Here I explicate a fuller picture of the way in which Bavinck deploys it to 
connect subject and object as peppered throughout the Dogmatics. The three themes 
already featured above re-emerge: (1) an organic ontology of creation, (2) the work of 
divine providence, and (3) the on-going revealing activity of the Word as Logos. I shall 
demonstrate as well that Bavinck’s deployment represents a development of a theme 
found in Thomas and the Scholastics and further portray Bavinck as an eclectic and 
Modern thinker.  
 First then, for Bavinck an organic ontology of creation in which all things are 
connected and parts of larger wholes accounts for the consciousness’s perception of 
objects. After a passage in which Bavinck argues that the world does not exist for us 
apart from consciousness, he says this: ‘Human beings are so richly endowed because 
they are linked with the objective world by a great many extremely diverse connections. 
They are related to the whole world. Physically, vegetatively, sensorily, intellectually, 
ethically, and religiously there is correspondence between them and the world; they are 
microcosms.’84 It is in this sense that Bavinck commended Schleiermacher and Hegel 
																																																																																																																																																										
verklaard door het getuigenis Gods in zijn woord. Het is dezelfde Goddelijk wijsheid, 
die aan de dingen existentie en onze gedachte objectieve geldigheid geeft; die aan de 
dingen kenbaarheid en aan ons verstand denkkracht schenkt; die de dingen werkelijk en 
onze denkbeelden waar doet zijn. Het intelligibele in de dingen is de inhoud van ons 
intellect. Beide, het zijn en het kennen, hebben hun ratio in het Woord, waardoor God 
alle dingen schiep.’ Emphases original.  
83 See Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 320, n. 31.  
84 Bavinck, RD, 1:  p. 586.  
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for recovering a reconnection between subject and object earlier in the Prolegomena. They 
overcame the rationalism of the centuries preceding them, and both specified an organ 
within the subject that corresponds with that which the subject knows.85 In both of 
these thinkers, Bavinck argues, ‘[t]hinking and being are most intimately related and 
correspond to each other’.86 The romantic spirit that recognizes the unity between self 
and world is congenial to and rearticulated by Bavinck’s Reformed redefinition of the 
organic.   
 The organic cosmos has implications for epistemology in the same way that it 
does for morality and physicality. Against what Bavinck perceives to be a Pelagian or 
rationalistic Modern tendency to bifurcate facts from value, or morality from nature, an 
organic ontology would parry such attempts. Here he specifically locates the emergence 
of the organic view in the contemporary outlook of his day.  
 
The world by its very design is one organic whole. The two spheres, 
nature…and morality… are most closely interconnected and interpenetrate each 
other at all times. The two, though certainly distinct, are never separated. One 
cannot designate a point in creation where the counsel and governance of God 
and the independent will and action of human beings begin. Especially in this 
century the historic and organic view of things has at every point driven out and 
condemned this Pelagian split.87 
 
I suggest at this point that these comments situate Bavinck’s use of the 
scholastics in the discussion of realism found in the Prolegomena. After making clear that 
a gap exists between mental representations and the things, Bavinck appeals to ancient 
Greek philosophy in its acknowledgment that like can only be known by like, and the 
Scholastics’ affirmation of the distinction between the thing known by the mode of 
cognition, and the mode of the thing known.88 Further, as David Sytsma notes, Thomas 
Aquinas also addressed similar questions concerning whether the contents of the mind 
(and the universals abstracted) do correspond with the reality outside of the mind.89 
Thomas, indeed, argues against the notion that ‘our cognitive faculties know only what 
is experienced within them, for instance, that the senses perceive only the impressions 
																																																						
85 Bavinck, RD, 1: pp. 260, 521. Cf. Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §34. 1.  
86 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 521. 
87 Bavinck, RD, 2:  p. 376. Emphasis mine.  
88 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 227.  
89 Sytsma, ‘Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology,’ p. 29, n. 83.  
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made on their organs.’90 Instead, Thomas asserts that the things we understand ‘are the 
same as the objects of science’, and that the absurd consequence of the above 
bifurcation between impressions and external objects is that we would only know 
appearances.91  
This scholastic dictum’s congeniality with the organic ontology Bavinck 
espouses provides the rationale, I would suggest, for Bavinck’s retrieval of it.92 The 
principle ‘like is known by like’ links with the Thomistic claim that human beings know 
both material and immaterial things because human beings, too, are material and 
immaterial; the active intellect abstracts universals from the sensations that the material 
soul receives in perception. The make-up of human beings as image bearers make them 
uniquely suited to understanding reality; they are the pinnacle of creation without being 
detached from it, and are fundamentally connected to it.93 
 Furthermore, as in the Philosophy of Revelation, Bavinck argues that the sovereign 
divine counsel further ensures the organic interconnectedness of all things, romantically 
characterizing creation as a work of divine art. ‘Just as in any organism all the parts are 
interconnected and reciprocally determine each other, so the world as a whole is a 
																																																						
90 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Michael Cardinal Browne (trans.) (London: 
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1968), I, q. 85, a. 2. Hereafter, ST.  
91 Aquinas, ST, I, q. 85, a. 2. See also ST, 1. Q. 79, 84, which deals specifically with 
the intellect and knowledge of material objects, respectively. For a nice elucidation of 
Thomas on the intellect and the soul in the act of perception, in relation to the claim 
that the human soul exists both subsistently and inherently, see Gyula Kilma, ‘Aquinas 
on the Materiality of the Human Soul and the Immateriality of the Human Intellect’, 
Philosophical Investigations 32 (2009): 163-82.  
92 Sytsma’s analysis in ‘Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology,’ draws many 
valid observations, but focuses too one-sidedly, it seems, on Bavinck’s scholastic 
sources. It seems more fruitful to me instead to pay attention to Bavinck’s organic 
worldview first, and, taking that into account, then interpreting particular portions of his 
text – focusing on how he uses his sources more closely. In doing this, the eclectic 
character of Bavinck’s sources finds a better appreciation.  
93 In reading Bavinck’s use of Thomas in light of the organic, one again notes that 
his use of particular thinkers is not a systematic endorsement of them. Rather, Bavinck 
negotiates and uses thinkers from both classical and modern eras quite eclectically. This 
does, however, put Bavinck closer to Kuyper, who in Klapwijk’s summary, too, adopts 
themes from von Hartmann while arguing that subjects and objects fit because of the 
organic character of creation: ‘How does one account for this “fit” [between subjective 
representation and external object]? ‘Kuyper’s romantically tinted answer is that our 
world is like a living organism. Everything in it is organically connected with everything 
else in it’. Jacob Klapwijk, ‘Abraham Kuyper on Science, Theology, and University’, in 
On Kuyper: A Collection of Readings on the Life, Work, and Legacy of Abraham Kuyper, eds. 
Steve Bishop & John H. Kok (Sioux Center: Dordt College Press, 2013), p. 228. 
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masterpiece of divine art, in which all the parts are organically interconnected. And of 
that world, in all its dimensions, the counsel of God is the eternal design.’94 The decree 
of God is the basis of creation’s specific shape. If the Triune being of God implies a 
cosmology of organism ad extra, the decree is one specific means by which that organic 
shape comes to expression. This point also harkens readers back to Bavinck’s comment 
in Christelijke wereldbeschouwing concerning the Christian doctrine of creation: ‘the teaching 
of the creation of all things through the Word of God is the explanation of all knowing 
and knowledge, the presupposition of the correspondence between subject and 
object.’95  
 Further, Bavinck affirms the on-going work of the Logos in actively sustaining 
the subject-object relation. The revelatory work of the Logos that organically connects 
subject and object is indispensable.96 The Logos works with and through reason, 
enlightening it and guiding it in its attempts to apprehend the world, and is also the one 
who independently produces the contents into the creature’s mind. In doing so, the 
Logos further ensures that the ideal representation in the mind is a faithful rendering of 
the world outside. This work is constant and dynamic, sustaining the epistemological 
situation and ensuring its relative stability and reliability. 
 From the preceding analyses, one conclusion may be drawn with some 
considerable certainty, and it is that the term ‘critical realism’ can hardly be adequate to 
capture the theological and philosophical depth of Bavinck’s conception of the 
epistemic process. If Bavinck’s work can be called critical realism, it is so only in the 
sense that he accepts that, (1) the mind plays a constructive role with respect to 
knowing, and (2) reality remains reliably communicated in perception. The term is at 
once too broad to apply only to Bavinck, and simultaneously too thin to carry the 
weight of Bavinck’s concerns, notwithstanding the equally weighty consideration that 
Bavinck could just as accurately be called an absolute idealist in the way he weaves the 
claim that God is an absolute through whom subject and object are reconciled as a pair 
																																																						
94 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 392.  
95 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 28. Dutch original: ‘De leer van de 
schepping aller dingen door het Woord Gods is de verklaring van alle kennen en weten, 
de onderstelling van de correspondantie tusschen subject en object.’ 
96 Bavinck, RD, 1: p. 231. The sense of the possible, here, I take to be both 
metaphysical and epistemological. Only when one believes (epistemologically) in the 
work of Logos can one be warranted to believe that science is possible. Also, only 
because the Logos is actively working is science metaphysically possible.  
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in relation.97 With Bavinck’s understanding of how an organic ontology and 
epistemology involves certain claims about revelation, creation, providence, and God as 
a personal Absolute, perhaps new terminology is required. I suggest, therefore, that 
terms such as ‘Reformed-organic-realism’ or, simply, an ‘organic epistemology’, however 
less familiar, seem preferable.    
 
III. Holism and Three Implications: A (Modified) Christian Internalism, the Question of 
Subjectivism, and 19th Century Philosophical Discourse – Toward a Development 
 
This chapter builds on the previous chapter in articulating how Bavinck specifically 
applies the organic motif to connect subject and object, a philosophical problem 
discussed widely in Bavinck’s day and an issue at the heart of Bavinck’s understanding 
of knowledge as a relation between thought and reality. The chapter thus explored how 
Bavinck connects mental representations and the reality they represent, and showed that 
Bavinck critically appropriated Eduard von Hartmann’s epistemology in situating 
himself between naïve realism and subjective idealism, even deploying von Hartmann’s 
arguments against subjective idealism and appealing to an absolute, a common source 
from which subject and object originate. We then linked those themes with Bavinck’s 
application of the organic motif: subject and object are connected precisely because they 
partake in a creation comprised of unities and diversities, and as such are in 
correspondence both by virtue of their constitution and the Logos who sustains the 
links between them. This created reality is reflective of an eternal decree that is itself 
grounded in the triune God’s wisdom.  
Before moving on to the next chapter, I suggest that three implications arise from 
the preceding analysis.  
First, the fact that Bavinck went further than the simple insistence on the reliability 
of our cognitive and perceptive faculties in apprehending reality suggests that an 
externalist account of epistemic justification cannot do full justice to Bavinck’s thinking 
here. Neither, as we saw, was Bavinck satisfied with a thin theological or metaphysical 
account of how knowledge takes place. Bavinck appeals to an absolute, a decree, divine 
																																																						
97 I am indebted to George Harinck for this suggestion in his response to a 
presentation I delivered at Kampen Theological University on the basis of the present 
chapter, namely that Bavinck is identifiable as an absolute idealist as much as he could 
be described in critically realistic terms.   
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wisdom, and an organic ontology to ground his  insistence that seemingly 
heterogeneous realities like mental representations and physical objects can correspond. 
This grounding points to a kind of internalism in Bavinck’s thought, suggesting that 
without them, knowledge might be rendered illusory. It seems that Bavinck is arguing 
that we have to possess cognitive access to these rich theological insights to ground the 
knowing situation. Bavinck also says this explicitly; at the outset of his first chapter in 
Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, he asks a question that situates that chapter’s argument:  
 
The fact stands fixed, that we all, of ourselves, and without compulsion, accept the 
existence of a world outside us, that we, through perception and thinking, seek to 
make it our mental possession, and that we, in thus acting, obtain a clear and reliable 
knowledge of its meaning. But on what grounds does the belief in a reality of a 
being that is independent of our consciousness rest? And what guarantee is there 
that our consciousness, enriching itself by observing and thinking, corresponds to 
the world of being?98  
 
A few comments on this passage seem appropriate. Bavinck again signals his 
agreement with the naïve realistic assumption that our mental faculties without 
compulsion and prior to all argumentation can understand reality. We can take this as an 
assumption, both because we already do in our daily, ordinary living and the denial of 
this starting point leads to solipsism or skepticism. But Bavinck does not leave it at that. 
He asks further, on what grounds can we believe that this is the case? Why is reality 
constituted in such a way that human beings can ordinarily take their understanding of 
the outside world in a basic, primordial fashion? He wants to probe deeper into the 
rationale underneath these commonsensical phenomena, and it is precisely this probing 
that leads him to the rich painting of an organic worldview and ontology that we have 
observed him doing above. Without that ground, without these reasons that are rooted 
in the organic, the intellectual mind is rightly unsatisfied.  
But how do these two claims – that we can ordinarily take for granted the reliability 
of our reception of reality, and that we need to provide some justificatory grounds for 
																																																						
98 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, p. 15. Dutch original: ‘Het feit staat vast, 
dat wij allen vanzelf en zonder dwang het bestaan van eene wereld buiten ons 
aannemen, dat wij ze door waarneming en denken tot ons geestelijk eigendom zoeken te 
maken, en dat wij, alzoo handelende, eene zuivere en betrouwbare kennis van haar 
meenen to verkrijgen. Maar op welke gronden rust het geloof aan de realiteit van een 
van ons bewustzijn onafhankelijk zijn, en wat waarborg is er, dat ons bewustzijn, door 
waarneming en denken zich verrijkende, aan de wereld van het zijn beantwoordt?’ 
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precisely that reliability – go together? Reality, Bavinck often reminds us, must come 
before philosophizing. Must every person then appeal to the organic for their belief in 
the reliability of their cognitive faculties to be epistemologically justified, for them not to 
flout their epistemic duties? I suggest here that Bavinck’s internalism should be read not 
as a universal imperative, but rather as situated within his task as a Christian theologian 
seeking to work out the particularities of that worldview and the resources that 
Christianity can provide in answer to philosophical questions. In other words, I am 
arguing here that Bavinck thinks that Christians specifically should provide a thick 
theological account in answer to philosophical questions, among which the 
correspondence between thought and reality is paramount. In this way of picturing it, 
Bavinck’s constructive organic outlook and his demand that we account for the 
reliability of our beliefs reflects primarily not a universal deontological account of 
justification but of a specifically Christian responsibility. Christians, that is, are not to be 
satisfied with leaving deeper questions of bases and grounds unexplored. Revelation, 
after all, is the ‘presupposition, the foundation, the secret’ of all that exists, and thus the 
‘deeper’ Christians investigate the more clearly they come into an encounter with the 
God behind all things.99 In this manner Christians, in Bavinck’s view, ought not be 
afraid to engage in the serious intellectual questions that occupy the modern world, for 
they have an obligation and a surety that undergirds their intellectual inquiries.  
Read in this light, the oft-quoted statement in the second volume of the Dogmatics 
concerning the Christian mind takes on a new significance:  
 
The thinking mind situates the doctrine of the Trinity squarely amid the full-orbed 
life of nature and humanity. A Christian’s confession is not an island in the ocean 
but a high mountaintop from which the whole creation can be surveyed. And it is 
the task of Christian theologians to present clearly the connectedness of God’s 
revelation with, and its significance for, all of life. The Christian mind remains 
unsatisfied until all of existence is referred back to the triune God, and until the 
confession of God’s Trinity functions at the center of our thought and life.100 
 
 Consonant with Bavinck’s concerns in the Philosophy of Revelation and his 
understanding of the organic structure of the sciences as observed earlier, Bavinck’s 
holism inclines him toward the relating of every area of knowledge to each other. With 
God and knowledge of God as the center of Christian thought, the organic motif in 
																																																						
99 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 27.  
100 Bavinck, RD, 2: p. 330.  
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Bavinck’s epistemology is simply another way of articulating how that is so. Bavinck’s 
desire to ground subject-object correspondence and the ordinary reliability of 
perception and cognition in the organic is thus an application of this programmatic 
desire. There is a functional Christian internalism in Bavinck’s thinking. It is internalism 
in the sense that Bavinck argues that Christians ought to have cognitive access or 
awareness of how the Trinity (and the organic worldview it implies) can provide the 
grounds for philosophical questions. It is Christian in the sense that for Bavinck it is not 
a universal or naturalized imperative that every person must follow in order to be 
justified in one’s beliefs, but rather that Christians have as much a moral and theological 
obligation to fulfill this epistemic duty before the God they confess.  
 The second implication revisits some of the claims observed above concerning 
the premium that Bavinck seems to place on consciousness and the subject. Recall now 
the questions raised by Henk van den Belt and Cornelis van der Kooi:  
 
[Bavinck’s] epistemology is dominated by the correspondence between object 
and subject on three levels: the level of science, the level of general revelation, 
and the level of special revelation. This tension leads to the theological question 
whether Bavinck was able to avoid subjectivism.101 
 
Bavinck cooperates in the turning toward the subject, and thereby (probably 
more than he likes) pays tribute to the anthropocentricism of modernity… his 
focus is strongly directed to the religious subject to whose mind’s eye the things 
of revelation must appear if he or she wants to find them worthy or true.102 
 
 As we have seen, just as the interpretations of Bavinck that put him squarely in 
line with Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology bear some truth, there is much in 
Bavinck’s discussions that lends him toward the readings offered by van den Belt and 
van der Kooi. Bavinck does place a heavy weight on the role that consciousness plays, 
																																																						
101 Henk van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 294.  
102 Cornelis van der Kooi, ‘The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit, 
Especially in H. Bavinck’, Journal of Reformed Theology 2 (2008): pp. 107-8. It is worth 
mentioning that while van der Kooi appeals to the Spirit and the Church to remedy 
Bavinck’s purportedly subjectivist tendencies, Henk van den Belt argues that Bavinck 
may already have a sufficient emphasis on the Church to limit his subjectivism in The 
Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology, pp. 297-8.   
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and the subject is constructively involved in every epistemic act.103 In comparison to the 
strong emphasis on the subject by the Romantics and the ethical theologians, Bavinck 
stresses the importance of the object in conditioning our reception of it. In comparison 
to classical epistemology, it is also observed, Bavinck affirms the constitutive role of 
mental representations in forming knowledge of objects.  
 Rather than seeking to figure out whether Bavinck prioritizes the subject or the 
object, the organic motif and the preceding analysis have shown that Bavinck treats 
subject and object in equipoise. The failure of one-sided rationalism or empiricism is 
precisely in the way in which the former seeks to purchase knowledge a priori that 
neglects sense experience while the latter does not do justice to the concepts and 
representations that the subject inevitably brings. In both cases the harmony between 
subject and object is broken.104 What Christianity provides in this case is a more 
balanced and equalizing perspective that treats subject and object as equally important, 
freeing the epistemologist to go back and forth between the two without fear that one 
or the other would disappear from the picture. The question of whether Bavinck falls 
into subjectivism thus loses its force because Bavinck has never intended to begin there 
as a sole starting point. The Christian worldview, as rendered by Bavinck, does not 
allow this move, and it provides a step toward going beyond picturing the subject and 
object as a binary.  
 Thirdly, what emerges in the preceding chapters is a reading of Bavinck that 
characterizes him firmly as a 19th century theologian who worked with the conceptual 
and philosophical tools prevalent in his day. He took for granted certain trends, patterns 
of reasoning, and grammars that are particular to the century within which he wrote, 
even while he sought to speak into that scene through his orthodox Reformed tradition. 
The organic motif is invoked to answer those specific questions. The next chapter will 
further probe into the ways in which the organic motif is used by him to relate the 
various functions within the faculty of knowing. 
																																																						
103 It should be noted that the discussion in the preceding chapter focused on 
Bavinck’s understanding of general epistemology. That is, we have discussed revelation 
and the organic in order to relate it to how Bavinck thinks we come to know objects in 
general. It has not been the purpose of this study to discuss primarily how Bavinck 
knows God or Scripture to be trustworthy, which would bring us into discussions of 
prolegomena proper and natural theology. 
104 Bavinck, Christelijke wereldbeschouwing, pp. 16-7.  
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Chapter 7: Revelation, the Unconscious, Reason and Feeling 
The ego is not an aggregate of parts, not a mass of phenomena of consciousness, afterwards 
grouped together by man under one name. It is a synthesis, which in every man precedes all 
scientific reflection, an organic whole possessing members. It is complex but not compound.1  
 
This way of taking cognizance is of the highest significance… it is not less certain than 
[reasoning and thinking], but exceeds far above them in certainty. But it is indeed less clear 
and conscious, precisely because it is not a knowledge in concepts, and is not the fruit of 
deliberate reflection and reasoning.2 
 
The previous chapter argued that Bavinck’s organic ontology and retrieval of 
absolute idealism allows him to connect subjects and objects, representation and reality, 
knowledge of self and God. The mistake of idealism consists in its failure to 
acknowledge the primordial character of our knowledge of the world, given through 
representations and immediately granted in self-consciousness. It hems itself into a 
sphere of representations in the mistaken attempt to infer the epistemic accessibility of 
the external world from internal representations, only to miss the inherently 
‘representational’ character of those representations. The reason these representations 
correctly represent and mediate reality to us is because the revelation of the world and 
God are direct and immediate, taking place in the locus of consciousness and within an 
organically unified creation.  
The organic motif goes further, however, in that it serves to account for 
Bavinck’s emphasis on the role of the unconscious life in human creatures. This chapter 
probes more deeply into the structures of Bavinck’s account of the relationship between 
revelation and reason (and thinking), and connects what he wrote in the Stone lectures 
to the discussion of revelation and the knowledge of God in the second volume of his 
Dogmatics. I shall argue that Bavinck’s treatment of revelation as prior to cognition and 
thinking in the Stone lectures is consistent with his discussion of revelation as prior to 
and the basis of both innate and acquired knowledge in the Dogmatics. The horizontally 
																																																						
1 Herman Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 61. 
2 Herman Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, pp. 57-8. Emphasis mine. Dutch 
original: ‘Deze wijze van kennisneming is van het hoogste belang; zij is onderscheiden 
van en voorafgaande aan die door redeneering en denken; zij is niet minder zeker dan 
deze, maar gaat ze in zekerheid ver te boven. Maar ze is wel minder helder en bewust, 
juist omdat zij geen kennis in begrippen is en geen vrucht van opzettelijk nadenken en 
redeneeren.’ 
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focused direction of the third chapter of his Philosophy of Revelation, which concerns the 
relationship between revelation and knowledge of external reality, therefore, 
complements well the vertical and theological direction of Bavinck’s discussion in the 
Dogmatics. Organism implies not only that representations connect one with reality, but 
also that the unconscious ways of living and feeling that characterize basic human 
activity cohere well with reality. Here, I incorporate insights from Bavinck’s Foundations 
of Psycholgy (Beginselen der Psychologie) to illuminate his conceptual arsenal. Finally, I observe 
that these points lead to Bavinck’s understanding of feeling not as a distinct faculty of 
the psyche, but rather an act of the knowing faculty. There is an intuitive kind of 
knowing that is akin to feeling – a non-conceptual knowledge. What emerges is a 
distinctly Reformed, neo-Calvinistic, yet romantic account of the doctrine of general 
revelation. 
 After this, the next section moves into an analysis of Bavinck’s discussion of 
key terms and their conceptual location in Bavinck’s thought, thereby indicating that his 
emphases on feeling and the unconscious do not denigrate an equal focus on conscious 
reflection as a mode of knowing. In that section, I shall argue that Bavinck’s use of 
‘representation’ (voorstelling) corresponds with that pre-cognitive, pre-predicative and pre-
conceptual sense in which revelation takes place in consciousness, whereas terms like 
association and conceptualization, for Bavinck, correspond with his understanding of 
innate and acquired knowledge of God. For Bavinck, representations always attend the 
self as he or she exists in the realm of God’s revelation, responding to the ‘impressions 
and intuitions’ (indrukken en beseffen), produced by God’s internal revelation. What the 
creaturely knower does with that revelation in reasoning, cognition, and concept 
formation, correspond to Bavinck’s understanding of innate and acquired knowledge of 
God. Finally, I revisit Bavinck’s discussion of general epistemological principles in his 
Prolegomena, situating what he says about reason as the light of the Logos in humans 
within his broader affirmation of the light of revelation already encountered in the 
unconscious, pre-predicative life of feeling.  
The organic motif enforces two key moves made by Bavinck: he establishes a 
connectedness between the unconscious life and the world, along with a connectedness 
between the unconscious psyche and conscious reasoning in the human self as two loci 
in which revelation takes place.  
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The final section of this chapter argues that Bavinck’s account structurally fuses 
two motifs in Medieval epistemology, represented by Aquinas and Bonaventure, 
between what Lydia Schumacher calls influentia on the one hand, and concursus on the 
other. Then, I note that such a move is rather characteristic of the neo-Calvinist 
tradition of which Bavinck was a part, producing examples from Kuyper, G.C. 
Berkouwer, and Bavinck’s missiologist nephew, Johan H. Bavinck. This chapter thus 
provides an analysis of Bavinck’s understanding of revelation and reason in a manner 
that situates him within the broader discussions in medieval theology, on the one hand, 
and neo-Calvinism, on the other. This further displays the fruits that are generated by an 
organic reading of his theological epistemology consistent with the chapters that have 
come beforehand.  
  
I. Revelation Causing Primordial Awareness – Innate and Acquired Knowledge 
 
The previous chapter broached on the key role of revelation in Bavinck’s 
thought and its locus in the human consciousness. It discussed Bavinck’s belief that the 
epistemic accessibility of external reality and revelation itself are obtained prior to all 
thinking. Representations connect with reality in an immediate and temporally direct 
way. As Bavinck wrote: 
 
In self-consciousness, therefore, we have to deal not with a mere phenomenon, 
but with a noumenon, with a reality that is immediately given to us, antecedently 
to all reasoning and inference. Self-consciousness is the unity of real and ideal 
being; the self is here consciousness, not scientific knowledge, but experience, 
conviction, consciousness of self as a reality. In self-consciousness our own 
being is revealed to us, directly, immediately, before all thinking and 
independently of all willing.3  
 
 This primordial contact, or illumination, not only with the self, but also with the 
world in the locus of consciousness, he would go on to write, is ‘the foundation of all 
knowledge and activity’, the denial of which commits oneself to making ‘not merely a 
logical but also an ethical sin’.4 Following Augustine, Bavinck argued that it is in the 
inner life that the ‘seeds and germs of all knowledge and science and art’ are to be 
																																																						
3 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 61-2. Emphases original.  
4 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 62.  
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found.5 To account for this, Bavinck appealed to revelation, which is the reason, the 
ground, the cause for the primordial contact that human creatures have with reality, 
precisely because both partake in God’s organic creation. Not only so, this revelation, as 
a divine act, takes place apart from creaturely agency, and is in fact entirely independent 
from it: ‘Not evolution, but revelation, is the secret of the mind; in our self-consciousness, 
independently of our co-operation and apart from our will, the reality of our ego and of the world 
is revealed to us. Whosoever here does not believe shall not be established.’6 
 Bavinck’s doctrine of revelation as articulated in the Stone lectures thus takes a 
decidedly Romantic tinge – a pre-cognitive awareness, a feeling, of one’s self as 
dependent on God and world – something akin to what George Pattison calls ‘romantic 
presence’.7 ‘This dependence is brought to our knowledge… We feel ourselves 
dependent on everything around us; we are not alone.’8 This knowledge that is felt, 
rather than inferred, obtains ‘before all reasoning and action’ as creatures ‘exist in a 
definite way, and inseparable therefrom [there is] a consciousness of our being and of its 
specific mode’.9  
When these observations are viewed against the previous chapter’s argument, a 
certain logical ordering in emerges in Bavinck’s account. Revelation, which invokes 
representations in the human consciousness, is the primordial basis of how creatures 
know and inhabit God’s organic creation – and creaturely reasoning in the acts of 
thinking and knowledge formation are derivatives that are contingent on this prior fact of 
revelation and the primordial, pre-cognitive connections that representations have with 
reality. ‘Self-consciousness does not exist apart from the representations, but lives and 
																																																						
5 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 64.  
6 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 69. Emphases mine.  
7 George Pattison, God and Being: An Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), pp. 58-79.  
8 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 66.  
9 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 66. The previous chapter notes Bavinck’s use 
of Schleiermacher; ‘If man is not one with the Eternal in the unity of intuition and 
feeling which is immediate, he remains, in the unity of consciousness which is derived, 
forever apart’. On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, John Oman (trans.) (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 1994), p. 40. See B.A. Gerrish, The Christian Faith: Dogmatics in 
Outline (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2015), pp. 37-43, on Schleiermacher’s 
feeling of dependence as consistent with Calvin’s sense of the divine, ‘an original 
revelation of God’ (43); see also Kevin Hector, Theology Without Metaphysics: God, 
Language, and the Spirit of Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 
77-86. 
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realizes itself in them’.10 To reverse this ordering is to make a mistake typical of 
subjective idealism – that of rendering knowledge of reality contingent upon one’s 
reasoning. Contact with reality, however, obtains independently of creaturely reasoning.  
   
a. Revelation That ‘Precedes’ Innate and Acquired Knowledge  
 
To grasp the concerns that motivate this part of Bavinck’s thought, the discussion 
on innate ideas and innate knowledge in the beginning of his God and Creation is worth 
considering. That Bavinck affirmed a divine revelation that preceded thinking is now 
clear enough, but this articulation should not be confused with the doctrine of innate 
ideas, or even a doctrine of innate knowledge that somehow renders knowledge of God 
wholly derivable on an a priori basis.  
It is noteworthy that Bavinck couches his treatment of the matter in terms of the 
subject-object distinction, and begins with the objective side first.11 Bavinck resolutely 
affirmed that revelation comes from a source extrinsic to creatures, and that this 
revelation provided an indirect exposure of the God revealed. This reason why, Bavinck 
observes, Christian theologians have denied the doctrine of innate ideas is their desire to 
avoid the twin errors of rationalism and mysticism.12 Rationalism makes human knowers 
independent of God’s revelation in nature and Scripture because the innate ideas are 
purportedly sufficient for them to know God and reality, whereas mysticism posits that 
God is known in some direct and unlimited way. So, although Bavinck affirms that 
‘God is indeed the light of human souls’ and that ‘the Logos enlightens every person 
coming into the world’, our knowledge of God is never a knowledge that overcomes the 
intrinsic conditions entailed by the Creator-creature distinction.13 Again, the immediacy 
of which Bavinck speaks in his Stone lectures is not an immediacy of reference (by 
which God is known in his essence in what Bavinck calls a ‘pantheistic’ manner14) – the 
																																																						
10 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, pp. 68-9.  
11 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 70, in which, after treating the objective side of the matter, 
he writes, ‘we have only highlighted one side of the truth. There is another side, one that 
is no less important. It cannot be denied, after all, that for us to see we need both the 
light of the sun (objectively) and our eyes (subjectively).’ 
12 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 68.  
13 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 69.  
14 Bavinck, RD: 2. P. 69.  
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immediacy of which he speaks there is that revelation takes place in consciousness apart 
from human cooperation in thinking and willing.  
Bavinck considers the twin errors of rationalism and mysticism to be a confusion 
between the order of being and the order of knowing. Though God is first in the 
former, he is not so in the latter – one moves from the world to God, in the order of 
knowing, dependent on Scripture and nature. Nevertheless, though Bavinck echoes the 
classical distinction between the orders of being and knowing to describe the objective 
side of the epistemological coin, he places an equally important emphasis on the 
subjective side in this order of knowing. On the subjective side, there is the twofold 
sense that humans have the innate disposition and capacity to receive revelation, and, 
further, the presence of an internal revelation in the human consciousness that is 
distinguishable from the revelation that comes from the created world.  
This capacity with which human beings are equipped to know religious truths 
includes ‘a “seed of religion,” a “sense of divinity,” a “divine instinct,” an “innate 
knowledge” that comports with the eternal truths and laws of thought that are instilled 
in nature.15 What this means, exactly, involves an inclination to believe in God, such that 
belief in God comes spontaneously and naturally to human creatures: 
 
“Implanted knowledge of God” [Cognitio Dei insita] does not mean that all people are 
immediately endowed by God himself with sufficient knowledge so as to be able to 
dispense with revelation… What it does say is that we possess both the capacity 
(aptitude, faculty) and the inclination (habitus, disposition) to arrive at some firm, 
certain, and unfailing knowledge of God. Human beings gain this knowledge in the 
																																																						
15 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 71. The English translation veils Bavinck’s usage of Latin in 
the original text, signaling his appeal to the classical terminology: ‘Bij de religie moet 
men, of men wil of niet, altijd weer tot een semen religionis, een sensus divinitatis, een 
instinctus divinus, eene cognitio insita’. GD: 2, p. 47. Elsewhere, Bavinck demonstrates 
that he is not uncritical about this notion that all human beings know the same laws of 
thought and eternal laws or truths in their conscience. As Bavinck wrote: ‘The content 
of conscience… differs amongst different peoples. And even if the conscience does 
contain something “common” or universal “by nature”… it is very difficult to identify 
which duties are specifically necessary pronouncements of the conscience entailed 
innately and not received from outside… We always know the conscience only 
concretely, as it is historically formed within the family, state, and society, through 
religion, art, and science by all the moral authorities of a people.’ Herman Bavinck, ‘The 
Conscience’, trans. Nelson Kloosterman, The Bavinck Review 6 (2015): p. 122. There is 
thus a distinction between the existence of these laws of nature and morality, and the 
epistemic accessibility of those laws, the latter of which is always culturally 
particularized.  
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normal course of development and environment in which God gave them the gift of 
life. It arises spontaneously and without coercion, without scientific argumentation 
and proof.16 
 
Bavinck is observing that by virtue of being in God’s world and living as God’s 
image bearers, human creatures have a natural capacity and tendency, a disposition, to 
believe naturally in God. These beliefs are formed not on the basis of other beliefs or by 
way of an argument, but are formed immediately.17 There is more, however, to this 
implanted knowledge of God than the mere disposition on the part of humans to 
believe in a Supreme being. The implanted knowledge of God involves not merely the 
faculties of the human psyche, the testimony of nature and history from the outside, but 
also a revelation that has an ‘interior impact’ on consciousness.18 There is, in this sense, 
an ‘innate’ knowledge of God – a knowledge that is not ready made, so to speak, but 
acquired through the sheer power and forcefulness of general divine revelation. In this 
way of expressing things, Bavinck argues that the distinction between innate and 
acquired knowledge is somewhat artificial, and that somehow revelation precedes both 
innate and acquired knowledge: ‘Accordingly, the innate knowledge of God is not 
opposed to the acquired knowledge of God, for, in a broader sense, also the former can 
be called acquired. In fact, God’s revelation precedes both, for God does not leave himself 
without a witness.’19 
																																																						
16 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 71; GD: 2, p. 48.  
17 In passages like these, Bavinck is articulating something like properly basic 
beliefs; ‘ a disposition whose output is immediately formed beliefs about God’. Nicholas 
Wolterstoff, ‘Herman Bavinck – Proto Reformed Epistemologist’, Calvin Theological 
Journal (2010): p. 139. 
18 ‘… the knowledge of God is called “innate” and talk of an innate potency or 
faculty was found unsatisfactory… over against the theory of innate ideas, it expresses 
that humans are not born fully equipped with a ready-made knowledge of God, but 
obtain it mediately, by the interior impact of revelation upon their consciousness.’ 
Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 72.  
19 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 73. Though Wolterstorff cites this passage in his ‘Herman 
Bavinck – Proto Reformed Epistemologist’, p. 139, he makes no notice of this 
statement and focuses instead only on the immediately formed beliefs of which Bavinck 
speaks. Insofar as Wolterstorff and Plantinga focus solely on knowledge as involving 
warranted (or justified) true belief, Bavinck’s articulation of feeling as knowledge 
remains elusive. Indeed, if feeling is an activity of knowing, then Bavinck is open to the 
possibility that knowledge can be had without there being an explicit proposition to be 
believed. Romantic presence is irreducible to propositional belief.  
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In other words, in this rather provocative claim Bavinck is arguing that revelation 
obtains prior to the formation of the beliefs about God that arise from the natural 
dispositions with which creatures are endowed (in both innate and acquired knowledge 
of God). Revelation that comes within and without the human consciousness is the 
primordial basis upon which beliefs about God are naturally formed. ‘With his eternal 
power he exerts revelatory pressure upon humans both from outside and from within’.20 
Bavinck then claims that this revelation creates ‘impressions’ (indrukken) and associates 
revelation as something that occurs prior to, or apart from, active, conscious, cognition 
on the part of the human knower. Bavinck writes:  
 
And humans, having been created in the divine image, were gifted with the capacity 
to receive the impressions [indrukken] of this revelation and thereby to acquire some 
sense and knowledge of the Eternal Being. The innate knowledge of God, the moment 
it becomes cognition and hence not only cognitive ability but also cognitive action, never originated 
apart from the working of God’s revelation from within and without, and is to that extent therefore 
acquired.21  
 
What is suggested here, it seems, is that revelation and the impressions that arise 
from it occur prior to conscious thinking and ‘cognitive action’, in a manner that 
coheres with Bavinck’s claims about revelation in his Philosophy of Revelation. The divine 
light is not an innate idea but rather a revelation that precedes active knowing. A 
paragraph later, Bavinck confirms this reading as he still articulates a modest distinction 
between the innate and acquired knowledge of God – keeping in mind what he has 
already said about how innate knowledge can be considered as a species of acquired 
knowledge:  
 
In both cases it is the same complete revelation of God that introduces the 
knowledge of God into our consciousness. But in the case of the innate knowledge 
of God, that revelation acts upon the human consciousness, creating impressions 
and intuitions [indrukken en beseffen]. In the case of the acquired knowledge of God, 
human beings reflect upon that revelation of God. Their minds go to work, though 
																																																						
20 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 73.  
21 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 73; GD, 2: p. 51. Emphasis mine. Bavinck expresses this 
same thought consistently in his Stone lectures: ‘For revelation always supposes that 
man is able to receive impressions or thoughts or inclinations from another than this 
phenomenal world, and in a way other than that usually employed.’ Philosophy of 
Revelation, p. 218.  
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processes are put in motion, and with clear heads they seek by reasoning and proof 
to rise from the observation of creatures to [the reality of] God.22 
 
In effect, Bavinck claims that revelation occurs prior to conscious thinking. Though 
innate knowledge can be considered a species of acquired knowledge because it emerges 
from this prior revelation as much as acquired knowledge, a distinction remains between 
the two insofar as acquired knowledge per se involves a clearly active and conscious 
mode of reasoning on the part of the human knower. Innate knowledge corresponds 
more closely to the indrukken en beseffen that revelation creates in the human 
consciousness. The Dutch beseffen, translated in the English as intuitions, can also be 
rendered as ‘awareness’, and it seems that the sense of Bavinck’s usage here is that 
revelation can be interpreted as a two-fold sense of primordial awareness that 
corresponds to external and internal revelation. The first, corresponding with objective 
revelation, involves the pervasive impressions that one receives as a dweller in God’s 
world – the thousands of ways in which human beings interact with and respond in an 
embodied way to the world often without being self-conscious of it.23 The second refers 
to the immediate awareness of the insides of one’s psyche, of the thoughts, impressions, 
and stimuli that reside in the internal life of the human soul. Bavinck confirms this as he 
relates the biblical concept of the heart with the inner life of the psyche and Kant’s 
inner sense in his treatment on the unconscious:  
 
[In consciousness, there is] observing, remembering, judging, knowing; but also 
feelings, both sensory and spiritual… Consciousness is knowledge, and awareness, 
“knowing” what goes on inside of me. And second, it is an immediate awareness. It 
is a knowledge obtained not through external sense organs or through deliberate 
research and serious study but directly through immediate experience, through an 
“inner sense’ [inneren Sinn], as Kant called it, in imitation of the sensus interior of 
Augustine and the Scholastics… This immediate awareness, which is part of and is 
produced by certain psychic phenomena, has an attendant character: it is a direct 
and concomitant consciousness.24 
																																																						
22 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 74; GD, 2: p. 52.  
23 See especially Bavinck’s ‘Onbewuste voorstellingen’ (‘Unconscious 
Representations’) in Beginselen der Psychologie, pp. 78-82, in which he writes that the 
unconscious ‘activities of the soul [werkzaamheid der ziel]’ (p. 81) include the myriad of 
mundane activities that humans undergo daily, such as sitting on chairs, walking on 
streets while failing to notice houses, writing and making mistakes, and so on.  
24 Herman Bavinck, ‘The Unconscious’, in John Bolt, ed., Harry Boonstra and 
Gerrit Sheeres, trans., Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand Rapids: Baker 
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The point is clear: God’s revelation is pervasive, within and without the human 
subject, and often apart from emerging into active cognition, attending the myriad of 
ways in which creatures engage in God’s world without attending to it in conscious 
reflection.25 What is important here, however, is this seemingly clean distinction drawn 
by Bavinck between the impressions and intuitions, on the one hand, and the clear and 
acquired knowledge produced by an active mental reflection on those impressions, on 
the other.  
 
b. Organism, the Psyche, and Feeling as Unconscious Knowing 
 
It turns out that Bavinck’s treatment of the knowledge and revelation of God in the 
Reformed Dogmatics corresponds well with his treatment of revelation in his Stone 
lectures. An important role is placed on the unconscious life and the pre-predicative 
character of revelation. Both point to the idea that revelation precedes thinking and 
conscious willing, and both argue that the locus of revelation is in consciousness, in a 
pervasive awareness of God – as impressions and intuitions in the Dogmatics, and as a 
feeling of dependence upon the world and God, a feeling prior to thinking and willing 
in the Stone lectures. Before some further concepts are explored, consider Bavinck’s 
claims in his lecture on revelation and religion in his Philosophy of Revelation, in which he 
argues that the unconscious feelings and activities with which humanity has been 
endowed is precisely the fruit of (1) an organic ontology and epistemology, and (2) 
revelation.  
In this lecture, Bavinck writes that although ‘reason is necessary to guide the ship of 
life, feeling is the stream that propels it. Beneath consciousness there is a world of 
instincts and habits, notions and inclinations, abilities and capacities, which continually 
sets on fire the course of nature. Beneath the head lies the heart, out of which are the 
																																																																																																																																																										
Academic, 2008), p. 176. The gloss for the original German is included in the translation 
cited. 
25 Importantly, Bavinck does not pit one against the other, and argues that human 
knowers should want to think reflectively of this primordial awareness: ‘humans are not 
content with impressions and intuitions in any area of knowledge. Mere consciousness 
of a thing is not enough for them. It is not sufficient for them to know: they want to 
know they know.’ RD: 2, p. 74.  
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issues of life.’26 The two can only go together, Bavinck reasons, just as the facts of 
history, religious feelings and objective revelation in nature and Scripture have to go 
together. Characteristically, Bavinck argues that it is the organic worldview that does 
equal justice to the unconscious life in the depths of human personality and to the 
objective world that surrounds humanity. Psychology, a reflection on the depths of the 
human personality, brings us face to face with metaphysical realities and the God who 
reveals. On this point, Bavinck is worth quoting in full:  
 
In reality, all these phenomena of consciousness, so far from being isolated, exist 
only in intimate mutual relations, and ever spring out of the depths of personality. 
The whole cannot be explained in an atomistic manner by a combination of its 
parts; but on the contrary the parts must be conceived in an organic way by 
unfolding the totality. Behind the particular lies the general, and whole precedes the 
parts. If, for example, we had to lead to see, we should be dead before the task was 
accomplished. But just as the bird knows how to build its nest, so we bring with us 
from our birth all kinds of abilities and capacities. It is the instinctive, organic life 
which in sensations, in thoughts and actions, gives an impulse to us and shows us 
the way. Instinct and capacity, norm and law, precede the life of reflection. Man is not 
sent into the world unarmed, but is equipped in body and soul with rich gifts and 
powers; he receives the talents which he has only to invest and augment them in the 
acts of his earthly life… And thus it becomes manifest that empirical life is rooted in 
an aprioristic datum, which does not come slowly into existence by a mechanical 
development, but is a gift of God’s grace, and a fruit and result of his revelation.27 
 
The instinctive, organic life of sensations that precedes the life of reflection coheres 
with the way reality is given to creatures precisely because God graciously upholds all 
things and continually reveals the world and himself to them. A focus on Bavinck’s 
understanding of reason and the life of the intellect, therefore, should not eclipse his 
emphasis on the revelationally conditioned fact that much of human life is operative 
apart from conscious reflection. ‘[T[he intellect’, he thought, ‘is certainly not total 
consciousness, not even the most important part of it, but only a certain function of 
cognition’.28 Cognitive life involves ‘sensory perception, memory, imagination, 
																																																						
26 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 215.  
27 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 216. Emphases mine.  
28 Herman Bavinck, ‘Primacy of the Intellect and of the Will’, in John Bolt, ed., 
Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres, trans., Essays on Religion, Science, and Society (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), p. 201.  
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conscience, reason, and then also the intellect’, such that it would be a misunderstanding 
of human life if knowing is identified with the intellect.29  
Bavinck’s understanding of the knowing faculty comes in its clearest expression in 
his Beginselen der Psychologie, in which he delineates the basic components that make up 
the knowing faculty (kenvermogen). There, he affirms a proper place for reasoning but 
relativizes it as merely one aspect of the faculty: ‘Understanding and reason [indicate] so 
little of the essence of man and the whole of the content of the faculty of knowing; 
rather they are merely particular activities of the knowing faculty that first began their 
work as the fundamentals of human knowledge that lies broad and deep in the 
unconscious’.30 Reason is not denigrated in this affirmation, although it does provide it 
with a proper function located within a specific context –  bringing order to the 
unconscious representations that reside in the psyche.  
This discussion of reason’s place in the knowing faculty, however, comes after a 
consideration of the place of feeling (gevoel). After summarizing the contemporary 
positions that describe the faculty of feeling (gevoelvermogen), Bavinck argues that one of 
the primary mistakes in the discussion is the location of feeling as a separate, individual, 
faculty that runs alongside other faculties (of knowing and desiring): ‘feeling… taken in 
the subjective sense and as an immediate sensation or consciousness of agreeable or 
unagreeable states, is not a particular faculty, nor can it be.’ Rather, ‘[a]s sensation or 
consciousness [feeling] belongs with all intuitions [beseffen], impressions [indrukken], 
perception, concepts, and so on, to the knowing faculty [kenvermogen].31 Feeling considers 
the same objects of knowledge as the intellect, but knows them in a different mode – 
again, a knowledge prior to thinking and willing. Appealing to Schopenhauer, Bavinck 
makes the significant move in locating feeling as a function of the knowing faculty. In his words:  
  
																																																						
29 Bavinck, ‘Primacy of the Intellect and of the Will’, p. 201.  
30 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 82. Dutch original: ‘Zoo weinig zijn verstand 
en rede het wezen van den mensch en de gansche inhoud van het kenvermogen, dat ze 
daarvan veeleer slechts bijzondere werkzaamheden zijn, die dan eerst hun arbeid 
beginnen, als de fundamenten der menschelijke kennis reeds breed en diep, tot in het 
onbewuste toe, gelegd zijn’ 
31 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 55. ‘Nu is het al terstond duidelijk, dat het 
gevoel, in den eersten, subjectieven zin genomen en als onmiddellijke gewaarwording of 
bewustzijn van aangename of onaangename toestanden omschreven, geen afzonderlijk 
vermogen is, noch kan zijn. Als gewaarwording of bewustzijn behoort het met alle 
beseffen, indrukken, waarnemingen, begrippen enz. tot het kenvermogen’ 
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Through feeling, we indicate, as Schopenhauer rightly said, all immediate and direct 
knowing that precedes thinking and reflection, which is in contrast to knowledge in abstract concepts 
and in the state of reasoning. Just as when something is told, we feel instinctively 
whether [that which is said] is true or untrue. From here it is decisive that feeling in 
this sense is not a special [separated] faculty, but a special activity within the 
knowing faculty.32 
 
This articulation of feeling as an immediate awareness, sensation, or perception, 
however, should not be mistaken to be a cool, detached and reflective contemplation on 
the veracity of particular propositions. It is more akin to the knowledge about our sense 
of touch and of the inner states of the soul. In no uncertain terms, Bavinck argues that 
it is a knowledge grasped apart from active consciousness, and it is here that he specifies 
that feeling indicates an inner certainty because it is a knowledge without concepts, as 
quoted in the very beginning of this chapter: ‘This way of taking cognizance is of the 
highest significance… it is not less certain than [reasoning and thinking], but exceeds far 
above them in certainty. But it is indeed less clear and conscious, precisely because it is not a 
knowledge in concepts, and is not the fruit of deliberate reflection and reasoning’.33 
A few conclusions may be drawn from the above. First, Bavinck’s distinction 
between feeling and knowing is not so much a distinction between irrational emotions 
and deliberative reasoning, but a distinction between two modes of knowing. Feeling, as 
immediate awareness and pre-cognitive knowing, indicates the main mode in which 
creatures live. In daily life creatures do not act on the basis of acting on propositions 
that have been reflected upon beforehand. Human beings live with an embodied 
knowing – they avoid buildings as they walk on the street without thinking about the 
buildings avoided, they can articulate what they feel in their inner life though they also 
know that what they articulate about that life far reduces their experience of it. 
																																																						
32 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 57. Emphasis mine. Dutch original: ‘Door 
het gevoel duiden wij, zooals Schopenhauer terecht zeide, al die onmiddellijke, 
rechtstreeksche, aan alle denken en reflectie voorafgaande kennis aan, welke tegen de 
kennis in abstracte begrippen en redeneeiingen overstaat. Zoodra ons iets verteld wordt, 
voelen wij instinctief, dat het waar of onwaar is. Maar daarmede is dan ook beslist, dat 
het gevoel in dezen zin geen bijzonder vermogen is, maar eene bijzondere 
werkzaamheid van het kenvermogen.’  
33 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 57-8. Emphasis mine. Dutch original: ‘Deze 
wijze van kennisneming is van het hoogste belang; zij is onderscheiden van en 
voorafgaande aan die door redeneering en denken; zij is niet minder zeker dan deze, 
maar gaat ze in zekerheid ver te boven. Maar ze is wel minder helder en bewust, juist 
omdat zij geen kennis in begrippen is en geen vrucht van opzettelijk nadenken en 
redeneeren.’ 
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Secondly, philosophy, reasoning, conscious reflection, are derivative modes of action – 
reasoning takes place in the context of a prior knowledge without concepts, and in fact 
presupposes it. As Kuyper argued, ‘All principles arise from practical life’.34 In being 
derivative, as one shall see, reason is not insignificant. Indeed, reasoning reflects upon 
the meaning, the telos, the reasons, behind human life, and brings order upon the 
impressions of the unconscious life. Indeed, Bavinck’s organic account of the human 
faculties require him to hold feeling and reasoning together without denigrating one or 
the other.  
Finally, the coherence of feeling and conscious reasoning as two modes of knowing, 
and its fit with objective reality, as Bavinck claims in the Stone lectures, are due to 
God’s organic creation and his ongoing act of revelation. Before connecting Bavinck’s 
claims to some broader epistemological moves in the classical tradition and neo-
Calvinism in general, a treatment of his view of reason, as significant yet operative 
within this broader account of knowing, remains necessary.  
 
c. Concept Formation and Reason in the Context of a Primordial Awareness 
 
The role of reason, as indicated briefly above, is to bring order to the unconscious 
impressions that are already present in the psyche. Attending to the soul as the subject 
of conscious and unconscious life, Bavinck argues that representations arise from the 
intuitions and impressions gathered in being in the world.  
 
Representations are not the first and the primary thing in the conscious life of 
the soul. There are also sensations, impressions [indrukken], awareness [beseffen], 
intuitions, instinct, and so on. A representation is actually only the name for the 
product of a sensation or recollection, and cannot include all of the activity of 
consciousness.35  
 
To be sure, he reminds his readers that this activity of consciousness, of the soul, is 
not to be confused with conscious thinking and willing. Representations are worked on 
																																																						
34 Kuyper, ‘Our Instinctive Life’, p. 263.  
35 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 39. Dutch original: ‘Voorstellingen zijn lang 
niet ’t eerste en het een en al in het bewuste leven der ziel. Er zijn ook 
gewaarwordingen, indrukken, beseffen, intuïties, instincten enz. Eene voorstelling is 
eigenlijk alleen de naam voor het product eener waarneming of herinnering, en kan niet 
alle werkzaamheden van het bewustzijn omvatten.’ 
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by ‘the soul’, ‘produced or reproduced, connected or distinguished’, he writes 
‘consciously or unconsciously, with or without her will’.36  
 The sense of Bavinck’s thinking here, it seems, is this: in one’s awareness of 
ordinary objects – the doorknob that is noticed by the hand as distinguished from the 
door that it unlocks, the typewriter and the words that appear on the page as authors 
articulate their thoughts on paper – the unconscious life is always at work, making 
distinctions, producing representations, mental images, of the things encountered. The 
knowing subject can, in a moment of conscious reflection, recollect and connect 
representations together, but in doing this he or she is already working with the activity 
of that unconscious life in producing representations. There is also, again, a certain 
ordering: impressions are the basis on which mental images arise.37 It is being in the 
world, encountering self, world, objects in the world, and ultimately, God and his 
revealing powers, that render this whole process reliable and suitable for ordinary life.  
 The role of reason, then, is to work with these representations and to bring 
about concept formation. In short: ‘thinking is the processing of representations into 
concepts, of judging and determining, of tracing in the world of perception the thoughts 
on which they rest, of the law according to which they are governed’.38 This is stated 
more explicitly in his Stone lectures, where Bavinck demarcates a clear line that 
distinguishes between the unconscious life of representations, on the one hand, and the 
conscious acts of thinking which forms concepts. There, he wrote that ‘between 
perception and intellect, representation and conceptions, association of representations 
and conceptual thinking, there is a fundamental difference’.39 Reasoning, therefore, plays 
a necessary function in the construction of science, and is itself a particularly human 
capacity that distinguishes them from all other creatures. As such, Bavinck could even 
																																																						
36 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 40. Dutch original: ‘Het is de ziel, die ze 
bewust of onbewust, met of zonder haar wil produceert en reproduceert, verbindt of 
scheidt enz.’ 
37 Later on, however, Bavinck makes a finer distinction between sensations 
[gewaarwording] and perception [waarneming]: ‘Gewaarwordingen geven indrukken, 
beseffen, maar waarnemingen verschaffen voorstellingen [Sensations give impressions, 
awareness, but perceptions provide representations] (fantasia, phantasma, species 
sensibilis, apperception, Vorstellung, Anschauung).' Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 75.  
38Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 104. ‘Denken is het verwerken der 
voorstellingen tot begrippen, oordeelen en besluiten, of het opsporen in de 
waarnemingswereld van de gedachte, waarop ze rust, van de wet, waardoor ze 
beheerscht wordt.’ 
39 Bavinck, Philosophy of Revelation, p. 65.		
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claim that in a sense it is a ‘higher activity [hoogere werkzaamheid]’ of the soul, in turning 
representations into concepts.40 Stated succinctly in an Aristotelian fashion, Bavinck 
would  claim that ‘[r]eason is thusly a characteristic of humanity [De rede is daarom een 
kenmerk van den mensch]’.41 When claims like these are situated within Bavinck’s broader 
account of revelation and unconscious knowing, however, it is clear that he is not 
merely repeating a typical medieval account of theological anthropology according to 
which reason is the sole or main distinguishing mark of humanity. Involved, also, are 
the instinctive, intuitive, and relational connectedness that mark the lives of all human 
beings.42 
 Bavinck’s affirmations concerning reason’s role are perhaps most clear toward 
the end of his discussion of general epistemological principles in the Prolegomena. There, 
before concluding the section on the necessity of the Logos to uphold the 
correspondence between subject and object, Bavinck aligns himself closely with Aquinas 
in affirming that reason is the light of the divine in humanity. His words clearly indicate 
that a robust affirmation of reason’s proper place is not eradicated by either his 
emphasis on the prior divine light, or the knowledge attained by feeling.:  
 
God is the light of reason in which, by which, and through which all things that 
shine so as to be intelligible, shine. Thomas repeatedly speaks in the same way and 
uses the same metaphor. Only he points out that this should not be understood 
pantheistically as Averroes, under neoplatonic influence, taught his students to do 
and was later followed in this by Malebranche and the ontologistic school. Says 
Thomas: just as we look into the natural world, not by being in the sun ourselves, 
but by the light of the sun that shines on us, so neither do we see things in the 
divine being but by the light that, originating in God, shines in our own intellect. 
Reason in us is that divine light; it is not itself the divine logos, but it participates in it. 
To be (esse), to live (vivere), and to understand (intelligere) is the prerogative of God in 
respect of his being (per essentiam), ours in respect of participation (per 
participationem).43 
																																																						
40 Bavinck, Beginselen der Pyschologie, p. 98.  
41 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, p. 100.  
42 Bavinck, again, is consistent with Kuyper on this point: ‘Still, we may never 
conclude that the instinctive life alone has value to us, as though reflection could safely 
be neglected if not eliminated. We have always had a different view of the matter, as is 
evident from the founding of the Free University. We have consistently stressed that a 
higher and more certain development of our conscious life calls for reflection, and that 
a political-social-religious group that neglects to arm itself with learning runs the risk of 
degenerating into a merely emotional undertaking’. Kuyper, ‘Our Instinctive Life’, p. 
266.		
43 Bavinck, RD: 1, p. 231. Emphasis mine.  
	 216 
 
To draw this section to a close, a few final comments are appropriate. Bavinck 
affirms that feeling, as an activity of knowing, is a necessary component of human life – 
it provides a knowledge no less clear or significant than the knowledge gained by a 
proper use of reason. Revelation, then, is used by Bavinck in a twofold sense that 
corresponds with his use of both romantic and Thomistic sources. On the one hand, 
Bavinck argues that revelation is a primordial unveiling of reality, an immediate contact 
that always obtains prior to thinking and willing that takes shape as a feeling of absolute 
dependence on God, and thus the context in which all reasoning occurs. The light of 
the Logos precedes all active reasoning and thus all acquired knowledge. Yet, Bavinck 
also affirms that reason is the light of God in us. Reason participates in revelation as 
much as there is a romantic presence of God felt by humanity prior to any conscious 
rational deliberation.  
The organic worldview that Bavinck develops posits a further two-fold account of 
organic connectedness: between the unconscious life of feeling and the world, on the 
one hand, and between the unconscious psyche with conscious reasoning, on the other. 
He sees no reason to pit one against the other, though historically a binary between 
them may have been erected. In a manner that again betrays his eclecticism, Bavinck 
uses both romantic and classical sources. Interpretations of Bavinck’s thinking that 
absolutize one or the other would seem inevitably to eclipse his own creative moves.   
 
II. Between Concursus and Influentia 
 
To substantiate the point above, the next two sections will suggest that 
Bavinck’s moves potentially blend together what Lydia Schumacher calls the distinction 
between concursus and influentia models of illumination (and the work of the Logos). Each 
of these terms correspond to the epistemological affirmations of Bonaventure and 
Aquinas, respectively. That Bavinck wrestles with both thinkers, and does so using and 
critiquing Thomstic tools, has already been shown. My argument, though, is not that 
Bavinck blended Aquinas and Bonaventure self-consciously in this way. Rather, the 
manner in which he meshes their thoughts can be discerned  in the way I am outlining 
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here, especially as the romantic overtones of his thinking are noted.44  In short, for 
Bonaventure divine illumination involves a divine light that is implanted by God in the 
minds of all creatures; the divine light attends the being and acts of creaturely 
intelligence that cannot be shaken away even by the entrance of sin. On this view of 
things, the deliverances of reason can be in conformity to or inconsistent with the divine light 
that is always known and recognized in one’s mind. Reason and illumination are thus 
two distinct things, though the latter is always the context in and from which reason 
operates. Hence reason’s activities are always in concurrence with the presence of the 
divine light (whether accurately or inaccurately). In Aquinas, however, the light in us just 
is the gift of natural reason in God’s creatures – and divine illumination obtains when 
creaturely reason is used in an appropriate way. The divine light is not something that 
always attends creaturely intelligence and something on which it depends, but is the 
result of the deliverances of its proper use, received as gift.  
These concepts will become clearer as one considers Schumacher’s words at 
length. She says this about Bonaventure:  
 
It is [Christ’s] light that supplements or concurs with the human 
cognitive light so that it can truly illumine reality. On account of the inner light 
of Christ, the mind can be directly illumined with the knowledge of God in 
three main ways, namely through an exterior light (lumen exterius); through an 
interior light (lumen interius); and through the superior light (lumen superius).  
Because the mind presupposes the divine Light in all its efforts to 
perceive reality by the light, Bonaventure concludes that “nothing can be 
understood at all unless God immediately illumines the subject of knowledge by 
means of the eternal divine truth.” Despite the fact that God Himself is beyond 
reach, Bonaventure indicates that He is “closer to the mind even than the mind 
is to itself.” Whenever the mind reflects on its powers, it cannot help but reflect 
on God, for His Light shines forth in the mind “in a manner that cannot be 
stopped.” In shining forth by the way of the transcendental concepts, that light 
renders the human subject the adequate foundation for all knowledge of realities 
outside, inside, and above itself.45 
																																																						
44 Bavinck defends Bonaventure from the charge that he advocated a theory of 
innate ideas while suggesting that, as previously noted, Bonaventure’s explicit treatment 
of Scripture as a starting point to the Breviloquium is worthy of emulation. Bavinck, RD: 
2: p. 65, 1: pp. 98-9, respectively.   
45 Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory 
of Knowledge (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), p. 142.  Schumacher’s comments are on 
Bonaventure’s De reduction atrium ad theologiam (Florence: Quaracchi, 1938). As one shall 
see, it is not that the light makes the human subject an adequate foundation for 
knowledge, but that the subject’s conformity to the light, which comes from the outside 
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The emphasis in Bonaventure’s account is one’s radical epistemological dependence on 
Christ’s light, without which scientific inquiry and the pursuit of wisdom are vain, and 
knowledge of reality cannot obtain. On Aquinas’s influentia model, things are quite 
different. For Aquinas ‘an awareness of God as constant as the awareness of the world 
is not always maintained, but was lost at the fall and must therefore be regained’.46 
Moreover, explicitly contrasting Aquinas from Bonaventure, Schumacher writes:  
 
Since Thomas holds that sensible rather than transcendental objects are the 
mind’s first objects, he denies that illumination affords a priori concepts. For 
Aquinas… the divine light is simply the source from which the innate cognitive 
capacity “flows in” to human persons. What comes from above, in other words, 
is not the mind’s ideas themselves but the ability to form ideas on the basis of things 
below. Put differently, the divine light is an intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic 
force… Thomas’ tendency to conflate illumination with the gift of the 
(Aristotelian) agent intellect has been regarded as a fundamentally anti-
Augustinian one.47 
 
On the page before this, she says:  
 
One of the first points Aquinas makes about divine illumination in this part is 
that it is the source of the “natural light” of reason, that is, the ability to engage 
in abstraction or to shed light on the significance of the phantasms that are 
stored in the memory by forming ideas about them.48 
 
To narrow the discussion to matters pertinent to the subject at hand (on the 
nature of the Logos’s work in illumination) one may consider the exegetical differences 
between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the enlightenment of the Logos in John 1:9. For 
Bonaventure, the text teaches that,  
 
																																																																																																																																																										
as a true foundation of knowing, is how one obtains (or ceases to suppress) knowledge. 
On this, Bavinck’s comment on Bonaventure is apt: ‘Hence, though Bonaventure also 
assumes that there are truths we do not obtain by sense perception but by interior 
contemplation and communion with God, even he does not believe in innate ideas in 
the strict sense of the term.’ RD: 2, p. 65.  
46 Schumacher, Divine Illumination, p. 168.  
47 Schumacher, Divine Illumination, p. 176. The burden of Schumacher’s rather 
controversial thesis, of course, is that Aquinas’s influentia model follows Augustine, 
whereas Bonaventure’s marks a departure from the Augustinian tradition. Emphasis 
mine.  
48 Schumacher, Divine Illumination, p. 175.  
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Since our mind itself is changeable, it can see such a truth shining forth 
unchangingly only by means of some light which shines in an absolutely 
unchangeable way; and it is impossible for this light to be a changeable creature. 
Therefore our intellect knows in that Light which enlightens every man coming into this 
world, which is the true Light and the Word who was in the beginning with God (John 
1:9, 1).49  
 
Here, one sees the strong distinction Bonaventure draws between the light of the logos 
and the intellectual faculties of the mind – a distinction between a changeable entity and 
an ever-present unchangeable illumination that is always within the mind. The mind can 
work in conformity with it or against it. This builds on Bonaventure’s comments in the 
first chapter concerning the necessity of grace for the penetration of reason. ‘Since grace 
is the foundation of the rectitude of will and of the penetrating light of reason, we must 
first pray, then live holy lives and thirdly concentrate our attention upon reflections of 
truth.’50 The changeable nature of reason and the corrupting powers of sin make its 
																																																						
49 Bonaventure, ‘The Soul’s Journey into God’ in Ewert Cousins (trans.), 
Bonaventure: The Soul’s Journey into God, The Tree of Life, the Life of St. Francis (Mahwah: 
Paulist Press, 1978), p. 82. Bonaventure argues that the content of divine illumination 
includes knowledge of absolute and eternal being – the standard against which one 
measures all finite beings.  
50 Bonaventure, ‘The Soul’s Journey into God’, p. 63. Bonaventure’s emphasis on 
the divine light as a pre-condition for reason’s proper operation thus is not meant to 
bypass one’s natural cognitive faculties, but rather to undergird it as an epistemological 
principle and empowering it for fruitful use. In this respect, while writing a fine essay, 
Michael Allen does not sufficiently attend to this nuance when he sees an inconsistency 
between Schumacher’s reading of Bonaventure and Webster’s when he implies that in 
Schumacher’s reading creaturely intelligence is bypassed altogether for Bonaventure (see 
Allen, ‘Knowledge of God’, in Michael Allen and Scott Swain [eds.], Christian Dogmatics: 
Reformed Theology for the Church Catholic [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016] p. 24 n. 
54.) Schumacher’s account agrees with Webster, especially when the latter writes 
statements like these: ‘[Bonaventure has] an uncluttered sense that created intelligence is 
flooded by divine light, and by the simple fact that it never occurs to him to think that the 
arts of the mind may be secular… Bonaventure is a positive divine, one for whom the 
mind’s powers are encompassed and accompanied by a gift and light which are not of the 
mind’s invention’; ‘creatures illuminate the world only insofar as their acts are 
themselves illuminated. Only as acts of knowing are bathed in light can they be the 
means of seeing our way around the world or of giving ourselves a truthful picture of it.’ 
John Webster, ‘Regina atrium: Theology and the Humanities,’ in The Domain of the Word: 
Scripture and Theological Reason (London: T&T Clark, 2012), pp. 174 and 176, respectively. 
Emphases mine. Webster, in other words, notices that for Bonaventure there is a 
distinction between the divine light and creaturely reason, which are in concurrence. 
Matters might be disentangled in Allen’s discussion if one attends to Schumacher’s 
distinction between Aquinas and Bonaventure on illumination (namely, that the former 
believes that the divine light just is reason whereas the latter that reason is accompanied 
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conformity to the ever-present light quite difficult. However notice here that an 
obtaining of knowledge does not resemble a shift from ignorance to enlightenment, but 
rather a retrieval (a ceasing to suppress?) of what God has always been revealing. For 
Bonaventure, God does not merely create creatures with the capacity to know. God 
supplies a divine light that always enlightens the mind, despite the moments that the 
mind fails to acknowledge it. God is both the metaphysical and epistemological source 
of knowledge. 
 When Aquinas comments on the same Johannine passage, however, one sees 
the ‘conflation’ that Schumacher notices between the intellect and illumination. This is 
seen in the reply to the third objection in Summa Theologiae I, q. 12, a. 11:  
 
All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because 
by the participation of His light, we know and judge all things; for the light 
of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are 
said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light.51 
 
More explicitly in I, q. 88, a. 3, and commenting on the meaning of John 1: 9, Thomas 
reasons thusly: 
Objection 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is 
the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light which enlighteneth 
every man that cometh into this world" (John 1:9). Therefore God is our first 
and most known object… Response to Objection 2: The axiom, 
"Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so," must be understood of things 
belonging to one and the same order, as explained above (81, 2, ad 3). Other 
things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the 
first known object, but because He is the first cause of our faculty 
of knowledge.52 
																																																																																																																																																										
by divine light), barring the debate on whether either theologian are faithfully following 
Augustine.  
51 Aquinas, ST I, q. 12, a. 11.  
52 Aquinas, ST I, q. 88, a. 3. Thomas’s understanding that God’s existence ‘in a 
general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, in as much as God is man’s 
beatitude’ does not mean that humanity knows ‘absolutely that God exists’. Cf. ST I, q. 
2, a. 1. Thomas’s comment on John 1:9, interpreting God’s enlightening as the gift of 
natural reason, is consistent with his commentary on the Gospel of John: ‘For when the 
Evangelist says, he enlightens every man, this seems to be false, because there are still many 
in darkness in the world. However, if we bear in mind these distinctions and take 
“world” from the standpoint of its creation, and “enlighten” as referring to the light of 
natural reason, the statement of the Evangelist is beyond reproach.’ Thomas Aquinas, 
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As such, though Aquinas clearly affirms the noetic effects of sin, divine 
illumination is accessed by the gift of the light of natural reason, and one participates in 
the divine light to the degree that one uses reason rightly. Further, it is not the case for 
Thomas that the knowledge of God ‘is closer to the mind’ than the mind is to itself 
(contra Bonaventure). Knowledge of God does not attend every act of the creaturely 
intelligence; it is not self-evident.53 Rather, things are known because of God only in the 
sense that he causes one to have faculties of knowing. For Thomas, God is the cause of 
knowledge only in the sense that he is one’s principium essendi – he causes because he 
creates us with rational faculties. One also sees the conflation between what Reformed 
theologians call general revelation with reason in Aquinas’s interpretation of Romans 1: 
19.  On the Sed Contra of Summa Theologiae I, q. 12, a. 12, he writes: ‘It is written (Romans 
1:19), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by 
natural reason, "is manifest in them."’54 In this regard, Matthew Levering’s comments 
concerning the difference between Anselm and Aquinas are apt:  
 
Unlike Anselm, then, Aquinas does not think that the fool is actually, in the 
strict sense, a fool; the fool’s statement is not, as Anselm thinks it to be, logically 
nonsensical. Rather, the fool, due ultimately to the effects of original sin, lacks 
																																																																																																																																																										
Commentary on the Gospel of John, James A. Weisheipl and Fabian R. Larcher (trans.). 
(Albany: Magi, 1980), 1. 129.  
53 This is also one way in which Thomas departs from Anselm’s proposal that 
God’s existence is self-evident within the mind by virtue of illumination. See the 
discussion in Matthew Levering, Proofs of God: Classical Arguments from Tertullian to Barth 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), p. 61. Hence, contra Anselm (and, it seems, 
Bonaventure) who argued that ‘we know truth by knowing God’, Levering notes that 
for Aquinas ‘we need not know God before we can know truth about things, even 
though it is certainly the case that “all our knowledge is caused in us through His 
influence”’. Proofs of God, p. 61. The sense of influentia is explicit in that account. Levering 
is quoting Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, 1. 11.  
54 Compare with Muller’s comment: “Where the Thomistic line of thought 
continues into the Reformation – for example, in the writings of Vermigli, Zanchi, and, 
to a certain extent, Keckermann – it is modified by a more negative assessment of the 
powers of reason and by a sense of diastasis between the ways of God and the ways of 
man that virtually cancels a Thomistic use of the analgia entis in theology.” Post 
Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, Prolegomena to Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2003), p. 65. Cf. Aza Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy: 1625-1750: 
Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 29-
84.  
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the speculative habitus that would enable him to reason to God from contingent 
things.55  
 
The natural light of reason, of course, is in need of the supernatural light for 
humanity to attain salvation, but this natural light remains the primary mode by which 
creatures know in the natural realm.56  
 In sum, for Bonaventure the divine light is entirely the work of God, implanted 
into humanity, that provides the context into and from which humanity reasons. Failure 
to observe this ever-present light is failure to gain wisdom. For Aquinas, the divine 
illumination is through the use of the gift of natural reason, through which one 
participates into the divine light. In Schumacher’s reading, these two options are 
mutually exclusive.57  
 Bavinck’s distinction between two modes of knowing, however, 
reconceptualises the distinction between concursus and influentia. Like Bonaventure, 
Bavinck locates reason within the context of a prior, primordial, knowledge by virtue of 
revelation. Revelation precedes and provides the context for the knowledge that is 
gained by reason. It provides the ‘atmosphere’, both internal and external to the mind, 
in which human beings come to knowledge. This revelation already sheds a pre-
cognitive knowledge for the human knower, and he reasons on that basis, from that 
embodied and lived reality. Hence, this primordial revelation is not in the sense of 
providing transcendental concepts like Bonaventure, but in the provision of a pre-
cognitive knowing that precedes conceptual reasoning. Like Aquinas, however, Bavinck 
also argues in at least one location in the Prolegomena that the faculty of reason in us is 
the light of the Logos, through which one participates in divine truth. The light of the 
Logos in revelation, therefore, both precedes the use of reason and is identified with it. 
By conceiving of revelation as both a pre-cognitive reality (a romantic presence) and 
something accessed by reason, Bavinck provides some resources that bring together the 
structure of concursus and influentia. 
																																																						
55 Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian 
Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 59.  
56 Thomas is clear on natural reason’s insufficiency to lead creatures to eternal 
blessedness; humanity requires a higher, supernatural light and grace. See especially ST 
I-II, q. 57, a. 1; q. 62 a. 3; II-II, q. 2, a. 3.  
57 See also Therese Scarpelli, ‘Bonaventure’s Christocentric Epistemology: Christ’s 
Human Knowledge as the Epitome of Illumination in “De Scientia Christi”’, Franciscan 
Studies 65 (2007), pp. 68-9, which reinforces the same observation.  
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III. On ‘Unconscious Knowledge’ and Primordial Revelation: A Revelational Phenomenology as 
Pre-predicative in Broader neo-Calvinism 
 
 It is interesting that, without carrying the same metaphysical thickness as 
Bonaventure, various neo-Calvinists have expressed general revelation in a manner that 
shares conceptual similarity with the concursus model. In their account, consistent with 
what Bavinck says, general revelation is something primordial, located in consciousness, 
or the heart, in a personal awareness of God that cannot be identified with propositional 
knowledge. It is even more stimulating to see, as I demonstrate below, that Kuyper 
would argue that general implanted knowledge of God is an unconscious knowledge. 
Though neo-Calvinists diverge in their affirmations on the role of reason, what can be 
gathered clearly here is that revelation is a primordial reality within which reason 
functions as a derivative.  
Consider these quotes from two figures before and after Herman Bavinck – his 
colleague Abraham Kuyper and Bavinck’s missiologist nephew, J. H. Bavinck.  On the 
implanted knowledge of God, Kuyper writes this: 
 
Knowledge of God is implanted, infused into man. It is inseparable from his 
nature. He cannot shake it off…The infused knowledge of God is not 
something that man possesses. It radiates from God from moment to moment 
as the steady impression on man’s heart of God’s omnipresent power. God has 
made of man’s heart a mirror. That mirror may be split and broken but it still 
reflects God’s radiance, though not His true image. The human heart, though 
fallen, remains open to knowledge of God. Our philosophers may talk proudly 
of our capacity for knowing God, but the Church speaks of the majestic 
impression of the Lord that bears down on all men.  
Thus, the natural knowledge of God is not acquired through training or study. It 
is infused into all men. That is why all people share in it. It is inseparable from 
human nature and belongs to man as a human being.58 
 
A little later, he writes: 
 
In sum, the natural knowledge of God is created into us and therefore part of 
our nature. It does not radiate from us but is radiating into us. And as a result of 
sin it bears down on us, being far from destroyed… In sensing God’s 
omnipresent power man is entirely passive, as passive as our lungs during 
																																																						
58 Abraham Kuyper, ‘The Natural Knowledge of God’, Harry van Dyke (trans.), 
The Bavinck Review 6 (2015), p. 75. Emphasis mine.  
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breathing, our eyes when touched by light, or our eats at the tremor of sound 
waves. He can neither block nor invite this divine power as it radiates onto him, 
touches him, and causes his heart to tremble. He can neither prevent God’s 
power from being everywhere nor his own being from being touched by it.59 
 
Similarly, J.H. Bavinck wrote this:  
If we wish to use the expression “general revelation” we must not do so in the 
sense that one can logically conclude God’s existence from it. This may be 
possible, but it only leads to a philosophical notion of God as the first cause. 
But that is not the biblical idea of “general revelation”. When the Bible speaks 
of general revelation, it means something quite different. There it has a much 
more personal nature… God’s deity and eternal power are evident; they 
overwhelm man; they strike him suddenly…They creep up on him; they do not 
let go of him, even though man does his best to escape them.60 
																																																						
59 Kuyper, ‘The Natural Knowledge of God’, p. 76.  
60 J.H. Bavinck, The Church Between Temple and Mosque (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 
1966), p. 124. This emphasis of unconscious knowledge located in the psyche rather 
than in reason as the proper way of describing general revelation and its results is shared 
also by two more recent thinkers in the Kuyperian tradition: the Reformed apologist 
Cornelius Van Til and philosopher James K.A. Smith. “....[the] Reformed apologist 
must seek his point of contact with the natural man in that which is beneath the threshold of 
his working consciousness, in the sense of deity that he seeks to suppress.’ Cornelius Van Til, 
The Defense of the Faith, 4th ed., K. Scott Oliphint (ed.), (Philipsburg: Presbyterian & 
Reformed, 2008), p. 120. Emphasis mine. James K. A. Smith argues that knowing 
creation as creation involves inhabiting the world in a pre-cognitive manner, attuning 
oneself to it: ‘What if inhabiting the world as God’s creation requires a similar 
“antepredicative” knowledge of place?’ Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013, p. 53. It may also be fruitful to consider Van Til’s 
critique of Bavinck (more recently re-articulated by Scott Oliphint), as an objection to 
Bavinck’s meshing of influentia with the concursus model. In other words, Van Til and 
Oliphint, it seems, argue that general revelation is solely a primordial and pre-predicative 
revelation, located in the soul (psyche), and therefore distinct from one’s use of reason. 
The light of the Logos illuminates the knower and the basis on which humans use 
reason, rather than to be accessed by reasoning per se. This sheds light on Van Til’s 
claim that ‘Psychologically, there are no atheistic men; epistemologically, every sinner is 
atheistic’. Common Grace and the Gospel , 2nd ed. K. Scott Oliphint (ed.) (Philipsburg: 
Presbyterian & Reformed, 2015), pp. 67-8. Vos’s discussion of the Logos principle, 
culled by Oliphint, articulates precisely this point of concursus. Critics of Van Til’s critique 
have not addressed these remarks in his Common Grace and the Gospel, and have been 
missing this distinction between general revelation as a primordial, relational 
(covenantal) and phenomenological reality, rather than conceiving general revelation just 
as the use of natural reason, and therefore have not yet addressed this issue in a 
maximally generative manner. His critique thus requires further examination in light of 
the organic motif. In other words, I suggest that whereas Bavinck is comfortable in 
affirming concursus and influentia, Van Til rejects influentia as an understanding of the 
Logos’s work in general revelation. Cf. Geerhardus Vos, ‘The Range of the Logos Title 
in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel’ in Redemptive-History and Biblical Interpretation: The 
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The emphases in the above texts by two important neo-Calvinists (especially in 
the language of infusion and in the explicit denials of the use of inferential reasoning) is 
that humanity is ‘passive’ in the reception of divine revelation. There is little to indicate 
that revelation is essentially or primarily accessed through the creation of rational 
faculties through which one gains knowledge of God or by which one participates in 
God’s light. ‘If you are looking for support of your internal sense of the divine and 
awareness of God, then look at our struggle with nature, not our intellectual contemplation of 
it.’61 Rather, revelation is a primal and primordial pressure that humanity cannot evade 
as a work of God. It attends creaturely intelligence in very much the same way as 
Bonaventure’s concursus model of divine illumination. As Paul Vissers observes, J. H. 
Bavinck’s doctoral thesis argued that attention to the human’s psyche reveals that ‘the 
processes of thinking and learning, far from occurring autonomously, are closely tied to 
an intuitive apprehension of given reality. It is precisely the operation of this feeling in 
the process of human reasoning that points to the influence of the human self’.62 
Likewise, rational creatures know God in the very moment that one knows things in 
creation or comes to self-consciousness, in a way that seems to curb Aquinas’s influentia 
model. In this way of conceiving things, Kuyper’s description of natural theology is 
fitting:  
Natural theology has often been portrayed as a process whereby man calmly 
contemplates nature, observing its order, regularity and beauty, and from there 
ascends to a recognition of God’s great power. Nothing is further from the 
truth. For ordinary man, such calm contemplation is an exception. Our constant 
contact with nature directly affects our life, our body, our struggle for survival. 
																																																																																																																																																										
Shoter Writings of Geerhardus Vos, Richard Gaffin (ed.) (Philipsburg: Presbyterian & 
Reformed, 2001), pp. 59-90;  K. Scott Oliphint, ‘Bavinck’s Realism, the Logos Principle, 
and Sola Scriptura’, Westminster Theological Journal 72 (2010), pp. 359-90. John Bolt, 
‘Bavinck’s Use of Wisdom Literature in Systematic Theology’, Scottish Bulletin of 
Evangelical Theology 29 (2011), pp. 4-23; Brian G. Mattson, ‘Van Til on Bavinck: An 
Assessment’, Westminster Theological Journal 70 (2008): pp. 111-27.  
61 Kuyper, ‘The Natural Knowledge of God’, p. 79. Emphasis original. Notice, too 
James K.A. Smith’s juxtaposition between divine revelation and intellectual argument 
for God’s existence: ‘I am skeptical about arguments for the existence of God – I saw 
we know [God’s existence] by means of revelation, which is given to humanity under 
the conditions of our finitude and social dependence’. ‘Echeverria’s Protestant 
Epistemology: A Catholic Response’, Calvin Theological Journal 49 (2014): 288.  
62 Paul Vissers, ‘Introduction’, in The J. H. Bavinck Reader, John Bolt, James Bratt, 
Paul Vissers (eds.), James De Jong (trans.) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), p. 8.  
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Not abstract reflection but restless, painful experience has acquainted us with 
the power of nature.63 
This is not suggest that for these thinkers there exists a necessarily competitive 
relationship between divine and human action, but rather there is here a distinct 
construal of the way in which human reason is understood to function. In these 
contexts, reason is always a response to, and is operative within, the saturation of God’s 
dynamic and ever-present revelation, such that an affirmation of divine revelation does 
not involve the validation of the use of natural reason as some pre-amble to attain 
natural knowledge of God. This brings us to Kuyper’s understanding that there is such a 
thing as unconscious knowledge. The conscious reflection of reason on the infused 
knowledge of God, for Kuyper, is always a second moment:  
Meanwhile, the natural knowledge of God does not remain submerged in our 
unconscious. It is proper to man to try and account for this sense of the 
divine… Man does not become active until he tries to account for those feelings 
and wonders what is causing his heart to tremble – in a word – when he tries to 
become conscious of the sense of the divine that has risen in him.64  
Knowledge of God is ‘submerged’ and a ‘feeling’ located in the ‘heart’ and again 
antecedent to any active use of reasoning. It is on the basis of these observations, 
Kuyper writes, that the church with which he identifies ‘makes a sharp distinction 
between infused knowledge of God and acquired knowledge of God. Only the latter is 
																																																						
63 Kuyper, ‘The Natural Knowledge of God’, p. 78. Kuyper relates this notion of 
revelation to science in that it prevents scholars from presuming that academic inquiry is 
always necessary for human flourishing ‘by means of his revelation’, he argues, humanity 
in every age have ‘rich’ knowledge ‘in their heart, in their soul’ that bears the ‘mark of 
the eternal’. Scholars, then, must begin by being rich in that faith if they are ever to feel 
their heart stir with the holy impulse that drives them to engage in true scholarship’. 
Scholarship: Two Convocation Addresses on University Life, Harry van Dyke (trans.), (Grand 
Rapids, Christian’s Library Press, 2014), p. 9.  
64 Kuyper, ‘The Natural Knowledge of God’, p. 76. At first glance, this might 
seem contrary to Schleiermacher’s account of feeling, as he wrote, in the Christian Faith, 
§3.2., that ‘unconscious states are to be excluded from’ his definition. However, 
Schleiermacher is arguing that feeling cannot include states in which the subject has a 
lack of consciousness, of awareness of oneself as a self (like states of sleeping), whereas 
Kuyper has a broader definition of the unconscious, which includes any state of the 
waking consciousness that is pre-reflective. Kuyper’s unconscious knowledge, that is, is any 
state of knowing that isn’t ‘objective’ knowing – not having a particular object 
consciously in mind. Kuyper’s claim then, be construed as consistent with 
Schleiermacher’s account according to which ‘unmediated self-consciousness… is not a 
notion but is feeling’ (Christian Faith, §3.2).  
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conscious.’65 Acquired knowledge is an elaboration of and dependent on the primal but 
pre-cognitive, pre-predicative, knowledge of God: ‘the natural knowledge of God does 
not remain submerged in our unconscious. It is proper to man to try and account for 
this sense of the divine.’66 In this way, the neo-Calvinistic construal is not amenable to 
the characterization of a twofold truth which identifies general revelation with that 
‘truth about God that can be known by the human mind’s own powers’ and a distinct 
‘truth about God that requires divine revelation to be known’.67 To identify general 
revelation with predicates that require the operations of thinking is to commit a category 
mistake.68 This is not to say that general revelation is not cognizable, but it is to say that 
it is irreducible to the level of cognized knowledge. What is known is cognizable and 
																																																						
65 Kuyper, ‘The Natural Knowledge of God’, p. 77. The language of infused 
knowledge, as distinct from acquired knowledge, of course, stems from earlier 
Reformed theology. Calvin says that the sense of divinity ‘is engraved upon men’s 
minds… naturally inborn in all… the sense of divinity, which [the impious] greatly 
wished to have extinguished, thrives and presently burgeons. From this we conclude 
that it is not a doctrine that must first be learned in school, but one of which each of us is master from 
his mother’s womb and which nature itself permits no one to forget.’ Institutes of the Christian Religion, 
John T. McNeill (ed.), Ford Lewis Battles (trans.), Library of Christian Classics 
(London: SCM, 1961), I. 3. 3. Emphasis mine. It is precisely the immediate language 
that Calvin deploys here that dissatisfies Plantinga. See the discussion in Kevin Diller, 
Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma: How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga Provide a Unified 
Response (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2015), pp. 138-43, on Plantinga’s apparent 
identifying of implanted knowledge of God strictly with innate capacity.  
66 Kuyper, ‘The Natural Knowledge of God’, p. 76. Kuyper, therefore, seems to 
be making room for a category of knowledge that remains unconscious, and also prior 
to the use of explicit reasoning. In this way, his understanding of knowledge is broader 
than that expressed by Michael Allen, as he argues that knowledge is not located 
anywhere other than in ‘human intellectual reasoning’ in ‘Knowledge of God’, p. 26. It 
is worth noting that the categories of ‘unconscious’ to ‘conscious’ knowing, and the 
movement from the former to the latter by the act of attention and cognition is a 
subject of rigorous debate in 19th century European philosophy. Cf. Angus Nicholls and 
Martin Liebschler, ‘Introduction: Thinking the Unconscious’, in Thinking the Unconscious: 
Nineteenth-Century German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1-
25.  
67 Levering, Proofs of God, p. 60.  
68 It seems that this conflation underlies Echeverria’s charge against Bavinck, 
according to which Bavinck is inconsistent to affirm that (1) general revelation renders 
all men without excuse and allows for truths to be known by the pagan world and yet 
(2) Bavinck is reticent to affirm ‘the idea that certain truths about God can be known by 
natural reason’. Eduardo Echeverria, ‘The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology: A 
Catholic Response to Herman Bavinck’, Calvin Theological Journal 45 (2010): p. 95. As we 
have seen, humanity knows God not just by reason, but by this primordial revelation, a 
pre-cognitive, pre-predicative knowledge.  
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susceptible to articulation, but what is known is known long before it is articulated.69 
Kuyper’s claims must not also be construed as if he reckons that the task of scholarship 
in general is reduced to an unconscious knowledge. Though God infuses knowledge of 
himself into the consciousness of his image bearers, the task of scholarship remains the 
searching and finding of the truths that are implanted by the Logos in creation. The 
conscious use of created reason remains fundamental to scholarship and humanity’s 
proper functioning. It is an ‘obligation to investigate the Logos that God has hidden in 
his creation and to bring it to light’.70 
What emerges in this discussion is that neo-Calvinism, broadly speaking, 
generally affirms a positive use of reason within the context of a primordial, romantic, 
construal of general revelation. Various neo-Calvinists may differ on the relationship 
between revelation and reason, or how reason can even be used in a fashion that 
accords with the influentia model. Nonetheless, there seems to be a general trend in the 
tradition to use distinctly Romantic (and phenomenological) language to describe 
general revelation, which distinguishes it quite sharply from natural theology as an 
epistemological response to that revelation by unregenerate or regenerate sinners. 
Provocatively, the early G.C. Berkouwer would characterize objections against Roman 
Catholicism’s view of general revelation as phenomenological, rather than epistemological. 
Despite possessing a few ‘dangerous’ ambiguities, Berkouwer writes that 
phenomenological concerns have an appropriate place.  
It is striking that the objections to natural theology (as a result of causal 
conclusions) are raised chiefly by those who have been strongly influenced by 
phenomenology. That is understandable because phenomenology wanted to direct 
itself, not simply to the fact of reality, from which a causal argument could be 
formed, but to the character and nature of this reality itself. Over against critical 
idealism, all emphasis is put up on the givenness of reality. Upon the basis of this 
givenness, this self-unfolding of reality, they came to combine this reality with God 
																																																						
69 By claiming that it is God who reveals himself, one ‘presupposes that it is not 
humans who, by the natural light of reason, understand and know this revelation of 
God’. Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 74.  Once again, I use the terms pre-cognitive or pre-
predicative rather than pre-propositional to leave open whether knowledge is necessarily 
propositional. For an account of non-propositional knowledge on Kuyperian lines, see 
James K. A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), pp. 47-
50.  
70 Kuyper, Scholarship, p. 10. See also his account of ‘immediate knowledge’ in 
relation to the sciences on pages 31-8.  
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revealing himself in it… In spite of the dangers [that might attend 
phenomenology], we must not forget that the attempt was made to do justice to 
the idea of revelation.71  
 This reading of Bavinck and the survey of neo-Calvinistic expressions on 
general revelation suggest at least three generative conclusions. First, their articulation 
indicates that there is a way to affirm both a radically universal account of general 
revelation that nevertheless eschews a pre-dogmatic model of natural theology. General 
revelation is objective in the sense that it is felt, real, and universally known, but it is 
known in the locus of the psyche – on an unconscious level that reverberates into the 
core of one’s existential being prior to the mind. Propositional articulations and 
epistemological inferences as a result of a reflection on that revelation are a response to 
general revelation, and cannot be identified with it. Sin causes human agents to fail to 
articulate in propositional form that which is delivered in the psyche. For that reason, 
Bavinck holds that it is necessary that ‘God’s revelation in nature’ is reproduced 
explicitly in his word: ‘The natural knowledge of God is incorporated and set forth at 
length in Scripture itself’.72 This opens up a Reformed account of revelation to 
philosophical and epistemological resources that emphasize the personal, holistic and 
existential contours of knowing while suggesting potentially unattended complexities 
concerning the knowledge of God and the noetic effects of sin. Knowledge of God and 
its suppression consist less in inferring erroneous propositions about him and more 
about relationships and dysfunctionality. Suppression and acceptance of the knowledge 
of God look more like a traumatic relationship and reconciliation, and less about 
rendering theological beliefs more precise, though, of course, it often includes this latter 
part. Second, Bavinck specifically provides some inclinations and conceptual resources 
that resist the pitting of feeling against reasoning. While it may first be thought that 
Bavinck’s emphasis on feeling as a part of the knowing faculty pushes him toward an 
entirely pragmatic or romantic philosophical program that sees rationality as second-tier 
																																																						
71 G. C. Berkouwer, General Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), p. 82. 
Emphases original. Later, on page 166, Berkouwer argued thusly on Kuyper: ‘What 
Kuyper calls the natural knowledge of God is quite other than what Rome understands 
by this term. In Rome’s natural theology we have to do with a true knowledge which is 
obtained by the natural light of reason.’ James K.A. Smith also describes revelation as 
described in Romans 1 as a ‘givenness’ suppressed. ‘Questions About the Perception of 
“Christian Truth”: On the Affective Effects of Sin’, New Blackfriars 88 (2007), pp. 585-
93 (especially 592).    
72 Bavinck, RD: 2, p. 74.  
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or even an obfuscation of what is primordially most important, his organic account is 
precisely what resists the binary between an epistemology that prioritizes feelings, on the 
one hand, and pure rationality, on the other. Indeed, he points towards a holistic 
epistemology that engages the whole person, while standing on divine revelation – an 
organic account of revelation that couples both nonconceptual and conceptual means of 
divine revealing, general and special revelation, respectively. Finally, then, these neo-
Calvinist accounts suggest a broad-mindedness in the sense that it is not wholly reliant 
on a correspondist account of knowing that merely connects inner concepts with outer 
reality – an inner/outer model and representationalistic realist mode of knowing. As 
such, the neo-Calvinists perform the philosophical flexibility of Christianity. Christian 
theology is free to adopt philosophical articulations of that theology in an eclectic 
manner, and is thus not dependent upon a single philosophical handmaiden.  
 What the previous three chapters show, then, is that Bavinck utilizes his organic 
motif not simply to organize the structure of knowledge and the relationship between 
theology and the other fields of science. Rather, Bavinck utilizes the motif to address 
particular and specific epistemological problems that arise in his day. The motif is not 
merely a metaphysical principle that organizes the cosmos as a result of the Triune life 
ad intra. For Bavinck it is also a fecund theological resource that informs and reshapes 
the way he thinks Christians should address the intellectual conundrums they face on an 
academic and philosophical level. The chapters show that he does this by taking 
seriously a problem taken for granted in the 19th-20th centuries, especially with respect to 
the connection of subjects and objects. Reconceptualizing absolute idealism, naïve 
realism, and romantic categories, the organic motif is located within a context creatively 
addressed by Bavinck. In this way, too, he shows that the organic motif allows him to 
resist false binaries – between realism and idealism, between rationalism and mere 
emotionalism. His is a theologically principled account that grounds a non-erratic 
eclecticism.  
 What emerges throughout this study thus far is an unfolding of the organic 
motif within the locus of his theological epistemology. Situated within his understanding 
that creation is marked by unities-and-diversities because God is an archetypal one-and-
three, Bavinck understands the structure of knowledge in a knower’s consciousness as a 
single organism in which there is a unity-in-diversity reflective of creation’s organic 
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shape. Christ and the doctrines of faith provide the centre which undergird the diversity. 
On a broader level, it is the doctrines of the Logos, revelation, creation, and providence 
that provides the grounds on which it can be claimed that subjects and objects 
correspond with each other, as each participate in a larger organic whole as parts in a 
creation conceived of as a single organism. Wrestling with the philosophical trends of 
the unconscious, the romantic emphases on the instinctive and the importance of 
feeling, Bavinck would deploy resources in both classical and contemporary milieus on 
theological and organic grounds. With these observations set in place, then, it is 































 This thesis has argued that Bavinck’s organicism shaped his theological 
epistemology. The Trinity is an arctypal unity-in-diversity, and creation reflects its 
creator as an organism filled with unities-in-diversities. The human knower absorbs 
reality by his or her consciousness, and knowledge itself is thus shaped as a single 
organism, and Christian theism provides the grounds for the unity of knowledge. The 
university and the sciences, when properly construed, are divided into specific fields of 
knowing that enjoy relative independence with their own methodological concerns and 
ends, their own principia, and yet the whole is greater than the sum of its parts in that all 
of the fields of knowledge ultimately form a single organism. Specialization can take 
place as part of the organic process of development if the prior unity is never forgotten. 
Unity-in-diversity is not merely the shape of the created cosmos: it is the teleological 
shape, too, of the epistemological reception of that cosmos as worked out in the 
sciences. It is only the entrance of sin that forces us to dissect and cut apart what is 
meant to be a singular organism.  
 In offering this interpretation, Bavinck’s epistemology is situated within the 
Reformed tradition that incorporated both classical and modern sources. As part of his 
self-conscious eclectic approach, he freely deployed Thomistic and post-Kantian 
patterns of reasoning, without capitulating to the temptation to endorse or imitate any 
specific thinker or philosophy wholesale. Past interpretations that characterize Bavinck’s 
epistemology as tethered to a particular ‘-ism’ miss not only his self-consciously eclectic 
approach but also the substantive way with which he uses the organic motif to structure 
his epistemology and the deployment of his sources. This reading thus incorporates the 
many valid insights that have been offered in the secondary literature without 
succumbing to charging Bavinck with inconsistency, as if he felt the need to make a 
choice between his classical, Reformed orthodox position and a creative yet critical use 
of the philosophies prevalent in his day. This study has shown this consistently in 
showcasing how Bavinck uses Thomas’s account of perception and the role of reason 
with respect to philosophy, Eduard von Hartmann’s empiricist absolute idealism, 
Bavinck’s rather romantic approach to the question of whether knowledge can be 
nonconceptual, and the nature of general revelation as being a pre-predicative reality 
that grounds both innate and acquired knowledge. The organic motif was deployed to 
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answer specific epistemological questions, and there is a holism characteristic of 
Bavinck’s theological epistemology that always stands behind the eclectic deployment of 
these patterns of reasoning.  
 This study, then, attempts to put to rest any claims to the effect that there were 
two Bavincks, and, hopefully, answers the charges that he was inconsistent in his 
deployment of classical and modern sources. It calls for a reconfiguring of the current 
discussions around his epistemology: instead of identifying Bavinck with his sources, it 
focuses on how Bavinck uses his sources with the organic motif in place. Such a reading 
displays the basic intended coherence of Bavinck’s epistemology. Indeed, I contend that 
it is precisely his desire to produce coherence and develop orthodoxy from such a wide 
stream of sources that is worthy of emulation.  
Certain questions do continue to arise as a result of Bavinck’s eclecticism: can 
one use such a variety of sources in this way and still remain responsible to the full 
sense of the works of those authors? Does Bavinck’s method produce such mutually 
exclusive contradictions into a forced unity, when no agreement is really there between 
the authors and concepts he deploys? Does Bavinck’s organicism ultimately hold up 
under greater critical scrutiny? Providing positive or negative responses to these 
questions remain a task worth pursuing, but these future studies on Bavinck, whether 
critical or constructive, should proceed in a manner that takes this basic organic 
structure and his intention to produce a coherent consistency as starting points.  
 I hoped, however, to go beyond merely explicating Bavinck’s use of sources and 
the organic structure of his epistemology. This study opens up various avenues for 
further research that relate Bavinck with other philosophers and theologians. It has 
offered a suggestive way in which the romantic view of pre-predicative feeling is similar 
to, yet conceptually different from Thomas Reid’s commonsense realism; it began to 
probe the ways in which Bavinck’s thought can be situated vis-à-vis medieval and broader 
neo-Calvinist epistemologies. It also provided potentially generative arguments about 
how various aspects of realism and non-subjective forms of idealism might overlap, and 
how Bavinck’s holism might be related to the contemporary work of Hubert Dreyfus 
and Charles Taylor. It related Bavinck’s thought to various discussions of analytic 
theology and philosophy as it entered forays that discussed the nature of knowledge, 
warrant, and a Christian form of internalism, while seeking to advance clarity with 
regard to Bavinck’s own claims. This study thus provides an impetus for further studies 
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that not only explicate Bavinck’s epistemology and its sources but its relationship to 
other views on offer in neo-Calvinist, classical, and contemporary epistemology. The 
claims already made here should be taken not as exhaustive but as suggestive ways in 
which Bavinck’s epistemology can be brought to bear in current discussions.  
Finally, and in anticipation of future studies, it should be made clear that my 
aims here are not to suggest that Bavinck’s epistemology offers definitive answers to all 
of the questions, nor am I suggesting that one should look to him as an exhaustive guide 
for all things epistemological. In my attempt to explicate, propel, and relate his 
epistemology to particular issues and questions, I am suggesting not that his content is 
wholly to be accepted but that he provides a modus operandi worth emulating for the 
contemporary theologian in a manner that is sensitive to our own philosophical milieu. 
That is, I suggest that despite Bavinck’s intentions and robustly theological construal of 
the epistemic situation, his account is still firmly situated within the 19th century 
philosophical context. Hence, though studying him provides an exemplary test-case of 
how a Reformed theologian should relate to the broader movements of philosophy and 
epistemology prevalent in one’s own time, it does put into question the present or 
universal applicability of his insights. An example of how this is the case is that his 
acceptance of the constitutive role of mental representations, the couching of 
epistemology as a relation between subject and object, the situating of his thinking on 
the matter between subjective idealism and naïve realism, all assume a basic structure of 
thinking that has been subjected to serious reconsiderations since Bavinck’s day. 
Readers in the 21st century have new philosophical questions to ask and resources from 
which to draw, resources that reject the ‘through which’ structure of Bavinck’s thinking 
and that seek to go beyond the binaries of realism/idealism, and subject/object. Martin 
Westerholm recently puts it into sharp focus as he questions the contemporary 
applicability of Kant’s epistemology and the historically situated character of 
representationalist epistemology, due no less to the influence and significance of 
Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger:  
 
The question of the reality of external objects of experience seemed pressing to 
those who presumed a representationalism in which cognition is understood in 
terms of the correspondence between objects and mental images; yet this 
conception has been marginalized through the critiques of representationalist 
thinking that have marked twentieth-century philosophy. One of the shared 
features of the work of Heidegger and Wittgenstein is the notion that 
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representationalism goes astray precisely because it enables human beings to 
doubt the reality of the external world. Where Kant argues that the scandal of 
philosophy consists in the fact that it has been unable to prove the reality of the 
external world, Heidegger famously suggests that the true scandal is that such a 
proof should be thought necessary at all.73 
 
Put another way, despite the weight of Bavinck’s arguments, his rejection of 
skepticism, subjective idealism, and the confidence with which he purchased the 
intelligibility of external reality, he still did so under the categories of representationalist 
thinking that was largely ubiquitous in 19th century philosophy. This is not to suggest 
that one should ignore Kant and the philosophical discourse produced by the impact of 
his thinking – that is not Westerholm’s argument, and in any case it would be a betrayal 
of Bavinck’s convictions concerning the need to engage with the contemporary 
questions that confront us – but rather, it is to argue that we should take into account 
that Bavinck’s epistemology at this point is a few steps removed from the present 
epistemological scene.  
 This observation generates an impetus to ask whether we can preserve the 
genuine insights provided by Bavinck’s organic epistemology in a manner that takes 
seriously the newer philosophical grammars available in the contemporary context – 
grammar that pushes beyond the binaries that Bavinck took for granted and from which 
the particularities of his epistemology were developed. With the emergence of 
phenomenology, on the one hand, and analytic philosophy, on the other, it is worth 
exploring what it might mean for the theologian to emulate Bavinck’s spirit in bringing 
about the tradition on which one stands with the contemporary philosophical context in 
a critical and creative fashion. Bavinck’s claim that catholicity involves the rethinking of 
one’s tradition and the desire to move it forward in an attempt to labor for the future 
does not, after all, demand that one imitates his theology. Rather, he provides a model 
to follow – and in emulating that model the theologian is required to think within his or 
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